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Early intuitions about probability | |||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Early intuitions about probability | |||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Vittorio Girotto University IUAV of Venice
Date and Place 30 de Maig, 12h Sala de Graus, Facultat de Psicologia (UB)
Abstract
Do naïve individuals possess correct probabilistic intuitions?
According to the extensional reasoning hypothesis, naïve individuals
are able to evaluate the probability of an event by considering and
enumerating the various ways in which it can occur (Johnson-Laird et
al., 1999; Girotto & Gonzalez, 2001). One crucial prediction derived
from this hypothesis is that early in their development individuals
should exhibit extensional intuitions about probability. In a series
of recent studies, we have shown that twelve-month-olds have
expectations about future events based on estimations of possibilities
(Teglas et al., 2007), and that five-year-olds have a correct
intuition of posterior probability (Girotto & Gonzalez, 2008). These
results corroborate the extensional reasoning hypothesis and
contravene the evolutionary hypothesis according to which the human
mind is intrinsically unable to deal with single-case probabilities.
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