Research Group
in Analytic Philosophy

Being better at knowing oneself and others

    Ophelia Deroy (SAS, London)

06 May 2015  |  17:00  |  Seminari de Filosofia UB

Abstract

This talk will focus on a specific kind of knowledge of others' mind - i.e.
the empathetic grasp of someone's emotions, usually referred to as
'empathy'. Most definitions of empathy converge in considering that having
empathy for someone’s emotional state E means being in an emotional state E*
which is (i) relevantly similar to E (ii) caused by the occurrence of E and
(iii) ascribed to the other (e.g. De Vignemont & Jacob, 2012; Goldman,
2013). The mechanisms behind the causation and ascription conditions might
still be controversial, but nobody doubts that they will be found by
studying cases which satisfy the similarity condition. In this talk, i will
argue that the insistence on similarity is misguided, and suggest a better
account based on the importance of individual differences observed in the
aptitude for empathy and the relation between being better at knowing
oneself and knowing others's emotions. 

Background bibliography

De Vignemont, F., & Jacob, P. (2012). What Is It like to Feel Another’s
Pain?. Philosophy of science, 79(2), 295-316.

Goldman, A. (2013). Joint ventures. Oxford: OUP. 

See also 

Fukushima, H., Terasawa, Y., & Umeda, S. (2011). Association between
interoception and empathy: Evidence from heartbeat-evoked brain potential.
International journal of psychophysiology, 79(2), 259-265.

Keysers, C., & Gazzola, V. (2014). Dissociating the ability and propensity
for empathy. Trends in cognitive sciences, 18(4), 163-166.