

Fiction-Making as a Gricean Illocutionary Type

I. PREAMBLE

There are propositions constituting the content of fictions—sometimes of the utmost importance to understand them—which are not explicitly presented, but must somehow be inferred. This essay deals with what these inferences tell us about the nature of fiction. I will criticize three well-known proposals in the literature: those by David Lewis, Gregory Currie, and Kendall Walton.¹ I advocate a proposal of my own, which I will claim improves on theirs. Most important for my purposes, I will argue on this basis, against Walton's objections, for an illocutionary-act account of fiction, inspired in part by some of Lewis's and Currie's suggestions, but (perhaps paradoxically) above all by Walton's deservedly influential views.

I start by quoting a story by the Argentinean writer Julio Cortázar, short enough to be given in full; it will provide a crucial example to help present my argument.

He had begun to read the novel a few days before. He had put it down because of some urgent business conferences, opened it again on his way back to the estate by train; he permitted himself a slowly growing interest in the plot, in the characterization. That afternoon, after writing a letter giving his power of attorney and discussing a matter of joint ownership with the manager of his estate, he returned to the book in the tranquility of his study which looked out upon the park with its oaks. Sprawled on his favorite armchair, its back toward the door—even the possibility of an intrusion would have irritated him, had he thought of it—he let his left hand caress repeatedly the green velvet upholstery and set to reading the final chapters. He remembered effortlessly the names and his mental image of the characters; the novel spread its glamour over him almost at once. He

tasted the almost perverse pleasure of disengaging himself line by line from the things around him, and at the same time feeling his head rest comfortably on the green velvet of the chair with its high back, sensing that the cigarettes rested within reach of his hands, that beyond the great windows the air of afternoon danced under the oak trees in the park. Word by word, licked up by the sordid dilemma of the hero and heroine, letting himself be absorbed to the point where the images settled down and took on color and movement, he was witness to the final encounter in the mountain cabin. The woman arrived first, apprehensive; now the lover came, his face cut by the backlash of a branch. Admirably, she stanchd the blood with her kisses, but he rebuffed her caresses, he had not come to perform again the ceremonies of a secret passion, protected by a world of dry leaves and furtive paths through the forest. The dagger warmed itself against his chest, and underneath liberty pounded, hidden close. A lustful, panting dialogue raced down the pages like a rivulet of snakes, and one felt it had all been decided from eternity. Even to those caresses which writhed about the lover's body, as though wishing to keep him there, to dissuade him from it; they sketched abominably the frame of that other body it was necessary to destroy. Nothing had been forgotten: alibis, unforeseen hazards, possible mistakes. From this hour on, each instant had its use minutely assigned. The cold-blooded, twice-gone-over reexamination of the details was barely broken off so that a hand could caress a cheek. It was beginning to get dark.

Not looking at one another now, rigidly fixed upon the task that awaited them, they separated at the cabin door. She was to follow the trail that led north. On the path leading in the opposite direction, he turned for a moment to watch her running, her hair loosened and flying. He ran in turn, crouching among the trees and hedges until, in the yellowish fog of dusk, he could distinguish the avenue of trees that led up to the house. The

dogs were not supposed to bark, they did not bark. The estate manager would not be there at this hour, and he was not there. The woman's words reached him over the thudding of blood in his ears: first a blue chamber, then a hall, then a carpeted stairway. At the top, two doors. No one in the first room, no one in the second. The door of the salon, and then, the knife in hand, the light from the great windows, the high back of an armchair covered in green velvet, the head of the man in the chair reading a novel.²

Consider an utterance of (1), below, by Cortázar as part of the longer utterance by him of the full discourse that, with a measure of idealization, we can think constitutes "A Continuity of Parks" (ACP). (This is, of course, itself part of the idealization; we should really be speaking of an utterance of the Spanish sentence '*había empezado a leer la novela unos días antes*,' the actual part of the story created by Cortázar and published by him in his 1956 collection *Final del juego*.)

1. He had begun to read the novel a few days before.

(1) is in the declarative mood, which by default expresses assertion in English. Nonetheless, most accounts of fiction would follow Alvin Plantinga's view that the author of a fiction "does not assert the propositions that form his stock in trade," and hence would not count such an utterance as assertoric in illocutionary force at all: the context in which it occurs overrides the default interpretation for (1)'s mood.³

Just for the sake of having a specific proposal about assertion in mind, let us assume what I in any case take to be a plausible account of what such an interpretation amounts to, based on Timothy Williamson.⁴ According to this view, the following norm or rule, the knowledge-transmission rule (KTR), is constitutive of assertion, and individuates it.

(KTR)One must ((assert that p) only if one puts thereby one's intended audience in a position to know that p).

By default, use of the declarative mood indicates that utterances of sentences in that mood are subject to that norm (which, of course, does not mean that they fulfill the obligation that it imposes). By uttering (1) in the context in which he did, Cortázar makes it clear that he is not

doing something that commits him to KTR. Let us use the verb 'to fictionalize' to refer to what he is alternatively doing. A manifest fictionalizing context overrides the default relative to which the declarative mood is interpreted, and therefore Cortázar is not committed to KTR. Presumably, he lacks knowledge of any proposition of the kind that an utterance of (1) in an otherwise normal context would express, and is therefore unable to put anybody in a position to acquire such knowledge, but he is not thereby violating a norm.

This paper is about what *fictionalizing* is, about what Cortázar is alternatively doing in uttering the discourse of which (1) is part. I want to defend the view—rejected, among others, by Walton—that fictionalizing is a type of speech-act, like promising or voting, an illocutionary type understood along Gricean lines. Once again, for the sake of having a specific proposal in mind, I will adopt Currie's analysis of fictionalizing, or fiction-making; on this view, to fiction-make a proposition by uttering something (or by painting, or by having people acting on a stage, and so forth) is to so utter with the communicative intention to put an intended audience in a position to make believe (imagine) that proposition. In more detail, his proposal is this: U 's utterance of S is fictive if there is a Φ and there is a χ such that U utters S intending that anyone who has χ would: (1) recognize that S has Φ ; (2) recognize that S is intended by U to have Φ ; (3) recognize that U intends them (those who have χ) to make believe that P , for some proposition P ; (4) make believe that P ; (5) take (2) as their reason for (3); and (6) take (3) as their reason for (4).⁵

The main objection to such accounts is still, or so I feel, that they incur some form of the "intentional fallacy," which (even if perhaps in this particular form it sounds a bit old-fashioned), in their famous manifesto purportedly exposing it, M. Beardsley and W. Wimsatt characterized as the view that "in order to judge the poet's performance, we must know what he intended," as against which they argue that "the design or intention of the author is neither available nor desirable as a standard for judging the success of a work of literary art."⁶ I will come back to this at the end. The core of this essay is an argument that nonnegotiable intuitions about what propositions constitute the content of a given fiction are best accommodated if fictionalizing is an illocutionary type.

II. THE CONTENT OF FICTIONS

I will start developing the argument by considering a different speech-act that one could make in uttering (1), related to Cortázar's story. One who is familiar with the story could utter it in the context of telling someone else, or otherwise discussing, the content of the story, its plot, what goes on in it, for instance by uttering (1) after saying 'the story is about someone who reads a novel.' In such a context, the utterance does constitute an assertion, one, moreover, that appears to satisfy KTR and is therefore true. For this to be so, it must express a proposition and there is an obvious problem here: What is the contribution of the referential expressions in the utterance, 'he,' 'the novel,' the implicit indexical governed by 'before'? Neo-Meinongian views reply that the referents of those expressions are fictional characters, like the ones that are explicitly referred to in utterances such as (2).⁷

2. The man who reads a novel in ACP is the sort of character with which any reader immediately identifies.

Peter van Inwagen argued that an acceptable semantic account of the content of assertions like (2) requires an ontology of "creatures of fiction," fictional characters that can be referred to by singular terms like the definite description in it.⁸ Given that one accepts his arguments, a similar neo-Meinongian treatment is available for the sort of assertion of (1) one makes in stating the content of the story.

There are well-known problems with this proposal.⁹ Consider uses of (3) and (4) intended to make assertions about the story's plot, analogous to the one discussed before for (1), in a similar context introduced by 'the story is about someone who reads a novel.'

3. He was born in Patagonia.
4. He was not born in Patagonia.

Both assertions appear to be false because Cortázar has not given us in the story any indications one way or the other. However, to the extent that, as neo-Meinongian proposals require, (3) and (4) have the logical forms that they apparently have—a property is predicated of an object in (3), and the same property is denied of the same

object in (4)—this appears to violate a logical law, $\forall x(P(x) \vee \neg P(x))$.

There are several ways to deal with this problem according to neo-Meinongian accounts. One possibility is to deny that the copula expresses predication in (3) and (4), contending instead that it expresses a relation in which a fictional character stands to a property when the property is ascribed to the character in a certain fiction. But this suggestion closely approaches the proposal to a simpler well-known view, developed among others by David Lewis.¹⁰ According to this proposal, in the logical form of the relevant assertions of (1), (3), and (4), there is an implicit operator, 'ACP makes it fictional that . . .,' which behaves in closely similar ways to operators that have been studied in depth in contemporary semantics, such as 'S believes that . . .'. To the extent that we can invoke a semantic account of the significance of referential expressions like 'he' when they occur in contexts governed by those operators on which they do not necessarily contribute their ordinary referents outside them, we avoid any problems caused by their lacking those referents.¹¹ There is no problem with both assertions (3) and (4) being false, when understood as suggested: like most belief systems concerning many propositions and their negations, ACP is noncommittal on the matter of the reader's origins in Patagonia.

Let us henceforth use 'F_{acp}(*p*)' as an abbreviation of 'ACP makes it fictional that *p*,' and consider now an assertion of the following sentences, uttered again in a context discussing ACP's plot introduced by 'the story is about someone who reads a novel.'

5. F_{acp}(he is killed).
6. F_{acp}(he reads a novel about what is in fact the scheme of his wife and her lover to kill him, whose denouement is about to happen as he reads about it unsuspectingly).

The proposition that (6) claims to be fictional in Cortázar's story is not just actually fictional there; it is *the* fictional truth in the story, the main one.¹² A puzzled reader who misses (6) has not understood the story. We will consider presently direct evidence for (5) and (6) in the text; as indirect evidence for the truth of (6), there is the fact that it allows us to make sense of the story's title—it is the parks in the novel (the reader reads that the lover-killer "could distinguish the avenue of trees which

led up to the house”) that are continuous with, indeed identical to, the parks with oaks upon which the reader’s study looks out. Moreover, it allows us to appreciate a point that Cortázar might well be trying to convey by telling us this story.

7. There might be fictions such that all propositions that are fictional in them are actually true.

There is nothing fictional about (7); (7) conveys a plain assertion, in fact a philosophical claim about fictions that would be rejected by some philosophers who have dealt with these matters—including, as we will see, David Lewis. For the moment, I will focus on trying to state in virtue of what (6) is true. I will argue, mostly against Walton, that only an illocutionary-type account of fictionalizing can properly supply an answer.¹³

Along with many other writers, Walton distinguishes facts about what is fictional in a given fiction that are somehow explicitly there, from others that are merely implicitly there. The proposition that (8) correctly claims to be fictional in ACP is not put in so many words in the story; it is something we infer from what we are explicitly told.¹⁴

8. F_{ACP} (the hero and heroine in the novel plan to kill the heroine’s husband).

I will follow Walton in characterizing the distinction as a contrast between the directly and the indirectly generated (or implied) facts; the latter are generated indirectly in that the propositions they correctly state to be fictional in the given work are derived in part on the basis of others, previously determined to be fictional in that work. Those facts about what is fictional in a given fiction that contribute to determine others, without being themselves *prima facie* determined on the basis of others, are the directly generated ones.¹⁵ A fundamental problem in giving the truth-conditions of claims like (5), (6), and (8) is to characterize what Walton calls “principles of generation,” the principles relative to which indirectly generated facts are determined.

III. LEWIS’S ACCOUNT: PRELIMINARIES

Lewis analyzes the truth conditions of claims like (5), (6), and (8) in the framework of possible

worlds semantics. As a first approximation, he contemplates “exactly those worlds where the plot of the fiction is enacted, where a course of events takes place that matches the story. What is true in the Sherlock Holmes stories would then be what is true at all of those possible worlds” (TF 264). However, he rejects this suggestion, particularly because of the following problem. Let us assume that Conan Doyle wrote the Sherlock Holmes stories as pure fiction; in particular, he had no knowledge of anyone who did the deeds he ascribed to Holmes. Still, it might be that the actual world is one of the worlds where the plots of the Conan Doyle stories is enacted—“Improbable, incredible, but surely possible!” (TF 265). It is false in the actual world that the name ‘Sherlock Holmes’ refers to someone; however, it is true in the stories that it does; so there is something that is true in the stories, but false in one of the worlds where their plot is enacted.

To deal with this problem, Lewis, like John Searle, adopts a *pretence theory* of the act of fictionalizing.

Storytelling is pretence. The storyteller purports to be telling the truth about matters whereof he has knowledge. He purports to be talking about characters who are known to him, and whom he refers to, typically, by means of their ordinary proper names. But if his story is fiction, he is not really doing these things (TF 266).¹⁶

Given this, to use the possible worlds framework to analyze the truth-conditions of claims like (6), the worlds to consider “are the worlds where the fiction is told, but as known fact rather than fiction. The act of storytelling occurs, just as it does here at our world; but there it *is* what here it falsely purports to be: truth-telling about matters whereof the teller has knowledge” (TF 266).

This is why Lewis is, as I said before, one of those philosophers who would reject claim (7), which I said Cortázar might be intending to convey with ACP: “Our world cannot be such a world; for if it is really a fiction that we are dealing with, then the act of storytelling at our world was not what it purported to be” (TCP 266). Any act of storytelling occurring in the actual world purports to be a (protracted) assertion, complying with something like what I earlier took to be its constitutive norm, KTR; there are possible worlds in which the very same act (or an appropriate epistemic counterpart of it) is such a thing, but the actual world (Lewis

submits) cannot be one of them because there the act is a mere pretence of a normatively correct assertion. On this view, claims like (9), below, are always true statements about the contents of stories. (I have replaced Lewis's 'telling as known fact' by, simply, 'asserting,' given the previous explication of that speech act.)

9. F_{ACP} (its utterer asserts that someone had begun to read a novel).

On Lewis's account, the embedded propositions in claims like (9) are true in all the relevant worlds we need to properly characterize the content of fictions, and therefore are part of their contents; and this aspect of their content is, according to him, always false of the actual world. This is how he intends to deal with the problem posed by the possibility that the plots of the Holmes stories is enacted in actuality: the proposition that 'Sherlock Holmes,' as used in the story, refers to someone may well not be the case in one of the worlds where the plot of the story is enacted (the actual world, under the improbable-incredible hypothesis), but the proposition is true in all worlds where the story is told as known fact.¹⁷ It has the consequence that (7) is false, on Lewis's view; at least propositions like the one embedded in (9) are a false part of the content of every fiction. Hence, on Lewis's view, Cortázar's story is one of those modernist fictions with an impossible content. Because, if I interpret it correctly, the main point of the story, captured by the truth of (5) and (6), suggests that the very world in which the main character is reading a novel is one of those worlds where the full content of that novel is enacted; and, on Lewis's philosophical account of fiction, that can never be the case. Claims (5) and (6) become on this view questionable; they create, in a very sharp form, the problem that possible-worlds accounts have with conceptually incoherent fictions.

Let me insist that this is not the real problem posed by the generation of (6) for Lewis's account that I will be mostly concerned with. Lewis could maintain the main features of his view so far considered, including his rejection of (7), and still appeal to some of the procedures he discusses to deal with conceptually impossible fictions to account for the truth of (5) and (6). However, I will briefly depart from the main course of my argument to say why I think that this aspect of his view is not convincing because the discussion will help later

to appreciate the real difficulties for Lewis's (and others') proposals posed by (6).

Even if the pretence theory of fictionalizing is correct (later I will reject it as a fully satisfactory account, but I will grant that there is something to it), someone who pretends to correctly assert that p may still be correctly asserting that p ; indeed, he or she might be correctly asserting that p by *pretending* to assert that p . We can, I think, coherently imagine that the story that Cortázar tells us actually obtains. Perhaps the reader's estate manager caught pieces of conversations between the reader's wife and her lover, and surmised their conspiracy; uncertain about the response that direct exposure to his suspicions would provoke in his employer, he wrote a novel under a pseudonym and made sure that the threatened employer read it, hoping (to no avail) that the details given in it would lead him to recognize the author's assertoric communicative intentions and its implications. Improbable, incredible, but surely possible! If this is so, the proposition that (6) claims to be fictional in ACP is possible; it is possible that the world according to ACP, in which the reader reads the novel, is one of the worlds in which the full Lewisian content of that novel (including contents corresponding to that ascribed in (9) to ACP) obtains, so as to make (7) true.¹⁸ Cortázar might well be correct in his implied claim (7)—if that is what it is. This disposes of accounts of fictionalizing like Goodman's, much more heavily committed—given their philosophical ambitions—than Lewis's to the view that some of the declarative sentences giving a fiction's content should be untrue, literally taken. But I think that nothing of substance would change in Lewis's views if we modified them in response to the objection.¹⁹

IV. THE PROBLEM WITH LEWIS'S ACCOUNT

As I said, this is not the main problem I want to discuss; as far as the core claims in the article are concerned, we could assume that my criticism is wrong.²⁰ Let us go back to Lewis's account of the truth conditions of claims like (5), (6), and (8). A first stab at a possible-worlds account already suggested by the pretence theory of fictionalizing is this: A sentence of the form, 'In the fiction F , ϕ ' is true if and only if ϕ is true at every world where F is told as known fact rather than fiction. But this proposal would only allow for the fictionality of what is explicitly stated in fictions, not for the

truth of, say, (8). It is compatible with Cortázar's story being told as known fact, rather than fiction, that it is not the heroine's husband that the hero in the novel being read by the main character purports to kill, but anybody whose house the woman can correctly describe. To allow for indirectly generated fictional truths, Lewis offers two different analyses; the two capture some of the principles guiding our inferences toward what is implicit in fictions. I will consider only the second one, which, even if both are ultimately similarly unsuccessful, is better suited to dealing with the problem I will raise.

(L)A sentence of the form 'In the fiction F, ϕ ' is true if and only if, for any collective belief world w of the community of origin of F, there is some world where F is told as known fact and ϕ is true that is more similar to w than any world where F is told as known fact and ϕ is false.

Assuming Lewis's well-known analysis of counterfactuals, (L), more simply put, has it that 'In the fiction F, ϕ ' is true if and only if ϕ would be true if F were told as known fact and the beliefs constituting common knowledge in the community where F originated were also known fact.²¹ We can fairly assume that it is commonly believed in the community where ACP originated that, if a love affair between a man and a woman is kept secret, if it is felt to be sordid, if jealous thoughts of another man are evoked in him by the woman's caresses, if all this leads to a murderous conspiracy for which the woman provides crucial information, the third person involved is (typically, at least) the woman's husband. On these grounds, we can grant that (L) accounts for the generation of the implicit fictional truth (8), that it is the heroine's husband that the hero in the fictional novel purports to kill.²²

Lewis's analysis (L) appeals to the beliefs that are common knowledge in the community of origin of the fiction to account for inferences to what is implicit in it from what is explicit. His alternative analysis, which I have not given, appeals instead to what obtains in fact in the actual world. It should be obvious that neither suggestion can account for the generation of (5) and (6), as I said the main facts about what is fictional in ACP. I have argued before, against Lewis, that the proposition that (6) claims to be fictional in ACP is possible, that one of the worlds in which all propositions fictional in the novel being read in ACP obtain might in

fact be the world in which the novel is read. However, if we were told ACP as known fact, and accepted it as such, no appeal to what we take to be common knowledge (now, or in Cortázar's time), even less to what is in fact the case in the actual world, would lead us to infer that the actual world is one of the worlds of the novel about which we are told. We would take it as a rather insipid narrative about someone sitting in a green velvet armchair with its back toward the door of a room with large windows and enjoying a novel that ends abruptly when, in the novel, a fictional character also sitting in a green velvet armchair with its back toward the door seems about to be murdered. Neither the coincidence in the upholstery and relative position of the armchair, nor in other details (the parks, the estate manager), would suffice—if the narrative is given as true assertion, and not as fiction—given what we take to be mutually known, to outbalance the enormous improbability of the implausible contingencies required to identify the reader as the victim in the novel that he is reading.²³

V. PROSPECTIVE DIAGNOSIS

So, how is it that as experienced readers we effortlessly infer (6) when, exhilarated with the increased narrative speed, we come to the revelations in the final sentence of the story? Intuitively speaking, it is a matter of Gricean *relevance*, relative to the aims we ascribe to the teller of a story. The main piece of evidence has to do with that ending, when put in the context of the piece of discourse in which it is supposed to belong. This discourse is supposed to be a piece of fictional narrative, to tell us a meaningful story, and stories have a peculiar kind of explanatory structure (the story typically highlights an event, the denouement, and disposes others to account for it and lead to it, in appropriate ways) that would be missing unless we come up with (5) and (6).²⁴ Only the generation of (5) and (6) makes narrative sense of the piece taken as fictional and, of course, the coincidences just mentioned support them. Then there is, in addition, the indirect evidence already mentioned—the account of the title. And, last but not least, there is the important point for a fiction intended as a serious literary undertaking that the inference of (5) and (6) supports (7) as, so to say, the moral of the story.²⁵

Walton notices the importance of this sort of relevance on the basis of several related examples.

We know what creators of representations are up to, that a large part of their job is to make propositions fictional. When an artist has arranged for a work to generate fictional truths that in one way or another call attention to some further proposition, it is often apparent that his reason for doing so was to make this proposition fictional as well. There is likely to be an understanding approximately to the effect that when this appears to have been the artist's objective, the salient proposition is fictional, its fictionality being implied by the fictional truths that call attention to it. (MM 166)²⁶

But I feel that he is not sensitive to the full implications of this mutual understanding concerning a form of Gricean relevance specific to fictions, for what does it tell us about the truth conditions of claims like (6), and ultimately about the nature of fictionalizing?

It tells us, I suggest, that we take fictionalizing to be a type of speech act, an illocutionary type understood along Gricean lines. Relevance figures prominently in H. P. Grice's well-known account of conversational implicature, as the only maxim in his third category.²⁷ The account depends on Grice's theory of speaker's meaning, developed in a series of influential papers. Speaker's meaning, according to Grice, is meaning resulting from a type of rational activity guided by a *communicative intention*: roughly, the (indexical self-reflexive) intention of rationally inducing an audience to form specific mental states on the basis of the recognition of that very intention.²⁸ Variations on the types of mental states to be formed, and on the expected rational procedures for the audience to be guided into them, account for differences in type of illocutionary force. Granted a number of (philosophically substantive) presuppositions, some of them concerning the very interpretation of Grice's proposals, the account of assertion based on KTR suggested above will count as a Gricean one, for a fundamental type of illocutionary force.²⁹

The Gricean account of speaker's meaning features a sign, the meaning-vehicle, which is not just a particular token, but consists of the instantiation of some recognizable properties, and it involves not just any nondescript audience, but audiences with specific properties.³⁰ In literal communication, speakers convey meaning by producing signs instantiating types that conventionally have certain imports, for the sake of audiences that share their knowledge with the speaker. In conversational implicature, speaker's meaning is typically

conveyed by uttering signs with literal meanings such that, given assumptions taken to be common knowledge with the intended audience, if the utterance expressed them it would blatantly violate the conversational maxims; this leads the audience to what is meant, as the most sensible way in the circumstances of interpreting the utterer as conforming to the maxims.

Grice's explicit theory of implicature does not cover the full scope of the phenomenon. The maxims or submaxims that he specifies are adequate for speech-acts that can be properly evaluated as true or false, of which assertion is the fundamental one. The account works well for Grice's examples, where an utterance that, if made literally, would assert that *p*, conversationally implicates something else. However, there are many cases (including indirect speech acts) for which the general Gricean framework supplies a correct account, but that do not fit this schema; thus, for instance, when, by rhetorically asking "Is he a good friend?" the speaker does not express the literal question he or she is asking (the answer to which the speaker knows very well to be negative), but an assertion.³¹ The submaxims of quantity and quality do not apply in those cases because if the utterance is taken literally, no amount of information is supposed to be given, nor is there any knowledge that the speaker intends to convey. The maxim of relation appears to work better with these cases; as Stephen Levinson argues, this is because Gricean relevance is a determinable principle of attending to interlocutors' goals or plans that should be further determined relative to the types of speech-act setting up the specific goals at stake.³² What counts as relevance when it is an act governed by KTR that would be made, were the utterance made literally, differs from what counts as such when it is a request, or a question. A similar point applies to the submaxims of manner.

Any form of activity guided by communicative intentions, not just assertion, is thus governed by Grice's *Cooperative Principle*—"Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged"—together with more specific maxims that follow from this given the specific "purpose or direction of the talk" constituted by the intended illocutionary types.³³ The indirect generation of truths like (5) and (6) depends on specific submaxims derived from the Cooperative Principle

for the specific case of fictionalizing, a particular illocutionary type. The distinctive nature of fiction-making does not therefore lie in the truth-properties of the fictional propositions conveyed, but in the norms distinguishing such an illocutionary type from others, assertion in particular.

The pretence theory of fictionalizing provides an account along these lines, but, as other writers have shown, one with serious difficulties.³⁴ Pretended assertions (or any other speech-acts) sometimes have nothing to do with fictionalizing: they could just be a parody of somebody's speech. Fictionalizing sometimes has no use for pretended speech-acts (as in silent movies or pictures), even if, in the case of literary fiction, the pretence of assertion (and other speech-acts) does play an important role. Pretended speech-acts are not, in general, at the core of what fictionalizing is; pretence itself, or make-believe, as Walton has persuasively argued. Walton, however, extends his criticisms of the pretence theory of fictionalizing to any illocutionary-type account—to any account on which fictionalizing essentially involves communicative intentions, or any specific kind of intention on the part of the fiction-maker.³⁵ Others have convincingly replied to his criticisms.³⁶ My argument here for illocutionary-type theories lies in that they give proper elaboration to the intuition—tacitly accepted by Walton in the text I quoted earlier—that a principle of relevance guides us to infer claims like (6) and the best account of their truth-conditions.

At the outset I presented Currie's illocutionary-type analysis of fictionalizing as adequate for my purposes to illustrate the kind of analysis of fiction-making that I want to defend. Paradoxically, Currie's own analysis of the truth-conditions of claims like (8), (C), fares not much better than Lewis's, similarly failing to account for (6).

(C) A sentence of the form 'In the fiction *F*, ϕ ' is true if and only if it is reasonable for an informed reader of the text to infer that the fictional author of *F* believes that ϕ .

According to Currie, "what is true in the fiction is what the teller believes. But it is important to realize that the teller is himself a fictional construct, not the real live author of the work" (NF 75); "as readers, our make-believe is that we are reading a narrative written by a reliable, historically situated agent (the fictional author) who wants to impart certain information" (NF 80). There are obvi-

ous problems with this proposal. It is unclear how to apply it to fictions that do not consist of (pretended) assertions, for instance, an epic poem consisting only of questions. There are narratives with explicit, but unreliable narrators; what they purport to believe in these fictions is not fictional—in fact, it is usually the opposite that it is fictional. There are fictions that preclude the possibility that they could be told as known fact, fictions about situations without intelligent life, for instance. To deal with the second problem, Currie contends that an explicit narrator is never his fictional teller; the latter tells us about the former (NF 124). To deal with the third, he contends that these narratives have contradictory contents (NF 125–126). These replies are problematic.³⁷ Be this as it may, the above discussion shows that Currie's proposal cannot at any rate account for the generation of (6). If we took ACP to be a narrative written by a reliable agent who wants to impart information, and tried to infer his beliefs, we would never ascribe to him the proposition embedded in (6).

Currie's proposal appears to be motivated by the fear of incurring the intentional fallacy (NF 109–116). After presenting my own proposal, I will appeal to the distinction between communicative and noncommunicative intentions in order to evade it.

VI. A GRICEAN ALTERNATIVE

My own proposal appeals directly to the fiction-making intentions of the author, instead of the beliefs of Currie's fictional teller. The creator of a fiction wants us to imagine propositions shaping a story so as to entertain us, to lead us to reflect on the consequences of the possibilities he thereby depicts, and so on. There is, of course, much more to say about these intentions specific to the production of fictions, and authors to whom I have been referring, such as Walton, have made interesting contributions to this, but I cannot go any more into it here. For my purposes, it is enough that we have an intuitive understanding of the difference between the specific projects of the fiction-maker and those of the serious asserter subjecting his or her utterance to a rule such as KTR, for it is this difference that accounts for the fact that, while we would never infer the proposition ascribed to ACP in (6) if we took Cortázar's utterance to be a serious assertion, any educated reader smoothly

infers it when it is clear that it is a fictional narrative. That proposition is entirely *relevant* when the intentions constitutive of fiction-making are at stake, fully out of place when those constitutive of assertion apply.

There is an established practice of using certain means for the goal of fiction-making. One of them is to pretend to use sentences of natural languages in their agreed ways, although this is by no means the only one; there are others, like having people pretending to act in certain ways on a stage, arranging colors on a canvas, and so on. When assertoric sentences are used for this purpose, it is common knowledge that they are going to serve it by leading us to imagine that they are used in their agreed ways, to imagine what typically goes on when they are correctly used in their agreed ways, and so on. However, it is common knowledge that there is only the pretence of assertion, ultimately for the sake of giving rise to interesting make-believe; the creator of the fiction is by no means forced to observe the rules governing serious assertion. In producing ACP, Cortázar is merely pretending to know about a reader reading a novel with the features he represents for his fiction-making purposes. Were we to assume that it is knowledge that he is trying to convey, it would not cross our minds that the reader he is telling us about is the victim in the novel he is reading, in spite of the coincidences (the upholstery of the armchair, the large windows); if the story is told to express knowledge about the actual world, it makes much more sense to think that these are just accidental. We only derive (6) when we take into consideration that Cortázar is merely pretending to assert and that his real purpose is to entertain us with an amusing story, perhaps, in addition, one with interesting consequences to reflect upon, such as (7). Thus, it is something like (G-C) that captures in a general way the basic assumption that we use in determining the content of a fiction.

(G-C) A sentence of the form ‘In the fiction F, ϕ ’ is true if and only if it is part of the communicative intentions of F’s creator, as expressed by recognizable features Φ of F, to put audiences with intended features χ in a position to make believe ϕ .

(G-C) accounts for the generation of (6); the pieces of evidence mentioned in the intuitive justification offered above for its truth are in fact

considerations of Gricean *relevance* relative to the communicative goals constituting fiction-making.

(G-C) is not in opposition to the two sorts of principle that Lewis appeals to in his two analyses, (L) and the alternative one appealing to the way the actual world is instead of what is common knowledge. I take both of them, in those cases in which each is intuitively applicable, to be entailed by (G-C). Reliance on shared beliefs (or on not so commonly known actual facts, for instance, autobiographical facts in poetry) to go beyond what is explicit in the fiction is just one of the usual make-believe devices presupposed in the communicative intentions of authors, one of the ways through which authors lead reasonable audiences to imagine propositions.³⁸ What are “reasonable” audiences? The most that can be said here is that there is a practice of criticism (in which, of course, not just official critics, but most people fond of fiction engage), according to which not every proposition is fictional in a given fiction, on whose standards depend the nature of the illocutionary-type at stake.³⁹ In general, I share Walton’s skepticism about the prospects for working out an exhaustive catalogue of the resources successfully used to generate fictional contents.⁴⁰ To put it bluntly, given such a catalogue, a clever author could produce a fiction relying on a procedure not in the catalogue to generate content for its fiction, which most informed appraisers would agree in counting as fictional in the work. (G-C) is, of course, vaguely general, but I think that the philosopher’s task finishes with such a proposal; beyond that, it is the critic’s work to characterize specific principles of generation.

(G-C) could thus be put in terms closer to Lewis’s possible-worlds account by including a restriction on the relevant worlds additional to Lewis’s shared belief restriction.⁴¹

(G-C_{pw}) A sentence of the form ‘In the fiction F, ϕ ’ is true if and only if ϕ would be true if, consistently with the fiction-making intentions of the author as ascertainable from F by intended audiences, F were told as known fact, and the beliefs constituting common knowledge in the community where F originated were also known fact.

How useful the appeal to possible worlds will be depends in general on how adequate the possible-worlds account of the content of fictions is, for instance, to deal with the crucial issue that referential expressions like those in (1), (3), and (4)

lack their ordinary referents, or with intentionally impossible fictions. My own view is that it is useful, if we take into consideration only the “primary intensions” of two-dimensional semantics on a certain neo-Fregean interpretation of them; but this should be properly elaborated elsewhere.⁴²

VII. THE INTENTIONAL FALLACY

Most criticisms of illocutionary-type accounts of fictionalizing accuse them of incurring the alleged “intentional fallacy,” which, as previously indicated, Beardsley and Wimsatt put as the view that “in order to judge the poet’s performance, we must know what he intended.” In evaluating these criticisms, it is very important to keep in mind that on the present account, not just any intention of the fiction-maker is relevant: only *communicative* intentions are. Let me provide an illustration of this distinction, taken from recent disputes regarding the nature and role of demonstrations in the interpretation of demonstratives. In his earlier work, David Kaplan took demonstrations to be something like visual presentations of objects discriminated by pointing gestures, or the pointing gestures themselves.⁴³ Later, Kaplan proposes a revision of that theory, according to which demonstrations are to be considered sets of “directing intentions.”⁴⁴ To justify the revision, he mentions a famous example that he had given earlier. The speaker points at a picture of Agnew while wrongly believing to be pointing at a picture of Carnap that used to hang in the place on the wall where he is pointing, while uttering: “That is a picture of one of the greatest philosophers of this century.”⁴⁵ He says that he had adopted the earlier view with this example in mind, thinking that to take demonstrations to be directing intentions instead of pointing gestures “seemed to confound what Donnellan might call the *referential* and the *attributive* uses,” while now he has decided to disregard this example “as a rather complex, atypical case.”⁴⁶

This has suggested to some readers that a motivation for the revised theory is the belief that—against what he himself said earlier in presenting the example—a correct theory should entail that it is Carnap’s picture, and not Agnew’s, to which the demonstrative refers. Marga Reimer criticizes Kaplan’s revised theory on this assumption, endorsing the earlier account.⁴⁷ I think she is right that Carnap’s picture is merely the speaker’s refer-

ent, not the demonstrative’s semantic referent. In defense of the revised theory, however, Kent Bach points out that the speaker in the story *also intends* to refer to Agnew’s picture.⁴⁸ It is just that what he *ancillary intends to refer to* (the demonstrated entity, Agnew’s picture) does not coincide with what he *ultimately intends to refer to* (Carnap’s picture) by enacting the first, ancillary referential intention. Thus, says Bach, Reimer’s intuitions about the example are still borne out by Kaplan’s new theory of demonstration, to the extent that we assume that when a pointing gesture takes place, it is this gesture that gives the primary indication of the speaker’s directing intentions when determining the semantic referent.

Putting aside Kaplan’s exegesis, the important point is that Bach is surely correct that the two intentions are present, even if the one the speaker focuses on is his ultimate intention—the other being a merely ancillary one. More importantly, Bach is also right that there is good reason, inside a Gricean framework, to take the speaker’s ancillary intention expressed by his pointing gesture, as opposed to his ultimate intention to refer to the picture that used to be hanging there, as most relevant to determine the semantic referent; namely, that only the former can be reasonably taken to be a *communicative* referential intention, an intention that is expected to succeed by its being recognized.⁴⁹

When using demonstratives, speakers intend the propositions they express to be about individuals made salient to their audience when they utter them in agreed ways, particularly by the use of accompanying pointing gestures. Typically, they also intend for those propositions to be about individuals having further recognizable features (in the example, the features represented in the picture of Carnap that the speaker believes to be behind him). It is the latter intention that they have fully in mind because it involves more useful properties than that of being made salient in a particular act of demonstration for the cognitive handling (in inference, memory, and so on) of the propositions they want to convey to their audiences. Ancillary and ultimate referential intentions usually pick up the same individuals; otherwise, demonstratives would not be serviceable and there would not be conventions establishing their use. When they do not, the demonstrative’s literal referent is certainly not determined by the ultimate referential intentions because it is the conflicting ancillary

ones that are *communicative*—capable of producing their intended effects by being recognized in the required way. Whether the most sensible treatment of the cases have the ancillary referential intentions determining the semantic referent, or whether they should be treated as reference failures, is up for grabs; intuitions certainly waver, depending on the case. Perhaps the most that can be said is that different cases deserve different diagnoses.⁵⁰

These points apply *mutatis mutandis* to acts of fictionalizing. First, not every intention to put their audiences in a position to make-believe (imagine) propositions that authors might have in mind determines the contents of their fictions, no matter how important those intentions are for them: only those that it is sensible to count as recognizable by the intended audiences on the basis of features of their acts. Thus, even if Cortázar very much wanted us to imagine that clairvoyant Cubans wrote the novel in ACP, this is not a fictional truth in the story.⁵¹ Second, just as the speaker in Kaplan's example may have both unintentionally (relative to his ultimate intentions) and intentionally (relative to his communicative intentions) conveyed a proposition about Agnew's picture, an author might well unintentionally (relative to his or her ultimate intentions) but intentionally (relative to what his or her communicative intentions lead sensible audiences to ascertain from the story) guide his or her audience to correctly imagine certain propositions.⁵² Thus, (8) may still be true, even if Cortázar declares not to have thought of the victim of the conspiracy in the fictional novel of his story as the heroine's husband. For he knows very well our critical practices in interpreting fictions, which he exploits for his fiction-making purposes in his writings. He should thus agree that he intended that propositions that can be derived from what is explicit in his story on the basis of shared beliefs are part of its content and this, together with the pieces of evidence we gave before in justifying (8), entails that he intended, even if only in those general terms, the relevant proposition to belong to ACP's content.

It may be thought that the demonstrative analogy is misleading, in that the criteria for proper manifestations of communicative referential intentions are in that case clear, while they are not in the case of fictions. But the situation is not so different. Pointing gestures are acknowledged ways of conveying referential communicative in-

tentions for demonstratives, but they are not the only ones; there is an open-ended list of other equally serviceable criteria that speakers make use of. In some cases, there might well even be as a result two or more equally acceptable competing candidates, given by two or more equally acceptable criteria. The same applies to the interpretation of fictions.⁵³

It could be useful to discuss an example.⁵⁴ An unskilled author writes a mystery. He wants to write an open-ended story, one at the end of which the reader is supposed to make-believe that the case is not solved. But he is just no good at it. Without realizing it, he constructs the plot in such a way that it implies that the killer is the night porter. So, (10) is true.

10. In the mystery, the killer is the night porter.

However, this is unintended by the writer; he just did not figure out that the clues, once one puts them together, establish that the killer is the night porter. So, there is no intention on his part that the audience believe that the killer is the night porter. Thus, there is no communicative intention of this sort either.

Objections like this should be answered in two ways, depending on how much weight is put on the author's lack of skill. If too much weight is put, the case is similar to objections by Walton to illocutionary-type accounts, based on the fact that we take the Bible or Greek myths as fiction, or on examples like the wonderful literary piece accidentally produced by monkeys, and so on.⁵⁵ In that case, the sort of reply that Currie and others have suggested is also adequate here. The only clear thing about these cases is that we *treat them* as fictions with contents properly characterized by (10), not that they *are* fictions with those contents. It is acceptable for an otherwise theoretically well-motivated account to insist that they *are not* such fictions. To explain why we treat them as if they were should not be difficult. In the example, it is clear that we treat the mystery as one for which (10) is true, but it is not clear that it is one such. If, on the other hand, not too much weight is put on the author's lack of skill, then the previous line also works here. The author knows about the critical practice of determining the content of mysteries; indeed, he intentionally exploits it in constructing his mystery. It is part of his communicative intention to rely on this practice to fill out the

explicit content of his mystery. When the clues determining the night porter as the likely murderer are pointed out to him, he should acknowledge that he intended this to be part of the content of the mystery, although only in general terms, not having himself carefully worked out all the (intended, in those general terms) consequences of his assumptions.

Commonplace criticisms of the *intentional fallacy* thus have a point, which is why they are so popular, but the point they have is compatible with the truth of our intentionalist proposal, and thus with the alleged intentional fallacy, as characterized by Beardsley and Wimsatt, not being a fallacy at all. First, an author can unsuccessfully intend to make part of the content of his or her fiction a proposition that the author considers in its full specificity. Second, an author can wrongly deny that a proposition also considered in its full propositional specificity is part of his or her fiction's content, in that the author does have general intentions that entail that the proposition is part of the content, as the author himself or herself is in a position to work out.

VIII. CONCLUSION

Claim (6) is but a particularly clear-cut illustration of a type of inference to indirectly generated fictional truths that is part of our appreciation of the content of most fictions. (G-C) handles other cases similarly, which Lewis himself saw as problematic for his account, and upon which critics have dwelt since in discussions of his proposal, such as: the inference that the singer of the ballad of Mack the Knife in Bertolt Brecht's *Threepenny Opera* is a treacherous fellow (TF 274); unreliable narrators, like the one in "the puzzle of the flash stockman" (TF 279–280); fictions with intended contradictory contents (TF 274–275, 277–278); Walton's silly questions, as whether Othello spoke a wonderfully nuanced English for a military man.⁵⁶ Given the failures of competing views, all these cases provide good evidence in favor of Gricean illocutionary-type accounts of fictionalizing.

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1. All references to David Lewis, Gregory Currie, and Kendall Walton that appear throughout this essay are from the following volumes: David Lewis, "Truth in Fiction," in *Philosophical Papers* (Oxford University Press, 1983), vol. 1, pp. 261–280 (a reprint with postscripts of the essay with the same title, originally published in *American Philosophical Quarterly* 15 [1978]: 37–46), hereafter TF; Gregory Currie, *The Nature of Fiction* (Cambridge University Press, 1990), hereafter NF; Kendall Walton, *Mimesis and Make-Believe* (Harvard University Press, 1990), hereafter MM.

2. This story appears courtesy of the heir of Julio Cortázar. It is my own translation of Julio Cortázar, "Continuidad de los Parques," in *Cuentos Completos I* (Madrid: Alfaguara, 2001).

3. Alvin Plantinga, *The Nature of Necessity* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974), p. 161. Exceptions include followers of the views by Nelson Goodman, to be mentioned later.

4. Timothy Williamson, "Knowing and Asserting," *Philosophical Review* 105 (1996): 489–523; included with some revisions as Chapter 11 of his *Knowledge and its Limits* (Oxford University Press, 2000). I defend this version of Williamson's account in my "Assertion and the Semantics of Force-Markers," in *The Semantics/Pragmatics Distinction*, CSLI Lecture Notes, ed. C. Bianchi (The University of Chicago Press, 2004), pp. 133–166.

5. The variables χ and Φ are intended to pick up, respectively, features characterizing the intended audience (so that it has whatever is required to understand the speaker's intentions) and features of the utterance accessible to such an audience, such as its having a certain conventional meaning. See Currie (NF 30–35) and references there for details.

6. M. Beardsley and W. Wimsatt, "The Intentional Fallacy," in their *The Verbal Icon* (University of Kentucky, 1954), pp. 4, 3.

7. Terence Parsons, *Nonexistent Objects* (Yale University Press, 1980) is the classical reference for neo-Meinongianism, the contemporary version of the view that there are objects that "have being" but do not exist.

8. Peter van Inwagen, "Creatures of Fiction," *American Philosophical Quarterly* 14 (1977): 299–308. Unlike neo-Meinongians like Parsons, van Inwagen takes creatures of fiction to exist.

9. Amie Thomasson, *Fiction and Metaphysics* (Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 100–105, is a fuller short discussion.

10. I am sympathetic to Edward Zalta's suggestion that his preferred neo-Meinongian account, and the sort of proposal I will be endorsing, can be seen as mere notational variants. See Zalta, "The Road Between Pretense Theory and Abstract Object Theory," in *Empty Names, Fiction and the Puzzles of Non-Existence*, ed. A. Everett and T. Hofweber (Stanford: CSLI, 2000), pp. 117–147.

11. This is compatible with accepting van Inwagen's view that assertions like (2) do have their apparent logical forms, their singular terms genuinely referring to creatures of fiction.

12. There is an order of importance among the propositions that are fictional in a given fiction, to which we are sensitive when summing up the plot of a film or a novel.

13. Readers of a previous version of this article wondered how helpful it is to base a theory of fiction on "a bizarre and exceptional (albeit intriguing) case" like the Cortázar story. As I explain by the end (Section VIII), providing other

examples, I have chosen it merely because it dramatizes the point I want to make, given the importance of (6) in the story, among other things, as a foundation on which to base (7), but the point could be illustrated with more plain examples taken from almost any fiction, as those later examples will make clear.

14. Our evidence: their dilemma is “sordid,” their passion “secret”; the heroine’s caresses “sketched abominably” for the hero “the frame of that other body it was necessary to destroy”; she is familiar with the house, which she has described in detail to her lover.

15. As will become clear later, a given claim about what is fictional in a given fiction only defeasibly states a directly generated fact; considerations dependent on other propositions being fictional in the given fiction can defeat any claim that a proposition is fictional in it.

16. See John Searle, “The Logical Status of Fictional Discourse,” *New Literary History* 6 (1974), also included in his *Expression and Meaning* (Cambridge University Press, 1979).

17. With Lewis I am assuming a distinction between the content of the story, which includes meta-linguistic propositions such as that mentioned in (9), and its plot, which does not; I think this has a plausible intuitive basis.

18. In fact, one could take the possibility of the story to be implicitly conceded by what Lewis grants in postscript C of TF, pp. 278–279.

19. To deal with the problem posed by the incredible possibility that the plots of the Holmes stories obtains in the actual world, Lewis only needs that claims like (9) characterize contents fictional in all stories; the further contention that they cannot be actually true is not required.

20. Currie’s account of fictionalizing includes as a necessary condition that fictions are not nonaccidentally true, to deal with what he takes to be counterexamples to an account without it (NF 42–49). If this is correct, the novel that the main character in Cortázar’s story reads can at most be an apparent novel in the counterexample that I have described to criticize Lewis. The counterexample can be modified to deal with this; perhaps the state manager is paranoid, did not have any evidence and made up the conspiracy, did have the intention to warn his boss by writing the novel, and came upon the truth by accident.

21. ‘Common knowledge’ is used for the concept introduced by Stephen Schiffer in his *Meaning* (Oxford University Press, 1972), Lewis, and others so as to provide Gricean analyses of meaning, convention, and related notions.

22. As a matter of fact, this is not so clear, as John F. Phillips correctly points out in his “Truth and Inference in Fiction,” *Philosophical Studies* 94 (1999): 273–293, see pp. 279–281. If we were told as known fact a story like the one in the novel in ACP, we would infer at most that it is probable that the victim is the husband, while when we are told of it in the fiction, we are certain of this. But let us grant it, for the sake of illustrating how (L) is supposed to work. Later I will show how my proposal avoids the difficulty.

23. The problem with Lewis’s account of the contents of fictions that our examples (5) and (6) illustrate is, I take it, but a dramatic case of the more general difficulty pointed out by Peter Lamarque, “Logic and Criticism,” in his *Fictional Points of View* (Cornell University Press, 1996); the alternative I suggest below is also in accordance with that diagnosis.

24. See David Velleman, “Narrative Explanation,” *Philosophical Review* 112 (2003): 1–25, for an interesting account of the peculiar explanatory force uniting narratives, and related references.

25. It is this very same sort of relevance that is required for a full account of the generation of the implicit fictional truth considered in note 22, that it is not just probable but the (fictional) case that it is the heroine’s husband the hero in the fictional novel purports to kill. This would be explained by the elaboration of this idea to be provided in what follows, in terms of an illocutionary-act theory of fictionalizing.

26. See Walton (MM 161–183).

27. H. P. Grice, “Logic and Conversation,” in *Studies in the Ways of Words* (Harvard University Press, 1989), pp. 22–40; also included in *Syntax and Semantics*, ed. P. Cole and J. Morgan (New York: Academic Press, 1975), vol. 3.

28. Kent Bach advocates such an indexical self-referential analysis of communicative intentions; see his “On Communicative Intentions: A Reply to Recanati,” *Mind and Language* 2 (1987): 141–154. For an illuminating recent account of the nature of those states, applied both to communicative intentions and to common knowledge, see Christopher Peacocke, “Joint Attention: Its Nature, Reflexivity, and Relation to Common Knowledge,” in *Joint Attention: Communication and Other Minds*, ed. N. Eilan, C. Hoerl, T. McCormack, and J. Roessler (Oxford University Press, 2005).

29. I elaborate on some of those presuppositions in my “Gricean Rational Reconstructions and the Semantics/Pragmatics Distinction,” *Synthese* 128 (2001): 93–131; and “Assertion and the Semantics of Force-Markers,” in *The Semantics/Pragmatics Distinction*, CSLI Lecture Notes, ed. C. Bianchi (The University of Chicago Press, 2004), pp. 133–166.

30. Currie (NF 30–35) gives references and provides some reasons for this, for the particular case of his Gricean account of fictionalizing, on which I am relying here.

31. John Searle’s account is in the spirit of Grice’s, in his “Indirect Speech Acts,” in *Syntax and Semantics*, ed. P. Cole and J. Morgan (New York: Academic Press, 1975), vol. 3, pp. 59–82. The relation between plain assertions like (7) and the fiction-making giving rise to them (Cortázar’s utterance of ACP, in this case) is in my view essentially of this very sort, a kind of conversational implicature properly extended beyond Grice’s proposal so as to cover indirect speech-acts in general. See Grice, “Logic and Conversation.” Close uses facts like this, about the way fictions manage to indirectly convey assertions and other speech-acts, to argue for a speech-act account of fiction-making. See Close, “Don Quixote and the ‘Intentionalist Fallacy,’” *The British Journal of Aesthetics* 12 (1972): 19–39.

32. Stephen Levinson, *Presumptive Meanings* (MIT Press, 2000), p. 17.

33. Grice, “Logic and Conversation,” p. 26.

34. This is why, as I said above in note 19, once Lewis has adopted an illocutionary-type theory, he does not need to reject (7)—in contrast to theorists like Goodman, who analyze fictionalizing in terms of the truth-properties of the conveyed propositions. Concerning the difficulties, see the criticisms by Currie (NF 12–18), Walton (MM 81–85), and Peter Lamarque and S. H. Olsen, *Truth, Fiction and Literature* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), pp. 62–69.

35. Walton (MM 85–89).

36. See Currie (NF 35–42); Lamarque and Olsen, *Truth, Fiction and Literature*, pp. 46–49.

37. See the discussion on pp. 282–286 of John F. Phillips, “Truth and Inference in Fiction,” *Philosophical Studies* 94 (1999): 273–293.

38. I take it that my proposal is close to Jerrold Levinson’s “hypothetical” intentionalism about the semantic content of fictions, although, for reasons to be elaborated in the following section, I would count the relevant communicative intentions as actual, not hypothetical. See Jerrold Levinson, “Intention and Interpretation: A Last Look,” in *Intention and Interpretation*, ed. G. Iseminger (Temple University Press, 1992), pp. 221–256.

39. Lamarque and Olsen usefully discuss the nature of this practice in terms that I find congenial in their *Truth, Fiction and Literature*, pp. 29–52. They reject accounts that, like the present one, analyze fiction-making as a type of illocutionary force because “there is little to be gained” from them (p. 72); this article tries to articulate part of what there is to be gained.

40. Walton (MM 183–187).

41. Put in those terms, it can be more easily compared to A. Bonomi and S. Zucchi’s related proposal on pp. 117–119 of their “A Pragmatic Framework for Truth in Fiction,” *Dialectica* 57 (2003): 103–120; their appeal to “conventions for the fiction” can be understood, along the lines here advocated, as deriving from a speech-act account of fiction-making. Phillips’s proposal is also close: “A sentence of the form ‘In the fiction F, ϕ ’ is true if and only if, it is reasonable for an informed reader to infer from the text that, under ideal conditions, the author of F would agree that ϕ is a part of F” (“Truth and Inference in Fiction,” p. 287). By suggesting resources for elaborating on what an author should agree to under ideal conditions, implicit in the appeal to an illocutionary-type account of fiction-making, mine improves on this.

42. I outline this interpretation in my “A Neo-Fregean Interpretation of Two-Dimensionalism,” in *Two-Dimensional Semantics*, ed. J. Macià, and M. García-Carpintero (Oxford University Press, 2006).

43. David Kaplan, “Demonstratives,” in *Themes from Kaplan*, ed. J. Almog, J. Perry, and H. Wettstein (Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 481–563; see p. 490.

44. David Kaplan, “Afterthoughts,” in *Themes from Kaplan*, pp. 565–614.

45. David Kaplan, “Dthat,” in *Demonstratives*, ed. P. Yourgrau (Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 11–32; example on pp. 30–31. This essay originally appeared in *Syntax and Semantics*, ed. P. Cole (New York: Academic Press), pp. 221–243.

46. Kaplan, “Afterthoughts,” pp. 583, 582n.

47. Marga Reimer, “Demonstratives, Demonstrations, and Demonstrata,” *Philosophical Studies* 63 (1991): 187–202.

48. Kent Bach, “Paving the Road to Reference,” *Philosophical Studies* 67 (1992): 295–300.

49. Bach himself does not think that demonstratives have semantic referents, only speakers’ pragmatic ones, but this is irrelevant for present purposes.

50. Howard Wettstein’s discussion of several cases shows this in his “How to Bridge the Gap Between Meaning and Reference,” *Synthese* 58 (1984): 63–84.

51. Currie has a similar example (NF 109).

52. Whether a proposition has been properly expressed about Agnew’s picture depends, of course, on whether or not the case is treated as reference failure.

53. Currie provides as an example the well-known rival interpretations of Henry James’s “Turn of the Screw” (NF 66).

54. Together with other similarly interesting examples, this one was proposed by Alessandro Zucchi, to whom I am grateful for discussion of this and related points.

55. Those writings mentioned in note 36 provide convincing replies to these criticisms.

56. For further discussion of these problems, see Currie (NF 62–70, 83–89); Lamarque and Olsen *Truth, Fiction and Literature*, pp. 90–95; and Phillips, “Truth and Inference in Fiction,” pp. 277–281.