

Crime and social cohesion in Europe:

Social change and the new problems of western European security

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Security has become a central issue in the citizen's concerns and in the political agendas. There are a lot of examples of a rising social anxiety about security in general. New York and Washington terrorist attacks are just the most recent and dramatic one. Europeans consumers have faced recently serious alimentation crisis. One of the consequences of these situations has been consumer questioning of their safety. Another has been some loss of confidence in authorities. Victims surveys show a considerable fear of crime (Mayhew and van Dick 1997). Social movements express their concern about the deterioration of the natural environment. Alimentary, environmental, military, social exclusion, or criminal risks —among others— inter-links each other and affects large populations (Beck 1992). There are evidences of this at the macro and micro level. Security has three separate dimensions: objective, subjective and tolerable levels of unsafety (Vertzberger 1998). Different people in different circumstances vary in its unsafety perception and tolerance levels. This makes difficult to use universal security definitions or to apply simple standards. It is necessary to learn more about what factors make the difference. This article will address the issue of crime and fear of crime. When European countries subjective levels of insecurity are compared with their crime rates it can observed very different situations and patterns of relationships that can not be explained by simple analytical models.

Public opinion has a certain sense of risk in everyday lives. But security is not a

self-explaining concept. Like for other fundamental dimensions of human life like welfare, health, happiness, it is not easy to give a simple and broadly accepted definition. Security implies and means different things for different people and societies. Despite its difficulties, the concept of “security” give us a broader and better frame to locate our problems, understand society’s demands, and to design suitable answers than the concept of “crime” or even criminal justice. The idea of security has many connotations. It has to do with the idea of a stable and predictable environment, but also with the idea of absence of harm or pain. There is not absolute security since life itself is a risk and death is the bigger uncertainty for human beings.

Theoretical framework and methodology

Social theorists do not agree about the nature and transcendence of risks in contemporary society. Mary Douglas stress that risk is socially constructed. Society identifies threats and risks in order to identify social borders among groups, protect society from “contaminating” influences, or justify things that are not working well (Douglas and Wildavsky 1982; Douglas 1996). In the Foucaultian idea of governability, risk is conceived as the result of public agencies strategies for discipline and punish population and to exercise power. On the contrary, Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens, or Niklas Luckman believe that post-industrial societies face real risks (Beck 1992 and 1994, Giddens 2000, Luckmann 1993). Their argument is that globalisation processes and its industrial, scientific, and technologic development, bring a new type of risks which are more generalised, indiscriminate and threatening than ever before (Beck 1992). These risks are difficult to control and manage, and they challenge institutional legitimacy of democracies (Franklin 1998).

More applied studies show that risk perception, risk taking, risk acceptance or risk preferences are determined by psychological and social factors (Vertzberger 1998). Perception of safety is particularly important because it affects people’s every day decisions, levels of social tolerance, or confidence in political institutions. From this growing body of research studying crime and factors affecting safety perception,

it can be followed that many relevant variables have to do with social cohesion. It can be said that security is mainly a matter of social solidarity and links between people. Social cohesion does not mean social uniformity: On the contrary, it means to protect cultural diversity and personal liberty finding basis for living daily together peacefully. It implies social justice, community involvement, and human solidarity. Many evidences of that have been obtained from the criminological micro level research (Torrente 2001). People who feel alone, or who see themselves excluded feel unsafe. Urban residents feel more insecure partly because life is more anonymous than small towns. People's economic, labour, health problems or other life uncertainties correlates with a sense of unsafety (Veil 2000; Box, Hale and Anderson 1988). Poor people, for example, are more vulnerable because its limited resources to deal with criminal consequences of the attack. It can be also said that people who face some uncertainties can became more easily criminals. Perception of "incivilities" and social disorder cause fear (Newman 1972; Kelling and Coles 1996; Clarke 1992). When people are afraid of being in streets and they left them empty, more crime is committed and more fear appears (Felson 1994). Fear of crime also keeps citizens away from social and political participation. Most of the mentioned variables have to do with social solidarity and social cohesion. But is social cohesion so meaningful at the aggregate level?

The purpose of this article is to explore the relationship between ordinary crime and unsafety feelings and recent changes in social cohesion patterns in western European Union countries. The underlying hypothesis is that globalisation processes and recent social changes in Europe represent important challenges for social integration and for security institutions. The article has a preliminary character searching to rise hypothesis for futher research. It compares social cohesion with crime and unsafety indicators in some European countries. It uses social, cultural, and economic indicators of social cohesion. Criminal data used in this paper are extracted mainly from the International Victims Crime Survey carried out in 2000 (van Kesteren, Mayhew, and Nieuwbeerta 2001). This source is chosen because it allows cross-sectional and longitudinal data comparation. Data about socio-economic European structure are from Eurostat sources (European Commission 2002a) and

public opinion information is from Eurobarometer and other EU studies (European Commission 1996, 2001 and 2002b).

Recent social trends

Despite a process of convergence in economic, institutional or political aspects, European society is a complex space in cultural terms, life styles, socio-economic inequalities, social values, or national identities (European Commission 2002b). **Table 1** shows several indicators of this social and cultural complexity. Most EU countries have post-materialist values (although materialist values are still important among candidate countries) as a consequence of their wealth and economic wellbeing. Post-materialist values stress quality of life, individualism, self-realisation, search for new forms of human solidarity, and tend to question traditional institutions like government, political parties, or the criminal justice systems (Inglehart 2000a y 2000b). Because of these social values, citizens demand more security and, at the same time, they are more critics with traditional security institutions. In addition, these post-materialist values have the effect of diversifying individual life styles. Women economic independence and self-realisation values have consequences also in family models. There is a tendency towards smaller households and more people living alone also because the growing number of elderly people (European Commission 1996). These phenomena have an effect in safety feelings because they increase the isolation of some individuals.

Some European countries have experienced recently an increasing tendency towards an internal deeper cultural diversity. There is a general intensification of migratory movements —mostly from outside the EU— (Coppel et al. 2001). This phenomenon is particularly intense in the Mediterranean countries that, traditionally, had low rates of foreign population, but also is in Denmark or Austria. A great effort is needed to avoid social and cultural exclusion, and to reinforce bonds between new and old Europeans. Another tendency is toward more internal fragmentation of the States. Globalisation also implies a rebirth of localism and, in some cases, of

regional nationalism (Giddens 2000). Some Mediterranean (like Italy and Spain) and Eastern European countries experience strong regional and national identities. Nationalism can be a way of better knowing oneself and have better relationships with others. But it also can be exclusionary. It can also be focus of political conflicts and radical movements. All these forms of plurality and diversity represent a cultural richness for Europe, but they also represent an enormous challenge. It is necessary to find new basis for social cohesion.

A second type of social change that affects unsafety feelings has to do with economic transformation and the uncertainty they produce on people's daily life. The increasing competitiveness in a global economy, pressures for more labour market flexibility, public expenditures reductions, changes in the family structures, or the individualistic values of our post-modern societies makes a normal characteristic of contemporary life some labour; familiar or personal uncertainty (Vail 2000). **Table 2** shows some structural indicators of these changes. Unemployment is a significant problem for some countries. Economic difficulties affect an average of 15% of European population despite the alleviating effect of social benefits (European Commission 2002b). Individualistic values and life style, a growing elderly population, and new family structures reinforce feelings of loneliness and make harder for some people to attend economic or other life problems. The consequence is that population feels more insecure and, at the same time, they demand more security. There is the paradox that contemporary societies convert security in a key prerequisite for a better quality of life but, at the same time, in a strong source of unrest.

The persistence of economic inequalities is reinforced with the relative reductions in welfare structures. The traditional European welfare state faces diverse budgetary and organisational difficulties that lead it into a process of continuous restructuring and goals revision. First, there is a tendency to content public expenditure, particularly social expenditure, because economic –and ideological reasons–. One consequence of this is an increase in economic inequality and poverty. This process leads to more social tension and bigger uncertainty for some socially disadvantaged sectors. Another consequence of public expenditure retailing is that

private and civil sector are increasingly involved in providing and financing social needs, including security. Second, welfare state has to face a rising social diversity by specialised programmes that are more complex to manage. Third, with some exceptions, crime is still regarded as a police and criminal justice problem, and not always as a welfare matter. In many cases policies fail in connecting social welfare and social security programs with delinquency issues. But if security is a matter of social cohesion, it is extremely important to incorporate security in social and citizenship policies.

Globalisation is also introducing many security-related changes in Europe. The world are increasingly interconnected by a network of commercial, capital, tourist, communications, or labour force exchanges, among others. Although the density of these networks of interchanges varies a lot along planet areas (and there are some excluded from globalisation), the world is increasingly interdependent (see some indicators in table 2). There are also new actors, international institutions, forums, meetings, non-governmental agencies, and private multinational enterprises. That raises the idea of a global society. From a security point of view, this also means that interests, conflicts, problems and risks are also increasingly inter-linked. Because Europe is one of the largest and most dense network of exchanges, it can be expected some threat (and, eventually, vulnerability) in terms of trade derived risks, illegal trade activities and organised crime, political conflicts and international terrorism, and other international criminal activities (Reinares 2000). It is not just a matter of organised crime but also of abusive practises of legal organisations. These types of crime are particularly threatening for democratic governments because they corrupt its institutions and take advantages of a practically unregulated global economy (Reinares 2000). In that sense, it is no longer possible to speak about Dutch, German or Polish security problems; at this level, all are interconnected. The theory of a risk society holds precisely that those risks are bigger and more uncontrollable than ever before for governments (Franklin 1998). Causes are complex and multiple, threats are omnipresent and intangible, criminal organisations have flexible –sometimes virtual– structures, and criminal clues and dirty money are difficult to follow.

These broad changes have fundamental implications for security problems and security policies in the nearest future. There are challenges for European security in the present and in the coming years. Some of them are not new, but they still are open questions that deserve appropriate answers.

Unsafety in Europe

How much unsafe is Europe? International surveys allow us to compare between countries and also to avoid some of the measurement problems of criminal statistics. Comparative evidences from the International Victims Survey (ICVS) show that there are two aspects to remark about recent criminality in the European Union countries (see **table 3**). The first aspect is that common crime is an spread problem that affected in 1999 between 15 and 26% of the Europeans with an intensity that varies between 25 and 54 crimes per each hundred of the inhabitants depending on the country (Kesteren, Mayhew and Niewbeerta 2001). Although most incidents are minor (see **table 4**), figures are important and must be taken into account. In a broad sense, richer countries suffer more crime than less developed countries but there is not a perfect linear relationship between economic wealth and victimisation rates. England and Wales have more crime than can be expected by its GDP per capita or, inversely, Denmark has few crime compared with its wealth. It can be said that crime is structural problem associated with modernisation and development but they're many other relevant variables influencing this relationship.

A second aspect to remark is that, in a broad sense, crime evolution has follow similar patterns in most countries but percentages of increase o decrease varies among them. According to the ICVS data from the sweeps of 1988, 1991, 1995 and 1999, at the beginning of the nineties, crime rates worsened in relation to the end of the eighties. They continued worsening until 1995. At the end of the decade, the situation lightly improved or stabilised to 1991 levels. It seems that economic cycles generally affect crime tendencies but concrete impact varies between countries

(Kesteren, Mayhew and Nieuwebeerta 2001).

As it was expected, subjective feelings of safety do not correlate directly with crime levels. Sweden or Netherlands has good levels of subjective safety while its crime levels are important (although ICVS figures in these countries are comparatively inflated by the incidence of bicycle theft). On the contrary, Spain and Portugal have an exaggerated sense of unsafety considering their criminal data. Apparently, this situation makes no sense, but looking beyond it is possible to discover some rationality in the figures. A tentative hypothesis is that social protection levels will affect safety perceptions. As it was stated formerly, people feel more or less insecure in their lives for economic, health, loneliness, crime experiences or other reasons. It is not easy to separate the different sources of personal insecurity as victimization surveys try to do. That could explain why countries with small level of social protection experience more unsafety while they have less crime. Safety perception is very important because it affects citizens' tolerance, self-protective behaviour, security decisions, or institutional demands. In that sense, and considering the seriousness of most crimes, it can be said that fear is a bigger problem than crime itself.

Victims surveys have difficulties in registering some crimes that are particularly important to have a complete picture of population unsafety. One of these crimes is homicide. Intentional homicide is a good indicator of violence in a Society (Council of Europe 1999). Police records of that crime are quite reliable and they allow for comparative studies. In consonance with the social protection hypothesis, violence seems to be a more serious problem in the Mediterranean than in Scandinavian countries. But there are two important exceptions that are England and Wales and Finland. They need to be explained. There are other serious security problems that cannot be reflected directly in surveys or statistics. One of them is organised criminality. There are many evidences signalling an increase in the organised crime. White-collar crime is another very important and under-registered crime. Democracies will have increased difficulties in being credible if people perceive doubled moral standards in law enforcement.

At this point, it seems important to stress two points. The first are the difficulties to meaningfully content common criminal acts. This inability takes place in a context of rising demands and expectations in security. Second, subjective feeling of unsafety is a very important dimension of the security problem and it correlates strongly with welfare sensation. It is necessarily to devote more attention to it in public and security policies because fear of crime has a great share in the problem. Recent criminological research on fear of crime shows that environmental order, transparency on crime information, or police visibility is important in order to prevent fear.

Safety and security demands

Unsafety feelings depend, not only on crime levels, but also on security aspirations and demands. Security demands are a complex question. There are several indicators that can be used and they need to be interpreted jointly to reach plausible interpretations (see **table 5**). One of them is the victims' reporting practices to the police. Victims reporting rates are influenced by different variables like crime seriousness, victims' retribution purposes, sense of social duty or responsibility, in order to recover properties, or for insurance reasons among others. But, through reporting practices, people are also expressing safety and also security demands and aspirations. Indirectly, they also put pressure to the criminal justice system (particularly the police) to become more effective. At the same time, reporting are driven by a pragmatic motivation and conditioned by a certain perception of usefulness. The ICVS holds that reporting has been remained quite stable in general during the nineties. In some countries like England and Wales, Belgium or Sweden, reporting rates are decreased at the same time that crime increased. This could indicate some gap between victims' expectations and what is offered by the criminal justice system. In order to find out if there is some social disappointment with police, it may be useful look at the variation in reporting motivation, as it will be done later.

Under moderate levels of criminality, what people is primary demanding is not necessarily more punishment, but more security. Only when sensation of unsafety starts to be socially unacceptable or security aspirations are very high, people become more fearful, intolerant with deviance, and demands more punishment. When that happens we must interpret the phenomena as a symptom of certain social failure. Data from the ICVS shows in all European countries there is a growing preference for prison sentences over alternative punishment (Kesteren, Mayhew and Niewbeerta 2001). Also preferred length in prison sentences is increasing. Looking at the perceived level of safety of some countries like Finland, Sweden or Netherlands, the most plausible interpretation for this data is that there is an increasing security aspiration. For France, Belgium and, specially, England and Wales the data interpretation may be a combination of a deterioration of subjective security perception and the same aspiration for a better situation.

This interpretation is consistent with the data available about the demand of private security (Cunningham et al. 1990; Johnston 1991; Trevor and Newburn 1998). One indicator of the penetration of private security in society is the number of burglar alarms installed in households. This number varies between countries. It is high in England and Wales or Belgium and quite low in Mediterranean countries and some Scandinavian countries like Finland, or Denmark (Kesteren, Mayhew and Niewbeerta 2001). But what is more significant is the important increase in the number of such installations. It seems that private security is giving something that society is willing to buy. This value may be individualised security services, sense of protection, or prevention. In any case, a hypothesis is that private security is offering something that cannot supply public security. The matter is whether both services and sectors are complementary or are competing each other for the same market.

One different dimension of security demands is what role people want to play international institution in this area. Europeans supports strongly a broader implication of the European Union in fighting against crime and drugs (European Commission 2001). They are aware of the international dimension of modern organised crime. It seems that citizens reserve to supranational entities a key role in

their security. As a manner of partial conclusion, it can be said that in Europe here is a general increase in the security demands in the context of a risk society. Nevertheless this demand is not exclusively directed to national institutions but to private and international organisations. Others indicators show that criminal justice institutions do not satisfactorily respond to new demands on security. An important question to answer is why not.

Table 6 illustrates some population opinion about Criminal Justice Systems. One of the traits of post-modern societies is a certain loss of legitimacy and confidence in governmental institutions and authorities. As an extension of this, many Europeans seem to be a little sceptical with their trust in the Justice and legal system. Most percentages of the Mediterranean countries do not reach 50% of the population. The case of Belgium is particularly startling. Netherlands and Scandinavian countries express a wider trust. In this context, surprisingly, Police deserves for Europeans more trust. It ranks about 15 points above average confidence in justice systems in most countries. Differences between countries also follow a similar pattern and in the citizens' perception of police efficacy in controlling crime in the area they live. Southern countries are a more critics with police efficacy and have less trust in them. Contrarily, Northern countries perceive more police efficacy and are more confident in the institution. Confidence in the police is also reflected in the motivation to report crimes. Victims of southern countries tend to believe more that police could do nothing or would not do anything about their particular cases. These differences can be explained partially because of the more general perception of safety in Northern countries and because of a general broader support for public institutions. In all countries there is the general perception that police efficacy has improved in the nineties. In summary, there is a general criticism with justice and legal system that t is consistent with the tendencies in post-modern values. European Polices still have a wide space for social credibility. But this credibility seems to be linked to its efficacy. So, what challenges have criminal justice systems in a context of new problems and security demands?

In modern societies, criminal justice represents the state appropriation of

revenge through a predictable system under the rule of law. The central decisions and functions of the criminal justice system are two: to establish blame, and to fix a punishment. Despite that police had always performed different roles in keeping order or delivering some services, it has been traditionally stressed its role as a law enforcement agency and also its place in the criminal justice system. The point is whether a system of blame and punishment can face new demands and expectations. Even more, can Criminal Justice System deal with the new conflicts derived from a risk society? Can it deal with fear? These questions led us to the issue of efficiency. Efficiency is the central benchmark for the legitimacy of Criminal Justice Systems. In security terms, prevention is synonymous of efficiency, but it is not blame and punishment (Hughes 1998). Once a crime is committed, harm is done to victim and to society, it does not make too much difference if criminal are caught and punished. Criminal Justice Systems are not designed initially to do prevention. The main challenge for the institutions of the Criminal Justice Systems is how to redirect its traditional functions towards more preventive practises (Bayley 1994). If prevention is not taken seriously, the only alternative, looking at the present policing options, is going to zero tolerance models. But the problem is that models, although having good results in policing terms, tend to make deeper social fractures, expand the prison system, exacerbate antipolice feelings of some disadvantaged groups, and do not improve by itself social cohesion.

It is necessary to enforce social solidarity. We need to invest public and civil resources in social cohesion because, given the sociological tendencies explained above, it will be very difficult to achieve social solidarity spontaneously only through market mechanisms. We need to invest in citizenship, immigrants' integration, family support, young education, or labour promotion policies. Police cannot make prevention without such supporting policies. It is just not a matter of increasing public expenditures. It is a matter of efficiency, institutional reform arrangements, and the continuous searching of more effective ways of making social prevention. Crime, fear, or unsafety feelings have little sense as separate social problems. They need to be included in a broader framework of social security policies and social prevention strategies (and not only situational ones) need to be placed in a central position.

Table 1
Social indicators by Country
(In percentages)

Indicator:	Finland	Sweden	Denmark	United Kingdom	Ireland	Germany	Netherlands	Luxembourg	Austria	Belgium	France	Italy	Spain	Portugal	Greece
Scores on post-materialist values ^(a)	(0.85)	(0.86)	(1.01)	(0.93)	(0.87)	(0.81)
Local identity 1996 ^(b)	18.0	25.0	13.0	14.0	7.0	27.0	15.0	12.0	18.0	32.0	23.0	16.0	38.0	27.0	16.0
Distrust in Government ^(c)	39.0	49.0	42.0	58.0	43.0	46.0	31.0	20.0	47.0	50.0	57.0	55.0	48.0	47.0	57.0
Foreign population in 1998 ^(d)	0.4	5.0	2.8	3.2	2.4	7.3	4.2	...	4.5	8.8	6.8	1.1	0.9	1.0	...
% variation 1988-1998	300.0	12.0	71.4	18.7	25.0	21.9	4.7	...	102.2	-1.2	-7.4	90.9	66.6	80.0	...

One person households 1991	31.7	39.6	34.4	26.7	20.2	33.6	30.0	25.5	29.7	28.4	27.0	20.6	...	13.8	16.2
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Sources: European Commission, *Eurobarometer: Public Opinion in the European Union* (Brussels: Directorate-General Press and Communication, 1996 and 2001). Reports numbers 44 and 55, January 1996 and October 2001. European Commission, *The social situation in the European Union 2001* (Brussels: Eurostat, 2002). Jonathan Coppel, Jean-Christophe Dumont, and Ignazio Visco, *Trends in Immigration and economic consequences* (Paris: OECD, 2001). Working Paper of the Economics Department number 284.

Notes: ^(a) Average score in a 0-2 scale of post-materialist values from the 1993 International Social Survey Programme (University of Michigan, Ann Arbor). ^(b) The answered question was "In the near future, do you see yourself above all as a citizen of the European Union or a citizen of your country or a citizen of your regions." ^(c) People that tend not to trust in Government in 2001. ^(d) Foreign or foreign-born population. ^(e) Data are only from England and Wales and Catalonia respectively.

Table 2
Socio-economic indicators by Country

Indicators:	Luxembourg	Denmark	Ireland	Netherlands	Austria	Belgium	Germany	Sweden	United Kingdom	Finland	Italy	France	Spain	Portugal	Greece
Gross Domestic Product per Capita in 1999 ^(a)	38.7	25.0	24.1	23.8	23.5	23.4	22.7	21.6	21.6	21.4	21.1	20.9	17.3	16.1	14.2
Social benefits per head in 1997 ^(b)	8.5	6.6	3.3	6.2	6.0	5.8	6.0	6.4	5.0	5.0	5.1	5.8	3.2	2.5	2.8
<i>% of variation of all transfer benefits 1993-1998</i>	-0.6	0.6	-3.3	-4.9	-1.0	-2.3	0.6	-3.9	-1.7	-6.2	0.4	-0.4	-2.9	0.9	1.7
Population with low income before social benefits in 1996 ^(c)	24%	30%	33%	24%	24%	28%	23%	22%	27%	26%	27%	23.0%
Population with low income after social benefits in 1996 ^(c)	12%	11%	18%	12%	13%	17%	16%	14%	19%	16%	18%	22%	21.0%

Unemployment rate 1999	2.3%	5.2%	5.7%	3.3%	3.8%	9.1%	8.8%	7.2%	6.1%	10.2%	11.3%	11.3%	15.9%	4.5%	11.7%
Victimisation rates 1999 ^(d)	...	37%	...	51%	...	37%	...	46%	58%	31%	...	36%	30g%	27%	...

Sources: European Commission, *Eurostat yearbook 2001: The Statistical Guide to Europe* (Brussels: Eurostat, 2002). European Commission, *The social situation in the European Union 2001* (Brussels: Eurostat, 2002). John van Kesteren, Pat Mayhew, and Paul Nieuwbeerta, *Criminal Victimization in Seventeen Industrialised Countries: Key Findings from the 2000 International Crime Victims Survey* (The Hague: Ministry of Justice of Netherlands and National Institute for the Study of Criminality and Law Enforcement, 2000), 226 pp. European Commission, *Population, households and dwellings in Europe* (Brussels: Eurostat, 1996). European Commission (2000): Eurostat Social protection database ESSPROS.

Notes: ^(a) In thousand of Euros standardised by purchasing power standards at market prices. ^(b) Social benefits are direct transfers to households in 1997. In thousand of Ecus. ^(c) Population with low income before and after social benefits. Low incomes are 60% or less of the national average earnings in 1996. ^(d) Number of criminal incidents per 100 inhabitants in 1999. Includes car theft, theft from car, car vandalism, motorcycle theft, cycle theft, burglary, robbery, personal theft, sexual incidents, assaults and threats

Table 3
 Unsafety indicators by country

	England and Wales	Netherlands	Denmark	Sweden	France	Belgium	Finland	Catalonia (Spain)	Portugal
Prevalence rates of victimisation in 1999 ^(a)	26.4	25.2	23.0	24.7	21.4	21.4	19.1	19.0	15.5
<i>% of variation in prevalence rates 1991-99</i>	-12.6	-19.5	...	14.8	...	10.8	-9.9
Incidence rates of victimisation in 1999 ^(b)	54.5	48.1	35.1	45.6	33.9	33.3	28.6	28.9	25.8
<i>% of variation in Incidence rates 1991-99</i>	5.0	-12.9	...	31.4	...	11.7	-16.1
Homicide rates (per 100.000 inhab.) in 1996	1.3	1.8	1.3	1.2	2.6	1.2	3.7	2.5 ^(d)	3.9
<i>% of variation in homicide rates 1990-96</i>	--	20.0	62.5	-4.3	-7.2	...	--
People feeling unsafe in 1999 ^(c)	27.0	18.0	17.0	15.0	22.0	21.0	18.0	35.0 ^(d)	27.0
<i>% of variation of unsafe people 1991-99^(c)</i>	-18.2	-18.2	5.0	5.8

Sources: John van Kesteren, Pat Mayhew, and Paul Nieuwbeerta, *Criminal Victimization in Seventeen Industrialised Countries: Key Findings from the 2000 International Crime Victims Survey* (The Hague: Ministry of Justice of Netherlands and National Institute for the Study of Criminality and Law Enforcement, 2000), 226 pp. Council of Europe, *European Sourcebook of Crime and Criminal Justice Statistics* (Strasbourg: Directorate General I, Legal Affairs, 1999), 207 pp.

Notes: ^(a) Prevalence rates are the percentage of people who are been victimised one or more times during 1999.

^(b) Incidence rates are the number of criminal incidents per 100 inhabitants during 1999.

^(c) Percentage of surveyed population that feels a bit or very unsafe walking alone in the dark in their neighbourhood area.

^(d) Figures are from the entire Spain.

Table 4
Incidence rates of victimisation by country
(Crimes per 100 inhabitants in 1999)

Indicator:	England and Wales	Netherlands	Sweden	Denmark	France	Belgium	Finland	Catalonia (Spain)	Portugal
Car vandalism	13.2	13.2	6.7	4.6	11.0	8.4	5.0	11.2	9.0
Theft from car	8.5	5.7	7.1	4.1	6.2	4.1	3.2	6.9	6.9
Personal theft	5.7	6.0	7.2	4.4	3.1	4.8	3.9	3.6	2.1
Assaults and threats	12.4	5.3	6.5	4.7	6.0	4.6	6.1	2.4	2.0
Sexual incidents ^(a)	6.1	5.7	6.0	4.6	1.3	2.1	8.4	4.6	1.2
Robbery	2.0	1.5	1.5	0.8	1.8	1.4	0.7	1.0	1.3
Burglary	3.4	2.3	2.3	3.3	1.0	2.4	0.5	1.3	1.8
Car theft	2.4	0.4	1.4	1.2	2.0	0.9	0.4	0.4	1.0
Ten crimes incidence rate ^(b)	54.5	48.1	45.6	35.1	33.9	33.3	28.6	28.9	25.8

Sources: John van Kesteren, Pat Mayhew, and Paul Nieuwbeerta, *Criminal Victimization in Seventeen Industrialised Countries: Key Findings from the 2000*

International Crime Victims Survey (The Hague: Ministry of Justice of Netherlands and National Institute for the Study of Criminality and Law Enforcement, 2000), 226 pp.

Notes:^(a) This question was asked only to women. It includes offensive grab, touch or assault for sexual reasons at home, workplace or other place.

^(b) Addition of the incidence rates of car theft, theft from car, car vandalism, motorcycle theft, cycle theft, burglary, robbery, personal theft, sexual incidents, assaults and threats. Incidence rates are the number of criminal incidents per 100 inhabitants.

Table 5
 Citizens' security demands indicators by Country
 (In percentages)

Indicator:	Finland	Sweden	Denmark	England and Wales	Netherlands	Belgium	France	Spain	Portugal
Average of crimes reported to the Police in 1999 ^(a)	41	57	56	53	58	53	49	41 ^(e)	36
<i>Variation in crime reporting to the Police 1991-99^(a)</i>	—	-3	...	-10	2	-22
<i>Variation in crime rates 1991-99^(b)</i>	-16	31	...	5	-12	12
Population preferring a prison sentence for a burglar 1999 ^(c)	19	31	20	51	37	21	12	7 ^(e)	26
<i>Variation in preference 1991-1999</i>	35	17	...	37	...	10
Home burglar alarms in 1999	4	10	7	34	11	21	13	9 ^(e)	8
<i>Variation in home alarms 1991-99</i>	400	50	...	55	38	75
Support for EU fight against crime and drugs in 2001 ^(d)	88	96	92	82	90	88	...	91	95

Sources: John van Kesteren, Pat Mayhew, and Paul Nieuwbeerta, *Criminal Victimization in Seventeen Industrialised Countries: Key Findings from the 2000 International Crime Victims Survey* (The Hague: Ministry of Justice of Netherlands and National Institute for the Study of Criminality and Law Enforcement, 2000), 226 pp. European Commission, *Eurobarometer: Public Opinion in the European Union* (Brussels: Directorate-General Press and Communication, 2001). Report number 55, October 2001.

Notes: ^(a) Based on reporting rates to the Police of five crimes: theft from car, burglary, robbery, sexual incident, and assaults and threats. ^(b) Variation in the addition of the incidence rates of car theft, theft from car, car vandalism, motorcycle theft, cycle theft, burglary, robbery, personal theft, sexual incidents, assaults and threats. Incidence rates are the number of criminal incidents per 100 inhabitants registered in the International Crime Victims Survey. ^(c) Preference of a prison sentence over a non-custodial penalty. The question was which sentence consider most appropriate for a second time recidivist burglar (21 years old) having stolen a colour TV set. ^(d) The answered questions were whether it should be or not a EU priority fighting against crime and drugs. ^(e) Data are referred only to Catalonia.

Table 6
 Citizens' opinion about criminal justice system issues by country
 (In percentages)

Indicators:	Finland	Sweden	Denmark	England and Wales	Netherlands	Belgium	France	Catalonia (Spain)	Portugal
Population trust in the Police in 2001 ^(a)	88	69	88	66	70	49	55	57 ^(d)	55
Population trust in the Justice or legal system 2001 ^(a)	63	57	74	49	60	34	41	42 ^(d)	31
Perception of police efficacy controlling crime 1999 ^(b)	70	61	71	72	52	64	65	53	45
<i>% of variation on this perception 1991-99</i>	32	5	...	9	4	36
Victim's reasons for no reporting crime in 1999: ^(c)									
Police could do nothing	7	11	9	12	9	42	8	10	13
Police wouldn't do anything	6	11	6	11	9	35	10	17	10
Prefer to solve the situation by themselves or it was inappropriate for the Police	23	33	31	21	21	45	24	12	23
It was not serious or it was not loss	55	34	42	34	32	52	39	51	41

Sources: European Commission, *Eurobarometer: Public Opinion in the European Union* (Brussels: Directorate-General Press and Communication, 2001). Report number 55, October 2001. John van Kesteren, Pat Mayhew, and Paul Nieuwbeerta, *Criminal Victimization in Seventeen Industrialised Countries: Key Findings from the 2000 International Crime Victims Survey* (The Hague: Ministry of Justice of Netherlands and National Institute for the Study of Criminality and Law Enforcement, 2000), 226 pp.

Notes: ^(a) The question was “How much trust do you have in certain institutions?” Possible answers were “tend to trust” or “not tend to trust”. ^(b) The surveyed question was “how good do you think the police in your area are at controlling crime?”. Percentages are the addition of those who answered that they were doing a “very good” or a “good” job. ^(c) Based on crime reporting rates to the Police in five crimes: theft from car, burglary, robbery, sexual incidents, assaults and threats. Multiple answers were allowed, for that reason percentages do not add 100%. ^(d) Data are from the entire Spain.

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