Research Group
in Analytic Philosophy

Anton Alexandrov

Contact

 

Universitat de Barcelona

Departament de Lògica, Història i Filosofia de la Ciència

C/ Montalegre, 6-8, 4th floor

08001, Barcelona

 

E-mail: toni [dot] alexandrov [at] gmx [dot] at

Curriculum Vitae

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      Areas of Specialization

Philosophy of Mind and Language, Philosophy of Mathematics, Philosophical Methodology, History of Analytic Philosophy (Frege, Russell, Carnap)


      Areas of Competence

Epistemology, Metaphysics, Metaphilosophy, History of Phenomenology (early Husserl and early Heidegger)


I completed a B.A. in Philosophy and Linguistics (2011) and a M.A. in Philosophy (2015) at the University of Göttingen. In between, I was an Erasmus student at the Analytic Philosophy M.A. program of the University of Barcelona (academic year 2011/12) and a visiting graduate research student at the University of California, Los Angeles (spring 2014).


My B.A. thesis (supervised by Felix Mühlhölzer and Christian Beyer) exegetically and critically examines how Tyler Burge's philosophy of mind and epistemology interact with each other and give rise to his conception of gradual conceptual understanding in the light of anti-individualism. My M.A. thesis (supervised by Felix Mühlhölzer and Simon Friederich) focuses on Saul Kripke's unpublished Whitehead Lectures “Logicism, Wittgenstein, and de re Beliefs about Numbers” given in 1992. In his lectures he provides an unorthodox reduction of the (concepts of the) natural numbers in combination with an account of de re beliefs towards these. In the thesis I point out some difficulties of his proposal and provide how they can be accounted for in a Kripkean spirit.


Currently, my research is located at the intersection of the philosophy of mind, philosophy of mathematics and philosophical methodology. In my dissertation, I dwell upon several aspects of conceptual engineering.

On a general level, I, first, distinguish between different varieties of conceptual engineering and argue for an anti-foundationalist, pluralist view of these. Second, I provide a systematic framework for the evaluation of the compatibility of varieties of conceptual engineering and different, competing versions of externalism.

On a more specific level, I am particularly interested in Carnap’s method of explication and rational reconstruction. With respect to this method, I, first, inquire whether it can be carried out within an anti-individualist framework and, second, I examine how it relates to the mathematical practice of formalization and axiomatization. With respect to the former, I draw further implications for how anti-individualism can account for the constructability of concepts in highly theoretical and specialized contexts; with respect to the latter, I draw further implications for the foundations of mathematics.

The project is supervised by Manuel García-Carpintero and José Martínez and was funded by a FI grant.