Saul Kripke: Naming and Necessity, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1980. Lecture III
Ned Block: 'On a Confusion About a Function of Consciousness', Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 18 (1995), 227-47
Martin Davies & Lloyd Humberstone: 'Two Notions of Necessity', Philosophical Studies, 38 (1980), 1-30
Frank Jackson: 'Armchair Metaphysics', al seu Mind, Method and Conditionals. Selected Essays, Routledge, London, 1998. (Publicat per primer cop a John O'Leary Hawthorne and Michaelis Michael (eds.)¸ Philosophy in Mind, Dordrecht, Kluwer, 1994, 23-42)
David Chalmers: The Conscious Mind. In Search of a Fundamental Theory, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1996, ch. 2 'Supervenience and Explanation'
David Chalmers: The Conscious Mind. In Search of a Fundamental Theory, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1996, ch. 3 'Can Consciousness Be Reductively Explained?'
David Chalmers: The Conscious Mind. In Search of a Fundamental Theory, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1996, ch. 4 'Naturalistic Dualism'
Ned Block and Robert Stalnaker: 'Conceptual analysis, Dualism, and the Explanatory Gap', The Philosophical Review, v. 108, n. 1 (1999), 1-46
Brian Loar: 'Phenomenal States' a N. Block, O. Flanagan & G. Guzeldere (eds.), The Nature of Consciousness, MIT Press, Cabridge, Mass., 1997, 597-616 (revised version of Brian Loar: 'Phenomenal States', Philosophical Perspectives 4, J. Tomberlin (ed.), Ridgeview, Atascadero, Cal., 1990)
Christopher S. Hill : 'Imaginability, Conceivability, Possibility and the Mind-Body Problem', Philosophical Studies 87 (1997), 61-85
Manuel García-Carpintero: 'Qualia that are Right to Quine', ms.
S. White, 'Why The Property Dualism Argument Won't Go Away', ms.
Ned Block, 'The Harder Problem', ms.
Frank Jackson: 'Some reflections on representationalism', ms.
Sydney Shoemaker: 'Introspection and Phenomenal States', ms.
Dan Dennett: 'Are We Explaining Consciousness Yet?', ms.