Topics in Ontology

Course outline

1. Introduction: Theories of Truth

2. Realist Theories of Truth

3. The Notion of Truthmaking

4. Truthmaking and Truthmakers

5. Truthmaker Maximalis

6. Kinds of Truthmakers

7. Metaphysics or Properties

8. Truthmaking and Explanation

9. Truthmaking and Correspondence

Metodology

Teaching presentations, student presentations, discussion

Evaluation

Reading(s) presentation and class discussion: 40%

Short personal essay on one of the topics of the course: 60%

Bibliography

Alston, W. (1996): A Realist Conception of Truth, Cornell University Press.

Armstrong , D.M (1989): Universals, Westview Press.

Armstrong, D.M. (1997): A World of States of Affairs, Cambridge University Press.

Armstrong, D.M. (2003): “Truthmakers for modal truths”, in Lillehammer, H. & Rodríguez-Pereyra, G.

Armstrong, D.M. (2004): Truth and Truthmakers, Cambridge University Press.

Beal, J.C. (2000): “On Truthmakers for Negative Truths”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78, 2, pp. 264-268.

Beebee, H & Dodd, J. (eds.) (2005): Truthmakers, Clarendon Press, Oxford.

Campbell, K. (1990): Abstract Particulars, Blackwell.

Cheyne, C. & Pidgen, C. (2006): “Negative Truth for Positive Facts”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (2), pp. 249-265.

Cox, D. (1997): “The Trouble With Truth-Makers”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 78, pp. 45-62.

Daly, C. (1994): “Tropes”, in Mellor & Oliver.

Daly, C. (2005): “So Where’s the Explanation?”, in Beebee & Dodd.

Devitt, M. (1992): Realism and Truth, Princeton University Press.

Fox, J. (1987): “Truthmaker”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 65, pp. 188–207.

Fumerton, R. (2002): Realism and the Correspondence Theory of Truth, Rowman and Littlefield.Heil, J. (2006): “The Legacy of Linguisticism”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (2), pp. 233-244.

Hofmann, F. (2006): “Truthmaking, Recombination and Facts Ontology”, Philosophical Studies 128, pp. 409-440.

Hornsby, J. (2005): “Truth Without Truthmaking Entities”, in Beebee & Dodd.

Kirkham, R. (1992): Theories of Truth, MIT Press.

Kühnne, W. (2003): Conceptions of Truth, Oxford University Press.

Kukso, B. (2006): “The Reality of Absences”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84, 1, pp. 21-37.

Lewis, D. (2001a): “Forget about the “Correspondence theory of truth” ”, Analysis 61(272), pp. 275–280.

Lewis, D. (2001b): “Truthmaking and Difference-Making”, Noûs 35(4), pp. 602–615.

Lewis, D. (2003): “Things qua Truthmakers”, in Lillehammer & Rodríguez-Pereyra.

Lillehammer, H. & Rodríguez-Pereyra, G. (eds.) (2003): Real Metaphysics, Essays in Honor of D.H. Mellor, Routledge.

López de Sa, Dan (2006): “Disjunctions, Conjunctions and Their Truthmakers”, Unpublished.

Marino, P. (2006): “What Should a Correspondence Theory Be and Do?” Philosophical Studies 127, pp. 415-457.Maurin, A-S. (2002): If Tropes, Synthese Library, Kluwer.

Melia, J. (2005): “Truthmaking without Truthmakers”, in Beebee & Dodd.

Mellor, D.H. & Oliver, A. (eds.) (1997): Properties, Oxford University Press

Molnar, G. (2000): “Truthmakers for Negative Truths”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 78(1), pp. 72–86.

Mulligan, K., Simons, P. and Smith, B. (1984) “Truth-Makers”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 44, pp. 287–321.

Newman, A. (2002): The Correspondence Theory of Truth, Cambridge University Press.

Oliver, A. (1996) “The Metaphysics of Properties”, Mind 105, pp. 1–80.

Read, S. (2000): “Truthmakers and the Disjunction Thesis”, Mind 109, pp. 67-79.

Restall, G. (1996) “Truthmakers, Entailment and Necessity”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 74(2), pp. 331–340.

Rissler, J.D. (2006): “Does Armstrong Need States of Affairs?”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84, 2, pp. 139-209.

Rodríguez-Pereyra, G. (2002): Resemblance Nominalism: A Solution to the Problem of Universals, Oxford University Press.

Rodríguez-Pereyra, G. (2005): “Why Truthmakers?”, in Beebee & Dodd.

Rodríguez-Pereyra, G. (2006a): “Truthmaking, Entailment, and the Conjunction Thesis”, Mind 115, 460, pp. 957-982.

Rodríguez-Pereyra, G. (2006b): “Truthmakers”, Philosophy Compass, 1 (2), pp. 186-200.

Schnieder, B. (2006): “Truth-Making without Truth-Makers”, Synthese 152, pp. 21-46.

Simons, P. (1994): “Particulars in Particular Clothing: Three Trope Theories of Substance”, Philosophy and Phenomenological

Research 54, 3, pp. 553-575.

Vision, G. (2003): “Lest we forget ‘the correspondence theory of truth’”, Analysis, 63.2, pp. 136-142.