

DOUBLE-DUTY QUOTATION: THE DEFERRED OSTENSION ACCOUNT

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Abstract

This paper starts by outlining relevant aspects of a view of how indexicals in general and demonstratives in particular work, after which it presents a version of Davidson's (1979) Demonstrative Theory of quotation that I have argued for in previous work. On this form of the demonstrative view, the quoted material plays a role analogous to the demonstrated item in cases of "deferred ostension" uses of ordinary demonstratives. The paper then examines the phenomenon that Recanati calls open quotation, here called instead *double-duty quotation*, and argues that the version of the Demonstrative Theory previously sketched is consistent with the existence of double-duty quotation, and to that extent is confirmed by it even though the theory was elaborated without regard for double-duty quotation.

In my previous work on quotation (1994 and 2004a) I have defended a version of Davidson's (1979) Demonstrative Theory, which I decided to call the *Deferred Ostension* theory (*DO* henceforth) after I realized the affinities of the view put forward in my (1994) with Nunberg's (1993) general views on demonstratives. What Recanati (2001) calls *open quotation* and I would rather call *double-duty quotation*, as in (1) below (from the *New York Review of Books*, May 27, 2004, p. 10), a phenomenon that I had not thought about when I developed the theory, is I think entirely consistent with *DO*.

- (1) Saddam Hussein did not pose an "immediate threat to the security of our people," as Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld said.

In what follows, in the first section I will outline some relevant aspects of the views on demonstratives that I assume; in the second I sketch *DO*, and in the third and final section I conclude by showing how it is consistent with double-duty quotation, and to that extent is confirmed by it. Although at some points I will have to mention rival accounts of quotation, I will refrain from making fully-fledged comparisons or otherwise arguing for what I in fact think is the case, i.e. that *DO* provides the theoretically most systematic and simplest account of the evidence.

1. How Demonstratives Work

The account of demonstratives on which I rely – presented in García-Carpintero (1998 and 2000) – is indebted to the work of previous writers, including Kaplan (1989) and especially Perry (2001). Its main relevant features are as follows: (i) Demonstrative-types have as their linguistic meanings token-reflexive rules, (ii) which contribute to determining the referents (if any) of their cases or tokens, (iii) relative to specific speaker intentions; (iv) by default demonstrative tokens contribute their referents to the propositional objects of the main speech acts that they help convey, thus behaving in a directly referential way, even though (v), together, the token-reflexive rule that is the meaning of the type, the token itself and the speaker's referential intentions determine a descriptive content that is part of a conventional implicature, and thus of the fully-fledged content of the linguistic act. I will now briefly elaborate on these points.

Demonstrative types have a standing meaning, and demonstrative cases have a reference; it corresponds roughly to Kaplan's character, although I take the correct account of the standing meaning of indexicals in general and demonstratives in particular to be a Reichenbachian one, according to which it consists of a token-reflexive rule, such as (2) for the so-called "pure" indexical 'today':

- (2) A case *c* of 'today' refers to the day when *c* is uttered.

As Wettstein (1984) puts it, there appears to be a gap between the standing meaning of demonstratives and their reference: the cases of 'that' in two utterances of (3) will typically have different referents, but their standing meaning is the same. "What exactly bridges the gap between the *meager* lexical meaning of such an indexical expression and its *determinate* reference?"

- (3) That is a cocker spaniel.

Let us stipulate the *applied standing meaning* of a token indexical to be the token-reflexive description – schematized in (4) below for 'today' – which results from filling up the quantified variable in its corresponding standing meaning with an expression referring to that indexical-case. The question arises whether Wettstein's gap still exists regarding the applied standing meanings of indexicals and their references. In the case of so-called "pure" indexicals, like 'now', 'here', 'today' and 'I', researchers feel that it does not, that the relevant description suffices to bridge it; this is why they are distinguished as "pure." With Nunberg (1993) I think this impression is misleading, but I will here concentrate on impure indexicals or demonstratives,

simple as in (3) or complex, regarding which researchers feel that the gap still exists. What bridges it?

- (4) The day when *today* is uttered.

This matter has been debated in the recent literature. *Contextualists* hold that the gap is bridged by cues in the conversational context, paradigmatically pointing gestures by the speaker; Wettstein (1984) and Reimer (1991) defend this view. *Intentionalists* appeal instead to what speakers "have in mind", along the lines suggested by Donnellan (1970) for proper names. Intentionalists base their view on cases in which the demonstrative succeeds in referring without any apparent cues, as when (3) is uttered in a context in which there is only one visible dog. Kaplan (1989) argued for his partial contextualism on the basis of his famous 'picture of Carnap' example, and other contextualists have added similar examples to support their view:

Pointing behind him, Kaplan utters 'that is a picture of a great philosopher' thinking that the picture behind him is a picture of Carnap. Unbeknownst to him, the picture of Carnap has been replaced with a picture of Spiro Agnew, one of Richard Nixon's Vice-Presidents. (Kaplan 1978: 30)

Suppose that I suddenly realize that I have left my keys on the desk in my (shared) office. I return to my office, where I find the desk occupied by my officemate. I then spot my keys, sitting there on the desk, alongside my officemate's keys. I then make a grab for my keys, saying *just as I mistakenly grab my officemate's keys*, 'These are mine.' (Reimer 1991: 190)

A speaker wishes to say something about a certain man, Jones, who he mistakenly thinks he sees off in the distance. Jones has recently had open-heart surgery and the speaker has heard that Jones has foolishly been exerting himself raking leaves. He says, pointing to the man who he takes to be Jones but is actually Smith, 'That is a self-destructive man. He has been raking against his doctor's orders.' (Wettstein 1984: 70)

A speaker, focusing his visual attention on a ball that has bounced into the street, wants to tell his addressee to go pick it up. He points and says, 'Go pick up that ball.' But this speaker has extremely bad motor coordination, so that wherever he intends to point, he ends up pointing 90 degrees to the right. He does not know this about himself, however. As it happens, there is a ball in the direction in which he unwittingly points that is resting in a mud puddle. (Siegel 2002: 17)

Joan has been raised in a small community, where pointing with the big toe is the conventional way of demonstrating. Guillermo just entered the room, screaming; on the assumption that she is addressing people sharing her

demonstrative conventions, Joan utters ‘that man is Colombian’ while manifestly pointing with her big toe towards Pedro – who is in fact Colombian, while Guillermo is Mexican. (A variation by Jennifer Saul on an example by Bianchi (2003), during a presentation of the paper.)

Against intentionalism, I think we would agree that in all these cases the demonstrative does not refer to what the speaker primarily intends to refer to. (Notice that the issue concerns semantic reference, not speaker’s reference, in Kripke’s (1977) well-known distinction.) That is enough to refute simple intentionalism. It is an additional issue whether the demonstrative refers instead to what *S* mistakes for it, or whether the cases should be treated as reference-failures, on account of the otherwise blatant infelicity of the then resulting speech-act. (Thus, for instance, imagine that, in the last example above, the audience includes someone belonging to Joan’s community, or that, in Kaplan’s example, the pictures are exchanged in plain view of the audience while Kaplan lectures, just before his utterance.) Intuitions hesitate on this, and a theoretically motivated decision needs to be made, but this is an issue on which we cannot dwell.

However, as Bach (1992) notes, this result only casts doubt on an unduly simplistic version of intentionalism, which does not make independently required distinctions. A constitutive relation between intention and belief, as pointed out by Donnellan (1968) and Grice (1971) among others, requires that distinction. For present purposes, it will suffice to state as follows the nature of a relation that is notoriously difficult to articulate : it is not reasonable for *S* to intend to bring it about that *p* if *S* has no reasonable expectation that it is possible for him to bring it about that *p*.

Generalizing a point made by Siegel (2002: 7), we can see that all previous examples have the following structure, where *S* is the speaker, *D* is a demonstrative, and *P* is a specification of a *prima facie* individuating condition (roughly, a type that, it is at least reasonably to think, picks out a unique object in a context):

- (i) There is an object *x* that *S* takes to be the *P*
- (ii) There is a *y*, *y* ≠ the *P*, such that *S* intends his use of *D* to refer to *y*
- (iii) *S* believes that *y* is the *P*.

Bach’s first point is that in all our examples there is an individuating condition that can be put in the corresponding application of (i) which is *also* part of the content of a referential intention by *S*. In Kaplan’s case, the speaker intends to refer to the picture behind him which he is pointing to; in Reimer’s case, to the keys he is perceptually (tactually) focusing on; in Wettstein’s case, to the man he is perceptually (visually) focusing on; in Siegel’s case, to the ball he is pointing to; in Saul’s case, to the man made salient to conversationists by

means standard among them. Bach’s second point is that, on a Gricean framework, that is the most relevant intention, because, relative to that in (ii), it is more reasonable to take it to be a *communicative* referential intention satisfying the constitutive link with beliefs: one that is more reasonably expected to succeed through its being recognized.¹

Modified intentionalism is the view that, in cases of conflict of nested intentions as in the above examples, communicative intentions that better satisfy the link with reasonable expectations defeat conflicting intentions in determining demonstrative reference. Objections to this form of intentionalism based on examples like the previous ones do not work, then; and the distinction on which the modification is based is independently well supported. Moreover, Saul’s example suggests that unrefined contextualism is false: contextual clues not backed by the proper intentions are unable to fix the referent of demonstratives.²

According to an account of demonstrative reference which is therefore at least consistent with intuitions about the preceding cases, a necessary condition for an expression *E* to refer to object *o* is that *E* be part of a sentence by means of which a given speech act (assertion, question, command...) is performed, with a *de re* content about *o*.³ A necessary condition for this in turn is that the speaker *S* has relevant communicative intentions, including a communicative intention to refer to *o* with *E* by securing joint attention to the *P*, given that *o* = the *P*.⁴ I give only necessary conditions, assuming that reference is conceptually irreducible; the preceding purport to be claims of what is (conceptually) constitutive of reference.⁵ The above formulation also presupposes that referential intentions have *de re* propositions as contents, compatibly with their objects being descriptively identified.

Going back to our previous question, is there any need to bridge the gap between the applied standing meanings of demonstratives and their references? (5) states the more general determinable token-reflexive rule expressing the standing meaning of the demonstrative ‘he’ across contexts compatibly with the preceding discussion, and (6) schematizes the resulting applied standing meaning of a particular case:

- (5) A case *c* of ‘he’ refers to the most salient male when *c* is uttered.
- (6) The most salient male when *he* is uttered.

Salience is not here intended as an independently understood notion; it is whatever property best explains and accommodates our semantically significant intuitions concerning the use of demonstratives. It is itself a determinable, to be determined relative to the different procedures – some conventional – that the linguistic community uses to carry out reasonable referential intentions. Only psycholinguistic research could begin to specify its extension (Evans 1982: 311); and I doubt that an exhaustive list can be

produced: creative speakers are able to come up with sensible ways of manifesting referential intentions beyond those in any given list. In each particular case, such a determinable must be determined; to this extent, a gap has to be bridged.

On this view, the traditional division into deictic and anaphoric uses of indexicals in cases like those so far contemplated has no role to play in semantic theory. As Heim & Kratzer (1998: 240) put it, expressing a coinciding view, “anaphoric and deictic uses seem to be special cases of the same phenomenon: the pronoun refers to an individual which, for whatever reason, is highly salient at the moment when the pronoun is processed”. When uttered in a context including (7) as part of the preceding discourse, it, as opposed to a perceptually available situation, provides descriptive material helping to fix the referent of the demonstrative in (8):

- (7) There is a unique planet causing perturbations in Uranus’s orbit.
 (8) That planet is bigger than Mars.

For similar reasons, the distinction between ordinary and deferential uses of demonstratives (as in (9), uttered while pointing to a set of footprints) is equally irrelevant to the issues at stake here, as argued by Borg (2001). In cases like this, what determines the determinable ‘salient’ in the individuating condition intended by the speaker is something like *being a male related in a contextually salient way to the ostended object* (the appeal to *salience* in it to be further contextually specified).

- (9) He must be a giant.

On the present view, the contemporarily popular characterization of *genuine reference* in terms of the lack of descriptive content, which many philosophers take to be the main lesson from Kripke (1980), is misguided. Thus, for instance, after quoting Russell’s famous contention in “Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description”, “Here the proper name has the direct use which it always wishes to have, as simply standing for a certain object, and not for a description of the object”, Donnellan (1990: 101, fn.) says, approvingly: “This is the mark of the genuine name; its function is simply to refer without any backing of descriptions, without any Millian connotation or Fregean sense.” Later however, discussing Kaplan’s character rule for ‘I’, which he agrees provides descriptions like (4) above, Donnellan says: “This rule, however, does not provide a description which ‘I’ goes proxy for nor a Fregean sense. It simply “fixes the referent”, in Kripke’s phrase” (1990: 109). So: genuine reference is not backed by description; reference with cases of ‘I’ is genuine; reference with cases of ‘I’ is fixed by description. This

would be a contradiction, unless there is a relevant difference between *backing* and *fixing*; I am unable to see what it could amount to.

On the present view, demonstratives are devices of genuine reference in that their referents – not the descriptive conditions they are associated with – are the default semantic contributions they make to the propositional contents of the main speech acts performed with the utterances in which they occur – to the assertions made with typical utterances of (2) and (8). As Nunberg (1993) and others have shown, there are cases in which what they contribute is rather such a descriptive content; (9), in at least one obvious interpretation, is a case in point. In my view, however, this does not contradict the previous claim; these cases should be understood as departures from the default, direct-reference case, typically triggered by systematic semantic mechanisms – such as the presence of the epistemic modal ‘must’ in (9). I cannot here go into the arguments for these two complementary views.⁶

The fact that the descriptive content can be raised to the asserted content is in any case important, for it provides a crucial reason to consider it (against Millian views such as Donnellan’s) genuinely semantic. It is true that in many cases such descriptive contents include material which speakers obtain in context from their world knowledge, as opposed to their knowledge of language; this would be so for what I previously proposed conceptualizing as contextual determinations of the determinable appeal to salience in token-reflexive demonstrative rules. But they function as enrichments of schematic descriptive contents that are conventional meanings of demonstrative types; and, as I have argued elsewhere, the distinction between what is conventional and what is not is a more relevant dimension than that between what is context-dependent and what is not for tracing the semantics-pragmatics divide in a theoretically sensible way.⁷

A second, important argument for the semantic character of the relevant descriptive contents goes as follows. It is a given in the present discussion that semantics has to provide an explanatory systematization of the validity of English arguments like (10):

- (10) The tallest person is hungry.
 ∴ Someone is hungry.

By the same token, semantics has to include in its explanatory systematization the validity of arguments like (11)-(13):

- (11) He is hungry.
 ∴ Some male is hungry.
 (12) That pot is empty.
 ∴ Some pot is empty.

- (13) You are angry.
 ∴ Someone in the audience is angry.

On the present view, we must distinguish the validity of (10) from that of (11)-(13). Indexicals are directly referential; their default truth-conditional import is their referent. As a result, (11)-(13) are not valid in the sense in which (10) is: it is not the case that the truth-conditions of their conclusions are satisfied in all possible circumstances in which those of their premises are. The validity of (11)-(13) is “character-validity”: given contexts in which their premises, if uttered there, would all signify truth-conditions satisfied there, their conclusions would signify truth-conditions similarly satisfied if uttered in the very same contexts. On this view, character-validity, even though a semantic phenomenon, is not a matter of ordinary truth-conditions.

In previous work (García-Carpintero 2000), I have proposed conceptualizing character-validity in particular, and the descriptive contribution of demonstratives in general, as depending on a conventional implicature, a pragmatic presupposition (like that which distinguishes ‘but’ from ‘and’) understood along the lines proposed by Stalnaker (1978). This is the final piece of the theoretical framework about demonstratives we need to have in place in order to understand double-duty quotation, as will become clear in the third section. Let us now move on to the presentation of DO.

2. The Deferred Ostension View of Quotation

Let us take stock, and introduce some necessary terminology. There are token-reflexive rules conventionally associated with demonstrative types, which distinguish semantically, say, ‘he’ from ‘you’. In virtue of them, when a competent speaker uses a token demonstrative, he thereby manifests, by default, an intention to refer to an entity of a given *conventionally indicated type* (*male*, in the case of ‘he’), standing in some specific context-sensitive *existential relation* to the token he has produced, capable of sensibly revealing communicative referential intentions. With demonstratives, sensible manifestation of those intentions will typically require the speaker to produce a further token of some standardized intentional action (a *demonstration*: a certain pointing gesture, say) to instantiate the specific existential relation determining the referent. This is because, unlike with so-called *pure* indexicals, in typical contexts including the demonstrative there are several objects satisfying the conventionally indicated type. In some expedient cases, a unique such individual is already manifest, no demonstration being needed; this is in general the case with pure indexicals.

When a successful demonstration occurs, it picks out an object, the *demonstratum*, typically coinciding with the referent. In cases of deferred

ostension, the demonstratum cannot be the referent, because it does not satisfy the conventionally indicated type; it is rather an *index* (Nunberg 1993), helping to determine the referent in ways not unlike those in which the token typically determines it: in virtue of further *specific context-sensitive existential relations*, properly manifested by the speaker. By default, the referent (in successful cases) is the demonstrative’s contribution to the proposition constituting the main speech act it helps to convey. As for the mutually known descriptive condition that must also exist in successful cases, it rather contributes to characterizing a presupposed proposition, by specifying the content of the presupposed speaker’s communicative referential intention.

All this nicely fits the way quotation works in natural languages according to DO, a version of the demonstrative theory. Consider a written utterance of sentence (14):

- (14) ‘Boston’ is disyllabic.

According to DO, quotation-marks are the linguistic bearers of reference, functioning like a demonstrative; the quoted material merely plays the role of a demonstrated index.⁸ The referent is obtained through some contextually suggested relation, manifesting the relevant speaker’s intentions; in the default case the relation will be: ... *instantiates the linguistic type* __, but there are other possibilities. In this way, DO accounts for the fact that we do not merely refer with quotations to expression-types, but also to other entities related in some way to the relevant token we are using: features exhibited by the token distinct from those constituting its linguistic type, features exhibited by other tokens of the same type but not by the one actually used (as when, by using a *graphic* token, we refer to its phonetic type), other related tokens, poems or songs including the instantiated types as in (15), and so on and so forth.⁹

- (15) Almost all English schoolboys used to know by heart ‘The curfew tolls the knell of parting day’, but not anymore; now they rather know ‘Imagine’.

On the contrasting and currently popular Fregean *Identity* theory (IT), when an expression is referred to by means of quotation the quoted material itself is the linguistic referring expression. Quotation-marks are not needed; when they are used, they serve to make clearer the shift in syntactic and semantic properties effected on the quoted material by its occupying that linguistic context: whatever its usual syntactic function, the quoted material functions as a singular term; whatever its usual semantic function, in that linguistic environment the quoted material refers to itself. In this way, as Washington (1992) emphasized, IT nicely accounts for those cases

(particularly, although not only, in spoken language) where no form of quotation-marks is used. DO appears to predict that those sentences, lacking an expression playing a syntactic role such as, say, the subject in a spoken version of 'cat' has three letters without any special intonation, should sound syntactically defective in languages – like English – lacking the “pro-drop” feature. They are not perceived to be so, however; the presence of the quoted material seems to be enough for speakers to notice no syntactic solecism.

In presenting the two views, I have taken care to indicate what I take to be their main strengths. These also constitute the main problems for the rival view, which typically the opposing view deals with by appealing to the semantics-pragmatics divide. Thus, for instance, the defender of DO will argue that, while the semantic referent of the subject in spoken utterances of (14) without quotation-marks is a city, and therefore what is said in those utterances is false, typically the speaker's referent will be an expression-type, and the thereby conversationally implicated content true.¹⁰ The defender of IT, in turn, will typically argue that, while the semantic referents of quotations are always the very same expression-types, their speaker's referents may well be on many occasions other related entities like those previously mentioned.

I would like to emphasize a point I have been careful to make in presenting the two views, namely, that they differ as regards what they count as the *linguistic* referring device in quotation. DO does not deny that the quoted material counts also as a referring expression, according to ordinary conceptions of *reference*. For we naturally describe indexes in regular cases of deferred ostension as *referring* to whatever they help refer to. Moreover, as we just saw, in those cases in which no quotation marks are used, according to DO they are the vehicles of the speaker's reference. The real difference between DO and IT lies in the fact that, according to the former view, in the strict sense of *referring device* in which only tokens of linguistic types have a referring function in the system of a natural language, it is tokens of quotation marks that are the referring devices in quotation; only they convey semantic reference. According to IT, it is rather the token of the quoted type that is the referring device, in that strict sense. If, as happens in (14), the quoted type is itself conventionally a referring device, there is a systematic ambiguity involved. Quotation marks help to disambiguate; alternative contextual resources can also be used for that purpose.

At first sight, quotation marks look much more like punctuation marks with this sort of disambiguating role than like fully-fledged linguistic referring devices. That impression is even stronger if it is kept in mind that devices like italicization and, in spoken language, some intonation contours are (in my view, at least) among the different shapes that quotation marks can conventionally adopt. However, no theoretically compelling argument against DO can be based on this. For the assumption behind such an argument should be that only word-like expressions – lexemes – can have semantic roles. But,

of course, we indicate, say, co-reference not only with lexemes (anaphoric expressions), but also by using tokens of the same type, and the relation *being of the same type* is not a lexeme; we indicate thematic roles with lexemes (declensional inflection), but also by means of syntactical relations that are not lexemes at all; we indicate focus by means of intonation, and so on and so forth. And what we indicate in all these variegated ways are crucial semantic features of natural languages.

Nonetheless, there are important objections to DO. Some by Gómez-Torrente (2001) are among the most ingenious I have recently seen. I have offered replies to them in my (2004). All in all, as I argue there, I still think that DO is currently the best contender in the field. I will not rehearse the reasons here. Let me just briefly mention what I take to be the main problem for a version of IT, proposed by Reimer (1996), which adopts some aspects of DO. Reimer's view shares with orthodox versions of IT the claim that the quoted material is the linguistic referring expression. Her version of IT differs from previous ones concerning the semantic subcategory of singular terms inside which this self-referring linguistic expression is to be included: according to her proposal, the quoted material is a demonstrative; quotation-marks, in her view, play the role of a *demonstration*. This accounts nicely for their absence – this occurs when the referential intentions of the speaker are so clear that a demonstration is not required; also for the fact that quotation marks are more needed in writing – this is because the context then does not make the speaker's intentions so perspicuous (Reimer 1996: 140).

However, the way we have seen demonstratives work in natural languages does not fit this view of quotation. As the previous summary emphasized, two factors are required to account for the semantics of indexicals and demonstratives: a linguistic rule associating distinct conventionally indicated types with distinct linguistic types (one, say, for 'he' and another for 'you') accounting for the semantic commonalities among different uses, and a truth-conditional import assigned to their tokens, or contextualized types, accounting for the potential differences in truth-conditional import. Given that Reimer's proposal is a version of IT, on her view there cannot be anything playing the role of the first element common to *all cases* of mention; there cannot be a common rule associating a common type with, say, the quoting expressions in (14) and (16):

(16) 'Madrid' is disyllabic.

On any *identity* view, the referring expressions in cases like these two are *different*. Therefore, there is no one type instantiated in all cases of quotation, with which a *common* linguistic rule is associated. On Reimer's view, whenever tokens of different expression-types are used for mentioning, *different* demonstrative-types are also involved; otherwise, it would not be

correct to say that the token of ‘Boston’ in an utterance of (14) lacking quotation marks is a *linguistic* expression that, by default, refers to itself, and her view would not be a version of IT. According to Reimer’s view, therefore, every natural language includes as many demonstrative-types as it includes expression-types. Indeed, in view of the fact that we can use for indexical mention graphic and spoken material belonging to other languages, as in (16) – or even to no used language – Reimer’s view entails that the types they instantiate are further *demonstrative expressions* of English.

This is not correct. The use of expressive devices like quotation marks evinces the perception that a common semantic procedure applies in all cases, which disregards the type of the quoted material: whenever *any* expression is quoted, a common token-reflexive “picturing” rule operates. Whenever ‘you’ is used, the same indexical rule operates, one different from the indexical rule operating whenever ‘he’ is used, associated with a specific conventionally indicated type, *being the addressee*. Reimer’s proposal has it that, analogously, when ‘Boston’ is quoted, the same indexical rule is operating, one different from the rule operating when ‘Madrid’ is quoted, which should then be associated with a specific conventionally indicated type. This is not the case. The same indexical rule, associated with a unique conventionally indicated type – something like *being an expression*, in a broad understanding of that notion – operates when we quote any expression whatsoever, even when we quote material that does not instantiate any expression-type of our language. The models we have for indexicals suggest that the indexical rule operating here is one associated with a type that is present no matter what the quoted type is; quotation-marks are the obvious candidate.¹¹

3. Double-Duty Quotation

Cappelen & Lepore (1997) called attention to uses of quotation marks (*mixed quotation*, in their terms) as in (1), repeated below, which combine direct and indirect discourse. They argued that a proper account of those cases requires deploying together a Davidsonian demonstrative treatment of quotation, and a Davidsonian paratactic treatment of indirect discourse.

- (1) Saddam Hussein did not pose an “immediate threat to the security of our people,” as Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld said.

I sympathise with Cappelen & Lepore’s arguments. However, the Davidsonian analysis of indirect discourse that I take to be correct differs in some minor respects from theirs, and as a result the view I consider adequate to properly unify direct and indirect discourse is one along the lines of Pietroski (1996) and (1999). I agree with Recanati (2001: 660) that Cappelen & Lepore’s

mixed quotation is but a particular case of a more general phenomenon, also including, among other things, scare quotes as in his example (17):

- (17) A ‘fortnight’ is a period of fourteen days.

Recanati classifies all those cases as *open* quotations. I am using an alternative expression, ‘double-duty quotation’. I have two reasons to burden the reader with a new term for the phenomenon. Firstly, it is descriptively apt; for, at an intuitive level of description, the phenomenon consists in that the quoted expressions are both mentioned – i.e., they are used in order to explicitly call attention to themselves, as in cases like (14) and (16) which have been subject to significant philosophical scrutiny – and used – i.e., they are used in their standard ways, that of mentioning entities such as periods of time in the case of (17). Secondly and more importantly, because I feel that Recanati’s stipulations for his own expressions prejudice the issue against DO’s potential to account for the phenomenon. Let me explain.

Recanati criticizes Davidsonian views like DO by arguing that quotation marks are not linguistic referential expressions. I will discuss his argument after presenting DO’s account of the phenomenon, for his criticism is just the claim that, without unacceptable contortions, DO is incompatible with it. Now, Recanati agrees with DO that what he calls *closed quotation*, of which (14) and (16) are instances, involves demonstrations, but he does not take demonstrations to be always used to help refer. A demonstration for him is an act intended to “illustrate by exemplification” things like a limp, a movement, or indeed a linguistic expression (2001: 640). *Closed quotation*, he stipulates, is the “recruitment” of a “linguistic demonstration (a quotation)” to serve “as a singular term, filling a slot in the sentence” (ibid.). *Open quotation* is defined negatively, as a linguistic demonstration that lacks this or any other form of “linguistic recruitment” (ibid.).

Now, I take it that Recanati’s theory of closed quotation fails for the same reasons I gave against Reimer’s version of IT: unaccountably too many distinct terms are, according to such a view, demonstratives (by “recruitment”) of natural languages. Be that as it may, his definition of *open quotation* includes the rejection of DO’s treatment of the phenomenon; for, if (putting aside the objection just made) Recanati were right about what is the singular term in (14) and (16), on the account of double-duty quotation that I am about to present that very same item would also be recruited as a singular term in cases like (1) and (17), in contradiction to what classifying them as cases of *open quotation* would entail.

My account of double-duty quotation relies on the only main feature of the theory of demonstratives outlined in the first section that was omitted from the summary at the beginning of the second. I said I rely on the general view that the semantic contents (i.e., the conventionally determined meanings minus the

conventionally determined illocutionary force) of utterances, assertoric utterances in particular, include more than just the asserted propositions; and I contended that, by default, demonstratives contribute their referents to the asserted propositions, which code the assertion's truth conditions, but that they also semantically contribute descriptive contents to other, conventionally implicated or presupposed propositions. Other writers have recently advanced multi-propositional proposals along these lines, contending that more than one proposition can be expressed by an utterance. Thus, Dever (2001) argues for this view concerning non-restrictive relative clauses, as in (18), and complex demonstratives, as in (19):

- (18) Joan, who is mayor of Barcelona, might study Dennett's philosophy.
 (19) That mayor of Barcelona might study Dennett's philosophy.

According to Dever's proposal, an utterance of (18) is an assertion of a proposition to which the material in the appositive clause does not contribute; in addition, a second proposition is expressed in uttering (18), that Joan is mayor of Barcelona. Similarly, an utterance of (19) is an assertion of a singular proposition to which the noun phrase 'mayor of Barcelona' does not contribute; in addition, a second proposition is expressed in uttering it, that the object the first proposition is about is mayor of Barcelona. Dever explains in this way two sorts of intuitive data. First, if the main clause contains operators like 'might' in (18) and (19), the material inside appositives or in the noun phrases complementing complex demonstratives is typically not understood as falling under their scope. Second, intuitions suggesting that only cross-clause ("E-type") anaphora can exist between expressions in the main clause and expressions in appositives or the complements of complex demonstratives.¹²

My own view of conventional implicature in general and the descriptive contents of demonstratives in particular is more radical than theirs and closer to Barker's (2003), but we do not need to go into the nuances here. Predelli (2003) presents an account along these lines for a particular case of double-duty quotation – scare quotes – which I find entirely congenial; as he insists, one does not need to commit oneself on the specifics of the framework for these purposes. Predelli usefully distinguishes the main asserted proposition in examples such as (18) and (19) on the sort of view we are canvassing, from the proposition that typically plays a subsidiary role relative to it, as, respectively, *message* and *attachment*. Now, compare (20) to (17), and (21) to (1):

- (20) A fortnight is, to define it, a period of fourteen days.
 (21) Saddam Hussein did not pose an – as Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld said – immediate threat to the security of our people.

According to a view on which appositions such as those in (20) – which logicians typically abbreviate with the subscript 'df' attached to the defined expression – and (21) do not signify parts of the *messages* signified by the main sentences including them, but rather *attachments*, they express, respectively, (m)essages and (a)ttachments as follows:

- (20_m) That a fortnight is a period of fourteen days.
 (20_a) That *being a period of fourteen days* defines 'fortnight'.
 (21_m) That Saddam Hussein did not pose an immediate threat to the security of our people.
 (21_a) That Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld said this by using a sentence including 'immediate threat to the security of our people'.

Of course, reference to the expressions mentioned in the metalinguistic attachments is made not by quotation marks, but by expressions whose referential character is not under dispute, such as the pronoun 'it' and the conjunction 'as' – analogous in this respect to the adverb 'so' in the notorious 'Giorgione was so-called because of his size'. The present proposal is that, by putting quotation marks around expressions that are otherwise used in their standard ways (as required by the syntax of the sentences including them), (17) and (1) come to express, in addition to messages exactly like (20_m) and (21_m) respectively, attachments sufficiently close in context to (20_a) and (21_a). The view is not that quotation marks in those cases conventionally implicate meanings exactly like those of the non-restrictive clauses in (20) and (21); for the latter typically have more precise conventional meanings than what just the use of quotation marks in those cases conventionally implicates. The conventional implication of such uses of quotation marks is just that some or other metalinguistic attachment about the quoted material is conveyed; the extralinguistic context determines what the attachment approximately is. (See Predelli's (2003: 16-17) discussion for elaboration.)

A sufficiently convincing development of a view along these lines should, among other things, provide a proper account of more difficult cases. Thus, in (22) – uttered in a context in which it is common knowledge that a terrible fight is being reported – it appears problematic to maintain that the expression inside the scare quotes is used in its standard way to convey the message, because it is only used ironically. Something similar applies to (23), this time because the expression inside the scare quotes does not belong to the language being used; and also to the expression in the mixed quotation in (24), now because the context relevant to interpret the quoted indexicals is not the context of the utterance. With (25), the problem lies rather with the metalinguistic attachment, in that the mentioned expressions do not belong to the language of the individual whose discourse is reported.

- (22) The ‘debate’ resulted in three cracked heads and two broken noses. (Predelli 2003)
- (23) Nicola said that Alice is a “philosopher”. (Cappelen & Lepore 1997)
- (24) Like Luther, Lucian Freud seems to attest that “Here I stand, I can do no other”.
- (25) Descartes said that man “is a thinking substance”. (Tsohatzidis 1998)

At the level of elaboration that I can provide here, I cannot add anything useful to what previous writers have said about these cases, and thus I refer the reader to them (see Predelli 2003: 13-16, and Cappelen & Lepore 1998). In a nutshell, I think we should deal with cases like (22)-(24) by accepting that the messages are the more or less absurd ones obtained according to the unembellished account, and to derive then the intuitive messages as conversational implicatures. To deal with cases such as (25), I would appeal to the flexibility that the theory allows concerning the contextually indicated relationship between the words actually used and thereby mentioned in the attachment, and the reported discourse. This flexibility comes from the fact that, except for those words, the rest of the content of the attachment is given by the extralinguistic context of the utterance. Thus, although in some cases such as (1) and (21), it is conveyed that the words used and reported coincide, in cases such as (25) a less stringent relationship is conveyed.

To conclude, I would like to consider Recanati’s (2001: 656-658) criticism of such proposals, that they are “convoluted and gratuitous. The form of composition they appeal to is, to my knowledge, unheard of. The only motivation for offering baroque accounts like these is the desire to save a dogma: the view that quotations refer” (2001: 657). In contrast to what this harsh criticism suggests, the reader should know that the fundamentals of Recanati’s account do not differ much from the one I have outlined here. For he also appeals to the analogy with conventional implicatures, such as those associated with ‘but’ and ‘therefore’, and he also offers a multi-propositional account of them, so that his own theory, like the present one, also ends up envisaging something like Predelli’s messages and attachments (2001: 661-666).

Now, there is a difference between the two views, in that while I have insisted on the (partial) semantic character of the signification of attachments, Recanati counts the relevant mechanisms as pragmatic. To a certain extent the differences here are not just verbal, but of a substantive character.¹³ However, they concern issues that go well beyond the one at stake. Modulo those differences, thus far the two views do not disagree. Recanati’s treatment of problematic cases like (22)-(25) (2001: 667-680) also differs from the one I have suggested, probably reflecting again those underlying differences

concerning the semantics-pragmatics divide; but, once again, this does not affect the similarities between the two accounts at the fundamental level.

So, ultimately the disagreement concerns essentially only the issue of whether or not double-duty quotation involves *reference*. We agree that both closed and open quotation (in Recanati’s terms) involve *demonstrations*. We disagree in that, according to DO, demonstrations are in both cases associated with demonstrative expressions, quotation marks, and therefore with genuine reference (in open quotation, only at the level of attachments, not messages). According to Recanati, instead, in the specific case of mixed quotation (and also in that of scare quotes, I assume), “the very words which are used to express the content of the reported attitude (or speech act) are at the same time displayed for demonstrative purposes, but they are not referred to by a singular term” (2001: 658).

Against the positive part of the disagreement – Recanati’s main contrasting claim regarding DO, namely, that it is not quotation marks but his demonstrations that are the referring expressions in closed quotation – I have already given what I take to be a decisive argument – as I said, essentially the very same one I outlined in the previous section against Reimer’s version of IT. Against the negative part, that in the attachments conveyed in double-duty quotation the expressions are not referred to, but merely “illustrated by exemplification”, I think it is fair to say at least that more theoretical work is required to make so much of the alleged difference between reference and exemplification. Thus, as I announced at the beginning, I think that all in all we can still maintain that demonstrative theories can better account for the evidence, including facts about double-duty quotation, than their rivals.

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Notes

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¹ As Evans (1982: 311) puts it: “A speaker who is to say something by uttering a sentence containing a referring expression must make it manifest which object it is that he intends to be speaking about – which object an audience must think of in understanding his remark”.

² Neither Wettstein (cf. his 1984: 71) nor Reimer (cf. her 1992) would, I think, oppose the contextualism they support to the modified intentionalism we are characterizing.

³ As writers such as Searle (1969) and Bach (1987) hold, linguistic reference is an ancillary speech-act, constituted by specific communicative intentions contributing to the whole speech-act in such a way that it has a *de re* content: a content whose identity depends on a particular object – and perhaps cannot exist without it.

⁴ For a suggestive analysis of joint attention, see Peacocke (2004). The relevance of joint attention to demonstrative reference-fixing has been argued by Campbell (2002), although my views differ otherwise from his in important respects.

⁵ Kripke (1980: 97) notoriously defends the non-reducibility of reference.

⁶ Some, including King (2001), would accept these arguments for simple demonstratives as in (3), but not for complex ones as in (8). I do not accept their views, on the basis of considerations like those that Borg (2001: 493-495) nicely summarizes. I do not need to discuss them here, given that my main points here can rely on facts involving simple demonstratives like 'he', 'you', 'yesterday' and so on.

⁷ See Garcia-Carpintero (2001 and 2004b).

⁸ I will henceforth use *quoted material* to refer to what is inside the outermost quotation-marks – *Boston* in (14) – reserving 'quotation' for the whole constituted by it and the surrounding quotation-marks.

⁹ Garcia-Carpintero (1994: 261) provides more examples.

¹⁰ See Cappelen & Lepore (1999: 742) and my (2004) for elaboration.

¹¹ I take this to be the core problem for Reimer's proposal. More elaborated objections can be found in Caplan (2001).

¹² Bach (1999) also advances a multi-propositional account of conventional implicatures, such as those associated with 'but' or 'therefore'.

¹³ See Predelli's (2003: 17-20) discussion, which once again I find congenial.

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