Research Group in Analytic Philosophy

Deflationism is not an inferentialism

    Lavinia Picollo (LMU)

Date: 09 May 2018

Time: 15:00

Place: Seminari de Filosofia UB


It is frequently argued that formal theories of truth that square with the principles of deflationism must be (i) axiomatic and (ii) purely disquotational. As deflationism places truth among other logical devices, it would seem the view is tied to some form of inferentialism. I argue that the adequacy of this claim depends heavily on the purpose deflationists wish the formal theory for. More specifically, I argue that if the goal is to employ the truth predicate provided by the theory in the logical capacity deflationists ascribe to it, not only disquotational but also compositional principles can be deemed both acceptable and useful form a deflationary perspective, along with Tarskian truth definitions and (certain) families of models.