Lisa Bortolotti

Univ. Birmingham

Date and Place

Friday 7 March 2008, 16:00-18:00

Seminari de Filosofia (c/Montalegre 6, 4th floor)

Abstract

Philosophers are interested in the phenomenon of thought insertion because it challenges the common assumption that one can ascribe to oneself the thoughts accessed first-personally. Thought insertion has been described as a case in which the subject owns the reported thought but lacks a sense of agency towards it. In this paper I provide an alternative analysis, according to which subjects with thought insertion lack both ownership and authorship of their reported thoughts. I argue that by appealing to a failure of ownership and authorship one can describe more accurately both the phenomenology of thought insertion and its behavioural manifestations. We can also start developing a more psychologically realistic account of the relation between intentionality, rationality and self knowledge in normal and abnormal cognition.

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