Research Group
in Analytic Philosophy

Bullshit in public argument

07 June 2022  |  15:00  |  Seminari de Filosofia (UB, Barcelona)

Abstract

Harry Frankfurt (1986) inaugurated the philosophical discussion of “bullshit”, a particular form of non-cooperative speech he characterizes as speech that is unconcerned by truth. Intuitively, contexts in which bullshit is rife in public discourse (such as American politics under the Trump presidency) make it very difficult to engage in meaningful and productive public argument. Discussion tends to break down into invective and polarized slogans. This paper tries to gain some clarity on why that is. I will start by introducing and defending a non-assertoric view of bullshit which departs from the Frankfurtian approach. This new understanding of bullshit will enable me to argue that it threatens the possibility of non-defective argument in a way that is both distinctive and fundamental. The key hunch is that bullshit undermines a prerequisite of all meaningful argument: a common trust that all participants will respect the norms governing the practice of arguing. When bullshit becomes prevalent, this can lead to a form of what Langton (1993) calls “illocutionary disablement”, extended to the entire community: speakers can no longer make their words count as the speech-acts they intend them to be when they try to engage in public disputes.