Research Group
in Analytic Philosophy

Abstract

We ask questions to acquire knowledge. This observation has led to the wide endorsement of the Ignorance Norm, which states that we should not ask whether p if we know that p. However, cases of double-checking complicate this picture. When double-checking whether p, we may already know that p but seek further epistemic benefits, such as certainty or second-order knowledge. Since cases of double-checking appear to be a proper form of asking questions, they challenge the Ignorance Norm. Focusing on linguistic cases of double-checking, I propose a novel solution to this challenge, offering two key advantages over existing accounts. First, it treats double-checkings as proper cases of asking questions. Second, it preserves the Ignorance Norm. The proposed solution leverages the idea of Speech Act Contextualism—the view that context affects which speech act is performed. While this idea is well-established in speech act theory, it has been scarcely applied to interrogative speech acts.