INTRODUCTION

INNOCENCE? ETHICS

Billy suspects his fellow Americans secretly know better, but something in the land is stuck on teenage drama, on extravagant theatrics of ravaged innocence and soothing mud wallows of self-justifying pity.
—Ben Fountain, *Billy Lynn’s Long Halftime Walk*

We can be alive or dead to the sufferings of others—they can be dead or alive to us, depending on how they appear, and whether they appear at all; but only when we understand that what happens there also happens here, and that “here” is already an elsewhere, and necessarily so, that we stand a chance of grasping the difficult and shifting global connections in which we live, which make our lives possible—and sometimes, too often, impossible.
—Judith Butler, “Precarious Life and the Obligations of Cohabitation”

In “Self-Reliance,” that ur-text of American identity, Ralph Waldo Emerson provocatively asks, “why should you keep your head over your shoulder? Why drag around this corpse of your memory…?” Although Emerson himself likely would have objected, US hegemonic culture seems to have taken his exhortation literally. By insisting on a national identity based on ideals rather than on history, mainstream American culture maintains a veneer of future-oriented optimism. The resulting rejection of history understood as something other than an endless march toward progress supports the myth of national innocence. At least from the moment the Puritans personified their relationship to England as that of a child to its mother, Americans have had access to this myth: like children, Americans are “without history”—or at least without the kind of history filled with corpses. American imperialist discourse posits that past struggles and sacrifices have made Americans stronger but have not made them responsible for the damage they have caused under the cover of their idealism. Yet as Howard Zinn reminds us,

[the history of any country, presented as the history of a family, conceals the fierce conflicts of interest (sometimes exploding, often repressed) between conquerors and conquered, masters and slaves, capitalists and
workers, dominators and dominated in race and sex. And in such a world of conflict, a world of victims and executioners, it is the job of thinking people, as Albert Camus suggested, not to be on the side of the executioners. (10)

Especially, we might add, when the executioners are most vehemently protesting their own innocence.

The collection that follows grew out of a desire to understand the trope of innocence as it has accompanied and facilitated US aggression from the Civil War to the present. Although the philosophical debates about innocence as a state or condition are beyond the scope of this project, the concept itself is fascinating in its malleability, its capaciousness, and its apparent usefulness. Marita Sturken, author of *Tourists of History: Memory, Kitsch, and Consumerism from Oklahoma City to Ground Zero*, provides a useful overview of America’s ongoing “investment in the notion of innocence.” As she explains, “American national identity, and the telling of American history, has been fundamentally based on a disavowal of the role played in world politics by the United States not simply as a world power, but as a nation with imperialist policies and aspirations to empire. This disavowal of the United States as an empire has allowed for the nation’s dominant self-image as perennially innocent” (7). For her, the innocence that is repeatedly “lost” is found again each time the aggression of the state abroad or at home sparks a national crisis. Thus, the United States enters successive armed conflicts buoyed by an inflated sense of perpetual innocence that offers each new generation the possibility of a fresh start in its defense of liberty, morality, and justice abroad. This ideal projection is challenged by the repeated occasions in which US political and military practices cannot be reconciled with such idealization—the revelations of torture at Abu Ghraib are only the starkest example from a disastrously long list. After each of those unsettling revelations, the country manages somehow to resurrect its foundational belief in its own radical innocence.

American war literature suggests a complicated relationship between the reveries of national innocence and the trials of history. In the conclusion to *American Exceptionalism in the Age of Globalization: The Specter of Vietnam*, William V. Spanos argues that since the fall of Saigon in 1975, Americans have been obsessed with “the systematic and increasingly nuanced forgetting of the Vietnam War, or, more precisely, the tellingly insistent remembering of the war that was intended to obliterate its singular history from the consciousness of the American cultural memory” (243). Spanos’s argument resonates with Michael Rogin’s claim in “‘Make My Day!’ Spectacle and Amnesia in Imperial
Politics” that “amnesiac representation” succeeds in “[r]esuscitating the center rather than disintegrating it.” According to Rogin, “[a]mnesia disconnects from their objects and severs from memory those intensified, detailed shots of destruction, wholesaled on populations and retailed on body parts.” From that disconnect emerges “[a]n easily forgettable series of surface entertainments—movies, television series, political shows—[which] revolves before the eye.” These spectacular displays favor forgetting by pointing “to an identity that persists over time and that preserves a false center by burying the actual past” and thereby “heals the rift between present and past” (507-509). This healing via “motivated disavowal” (506) allows for the establishment and reinforcement of a reassuring narrative of the past, which justifies the devastation of war in part by insisting on the innocence of its intentions.

From Melville’s poems about the Civil War to the reportage and photographs documenting the experiences of soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan, the texts analyzed here presuppose the pervasive discourse of innocence in American culture traced by Spanos and Rogin. In so doing, they implicitly substantiate Sturken’s claim that “[n]ational innocence must be actively, constantly maintained by narratives that reinscribe it” (7). In these cases, however, the texts themselves apply pressure to the trope of American innocence precisely because that trope contributes to the ubiquitous and constitutive discourse of national identity without which the wars that the texts represent would be unsustainable or possibly even inconceivable. Our contributors discover the texts’ deep concerns with intersecting questions of experience, responsibility, and guilt. Their analyses explore the means by which representations of war can themselves provide sites of resistance, spaces of dissent where the “rift between present and past” is reopened as a reminder of the negative lessons of history in a call for ethical witness. At some point, each text looks over its shoulder and juxtaposes a version of innocence with the corpses of our shared history. The resulting destabilization of identity—national, as well as racial, gender, and class—challenges the efficacy of the trope of innocence as disavowal. The texts complement and sometimes contradict one another in ways that lay bare the complexity of the questions of innocence and responsibility that ripple beneath the surface of US identity as well as the difficulties inherent in the representation of atrocity and trauma in cultural texts.

In “From Battle Fields to Mounts of Stone: The Failed Promise of National Renewal in Herman Melville’s Battle-Pieces and Clarel,” Laura López charts a trajectory in Melville’s poetry that shows an initial—and unusual—optimism. “In the tragedy of the war,” writes López, “the poet
locates a way out of collective self-deception and thus the potential for meaningful maturation—both of the nation and of Melville’s readers” (2). However, by the time he wrote Clarel ten years later during the country’s centennial celebration, Melville’s rhetorical purpose had shifted: instead of thematizing a collective, national maturation process, the poet offers readers the narrative of individual struggle in a hopeless world. According to López, Melville seems to be responding to the public discourse in the postbellum United States that had turned its attention to territorial expansion and capitalist exploitation and discounted the possibility that experience could lead to “a real democratization of society” (13). Instead, experience leads the poem’s protagonist to an “unironic ‘unlearning’” (13), a shedding of illusions that had previously anchored him to a national identity and a shared dream of reconciliation.

Whereas for Melville the loss of innocence after the Civil War led to a kind of national ethical impasse, other writers seized on the project of national reconciliation as an opportunity to codify the individual and social changes that the war had wrought. In “Ellen Glasgow’s The Battle-Ground: The New Woman Emerges from the Ashes of the Civil War,” Constante González Groba demonstrates how Glasgow explores the cultural imperative pressuring women to disavow the experience and knowledge they had gained during the war in exchange for a return to an antebellum identity as vessels of essential femininity. Through the struggles and victories of her young female protagonist in The Battle-Ground, Glasgow ultimately “urged [readers] to reject the evasive idealism of Southern tradition as an indispensable precondition to navigating the uncharted waters of the modern South” (44). González acknowledges Glasgow’s use of sentimental narrative patterns and tropes, but he argues that her trenchant satire of the Old South’s gender roles undercut their conservative thrust. Women who retreat into the idealized world offered by the plantation tradition may be shielded from the harsh realities of the Reconstruction South, but as Glasgow insists, they are infantilized and incapacitated in exchange.

Since the Revolutionary War, people of African descent have fought America’s wars in hopes that their valor and sacrifice would somehow “earn” them recognition of their full humanity on the home front. Almost two hundred years later, Martin Luther King, Jr. agonized that in Vietnam the US government was instead “taking the black young men who had been crippled by society and sending them eight thousand miles away to guarantee liberties in Southeast Asia which they had not found in Southwest Georgia and East Harlem” (“Beyond Vietnam,” paragraph 10). Although Sutton Griggs’s Imperium in Imperio and Ralph Ellison’s
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Invisible Man are not typically considered “war novels,” Carme Manuel and Jochem Riesthuis find in their treatments of the Spanish-American War and the First World War, respectively, further evidence to support King’s denunciation of racist exploitation as a correlate to US militarism.

In “Sutton Griggs’s Imperium in Imperio and the Spanish-American War: The Battle for Black Constitutional Nationalism,” Manuel locates the novel’s intraracial conflict between accommodationist and more radical tendencies within the African American community in the wake of the United States’ first explicitly imperialist war. Whereas Griggs’s attempts to identify a “third way” to avoid the extremes of either position, for Manuel “[t]his claim for a third way does not consist of constructing a utopian, segregated black nation, as many of his readers have believed, but rather of seeking a middle ground which questions black radical nationalist separatist projects and imagines a reattachment to the nation through a shared commitment to the Federal Constitution” (53). Ultimately, with its formal ambiguities and the inclusion in the plot of a “paranoid organization” that leaves both its protagonists dead, Griggs’s novel urges its readers to consider the possibility of “black constitutional nationalism” through a character who has been accused of treason by his African American compatriots.

Such an ambivalent ending seems optimistic compared to the scene analyzed by Jochem Riesthuis in “Innocence and Insanity: The Golden Day Episode of Ralph Ellison’s Invisible Man.” Riesthuis turns our attention to the encounter between the unnamed protagonist and the “short fat man,” a veteran of the First World War and an inmate at the local asylum, and argues that this surreal scene “sets in motion the series of events that push the Invisible Man underground” (133). Here, Riesthuis argues, we see the extent of the protagonist’s “stubborn innocence” even when confronted with evidence of “the central taboos of American history as it relates to African Americans: slavery, interracial sex and sexual fascination, crime, insanity, violence, repressive charity, and the actual history of black World War I soldiers” (121). Inside the Golden Day bar, the veterans transmogrify from decrepit relics into decision-making and message-bearing speakers who are fully aware of the extent to which their history has been silenced. Although the short fat man’s admonitions—and the whores’ high jinx with the white trustee—fail to jolt the protagonist out of his thrall to discourses of racial uplift and meritocracy at the time, the implicit and explicit violence of the episode echoes throughout the rest of the novel as the protagonist trades his innocence for invisibility.

Although both Mercè Cuenca and Michael Podolny analyze literary texts concerned with apparatuses that reduce individual subjects to
anonymity, they come to different conclusions about the consequences—
formal and ideological—of that anonymity. Cuenca situates her reading of
Cold War science fiction as “one of the cultural repositories of a society’s
worst fears” (136). In Fahrenheit 451, Cuenca argues, Ray Bradbury
imagines a future world where innocence—understood as the absence of
history and culture—is enforced, not only through the burning of books
but also through the replacement of knowledge and experience with
consumerist hysteria. The state is clearly the entity manipulating citizens’
desires through appeals to conformity and the avoidance of pain; the
firemen burn books infrequently because, for the most part, the citizens
have voluntarily replaced them with screens. Perhaps paradoxically, when
the protagonist and his allies assert their individual agency by resisting the
state’s ideological and material force, they do so in order to salvage and
preserve the archive of collective experience, seen as the antidote to
vacuous and gullible innocence. Thus, Bradbury implicitly formulates a
notion of subjectivity in which individuals’ lives have authentic meaning
to the extent that they contain the culture of a shared past. If Bradbury,
writing in 1953, offers an unproblematized picture of “culture,” he at least
recognizes that the knowledge contained in the books that are memorized
is itself contradictory and contested. He accounts for the likelihood that
what is remembered will be uncomfortable at best. For Cuenca,
Bradbury’s challenge to the Cold War status quo is both laudable and
prescient as she marks the parallels between Bradbury’s imagined future
and the technocracy of contemporary American culture.

In Podolny’s analysis of James Jones’s The Thin Red Line, the state’s
attempts to appropriate soldiers’ individuality in order to give sanctioned
heroic or strategic meaning to the battles of the South Pacific during the
Second World War are short-circuited by formal and stylistic choices that
reveal a “war machine” at work. Using the concept of the war machine
elaborated by Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari in A Thousand Plateaus,
Podolny traces Jones’s attempts to “create a text that is at once
unflinchingly honest about all the ‘negative’ aspects of warfare without the
kind of judgment that seems inescapable from the position of overarching,
sedentary, retrospective knowledge” (108). In the war machine, Podolny
finds a framework within which the characters’ recognition of their status
as “cogs in a machine,” as mathematical iterations of a nomadic force,
registers neither as tragic dehumanization nor as a sentimental “band of
brothers” community. This reframing of war as prior to and productive of
politics challenges readers to resist positions of self-congratulatory critique
wherein we argue against particular justifications for particular wars rather
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The photographs by Nina Berman and the activism of Cindy Sheehan and Lila Lipscomb also focus our attention on state-sanctioned meanings of war—in this case, the meanings ascribed to dead or wounded soldiers. In “‘Mourn the Dead. Heal the Wounded. End the War.’ The Contribution of Women to Protest Culture during the Iraq War,” Elisabeth Boulot reads their work in the context of Joshua Goldstein’s concern that women anti-war activists ultimately have “a limited impact on the war system because their actions may feminize peace and thus reinforce militarized masculinity” (qtd. in Boulot, 170). Rather than downplay the effects of gender on their politics, the peace activists channel it for emphasis: the primary thrust of their work is to make public the private grief of individual mothers mourning the deaths of individual sons. Though their appeal to the polity is thus sentimental, it mobilizes that sentimentality in order to challenge official state discourses of “noble causes” and “heroic sacrifice.” For Boulot, Nina Berman’s portraits of wounded veterans depend on a similarly jarring irony made evident by the juxtaposition of the portraits with the texts of interviews with the veterans themselves. Berman demonstrates the disconnect between the interpretations of their suffering that the soldiers have accepted (and only in some cases begun to question or reject) and the visual representation of that suffering that has been largely absent from the mainstream media. While the soldiers use the hegemonic concepts of “duty to country” and “pride” to frame their experiences, the pictures themselves bring home the tragic consequences for the men who have embodied those concepts. The real and material bodies captured by the pictures are disfigured, mutilated, scarred—unquestionable signifiers of the national investment in the war and of the individual prices those men had to pay. When the soldier, “the icon of masculine potency, physical prowess, and heroism in American culture, is represented as disfigured, devastated, and pathological because he has encountered the reality behind the myth of American power and must carry that burden in his body” (Bibby, 151), his repetition of the state-sanctioned meanings paradoxically fails to reinforce those meanings; on the contrary, it underlines the uncanny presence of the penetrated body and the state’s own responsibility for the incontestable reality of such pain and loss.

For Lena-Simone Günther, questions of shifting responsibility are central to texts written by veterans and the reporters embedded with their units in Iraq. In “Innocents Abroad? Generation Kill in the Three-Block War,” Günther reads veteran Nathaniel Fick’s memoir One Bullet Away:
The Making of a Marine Officer alongside Evan Wright’s narrative of his own experience as an embedded reporter with Fick’s company, *Generation Kill: Living Dangerously on the Road to Baghdad with the Ultraviolent Marines of Bravo Company*. She first argues for a reexamination of the process of “soldierization” in which military training before deployment ostensibly prepares recruits for the tactical and ethical challenges of asymmetrical warfare as waged in Operation Iraqi Freedom. Although a thorough examination of the role of “Just War Theory” in contemporary American military training is beyond the scope of her project, Günther suggests that the theory’s ethical categories delineating responsibility and innocence are inadequate for those “strategic corporals” and other soldiers who find themselves whipsawed by constantly changing Rules of Engagement and shifting missions. For these combatants, the realities of what Charles Krulack calls the “three-block war” in which soldiers face “the entire spectrum of tactical challenges (…) within the space of three contiguous city blocks” (qtd. in Günther, 164) prove that legal responsibility is not the same as moral responsibility. Both Fick and Wright attempt to explain the difficulty—and necessity—of grappling with that difference.

Cristina Gómez Fernández offers another perspective on Evan Wright’s *Generation Kill* as well as on a set of photographs that—in contrast to those examined by Boulot—have gained traction in the public sphere. In “‘Where Have All the Soldiers Gone?’ Ideological Identification and Ethical Responsibility in Contemporary Images of American Postmodern Wars,” Gómez leverages Jean Baudrillard’s provocative argument in *The Gulf War Did Not Take Place* in order to analyze the photojournalism and embedded reporting that were offered as correctives to the overly technological, almost surreal visual representations of the first Gulf War. Gómez points to examples of what she calls “journalistic reductionism” and argues that ironically the “ideological architecture of war is precisely sustained by a deliberate textual and visual disengagement from its most barbaric and traumatic manifestations” (198). Her conclusions intersect neatly with Podolny’s attention to manifestations of the “war machine” and resonate with Rogin’s arguments mentioned above as she shows how those “journalistic articles that claim to reveal the reality of the battlefield” by foregrounding humanistic details of soldiers’ daily experience, in fact “divert the gaze from the big (‘real’) picture of war: the intricate political and economic motives that historically mark the origin of any episode of authorized violence” (197). By attending not just to the sanctioned representations of the war, but also to the ironized and parodied replicas that circulate in popular culture, Gómez outlines an active and
critical ethical viewership “alert to the interstices of reality and representation” and to the fact that by “focusing on the banal aspects of disconnected human experiences” journalism contributes to our disremembering the reality of the war (197).

In “‘Huge protests continue, protests without alone and against alone’: Situating Juliana Spahr’s Antiwar Poem this connection of everyone with lungs,” Nerys Williams focuses on contemporary poets whose work wrestles with the distancing effects of news media and internet reports of 9/11 and the subsequent war in Iraq. According to Williams, Juliana Spahr, Eliot Weinberger, and Michael Palmer each experiment formally in efforts simultaneously to break the mesmerizing rhetorical and linguistic trance created by twenty-four-hour news cycles and endless bureaucracies and to mobilize poetry as a means of ethical witness. Yet, each poet is attuned to the dangers of the antiwar poem assuming a tone of self-congratulation in which the noncombatant speaker claims a position of innocence cum distance. This creates ethical and artistic dilemmas that for Spahr, especially, are themselves posed as conflicts “between distance and activism, observation and involvement.” Williams argues that Spahr’s work pushes the lyric into a “search for documentation and information” mixing impulses toward intimacy with what Spahr calls “moments of connections with the mass” (224). The resulting poems seek to establish a kind of ecosystem in which the barrage of information and sensory detail is gradually reconfigured as a pattern of connection between daily life and geopolitical events. The aim, according to Williams, is to move readers from a sense of hopelessness in the face of overwhelming information to a political agency born of collectivity.

Víctor Junco looks to poets whose collectivism took them into battle rather than into war resistance. In “‘Say of them, they are no longer young’: The US Left and the Cultural Response to the Spanish Civil War,” Junco reminds us that the disavowal of histories of conflict is not unique to the United States, that in fact, a wave of mid-twentieth-century US literature bore witness to a moment in Spanish history that official state discourse actively encourages its citizens to forget. As Junco explains, any enunciation regarding the Civil War is immediately so contested in Spain that the result is a kind of cultural paralysis; meanwhile, Spaniards confront the fact that most of the representations of the war have been produced outside their borders. Using the poetry of Edwin Rolfe as a touchstone, Junco reads poems and narratives by US writers who drew on their own experiences as members of the International Brigades and/or on their ideological commitments in their depictions of the Republican cause. At least in part because of those ideological commitments—anti-fascist
and socialist or communist—the writers have largely been erased from the
canons of US literature in a gesture of “enforced innocence” that would
have made the firemen in Fahrenheit 451 proud. Junco is conscious of his
own ideological investments and is careful to avoid romanticizing his
subject. He warns that “[d]espite the fact that the legitimate frustration at
the evident call for oblivion emanating from the official discourse since
the end of the Spanish Civil War may sometimes lead us to the danger of
idealization, we must reject the idea that this is an immaculate story”
(100). Still, he wonders whether, with the help of poets like Rolfe,
nostalgia—in opposition to state-sanctioned amnesia—might be reconfigured
as a radical act.

All of our contributors have, at some level, taken issue with the
cultural imperative in the United States to forget the country’s history of
aggression, to take refuge in a belief (however ambivalent) in its own
innocence. In “Amnesia and the Geographies of Innocence and War,”
Stipe Grgas traces that imperative through the history of American Studies
as a discipline. He reminds us that many scholars in the early years of the
discipline actively promoted a narrative of exceptionalism that distracted
attention from the country’s history of near constant warfare. While Grgas
recognizes the important work of revisionist readings produced in recent
scholarship, he warns that we risk echoing an amnesiac paradigm if we
neglect the role of geography in our analyses. From Grgas’s vantage point
in Croatia, America’s geography—not the frontier whose closing Turner
lamented, but the oceans that insulate it from its enemies—matters as
much as its ideology in maintaining hegemony. “Although the discourse of
innocence is clearly an ideological construct,” he argues, “it nevertheless
has a material, geographical foundation which has served to keep the
polity severed from the reality of war” (242).

In addition to the perspectives of academics from seven countries, this
volume includes a coda that asks more directly, “what’s at stake?” We
have invited writers and activists whose work we most respect to weigh in
on the theme of innocence as it has been deployed in the United States as a
cover for military intervention and state-sanctioned aggression. William V.
Spanos, Cary Nelson, David Zeiger, and Cindy Sheehan have provided
less formal meditations on the theme as it has shaped their own thinking
about their experiences, their art, and their politics.

As readers of literary and photographic texts about war, our contributors
contend with the often painful, sometimes ironic, but never disengaged
labor of witness undertaken by the authors of the texts they scrutinize. As
readers of this collection, we in turn have access to their interpretations of
the artists’ representations of certain episodes of the history of US
aggression, both at home and abroad. We thus become, through our contributors, witnesses of the artists’ own act of witnessing. Without forgetting that we have neither experienced the trauma described nor seen it first hand, and without ignoring the mediating effects of language, fiction, or the photographic frame, we as readers of war still find ourselves in a web of witness. That act of witnessing should never come, as the extensive work in trauma studies reminds us, without its share of responsible listening and the adoption of a clear ethical subject position toward the pain of others. As Robert Jay Lifton explains in Cathy Caruth’s *Trauma: Explorations in Memory*,

the witness is crucial to the entire survivor experience. The witness is crucial to start with because it’s at the center of what one very quickly perceives to be one’s responsibility as a survivor. And it’s involved in the transformation from guilt to responsibility (...). But carrying through the witness is a way of transmuting pain and guilt into responsibility, and carrying through that responsibility has enormous therapeutic value. It’s both profoundly valuable to society and therapeutic for the individual survivor. (138)

Psychoanalyst Chaim Shatan goes further in his groundbreaking 1973 essay “The Grief of Soldiers: Vietnam Combat Veterans’ Self-Help Movement” when he argues that the “talking cure” alone is worthless. During veterans’ rap sessions, verbalizing grief and pain allowed the veteran to start “bear[ing] witness to a truth that nonetheless continues to escape him, a truth that is, essentially not available to its own speaker” (Felman and Laub, 15, italics in the original). Crucially, the testimony of the veterans was addressed to others, the witnesses, who in turn would testify to what had been said through them. “Because the witness has said ‘here I am’ before the other” (Levinas, qtd. in Felman and Laub, 3), he has established with the person giving testimony a bond of co-responsibility and emotional support which enables the speaker to tentatively look for the words which will bring order to his memories and help him find meaning in the traumatic experience. That dialogical relationship between the testimony and the witness creates the conditions for healing. In fact, Shatan and his team concluded that in order for testimony to intervene effectively, it must gear those participating in the act of witnessing to “active participation in the public arena, active opposition to the very war policies they helped carry out” (Shatan, 649). For Shatan, the postwar rap group experience was successful because it staged a therapy based on language, verbalization and narration to empower the GIs to enter the “cultural war” over the meaning of the conflict.
The act of testifying and bearing witness is, ultimately, a socially relevant and communal act:

The emergence of the narrative which is being listened to—and heard—is, therefore, the process and the place wherein cognizance, the “knowing” of the event, is given birth to. The listener, therefore, is a party of the creation of knowledge *de nova*. The testimony of trauma thus includes its hearer, who is, so to speak, the blank screen on which the event comes to be inscribed for the first time. By extension the listener to trauma comes to be a participant and a co-owner of the traumatic event: through his very listening, he comes to partially experience trauma in himself.

(Felman and Laub, 57, italics in the original)

Thus, the nature of the bond between testimony and witness is one of shared responsibility, of acknowledging in an ever expanding net of connections that, as Sontag reminds us, “our privileges are located on the same map as their suffering, and may—in ways we might prefer not to imagine—be linked to their suffering” (103-104).

As readers of this volume, we participate, then, in an act of witnessing that is “a particular form of ethical solicitation” (Butler, 3). The cultural texts analyzed in this collection of essays problematize the processes of “motivated forgetting,” the official postwar strategies of silencing needed to restore a sense of national innocence and freedom from guilt (Rogin, 503). They do so by reminding us of our responsibility as readers of the testimonies around which the fictional or documentary worlds in those texts are constructed. For our contributors, the stories and poems and photos ask us to

negotiate questions of proximity and distance. They do implicitly formulate ethical quandaries: Is what is happening so far from me that I can bear no responsibility for it? Is what is happening so close to me that I cannot bear having to take responsibility for it? If I myself did not make this suffering, am I still in some other sense responsible to it? (Butler, 3)

Paul Berlin, the narrator in Tim O’Brien’s *Going After Cacciato*, faces the need to honor his responsibility to the suffering of others and he does so by trying, on the one hand, to answer the questions “Who were these skinny, blank-eyed people? What did they want? (…) what did they long for? Did they have any secret hopes?” On the other, he wants them to see him for what he is:

a scared-silly boy from Iowa [whose] intentions were benign. He was no tyrant, no pig, no Yankee killer. He was innocent. Yes, he was. He was innocent. He would have told them that, the villagers, if he’d known the language, if there had been time to talk. He would have told them he
wanted to harm no one. Not even the enemy. He *had* no enemies. (…)
Guilty perhaps of hanging on, of letting [him]self be dragged along, of falling victim to gravity and obligation and events, but not — not! — guilty of wrong intentions. (248-249, italics in the original)

Berlin acknowledges the humanity of the enemy and clings to his own as he tries desperately to establish a human communication that supersedes the framework of war. The acknowledgement of the enemy’s humanity generates Berlin’s need to disentangle himself from the official justifications of war and ultimately to present himself in all of his human vulnerability. Establishing dialogue with the other as human leads to an ethical relation that makes aggression toward that human being intolerable; the ethical solicitation to which Berlin feels drawn wakes in him what Levinas calls “a fear for all the violence and murder my existing might generate, in spite of its conscious and intentional innocence” (82).

Berlin’s empathy and vulnerability are also that of the witness who, when faced with the pain of others, understands that such pain calls for an ethical response because “we are also bound to one another, in passionate and fearful alliance, often in spite of ourselves, but ultimately for ourselves, for a ‘we’ who is constantly in the making” (Butler, 24). As visual and textual representations of war so often thematize, “being alive to the sufferings of others” is especially complicated when the suffering is inflicted by or on those who fight “on our behalf.” We hope that reading the analyses that follow will help sustain the “we” in Butler’s formulation, a “we” who reject the false promise of perpetual innocence and instead accept the challenges of responsibility.

**Works Cited**


