
Contents

<i>Preface</i>	ix
<i>Introduction</i>	xii
I Truth-Conditional Semantics	I
1 One version of truth-conditional semantics	2
2 Compositionality	3
3 Force indicators and content indicators	4
4 Truth definitions ‘serving as’ meaning theories	6
5 Application to natural languages	10
6 Proper communicative function	10
7 Communicative acts	14
8 Summary and conclusion	16
2 Excess Objectivity	18
1 Excess objectivity	18
2 Three ways of solving the problem of excess objectivity	20
3 Kinds of objectivity	21
4 Wright’s criterion of cognitive command	22
5 The problem of a priori error	24
6 Does plain error amount to cognitive failure?	25
7 A new criterion for objectivity	28
8 How to solve the problem of a priori error	31

3	Revisionism	35
1	How to revise a content ascription	35
2	The attraction of revisionism	36
3	Objection to revisionism: denial	38
4	Revising revisionism	40
4	Expressivism	43
1	Some expressivists	44
2	Unendorsed contexts	46
	<i>Searle's adequacy condition</i>	47
	<i>Geach and his Frege-point</i>	49
3	Two ways of meeting Geach's challenge	52
	<i>The force-indicator approach</i>	53
	<i>The content-indicator approach</i>	57
4	Hale and the grammatical uniformity of declarative sentences	60
5	Resolving Hale's problem	64
6	Concluding remarks	67
5	Soft Truth	69
1	The traditional debate	70
2	Two notions of truth	72
3	Davidson's programme	74
	<i>The biconditional doctrine</i>	76
	<i>How to derive intensional theorems</i>	78
	<i>Davidson's programme before the truth doctrine</i>	81
	<i>The emergence of the truth doctrine</i>	82
4	Radical interpretation without <i>the</i> notion of truth	85
5	'Meaning as truth condition'	88

6	Relative Truth and Linguistic Communication	91
1	An absolutist model of linguistic communication	92
	<i>Background assumptions</i>	92
	<i>Simple cases of communication</i>	93
	<i>Cases of incredulity</i>	94
2	Disagreement without error	98
3	The relativized truth framework	100
4	The explanatory status of the theory	103
5	Methods of belief acquisition	105
6	Extension of the framework: shades of objectivity	107
7	One further application: fiction	109
8	Alan Gibbard: revisionist, expressivist or relativist?	110
7	Defence of Relativism	116
1	The essence of relativism	116
2	Classifying relativisms	118
3	Newton-Smith and the traditional conception of proposition	119
4	The dilemma/self-refutation	122
	<i>Horn (ii) contradicts (GR)</i>	122
	<i>Horn (ii) is pragmatically self-refuting</i>	123
	<i>Given horn (ii), it is pointless to assert (GR)</i>	123
5	The possibility of communication	124
6	Problems for Protagorean relativism	126
	<i>Notes</i>	129
	<i>Bibliography</i>	142
	<i>Index</i>	147