Research Seminar in Theoretical Philosophy: The epistemology of perceptual experience
- Academic year
- Department of Philosophy
- Universitat de Barcelona
- Itinerary 1 Theoretical Philosophy
- Module 3. Research Seminar in Theoretical Philosophy
- Mon. Wed. Thu. & Fri. 15-17h. Tue. 12-14h. (Siegel)
- Siegel: 10-12-13-14/1 Room 407. 11/1 Room 411. Fac de Filosofia UB.
"The epistemology of perceptual experience".
*In virtue of which features do perceptual experiences provide rational support for believing their contents?
*What is the epistemic impact of top-down effects by other mental states on perceptual experience? For instance, if you're afraid that there's a gun in the fridge, and when you open the door to check, your fear influences the contents of your experience so that you seem to see a gun, does the impact of your fear on your visual experience reduce the rational support provided by your experience for believing that there's a gun in the fridge?
*When prior mental states (such as prior knowledge or recognitional abilities) enrich the contents of experience, what role do those states
if any play in perceptual justification?
*What is the relationship between perceptual ideals ('good' cases of perception), justification, and knowledge?