Research Group
in Analytic Philosophy

Anton Alexandrov

Contact

 

Universitat de Barcelona

Departament de Lògica, Història i Filosofia de la Ciència

C/ Montalegre, 6-8, 4th floor

08001, Barcelona

 

E-mail: toni [dot] alexandrov [at] gmx [dot] at

Curriculum Vitae

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      Areas of Specialization

Philosophy of Mind and Language, Philosophy of Mathematics, Philosophical Methodology, Theory of Normativity, History of Analytic Philosophy (Frege, Russell, Carnap)


     Areas of Competence

Epistemology, Metaphysics, Metaphilosophy, Philosophy of Measurement, History of Phenomenology (early Husserl and early Heidegger)


I completed a B.A. in Philosophy and Linguistics (2011) and a M.A. in Philosophy (2015) at the University of Göttingen. In between, I was an Erasmus student at the Analytic Philosophy M.A. program of the University of Barcelona (academic year 2011/12) and a visiting graduate research student at the University of California, Los Angeles (spring 2014).


My B.A. thesis (supervised by Felix Mühlhölzer and Christian Beyer) exegetically and critically examines how Tyler Burge's philosophy of mind and epistemology interact with each other and give rise to his conception of gradual conceptual understanding in the light of anti-individualism. My M.A. thesis (supervised by Felix Mühlhölzer and Simon Friederich) focuses on Saul Kripke's unpublished Whitehead Lectures “Logicism, Wittgenstein, and de re Beliefs about Numbers” given in 1992. In his lectures he provides an unorthodox reduction of the (concepts of the) natural numbers in combination with an account of de re beliefs towards these. In the thesis I point out some difficulties of his proposal and provide how they can be accounted for in a Kripkean spirit.


Currently, my research is located at the intersection of the philosophy of mind and language, philosophical methodology, and the theory of normativity. In my dissertation, I dwell upon the ins and outs of conceptual engineering.

On the most general level, I investigate whether conceptual engineering is interestingly unified so that foundational work in any significant sense is justified. On a slightly less general level, I explore whether there is any interesting sense in which conceptual engineering is normative in such a way that conceptual analysis is not in that sense (as the common contrastive introduction of conceptual engineering has it).

Another aspect of my current research focuses on Carnap’s conception of explication. First, I evaluate whether several recent criticisms of this conception are convincing. Second, I examine to what extent Carnapian explication can be done within a framework that rejects both the analytic/synthetic distinction and the internal/external distinction.

In a case study centering on the concept temperature in kelvin, I argue that certain kinds of procedures that fix topological and metrical aspects of quantitative concepts represent the least controversial instance of conceptual engineering.

In a recent publication of mine, I have pointed out that contrary to first appearance different externalist theories about linguistic meaning and conceptual content can unproblematically account for a sundry range of apparent and real instances of conceptual engineering (cf. https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2020.1805709).

As the above illustrates, my dissertation is accumulative in nature. The project is supervised by Manuel García-Carpintero and José Martínez.