Challenging issues in local privatization

Introduction

Analysis of local privatization is giving increasing relevance to the insights provided by transaction costs and industrial organization theories. These theories point to the importance of a sector’s market structure and incentives as the key factors explaining differences between sectors and dynamics within sectors. By focusing on incentives we see how contracting creates pressure on managers to benchmark costs and production practices with private actors. It also encourages managers to consider other innovations that could increase efficiency. These include mixed public and private production which is growing in the US (Warner and Hefetz, 2007), and inter-municipal cooperation to gain economies of scale (Bel and Costas, 2006; Warner and Hefetz, 2003). Local privatization is not ideological; it has been shown to be primarily pragmatic, as local governments must manage political interests in both the market and policy arenas (Bel and Fageda, 2007; Bel and Miralles, 2003; Hefetz and Warner, 2004; 2007; Warner and Hebdon, 2001).

In this editorial we present evidence on lack of cost savings with privatization and show the importance of managing markets, policy, and political interests to ensure benefits from privatization. We draw on our own work and that of papers presented by members of the Scientific Committee at the Barcelona International Workshop on “Local Government Reform: Privatization and Public–Private Collaboration”, which we organized in June 2006 at the University of Barcelona, Spain. We give critical attention to the challenges of managing costs, structuring the market, and managing political interests. We argue that the debate on local government reform is moving beyond the ‘either/or’ dichotomy of public or private and now must focus on synergy between the public and private sectors. The challenges of a dynamic market-management approach are the focus of this theme issue.

Local privatization and costs

A primary goal of local government privatization is cost reduction. Early surveys of the literature (Domberger and Jensen, 1997; Domberger and Rimmer, 1994) concluded that privatization was linked to cost savings. However, meta-analyses including more recent studies (such as Boyne, 1998; Hodge, 2000) emphasized that the evidence is mixed and no systematic relation between private production of public services and costs savings can be proven. More recent studies are less likely to find cost savings with privatization. In Bel and Warner (2006) we review all econometric studies of costs for waste collection and efficiency/productivity for water distribution from 1965 to the present and find that the majority of studies find no difference in costs and efficiency/productivity between public and private production. See table 1. These two services are the most commonly privatized local government services and the subject of the majority of econometric studies of costs.

Cost savings are more likely to be found in the earlier studies from the 1970s and 1980s. Only two studies find cost savings with privatization in the 1990s [Szymanski (1996) for the UK, and Reeves and Barrow (2000) for Ireland]. What accounts for this erosion in cost savings? The answer is simple. Competitive markets for water and waste are uncommon and prone to erosion. Most economic theories arguing for lower costs under privatization base those savings on competition. Public choice theory argues competition would restrict excessive public supply of public services, thus decreasing...
the cost of delivery (Niskanen, 1971); property rights theory points to stronger incentives for cost reduction under private property (Shleifer, 1998); and industrial organization theory suggests that contracting out could take advantage of economies of scale (Donahue, 1989).

The reality is that markets for both water and waste are rarely competitive. In waste collection the only potential competition is for the market— for the initial contract. Economies of scale require monopoly production, at least at the neighborhood or municipal scale (Rubin and Navarro, 1988). In the case of water, due to the nature of a fixed infrastructure of sunk costs (pipe systems), long-term concessions are the norm. This creates incomplete contracts. Even when a concession is reopened for bidding, the position of the incumbent is extremely strong given the asset specificity of water services. In extreme cases, such as England and Wales where regional private firms own the infrastructure itself, there are strong barriers to entry, typical of noncontestable markets. Cost savings should not be expected from privatization without competition.

However, even competition for the market is facing increasing difficulties. Recent evidence on the changing structure of the solid waste management sector shows significant consolidation during the 1990s (Bel and Costas, 2006; Dijkgraaf and Gradus, 2008). Most municipalities do not face a competitive market of alternative suppliers. Competition for the market also erodes due to incumbency— contracts are typically renewed as other providers exit the market. In the US, Hefetz and Warner (2004; 2007) have shown the importance of reverse contracting and the need for local governments to structure the market through direct intervention in order to maintain competition over time. Reductions in service quality and lack of cost savings were the primary reasons for this reverse privatization.

Dijkgraaf and Gradus (2008), in this issue, show the importance of erosion of competition and the challenges of market management as the Dutch government tried to ensure competition and cost savings through new pricing policies. In a dynamic analysis using a standard function of total costs for solid waste collection, they assess the impact of a VAT compensation fund and unit-based pricing (UBP) on relative costs of public and private firms. They test their model for 1998–2005 with a sample of 380–450 Dutch municipalities and find private production is on average 10% cheaper than public production but that cost savings erode over time. By 2004 and 2005 no significant differences in costs between private and public production are found and they attribute this to eroding competition. By contrast, UBP is strongly linked to lower costs whether the system is public or private. UBP is more frequent in municipalities using private production, so not considering UBP in the analysis would bias upwards the cost savings from private production. Dijkgraaf and Gradus’s analysis shows that managing the market through efficient pricing (such as UBP) can be more powerful in reducing costs than contracting.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of studies showing</th>
<th>private production cheaper/more efficient</th>
<th>public production cheaper/more efficient</th>
<th>no cost/efficiency difference between public or private production</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Water distribution</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waste collection</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The dynamics of service delivery choices
Markets are dynamic and so are local government service delivery decisions. Local government contracting is not a simple decision. It involves a broad array of choices (Warner and Hebdon, 2001) and requires a dynamic view of contracting behavior over time. Hefetz and Warner have pioneered work on the dynamics of contracting in the US and found local governments both contract out and reverse contracts in response to market and political considerations (Hefetz and Warner, 2004; 2007). This reverse contracting is growing in the US and reflects a pragmatic ‘social choice’ market management approach (Hefetz and Warner, 2007).

We have analyzed differences in reverse privatization between the US and Spain, where reverse privatization is less common (Warner and Bel, 2007). Rather than managing competition at the level of the market as in the US, Spanish local governments focus at the firm level through publicly owned firms or mixed public–private firms to manage costs. We believe wider flexibility in the use of hybrid organizational forms in Europe may have induced more stability in markets for services where private delivery has an important role (Warner and Bel, 2007). For rural and small towns, intermunicipal cooperation has been used as an alternative to privatization to exploit economies of scale (Bel and Costas, 2006; Warner 2006; Warner and Hefetz, 2002; 2003).

By looking inside the contracting decision at the costs of contract specification, monitoring, and the nature of market competition, we can learn how governments choose between public and private delivery alternatives. Brown, Potoski, and Van Slyke (2008) build on earlier work on the dynamics of service delivery choices (Hefetz and Warner, 2004) and reverse privatization (Warner and Hebdon, 2001) to explore why governments shift between alternatives over time. Using measures of the costs of switching (asset specificity and measurability) and the power of inertia (how the service was originally provided) they explore the likelihood of shifting between public delivery, cooperation, for-profit or nonprofit privatization in the 1992–97 time period. Although asset specificity was not significant in most of the models, measurability was for joint contracting. The models of joint contracting show a slightly higher likelihood of switching to and from other forms which suggests the costs of switching in and out of joint production are lower. This is confirmed by other work that shows significant growth in mixed delivery modes since 1997 and the importance of managerial learning over the 1992–2002 decade (Warner and Hefetz, 2007).

Prices and political interests
Privatization has long been linked to political and financial interests (Bel, 2006a; 2006b). At the local government level we see a pragmatic politics where ideology is of limited importance and management of interest groups is more critical. However, political interests may work in opposite ways than expected. Hebdon and Jalette (2008) present the first-ever survey on Canadian municipalities’ use of privatization and find it is higher than in the US despite Canada’s more communitarian ideology. Miralles (2008) shows how industrial water users in Spain influence cross subsidy policy in their favor under privatization.

Hebdon and Jalette compare 2002–03 survey data from US and Canadian municipalities to explore differences in local government privatization by region. They expected lower levels of privatization in Canada due to its more coordinated market economy, compared with the liberal market orientation of the United States. While this was true in culture and arts services, it was not true overall. Even at the regional level, they found higher levels of privatization in regions considered to be more opposed
to privatization (due to more labor union activity and stronger support for direct
government), such as the US northeast and Ontario in Canada, than among more
politically favorable regions in the US south and west and Canadian west. What
explains these ironic results? Hebdon and Jalete test four theoretical perspectives:
public choice (Tiebout, 1956), transactions costs (Williamson, 1999), pragmatism
(Warner and Hebdon, 2001), and social choice (Hefetz and Warner, 2007).(1) They
determine that pragmatism and social choice provide better explanations because local
privatization choices are driven as much by contract costs as by political interest
management. They conclude that managers are pragmatists who balance citizen voice,
political interests, market competition, and contract management in a comprehensive
social choice framework.

Miralles (2008) analyzes the effect of recent privatization of water services on the
difference between the marginal price paid by the average residential and industrial
consumer. He builds a simple theoretical model with two types of consumers, indus-
trial and residential, where the local regulator solves a maximization problem of
a weighted sum of surpluses and profits. Using a sample of 133 Spanish municipalities
in Catalonia, he finds a link between recent privatization and a reduction of the
regulator’s preference for residential consumers. Hence, privatization of water may
reduce the cross-subsidization from industrial to residential consumers. These results
are consistent with industrial sector lobbying for privatization in recent years. Until
now the empirical literature has tested the hypotheses of trade unions and rent-seeking
groups of residential consumers negatively influencing privatization,(2) but few have
analyzed the influence of industrial sectors on privatization, found to be positive in
Miralles’s analysis. The challenge of price and interest-group management is also
shown in the Dijkgraaf and Gradus (2008) paper where government introduced the
VAT compensation scheme to make private producers more cost competitive, but
instead private firms increased their prices.

Conclusion: managing costs, markets, and interest groups
One of the challenges of local privatization has been its failure to provide lower
cost service delivery. Inadequate understanding and management of local govern-
ment service delivery markets are partly to blame. Lack of competition is common
and other forms of market management—mixed public–private delivery, mixed
public–private firms, intermunicipal cooperation, and dynamic contracting (in and
out) may achieve better results.

But local government reform is more than a market management process. Competi-
tion and price policies must be considered in a framework of political interest groups as
well. The debate needs to move beyond ideology and recognize that contracting decisions,
at least at the local government level, are primarily pragmatic. Political interests are an
expected and legitimate aspect of local government. Understanding how these interests
affect the privatization process is an important contribution of this theme issue.

The debate on local government reform is shifting toward a network management
approach which looks at the potential of service delivery in a mixed market/public
delivery framework. But in these networked systems, we must carefully assess manage-
ability, transparency, and accountability (Salamon, 2002). Concerns over cost savings
must be balanced with concerns about managing interest groups and citizen voice.
Local government’s mission is not merely cost reduction; but to achieve cost savings
it must manage markets, contracts, and political interests. Indeed, the challenge of

(1) Hefetz and Warner articulate a ‘social choice’ theoretical framework which combines markets,
governments, and deliberation in a comprehensive approach.

(2) Bel and Fageda (2007) provide an extensive review of these works.
privatization is it does not deliver adequately on all three dimensions and for this reason we are seeing a ‘reform of the reform’ toward a more comprehensive, balanced approach.

Germà Bel
Public Policies and Economic Regulation, University of Barcelona
Mildred Warner
Department of City and Regional Planning, Cornell University

References
Niskanen W A, 1971 Bureaucracy and Representative Government (Aldine, Chicago, IL)
Reeves E, Barrow M, 2000, “The impact of contracting-out on the costs of refuse collection services: the case of Ireland” Economic and Social Review 31 129 – 150
Szymanski S, 1996, “The impact of compulsory competitive tendering on refuse collection services” Fiscal Studies 17(3) 1 – 19