

## SENSE DATA: THE SENSIBLE APPROACH\*

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### *Summary*

In this paper, I present a version of a sense-data approach to perception, which differs to a certain extent from well-known versions like the one put forward by Jackson. I compare the sense-data view to the currently most popular alternative theories of perception, the so-called Theory of Appearing (a very specific form of disjunctivist approaches) on the one hand and reductive representationalist approaches on the other. I defend the sense-data approach on the basis that it improves substantially on those alternative theories.

### 1. *The Theory of Appearing*

Sense data are out of favor these days. Most philosophers currently writing on conscious experience and perception go to great pains to avoid them. In a recent paper on perception Alston writes: “Since sense datum theory has been almost universally abandoned for good and sufficient reason, I need not spend time bad mouthing it” (Alston 1999, 189). Only two pages later, however, in response to the main argument for sense data, Alston (who purports to defend a

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version of the Theory of Appearing) contends that in hallucination subjects are in experiential relations with “a particularly vivid mental image,” a mental particular. Thus, although Alston dismisses sense data, he is prepared to commit himself to what was traditionally supposed to be the main ontological burden of those theories. One then wonders what he takes to be the “good and sufficient reasons” to dismiss sense data.

It is healthy to remember that it has not always been so; for a good half of the past century, sense data were taken for granted by most philosophers. For better or for worse, a new trend was forcefully established by the joint efforts of philosophers such as Austin, Ryle, Sellars and Wittgenstein, which has acquired the force of established presumption. Philosophers take for granted that Austin, Ryle, Sellars and Wittgenstein gave arguments that made it clear that sense data are one more philosophical invention; but they are not very explicit about how exactly the arguments go. There are, of course, some exceptions, outstanding among them Jackson (1977) and Perkins (1983). This paper is an attempt at a vindication of sense data against currently fashionable alternative proposals, which departs at some points from their views but has been influenced by them.

Like other accounts of sensory experience envisaging sense data, the one presented in this paper posits them as part of a causal account of perception. Any correct explication of perception will involve distinctive conscious sensory experiences. Perception is a form of knowledge; perceptual states have a representational content, correctness conditions that are as a matter of fact satisfied. There is a systematic, non-accidental relationship such that perceptual states with different intentional contents typically involve sensory experiences with different qualia. We report the phenomenal character of perceptual experiences involved in perceptual states by resorting to “look” or “appear” talk: “it appears to S as if a bright red solid sphere of radius of about one foot hovers at about one yard in front of him against an undifferentiated gray background”.

As this example reminds us, sensory experiences are quite complex. It is natural to isolate in them phenomenal *features*: the apparent color, shape and size of the sphere, its apparent distance and position with respect to the subject’s body, its apparent solidity, and so

on. These phenomenal features will be called henceforth *qualia*. This term is introduced without presupposing anything very controversial. It is left open here whether or not individual phenomenal features are relational, even when, as with appearances of shapes and colors for instance, they do not seem so at first sight. Qualia might be relational in the sense that the instantiation of a quale always involves the instantiation of an intentional object; this is so on the view advanced here. Qualia might even be relational in the most straightforward sense that the instantiation of a quale in the sensory experience in a case of perception always consists in the instantiation of a relation between the perceiving subject and a feature instantiated in a material object. This is the disjunctivist claim characterizing one of the views that I will be questioning, the Theory of Appearing. These introductory stipulations leave also open whether or not qualia are reductively definable in intentional terms – as another view on perception that I will be criticizing holds.

Qualia can be isolated in our typically complex sensory experiences in a methodologically perspicuous way, by taking advantage of an important fact about them. The fact is that instances of qualia are constitutively related to other qualia, relations of which subjects aware of those instances are also consciously aware. A subject experiencing an instance of a quale will be able to recognize other instances of the same quale, and to discriminate them from other qualia. Also, he will typically be able to merely imagine qualia, and thus to be in a different conscious relation with them. A subject will thereby be able to consciously appreciate how a new token feature of which he is aware or which he imagines shares some qualia with others he has experienced, and differs in some other qualia from them. Subjects are also consciously aware of determinables of which qualia as those previously mentioned are determinates, and also of orderings of the determinates in each determinable along different dimensions (hue, brightness and saturation for appearances of colors, pitch and timbre for appearances of sounds, intensity for most qualities, etc). Qualia thus belong in a multi-dimensional space. Elaborating on previous proposals by Carnap and Goodman, Clark (1993) shows how the presumption that specific qualia can be isolated in our complex sensory fields can be scientifically cashed out on that basis.

I have so far made the relatively uncontroversial claim that perception constitutively involves sensory experiences, states consisting in the perceptual subject being consciously aware of specific phenomenal qualities. What I plan to do in the rest of the paper is to defend a sense data theory of a particular sort, by arguing that it has clear advantages over alternative accounts of perceptual experience. I will consider two views: disjunctivism, in the form of the *Theory of Appearing* (TA), a view that qualified observers consider the strongest rival of sense data accounts.<sup>1</sup> I will present this view in the rest of this section. In the second section I will present and criticize a functional-cum-physical representationalist approach. The third section of the paper will outline the main traits of the sense data theory that I take to be correct. The fourth and final section contains my criticism of TA.

TA (in Jackson's (1977) terms, the *Multiple Relation Theory of Appearing*) is already discussed in classic papers by Moore (1918-9), Chisholm (1950), Sellars (1963) and others, and has been given a sharp formulation by Langsam (1997). Johnston (1997) and Alston (1999) have recently praised it as the best account of perceptual experience. The theory embodies a form of the disjunctive conception of experience incompatible (in contrast with other forms of disjunctivism) with sense data accounts. The main claim characterizing TA is that "phenomenal features such as redness are relations between material objects and minds" (Langsam 1997, 35). A subject *S* experiences a phenomenal feature *F* if and only if *S* is in a primitive relation with a material thing; this is the relation consisting of that material thing appearing red to *S*. It is the primitiveness of the relation which characterizes TA. As Jackson (1977, 91) emphasizes, sense data theorists do not dispute that when *S* perceives *O* to be red, *O* appears red to *S*. According to them, however, the fact that a material thing appears *F* to the perceiving subject is to be analyzed in

1. One such qualified observer, C. D. Broad, wrote: "How are we to describe [appearance] and to analyze it? Two different types of theory seem to be possible, which I will call respectively the *Multiple Relation Theory*, and the *Object Theory* of sensible appearance" (Broad 1965, 88). The first is Broad's term for the theory of appearing (towards which he, like Moore at times, was not entirely unsympathetic, although both he and Moore are classic proponents of the sense data approach), the second is his term for the sense data theory.

causal terms involving sense data.<sup>2</sup> It is therefore of the essence of TA that the relation of a material object appearing *F* to a subject be unanalyzable. This is compatible with considering the appearing-relation as *explainable* (as opposed to *analyzable*) in scientific terms, even in scientific terms involving something called ‘sensations’. Most defenders of the theory of appearing, as we will see, would support a claim of explainability, as opposed to one of analyzability.<sup>3</sup>

The philosophical primitiveness of the relations postulated by the theory of appearing makes a causal *analysis* of *S perceives O* out of the question. There is in this a further incompatibility with sense data theories that explain the relation between sense data and perceived objects in causal terms. If the perceptual experience in a case in which *S* perceives *O* instantiating a given feature at *t* conceptually involves the instantiation by *O* of that feature at *t*, no causal claim linking the relevant state of *O* and the relevant experience *E* can be sensibly made *under those descriptions*. Surely causally related particular events are “distinct existences” at the very least in that, under the descriptions relevant for the evaluation of the causal claim relating them, the existence of the effect should only contingently require that of the cause. If *c* causes *e*, then, if *c* had not occurred, *e* would not have occurred either. But this counterfactual claim has a different force than this: if Socrates had not died, Xanthippe would not have become a widow; Socrates’s death did not cause Xanthippe’s widowhood. One difference lies in that the former counterfactual, but not the latter, is made with respect to a context which includes possible worlds (albeit sufficiently remote from actuality) in which *e* occurs without *c* having occurred.<sup>4</sup>

2. In phenomenalist versions of the sense data theory, the relation would be analyzed instead as that of a “material” thing – a mere possibility of sensation – becoming manifest to the subject by its defining potentiality for sensations of determinate types being actualized.

3. See Moore (1918-9, 23), Chisholm (1950, 173), Sellars (1963a, 141), Johnston (1997, 174) and Alston (1999, 183). Sellars (1963a, 150), who seems at times to favor the theory of appearing, also advocated “the idea that ‘immediate experiences’ play a role analogous to that of the molecules of the kinetic theory.” Later I will interpret this as proposing a reductivist “third way”, close to the view recently advanced by Tye (1984, 1995).

4. I rely here on Lewis’ (1973) well-known analysis of counterfactuals.

Traditional arguments for sense data elaborate two related considerations. In the first place, considerations based on the facts of perceptual illusions or misperceptions (including here the temporal illusions on which the “time-gap” argument is based), and hallucinations. In the second place, considerations based on the need to distinguish primary from secondary qualities. The arguments to be provided here do not depart from these traditional themes. I only claim a measure of originality in the specific way in which they will be deployed against recent supporters of alternative accounts, who seem not to appreciate the force of the traditional concerns regarding views like those they hold. Let us see at this point how the defender of TA attempts to handle the first sort of argument.

If we look at a red surface with one eye for about a minute, while keeping the other eye closed, and then immediately afterwards look at the surface alternately with the accustomed and the unaccustomed eye, we will realize that the color looks noticeably different. It looks bright red when looking with the unaccustomed eye, but is a considerably darker shade of red when looking with the accustomed eye.<sup>5</sup> The appearance obtained with the accustomed eye is a misperception, because the surface does not change color when we alternate eyes. TA handles cases like this by contending that one and the same material thing – the colored surface as it is at a certain time – appears to us bright red in one case and dark red in the other. That is to say, one is in each case in a different primitive, unanalyzable relation with an unchanged material thing. Essentially the same considerations serve to handle “time-gap” arguments. The subject is at time  $t$  unanalyzably related to a material thing as it was at the time  $t - a$  ( $a > 0$ ) when the material thing triggered the causal chain leading to the subject’s experience. The relation itself in fact obtains at  $t$ , the object appearing to have whatever properties the subject perceives it to have contemporarily with his experience. This temporal appearance may or may not be illusory, but there are good reasons not to count it so in most ordinary cases.<sup>6</sup>

This same treatment cannot be applied to hallucinations, however, for there is no material thing perceived in those cases.<sup>7</sup> TA re-

5. I borrow the example from Clark (1993).

6. See the illuminating discussion of the time-gap issue by Suchting (1969).

7. It is probably because of this that Sellars (1963a, 142) refuses to count ‘O

jects the common assumption that the appearances experienced in hallucination can be identical to corresponding appearances present in subjectively indistinguishable cases of veridical perception or misperception. TA adopts instead the most radical form of what has come to be known as the Disjunctive Conception of Experience – or disjunctivism for short. This view, advocated by philosophers like McDowell (1982 and 1986) and Snowdon (1981 and 1990), denies – in McDowell’s suggestive phrase – that the experiences involved in vision and hallucination share a “highest common factor.”

Thus, Langsam has this response to objections to TA based on hallucinations: “I deny ... that the indistinguishability of perceptual experiences and their corresponding hallucinations can be explained only in terms of their instantiating the same phenomenal features ... it is sufficient if they instantiate *similar* phenomenal features, phenomenal features that are the same in some respects but different in others ... they need not share the same ontological character; in particular, the phenomenal features of perceptual experiences can be instantiations of relations between material objects and minds even though the phenomenal features of hallucinations are not. There is no reason to think that two phenomenal features cannot share the same appearance yet differ in ontological character” (Langsam 1992, 39).

I will postpone a critical discussion of TA until the final section; my argument will be essentially abductive (sense data theories are better qualified to account for the relevant facts than their rivals), and only by then will be the main considerations for this form of argument in place. Against Langsam, I will present considerations there in support of the view that the appearances in perceptual experiences and corresponding hallucinations share an ontological character. I will argue that, at the relevant first-personal level and not merely at the causal-explanatory level, there is no room for the wedge that Langsam seeks to drive between a subjective commonality and a real distinction. There is something, however, that I find appealing in the disjunctive conception of experience, and I want to look F to S’ as relational at all. He posits a common explanatory factor to the three standard cases in which “looks” talk is used, veridical perception, illusion and hallucination. This is the main reason supporting the representationalist interpretation of his views, to be provided in the next section.

grant it now: its refusal to countenance a symmetrical treatment of the experiences involved in cases of hallucinations and cases of perception. Perception is a form of knowledge, and perceptual experiences are constitutively intended to play a role in accounting for the claims of perception on that score. Experiences involved in perception and in hallucination are asymmetric from an epistemological point of view; and the epistemic factors that determine the asymmetry ought to be taken into consideration in a philosophical explication of perceptual experiences.<sup>8</sup>

The main lesson from discussions of the Gettier-like counterexamples to traditional analyses of *knowledge* lies precisely here. There is little chance of reductively capturing perception, or any other form of knowledge for that matter, by starting from a fully non-factive notion (belief, in the general case; a purely internal notion of experience in the specific case of perception) and adding further conditions to it. Only already factive states with the content that *p* can lead to knowledge that *p*; only already factive experiences with the content that *p* can be a basis for the perceptual knowledge that *p*.<sup>9</sup> It is *belief* that is to be explained on the basis of the concept of *knowledge*, and not the other way around. Likewise, hallucinatory experience is to be explicated on the basis of a factive concept of successful experience. A fundamental asymmetry should be recognized in the epistemic status of those experiences involved in perception vis-à-vis that of those involved in hallucination. The disjunctive conception of experience constitutes a way of capturing this.

The externalist form of the sense data theory recommended here is in harmony with this point; as previous writers have noted, there are forms of disjunctivism compatible with the causal theory of perception.<sup>10</sup> What I reject is the strong externalism that distinguishes the theory of appearing, according to which perceived objects *themselves* individuate perceptual experiences. On the view of empirical

8. As Peacocke (1999, ch. 2) puts the point, phenomenal features play a constitutive role in the individuation of observational concepts (those that figure in perceptual judgments), and these are *epistemically individuated* concepts: “concepts ... individuated, partly or wholly, in terms of the conditions for a thinker’s knowing certain contents containing those concepts.”

9. Williamson (1995) argues for this; see also McDowell (1995).

10. Child (1992, 303) considers a view like the one defended here.



judgments promoted here, it is only some material *properties* (together with some previously encountered instances of them) that individuate experiences, not the perceived concrete instances of those properties.<sup>11</sup> In any *particular case* of perception, the phenomenal features of perceptual experiences are to be analyzed as individuated independently of the perceived object. It is compatible with the nature of the particular experience as such that it might have been hallucinatory; it is because it has been caused by the perceived object that it is not hallucinatory. However, this does not mean that perceptual knowledge is to be understood as involving a state individuated without any commitments concerning external objects, plus conceptually contingent causal relations with external objects. To satisfy the requirements of the causal theory, any particular perception will be understood to involve experiences individuated without the aid of the perceived objects. But I will also claim that the perceptual experience in any such particular case of perception is in its nature one such that experiences of the same kind are instantiated in cases of perceptual knowledge.<sup>12</sup> The concept of experience cannot be explicated without the notion of experiences that are (primitively) cases of knowledge.

## 2. A Sellarsian Third Way

Having presented TA, in this section I will introduce the other main contender as a philosophical account of perceptual experience: (reductive) representationalism. I will discuss Sellars' (1963a) views on perception, because the sense data theory that I will present in the following section incorporates some of his insights.

This is the way Sellars describes the three kinds of cases that any philosophical account of perception should consider (*op. cit.*, 151-

11. I am aiming here at distinction which has links with McGinn's (1989) between strong and weak externalism. Burge's views on these issues have also been most influential on me; see, for instance, his (1977).

12. More precisely, one such that experiences of *related kinds* are instantiated in cases of perceptual knowledge. This is required to give content to phenomenal features to which no actually instantiated material property corresponds – like Hume's missing shade of blue.

2): (a) seeing that *O*, over there, is red (a claim made in cases one considers veridical); (b) its looking to *S* that *O*, over there, is red (a claim made in cases one has reasons to consider misperceptions), and (c) its looking to one as though there were a red object over there (a claim made in cases one has reasons to consider hallucinatory). According to Sellars, in all these cases there is a common propositional content, concerning the instantiation of an observable property by the scene before the eyes. This common propositional content is endorsed with different forces in the three cases: it is fully endorsed in the veridical case, partially in the misperception case (only the presence of *O* is endorsed there) and not at all in the hallucinatory case.

As I interpret him, Sellars shares with sense data theorists the anti-disjunctivist contention that, as he puts it, in addition to the common propositional content there is in these three cases a further commonality, a common *descriptive* content. This content is characterized by the fact that its instances (in contrast with the instances of the observable properties) can never be merely intentional, but are real constituents of the actual world. For the sense data theorist, it is a red sense datum being experienced in the three cases; for Sellars, it is a brain state, to be fully characterized by future neuroscience. I will borrow at this point a device introduced by Peacocke (1983) in a related context. The device consists in writing predicates signifying observable properties with primes when they are used to refer to those “descriptive contents” of experiences. I will say that the descriptive commonality that Sellars talks about consists in the fact that in all three ascriptions (a)-(c), in addition to the common representational content, the instantiation in the experience of a common sensuous feature *red'* is presuppositionally involved.

By resorting to Peacocke’s primed predicates, I leave open whether the redness actually instantiated in the three cases (a)-(c) is the very same property as the redness whose instantiation by the material scene before the eyes is in question. Some sense data theorists, including Jackson, believe them to be the same; I disagree, for reasons to be given shortly. I will refer to the properties signified by primed predicates as *primed properties*; taking them to be constitutive of *phenomenal properties* would beg the main issue at stake against the other theorist. As Sellars correctly indicates, the com-

mon descriptive character *red'* is *intrinsic* – or, at least, less extrinsic than the phenomenal features involved in perception according to TA.<sup>13</sup> It is intrinsic in that particular instances of *red'* exist independently of the existence of a related instance of the corresponding material property, or any other similar property. This is of course required by the claim that the primed properties are the same also when they occur in hallucinations. Thus, instances of *red'* are not relational in the strict sense that phenomenal qualities are relational according to the theory of appearing. Thanks to this non-relationality, primed properties can be properly mentioned in a causal account of how perception occurs in the veridical case and in misperceptions.

The representationalist “third way” between the sense data view and TA shares with sense data accounts the claim that there is, analytically, a common factor to all three cases (a)-(c), which is to be invoked in a causal analysis of perception. There is a *constitutive* relation between the meanings of ‘red’ and ‘square’ on the one hand, and those of ‘looks red’ and ‘looks square’ on the other, in virtue of which the latter predicates do *not* signify primitive or unanalyzable relations, but are definable partly in terms of the former. The third way disagrees with sense data accounts, however, in taking the phenomenal common factor to (a)-(c) relevant for a philosophical explication of perceptual experience to be an intentional instantiation of an observable property of material objects. According to this third way, that common factor is fully specifiable in terms of the redness of material things, the beliefs of subjects about its instantiation in certain circumstances, and the actions these beliefs dispose them to perform. Given the existence of this analysis, in any given experience the instance of the relevant phenomenal property (identical with an observable property) might be a merely intentional object if the experience is hallucinatory. Thus, this view is reductivist about *qualia*, in that it takes them to be fully characterizable in causal-explanatory terms. Now, while sense data theorists might agree with the third way that *looks F* is definable in terms of *F* and a common factor along the suggested lines, they disagree with the third way on the issue whether the common factor itself can be so reductively un-

13. See Langton & Lewis (1998), for a useful explication of *intrinsicness*.

derstood. Although for sense data theorists qualia constitutively involve the observable features of material things, they cannot be reductively analyzed in terms of them; for *qualia* are also constituted, irreducibly, by the sensuous primed properties.

The descriptive primed properties posited by Sellars are not relational in the strict sense in which phenomenal properties are relational according to the theory of appearing, but they are relational in a less demanding sense on his account. On Sellars' view a *red*' sensation is one typically caused in normal subjects by red objects in normal circumstances, which then typically causes in properly equipped subjects who think that the circumstances are normal for perception the judgment that something red is instantiated by the scene before their eyes. The subjects then count thereby as perceiving a red expanse, if they in fact know that circumstances are adequate for perception. Sellars thought that sensations instantiate analogues of the observable properties causing them. He writes that "the *essential* feature of the analogy is that visual impressions stand to one another in a system of ways of resembling and differing which is structurally similar to the ways in which the colors and shapes of visible objects resemble and differ" (*op. cit.*, 193). We could make the point by resorting to the previous indication that qualia belong in a qualitative space. Both the manifest properties of material things that figure in the propositional content of 'looks' talk, and the primed properties of appearances whose instantiation we presuppose in that talk, belong in structurally isomorphic qualitative spaces: one space for the manifest properties of ordinary material objects, another for the primed properties.<sup>14</sup> Because the relational properties determining those spaces are an integral part of our conception of both manifest and sensational properties, it is analogically correct to use the same predicates for both.

This usage is nevertheless merely analogical. There is more to a primed property than its position in qualitative space, among other

14. See Mulligan (1995). While the relations determining the spaces might be the same in some cases – for instance in the case of spatio-temporal properties and their primed correlates – they might not be exactly the same, but only structurally related in others. A case in point is the relations of intensity for sounds, vis-à-vis the corresponding relation of degrees of loudness for their phenomenal correlates, which differ in significant respects.

things because it is conceptually possible that the relevant qualitative space has at least two different points holding the same patterns of relations to other points in the space. An automorphism (a one-to-one function) other than the identity relation could be defined from the set of points constituting the space onto itself, preserving the relations that define the space. There would then be at least two *different* points in the space (two different primed properties) standing in the same relations to other points.<sup>15</sup> For Sellars, the specific character identifying primed properties over and above their position in qualitative space is a neurological property. For the sense data theorist, it is an irreducible experiential character (which, I submit, might be identified *a posteriori* with a neurological property). Similarly, there is more to the manifest properties than their position in their own qualitative space. Manifest properties are analytically said to cause sensations with corresponding primed properties in normal circumstances. They must have some specific categorical nature over and above their position in qualitative space to have this causal efficacy, which there is no reason to think will coincide with the categorical nature of the primed properties caused by them.<sup>16</sup>

Thus, on Sellars' account primed properties are not relational in the demanding sense required by the theory of appearing; but they are relational on two less demanding counts. First, there are causal relations holding in normal circumstances between instances of ob-

15. Aiming to promote a reductive functionalist analysis, Clark (1993, 178-184) defines individual qualia exclusively by their relations in qualitative space to other qualia. The considerations in the text show that Clark's proposal fails as an analysis. In response to this problem (see pp. 203-205), Clark seems to be prepared to accept "definitions" which do not determine unique referents across the relevant set of possible circumstances. I find this unacceptable. The correct alternative is to include, as an additional part of the definition, something over and above the structural aspects; something, as Clark envisages, indexically introduced. (Paradigm cases of primed properties, introduced directly by ostension as in Loar's (1997) theory of phenomenal concepts, or indirectly by ostension of corresponding material properties.) Perhaps this is, after all, what he himself would suggest.

16. I depart here from Jackson, who claims (1977, 74-81 and 103) that manifest properties are predicated in the same univocal sense of material things and sense data.

servable properties and them, and between them and instances of mental states. In virtue of these relations, primed properties essentially contribute to the fact that the experiences in which they are instantiated have intentional contents of a functional-cum-teleological character. Second, primed properties are essentially in a qualitative space determined by their relations to other primed properties. The two relational aspects are related. Orderly variations of observable properties along the dimensions in their qualitative space would give rise, in normal circumstances, to sensations whose primed properties vary along corresponding dimensions in their corresponding qualitative space. They in turn would give rise, in the appropriate conditions, to judgments with correspondingly varying contents, thus to beliefs and, in the presence of the relevant desires, to action. Now, the sense data theory that I will advance takes phenomenal features to be constituted by sensuous primed properties, understood as Sellars suggests. In order to distinguish the demanding relationality attributed to phenomenal features in TA from the less demanding one present in Sellars' views on primed properties, I will say that on such a view phenomenal features are *ta-intrinsic*. They are not absolutely intrinsic, because of the two relational aspects we have emphasized; but they do not have the demanding relationality attributed to them in TA.

If a theorist merely ascribes a causal-explanatory role to primed properties of experiences, there is no incompatibility with TA's disjunctivism (its opposition to a "highest common factor") resulting from the fact that primed properties are TA-intrinsic. TA is a philosophical explication of experiences, as mental states operating at the personal level – at the level at which reflective folk-psychological rationalizing explications (aided by philosophical theorizing) are provided. The fact that a "highest common factor" to veridical perception, misperception and hallucination is posited at a subpersonal, merely causal-explanatory level, does not contradict the main claims of the theorists we are discussing (as, for instance, Snowdon (1990) rightly emphasizes). If we took phenomenal features to be constituted by primed properties, as part of our philosophical explication, we would be in fact rejecting the distinguishing tenet of the theory of appearing. But that would not follow if we thought of this identification as only required on the basis of *a posteriori*, scientific

considerations. Sellars' views stand in contrast to TA, but not on account of his positing sensuous properties. This, by itself, is not incompatible with the theory of appearing, in view of Sellars' insistence that sensations (instances of primed properties) have only a place "in the logical space of an ideal *scientific* picture of the world" (*op. cit.*, 153). What separates Sellars from TA is his identification of phenomenal properties with the intentional contents of experiences, which, as we have seen, already provides for a common factor to cases (a)-(c), thus avoiding the radical disjunctivism distinguishing TA and the associated difficulties (to be developed in section fourth).

Sellars' account of perceptual experiences does feature commonalities in primed properties, however, in addition to intentional ones. We move in the direction of a sense data theory if we also acknowledge Sellars' sensuous properties in our philosophical explication of appearances. After all, the claims made so far about primed properties do not rest for their justification on any empirical claim – on any claim whose truth we know through perception – more than any philosophical proposal does. They are based on considerations regarding the commitments we incur in making perceptual ascriptions, relative to intuitions concerning clearly possible circumstances in which we incur them; in particular, those sharing the commonalities and differing in the ways highlighted by Sellars' cases (a)-(c).<sup>17</sup>

It might be objected that it is essential to Sellars' view that it is intended to be corroborated by empirical (say, neurological) findings. Sellars correctly insists that an expression signifying a primed quality should be "truly a name, and not just shorthand for a definite de-

17. It is true that we take ourselves to know that these represent clear-cut possibilities for potential perceptual ascriptions on the basis of our previous perceptual experience; but we should not confuse claims which depend for their justification on perception, from claims which depend on perception in other ways. Only the former dependence undoubtedly makes a claim a posteriori. Recent discussions of a priori knowledge insist on this distinction; see Bonjour (1998), Burge (1993) and Peacocke (1993). Snowdon (1990) evinces the confusion I am criticizing. The discussions of a priori knowledge just referred to also show due sensitivity to the grain of truth in Quinean qualms, which is acknowledged below.

scription” (*op. cit.*, § 24; see also § 61, (2), in connection with the discussion in §§ 51-55). The view here is, I think (to put it in Kripkean terms), that a primed predicate is not *synonymous* with a description constructed on the basis of its functional role – the description merely *fixes its reference*. The term is to all effects an atomic one, denoting (to the extent that the theory introducing it is true) the categorical basis of the functional state, as it might some day come to be properly identified, in more direct ways, by using terms of neurological theories. However, this only shows that claims justified on the basis of non-empirical considerations (and concepts introduced relative to those claims) might also later receive empirical justifications.<sup>18</sup> It also shows, correspondingly, that claims that are thought to be justified on the basis of non-empirical considerations, might in principle later be rejected on the basis of empirical evidence. Both facts manifest that certain traditional conceptions of philosophical knowledge are incorrect – which is the grain of truth in the Quinean qualms on the a priori. However, more sophisticated conceptions are possible, compatible with the facts.

By moving from Sellars’ views to a sense-data account, moreover, we escape a well-known criticism that is otherwise well-taken. When Sellars examines in *Science and Metaphysics* (1969, ch. 1) the issues whose treatment in “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind” I have been discussing, he applies the term ‘non-conceptual’ to sensations. He is thus indicating that sensations are introduced merely to explain *causally* the commonalities to cases of veridical, illusory and hallucinatory experience.<sup>19</sup> Sensations would have a *non-con-*

18. I say ‘non-empirical’ instead of plainly ‘a priori’ because some philosophers would balk at counting as a priori a justification that involves propositions concerning matters of particular fact, even if these matters are not known perceptually but introspectively.

19. However, while playing this explanatory task sensations also play for Sellars an epistemological role: their existence accounts for the “receptivity” of perception – for a general dependence of perceptual belief on the character of the external world – which the myth of the Given was wrongly intended to account for. McDowell (1998, first lecture) sees a difference in Sellars’ presentation of his views on this matter in chapter 1 of *Science and Metaphysics* with respect to those he advances in “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind” which I am unable to discern. As far as I can see, sensations are also introduced in this work to



*ceptual* content in that they play a content-involving explanatory role merely at the subpersonal level of the information-processing states posited by cognitive scientists; they do not belong in the personal-level “logical space of reasons.” Thus understood, the fact that they have propositional content (correctness conditions, which we might present in terms, say, of possible circumstances compatible with their veridicality)<sup>20</sup> is not sufficient to give them a rationalizing role. In order to have a rationalizing role, their subjects should meet a quite demanding condition, which McDowell characterizes thus: “it is essential to conceptual capacities, in the demanding sense, that they can be exploited in active thinking, thinking that is open to reflection about its own rational credentials” (1994, 47; see also pp. 10-13). By McDowell’s lights, to enjoy contentful states positioned “in the logical space of reasons” entails having the capacity to reflect about the epistemic status of those states. For him, perceptual experiences are capable of offering justification and have “conceptual content”; but only subjects having general views about conditions in which they can trust their senses, and in general the “rational credentials” of their thoughts, can enjoy them.

This threatens an obvious regress, which Sellars confronted in this way: “all that the view that I am defending requires is that no tokening by *S* *now* of ‘this is green’ is to count as ‘expressing observational knowledge’ unless it is also correct to say of *S* that he *now* knows the appropriate fact of the form *X is a reliable symptom of Y*, namely that ... utterances of ‘This is green’ are reliable indicators of the presence of green objects in standard conditions of perception. And while the correctness of this statement about Jones requires that Jones could *now* cite prior particular facts as evidence for the idea that these utterances *are* reliable indicators, it requires only that it is correct to say that Jones *now* knows, thus remembers [fn: My thought was that one can have direct (non-inferential) knowledge of a past fact which one did not or even (as in the case envisaged) *could* not conceptualize at the time it was present.] that these particular

properly account for the dependence of our system of knowledge on the external world.

20. Most properly, in terms closer to Peacocke’s (1992, ch. 3) “scenario content”.

facts *did* obtain. It does not require that it be correct to say that at the time these facts did obtain he *then knew* them to obtain. And the regress disappears” (Sellars 1963a, §37, 169).

As Brewer (1996) aptly indicates, what Sellars’ argument to reject the regress requires is not quite the possibility that he suggests in the quoted footnote. If those past events that the subject did not at the time conceptualize had been cognitively present to him, and the subject had kept memory of them, he might justificatorily invoke them later, when he is in a position to apply the required concepts. Suppose that *S* has been seeing for some time a light turned on in his car, without knowing that the event indicates that the car is running out of gasoline – *S* might even lack the very concept of an instrument whose function it is to indicate such a thing. Suppose that he has noticed that, more or less coincidentally with the light going on, the engine makes a peculiar sound. When he becomes knowledgeable about the function of the light, he might also come to know of a reliable correlation between the noise and the car running out of gasoline. This is made possible by the fact that *the subject* is able to cognitively register the fact, even though he lacks the concept of the indicator. Sellars’ suggestions, however, require something much more difficult to understand, if we assume that the ‘non-conceptual’ character of the primed properties implies that their subject lacks cognitive access to them. It requires that something like that is possible “even if there is no sense whatsoever in which such a fact was actually present *to the subject* at the earlier time” (Brewer 1996, 265). This is difficult to accept: “my memory at some time  $t_1$  of what was the case at an earlier time  $t_0$  radically depends on my conceptual sophistication at  $t_1$  in the following sense. I might have known *absolutely nothing* at  $t_0$ , about the way things then were in the world around me, or indeed about anything else; yet I might at  $t_1$  directly (non-inferentially) remember that there was a green object in front of me at  $t_0$ ” (*ibid.*).

The sense data theorist has a more satisfactory way around this issue. Because he finds the common descriptive factor at the proper personal level of rationalizing explanation, he can appeal to Sellars’ suggestion to avoid the regress, without falling prey to Brewer’s objection. According to him, experiences have primed properties that (i) are common to the likes of cases (a)-(c), (ii) are analogous to

manifest properties of perceptible material beings in the way suggested by Sellars, and (iii) have contents derived from the instantiation of those manifest properties in normal circumstances also in the way suggested by Sellars. Sense data theorists classify the contents of experiences as non-conceptual to indicate that they can be shared by discursive adult humans, capable of playing the language-game of justifying their claims, *and* by animals and children who lack that capability. This notwithstanding, experiences so conceived are postulated at a first-personal level: they are capable of playing a rationalizing, justificatory role. They are not merely posits of the empirical theories of cognitive scientist, which only relative to purely reliabilist accounts of knowledge could be thought to play a justificatory role. Experiences as understood in the sense data account are posits of a personal-level explication of perception, playing a fully-fledged epistemic role in ordinary folk-psychological rationalizing explanations. This does not require counting the relation between sense-experiences and ordinary perceptual judgments as strictly speaking inferential. As Broad said: “Perceptual judgments are indeed *based upon* *sensa* and their properties to the extent that if we were not aware of a *sensum* we should not now judge that any physical object is present to our senses, and that if this *sensum* had different properties we should ascribe different properties to the physical object. But the relation between the *sensum* and its properties, on the one hand, and the perceptual judgment about the physical object, on the other, is not that of *inference*” (Broad, 1965, 96).

Broad’s point here is not that the relation is merely causal. He goes on to offer a well-known analogy.<sup>21</sup> *Sensa* stand to the perceptual objects we access by means of them as words stand to the objects words tell us about: while reading, we focus on the meaning, not the words; typically we would be able to report the content of a message at a later time, but not the words in which it was expressed. But we could not have accessed the meanings without accessing the words. Similarly, we could not have knowledge of observable properties of material objects without being aware of the relevant properties of our sense impressions. This awareness plays a rationalizing and justificatory role in folk-psychological, personal-level explana-

21. Kevin Mulligan informed me that the analogy comes from Husserl.

tions.<sup>22</sup>

The Sellarsian third way we have been discussing has in its favor that it is a straightforward naturalistic proposal, while sense data theories are at the very least not obviously so. Alas, in spite of this strength, like any other similarly reductive theory<sup>23</sup> the Sellarsian third way cannot be right. In addition to the epistemological considerations that I have just marshaled against it, I have only space to mention the two main problems with reductive accounts, well elaborated in the literature. The first comes from inverted spectrum considerations. Thought-experiments like those by Block (1990), Peacocke (1983) and Shoemaker (1984) show that there are conceptual possibilities which a reductive analysis cannot recognize. Some reductive theorists advance their proposals in a framework in which conceptual and empirical claims are not separated. A strategy available to them is to suggest that so-called cases of inverted qualia always involve, as a matter of empirical fact, functional differences hidden from common sense. I do not think this helps reductivism in general, in part because I think that the presupposed Quinean framework is wrong; our discussion assumes an epistemological distinction between conceptual and empirical claims. The second difficulty for reductivism comes from the problem of distinguishing primary from secondary qualities. A reductive account would have to count all observable properties as equally objective. In my view, however, there are very good reasons for a response-dependent treatment of some manifest properties, most prominently colors.<sup>24</sup>

22. The view has points of contact with the one advanced by Searle (1983). The form of externalism defended below distinguishes it from Searle's. García-Carpintero (1999) discusses the relations between Searle's views and sense data theories.

23. Representationalist theories of *qualia* close to the Sellarsian third way have been advocated by Dretske (1995), Harman (1989), and Tye (1995).

24. Johnston (1992) offers some of these reasons. I should say that Johnston has changed his views here, as is coherent with his adoption of the theory of appearing. See Johnston 1998, for his new reasons against the response-dependence of manifest properties. The two problems I have mentioned are discussed by Jackson (1977, 33-48). The need for reductivists to assume an objectivist account of all properties configuring the immediately perceptible material world (including, for instance, painful bodily conditions perceived in feeling pains),

### 3. *Outline of a Sense data Theory*

In this section I will present the main features of a sense data theory and a causal account of perception involving sense data. It offers in my view the best explication of perception, in view of the difficulties for representationalism we have just mentioned, and those of TA that will be developed in the next section. Space only allows the barest sketch, but I hope it will be sufficient to show at least that the view is not obviously wrong.

Our favored analysis for *S perceives O* will include the following claims:<sup>25</sup>

- (i) The experience *E* constitutively involved when subject *S* perceives object *O* consists of a relation of awareness between subject *S* and an (event-like) *object*, *s-d(E)*, consisting of the instantiation of a complex of phenomenal properties in an egocentric spatio-temporally structured array.

This first claim, by itself, does not go far beyond what was taken as common ground in the first section. If each particular phenomenal feature instantiated in *s-d(E)* consists in a primitive relation of appearance with *O*, or if it can be reductively analyzed by means of physical and/or functional properties involving *O*, then *s-d(E)* would not be a sense datum in any problematic sense of that notion. (The term ‘sense datum’ is introduced in classical discussions with the same lack of commitment to whether its referents are essentially experiential relations with features of material things, or rather intrinsically mental, that we used in introducing ‘phenomenal feature’ earlier; see Moore, 1918-9, as an example of this.) The main point of

and the implausibility of doing so, constitutes the main body of the detailed argument by Perkins (1983) for sense data. Jackson also mentions these difficulties. In sum, the conditions mentioned in reductive analyses (causation under normal circumstances of the phenomenal features by the observational properties, belief that the observational properties are instantiated, or both) are not *sufficient* for the truth of “phenomenal-look” ascriptions. Nevertheless, I believe, against Jackson, that both sorts of conditions are *necessary*.

25. Although the points I will be discussing are intended to apply to perceptual claims generally, I will mostly concentrate on vision.

mentioning events in (i) is, firstly, to allocate sense data to what I take to be their proper ontological slot. Sense data are particulars, granted, but event- or state-like; they are not particulars that *endure* through time, but particulars that *stretch* through time as enduring things extend in space.

In addition to this, (i) puts the present view in opposition to the adverbial analysis of experience – a typical logical device in the armory of defenders of the theory of appearing. Adverbial analyses are an attempt at getting rid of any objects susceptible of having properties like those ascribed by means of observational predicates, ‘red’, ‘cube’, ‘solid’, etc, other than the perceived material objects. In order to avoid the commitment of sense data theories to mental objects to which primed analogues of those predicates are properly applied, adverbialists suggest that we think of *experience* as a determinable for a type of state. Determinates for this determinable are obtained by using the observational predicates, semantically speaking, like adverbial modifiers. Thus, when *S* experiences a hallucinatory red after-image, the determinable ‘experiencing’ applies to *S* adverbially modified with ‘redly’: *S* is experiencing red-ly. No red object of *S*’s experience has to exist; it is only that the more determinate property, *experiencing red-ly* applies to *S*’s condition.<sup>26</sup>

Jackson (1977, 58-72) submits adverbial analyses to a thorough criticism, to which I do not think their proponents have acceptable replies. Jackson’s criticism is based on two related objections, the “many-property” objection and the “complement” objection. The first is the problem for the adverbialist to distinguish, say, experiencing the appearance of a red square besides a green circle, from experiencing the appearance of a green circle besides a red square. Adverbialism threatens to conflate them into something like *experiencing red-ly, circular-ly, green-ly and square-ly*. The second is the problem for the adverbialist to avoid absurdly concluding, from the fact that *S* experiences a red appearance and a green, i.e., non-red appearance, that *S* is at the same time both experiencing and not experiencing (“red-ly”).

Tye (1984; the main claims are still endorsed in his 1995) con-

26. Adverbial analyses have been proposed, among others, by Chisholm (1957, 115-25), Sellars (1963b) and Tye (1984).

fronts Jackson's objections. It does not distort matters to present his proposal in two stages. Tye first introduces a phenomenal spatio-temporally structured visual field, and two relations of "coincidence" and "separation" of phenomenal qualities in the apparent spatiotemporal structure. (To generalize the solution, we should contemplate experiential fields with perhaps spatial and always temporal apparent structures.)<sup>27</sup> The first step to deal with the many-property problem is then to describe matters thus: it is for the subject as if redness *coincided* with squareness and greenness with circularity in his visual field. To deal with the complement problem: it is for the subject as if there were redness *separated* from greenness in his visual field.

If the maneuver ended here, it would achieve nothing for the adverbialist. For positing concrete instances of merely apparent sensory fields, with richly structured spatio-temporal-like *parts* determined by analogues of the observable properties, is precisely the move made by the sense data theorist whose views the adverbialist ultimately wants to oppose. Tye's second step is therefore crucial for the success of his adverbialist proposal. The second step is a reductive analysis of ascriptions of appearances as of spatio-temporally structured sensory fields: "The operation of coincidence itself, therefore, may be thought of as mapping any two given sensory modes or functions *F*-ly and *G*-ly onto a function which, in turn, maps the property of sensing onto a further sensing property which is usually instantiated in normal perceivers by virtue of their viewing a physical object, which is both *F* and *G*, in standard circumstances" (Tye 1984, 218; analogous claims are made about the operation of *separation* on p. 222). In sum, sensing coincidental-with(red-ly, square-ly)-ly is intended to be reductively analyzed as *being in a state typically caused in normal observers under normal*

27. Tye restricts his discussion to the visual field, and then only to versions of Jackson's problems arising from its spatial structure. But, of course, the visual field has also a temporal structure (there is also apparent movement), and most sensory fields have only temporal structure. Jackson's problems can be trivially restated on the basis of the temporal structures of appearance. Sensing a violin middle C succeeded by a cello A cannot be conflated with sensing a cello middle C succeeded by a violin A, as unmodified adverbialism would entail, nor lead us to conclude that the subject is both sensing and not sensing ("cellish-ly").

*circumstances by something which is both red and square.*

As far as I can see, this proposal requires that reductive analyses be forthcoming *for all phenomenal features* in terms of corresponding immediately perceptible properties of material things: not only of (primed) spatio-temporal phenomenal features, but also of any other phenomenal features without which the spatio-temporal features cannot be characterized. Perceiving a complex of sounds has a temporal dimension; the same applies to perceiving a complex painful condition of one's own body. This temporally felt structure gives rise to counterparts of the two problems for adverbial accounts presented by Jackson. Now, for a solution along the lines of Tye's to work, a reduction ought to be available not only of the temporal experienced features in terms of temporal properties of material events perceptually accessed in canonical circumstances. A reduction must also be possible of the, respectively, specifically sonorous and "paining" properties which in each particular case, as it were, "fill up" that temporal structure. Like any other reductive analysis of the phenomenal qualities, this will not do, essentially for the two reasons indicated at the end of section 3. In particular, while the first reduction – the one for primary properties – sounds feasible, I think we should discard the possibility of the second one, without which the first does not suffice.

Arguments making this clear include those given by Akins (1996) for the "narcissistic" character of some phenomenal features. The main difficulty she raises has the following form. She starts from a class of properties reasonably counted as objective; for instance, temperatures, as classified and measured by physicists. Then she shows that the system of thermal sensations in humans cannot be taken to represent properties in the presupposed class (see particularly her arguments against the "appeal to signal information", pp. 356-359). Two different temperatures can give rise to the same sensation, and the same temperatures can give rise to different sensations in different parts of the skin. In addition to this, the structure of temperatures and the structure of thermal sensations differ also in that changes of temperature of the same amount are felt as differing in intensity, depending on the initial temperature. These disparities, moreover, reflect the specific interest of the organism incorporating the representational system. Facts like these are not specific to the



thermal receptors; we could find them for most sensory systems (including some representing “primary” properties like spatial positions, see the example of the sense of balance on p. 369).<sup>28</sup> In view of problems like these, Tye should tell us how he expects to be able to reduce, say, feelings of temperature to physical conditions.

- (ii) The object  $s-d(E)$  is the *immediate object* of the perceptual state.

As before with (i), (ii) *per se* is not incompatible with the claims distinguishing the theory of appearing. Any account of perception will require a distinction between mediate, or indirect, and immediate, or direct, objects of the conscious awareness involved in perception. Instances of phenomenal properties may be taken to be the immediate objects of awareness in perception even by the supporter of the theory of appearing, because for him the only particulars involved are the perceived instances of material manifest properties.

The way of describing the mediate/immediate distinction mentioned here may sound slightly strained. A more straightforward formulation would simply distinguish mediate from immediate objects of *perception*, instead of *the conscious awareness involved in perception*. If I nonetheless avoid the more straightforward formulation it is because I do not think it proper to count the immediate objects of perception – mental sense data on the present view – as themselves perceived; this is one point at which I depart from Jackson. In a recent penetrating discussion, Shoemaker (1994) has given good rea-

28. See in addition the arguments by Perkins (1983), already mentioned in this connection. I should say that, while I take these considerations to put reductivist accounts in jeopardy, against Akins’ own conclusion they do not seem to me to affect a view such as the one I am developing. The obvious reaction to Akins’ examples is to take the properties represented by qualia to be characterized essentially in relation to qualia themselves (to be “narcissistic properties”, in her terms), and to accept that her examples show that those properties cannot be identified with physical properties. There is no metaphysical problem with this, because any sensible physicalism should be understood as a requirement of supervenience, not one of reduction; and, as Akins acknowledges, the facts she mentions are compatible with the required dependence of narcissistic properties on physical properties.

sons not to count introspective access to our own occurrent mental states as a form of perception; and, by my own lights, experiencing sense data counts as such. Shoemaker's considerations are much richer, but for present purposes we can reduce them to the following point. Perception is a cognitive achievement; in any particular case, the actual achievement could have turned out to be instead an unsuccessful attempt at cognitively accessing the perceived object. This is not the case for experience and its phenomenal objects. In the first place, attention is enough to experience concrete sense data; additionally, experiencing sense data guarantees their existence.<sup>29</sup> In the second place, in experiencing sense data we cannot be grossly mistaken about their character. (This is compatible with a limited admission of corrigibility.) Given these differences, it would be wrong to count introspective access to phenomenal features as a form of perception.

I assume that claims such as the following will not be disputed: When we see both Venus and a bright speck of light in the nightly sky, we see Venus in virtue of seeing a bright speck of light. When we see both the orange and an orange spherical shape of such-and-such size, we see the former in virtue of seeing the latter. Jackson offers an in my view insufficient elaboration on this relation of *perceiving something in virtue of perceiving some related thing*. He then goes on to explain the idea of immediacy by appealing to it. A mediate object of perception is one perceived at a time in virtue of perceiving at that very time a different, related object; and immediate object of perception is a perceived object which is not mediate (see Jackson 1977, 15-22 for this explication).

In his explication of the "in virtue of" relation, Jackson steadfastly refuses to invoke epistemic notions traditionally appealed to in the account of the immediacy at stake. This is why I say that his explication is insufficient; for, although I take it to be correct, as far as it goes, I think that it requires further elucidation. Jackson's abstract explication provides only a necessary but insufficient elaboration of the "in virtue of" relation holding in our case. The additional

29. Adverbialism of course provides a nice explanation for this; in rejecting adverbialism, we are forced to provide a different account for the fact. This will not be attempted here.

material is of an epistemic character. Traditionally it has been said, for instance, that when something is seen in virtue of seeing something else, the beliefs we have about the former *are inferred from* those we have about the latter; or that we are *less certain* regarding the former beliefs than we are regarding the latter. As part of his refusal to invoke epistemic notions Jackson adopts the view, advocated by Dretske (1969), that what the latter calls “simple seeing” (seeing objects, including here events) is analytically more basic than what he calls “epistemic seeing” (seeing that a fact obtains). Another integral part of Jackson’s refusal to use epistemic notions in the analysis of the immediacy at stake is his refusal (shared with many other contemporary philosophers, like Evans (1982), for similar reasons) to count perceptual judgments as constitutively involved in perception.

A proper discussion of these issues is beyond the scope of this paper, but our limited aims do not require it. Let me just indicate the main points to be developed in a fuller discussion. Firstly, the proper order of analysis is the opposite to the one that Dretske and Jackson assume; simple seeing is to be explained in terms of epistemic seeing, seeing that a fact obtains. In basic cases, the fact involves the instantiation by *the scene before the senses* (a situation involving relations with some egocentric condition of the perceiver’s body) of an array structured temporally and perhaps also spatially of manifest properties. The basic idea for the explication of the simple perception of objects and events in terms of the epistemic perception of that type of fact is to think of simple perception as a form of *de re* ascription. I would provide a treatment of *de re* ascriptions along the lines of the one given by Kaplan (1969) for *de re* belief reports, without assuming any other ontological category of beliefs than that required to analyze *de dicto* reports.<sup>30</sup> Thus, *S perceives O* is to be un-

30. These proposals are sometimes understood as attempts to reduce singular thoughts, thoughts constitutively involving particulars, to purely general descriptive thoughts. They do not need to be understood in that spirit, however, and they are not so understood here. There are two ways in which the distinction *de dicto/de re* might be seen. According to the first interpretation, it is a distinction of two kinds of thought- (and utterance-) content: singular or object-dependent content (content essentially involving particulars) vs. general content. According to the second interpretation, it is a distinction of two kinds of content-ascrip-

derstood as condensing something like *S perceives that ... ? ...*, and the singular concept ? represents *O* for *S*.<sup>31</sup> Secondly, as is the case in the analysis offered in the Sellarsian third way, perception constitutively involves belief, i.e., perceptual ascriptions conceptually entail *ceteris paribus* belief ascriptions.

The usual arguments (including Jackson's; *op. cit.*, 38-42) against the view that judgment and belief are constitutively involved in the account of the nature of perceptual experience are based on cases of well-known illusions, like the Müller-Lyer illusion; subjects familiar with it refuse to take it at face value. My reply to this is based on a broadly functionalist conception of the mind in general, and of perceptual experiences in particular. This functionalism is "broad" in that it is not reductive; it acknowledges mental properties which, even though they necessarily play a functional role, cannot be identified with functional properties as usually understood.

Thus, the view is not that perceptual experiences are identical with beliefs, or that whenever they occur, necessarily a judgement occurs, or that whenever a perceptual judgement occurs, it has been

tion. On the one hand, ascriptions whose ascriber commits himself in part as regards the nature of the modes of presentation in the ascribed content, but do not need to involve existential commitments. On the other, ascriptions whose ascriber commits himself to the existence of entities which he refers to in order to partially characterize the ascribed content, while he does not need to commit himself to the modes of presentation relative to which the entity is presented in the ascribed content. It is according to the first interpretation that a Kaplanian proposal is intended as a reduction of singular contents to general contents. The interpretation favored here is the second, however. My own view is that there are irreducible singular contents, including contents constituting the phenomenal character of perceptual experiences.

31. A view of this kind can be found in Roxbee Cox (1971). An important difference between us is that Roxbee Cox is attempting to provide a reductive analysis of perception in terms of the causation of belief. Therefore, he avoids mentioning experiences. Although, in contrast with Jackson, I believe that perception constitutively involves belief (i.e., perceptual ascriptions conceptually entail *ceteris paribus* belief ascriptions), *contra* Roxbee Cox and other philosophers I do not think that perception can be reduced to belief. That is to say, I do not think that any belief ascriptions not involving concealed appeal to experiences can be sufficient for perceptual ascriptions, for reasons given by Jackson (1977, 42-48).

generated by a corresponding perceptual experience. Firstly, certain general conditions for judging should be in place for an experience to generate a corresponding judgment. Judgment and belief are, I take it, conceptual affairs; to make judgements requires the capacity to give reasons for them, and that means that the content of judgments and beliefs is conceptualized content. Attention to the consciously experienced features is one more general condition required for an experience to generate a belief. When *S* suddenly realizes that there is – and has been for some time – a deafening pneumatic drill digging up the street, previous to the realization he was already having the experience of the sound. He was not judging that there was that sound, though, because he was not attending to the relevant phenomenal features he was (inattentively) experiencing.<sup>32</sup>

Consider now circumstances (knowledgeable subjects confronted with the Müller-Lyer figure, say) in which a perceptual experience does not give rise to the corresponding judgment. The broadly functional character of the proposal makes this compatible with the view that belief is constitutively involved in experience. For, in such cases, certain *collateral information* is present, in virtue of which the subject refrains from taking the experience at face value. Hence, default canonical cases are possible in which the collateral information is absent, and in those cases the subject would make the judgment.<sup>33</sup> Similarly, in some cases the perceptual belief can be formed without the causal operation of the perceptual experience (say, a reliable source informs the subject of the fact, while the subject would not have taken his experience at face value in the cir-

32. The example comes from Block (1995, 234), and the remark on attention is intended to refute Block's claim that the example establishes the possibility of a form of consciousness, what he calls 'phenomenal consciousness', which unlike what he calls 'access consciousness' does not have a functional/representational nature. Block's claim is a form of the internalism about phenomenal features that I reject here.

33. See also Mulligan (1999). In response to this sort of proposal Jackson (1977, 41) makes the bold empirical claim that even in the default situation people would refuse to take the appearance provoked by Müller-Lyer figures at face value, abstaining from making the corresponding judgments. Our disagreement here could in principle be resolved on the basis of the results of carefully designed experiments.

cumstances). But, again, these cases involve collateral information. Hence, there are possible canonical cases in which the collateral information is absent, and in them the perceptual belief would be generated by the experience.

In summary, a perceptual experience that *p* constitutively causes, *cæteris paribus* (relative to conditions existing in some canonical circumstances), a perceptual judgment with a corresponding content, and rationalizes it.<sup>34</sup> The present view therefore contrasts *both* with Jackson's views and with those of the classical sense data theorist. For them, at the basic level of analysis sense data are objects of states without propositional content. I should point out that this is the *only* sense data theorist whose views Sellars presents and aptly criticizes in the first section of "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind". For the more sophisticated fellow whose views we are supporting here, experiences involving sense data are, at the most basic level, propositional.<sup>35</sup>

To explicate the distinction mediate/immediate only the perception of facts is therefore relevant. A fact is perceived in virtue of perceiving (or being consciously aware of) another fact if and only if the following two conditions obtain. Firstly, *cæteris paribus* (relative to canonical circumstances), a subject could not perceive the former without perceiving (or being consciously aware of) the latter. Secondly, he could perceive (or be consciously aware of) the latter, without perceiving the former. On the present sense data theory, instances of the manifest properties (material properties placed in Sellars' qualitative space) are the objects we most directly *perceive*; but we indirectly perceive facts involving them, by being consciously aware of facts involving instances of sense data.<sup>36</sup> These remarks do not add up to a fully-fledged definition of the intended me-

34. In speaking of "corresponding" content, I am skipping over thorny issues that have to do with the already pointed out fact that the content of perceptual experiences is non-conceptual, while the content of judgments based on them is conceptualized content.

35. For a state to be propositional, in my view, is for that state to have possible-world truth-conditions, as determined by modes of presentation. It is not, obviously, to have conceptual content, or possible-world truth-conditions determined by conceptual modes of presentation.

36. See Perkins (1983, p. 16) for similar suggestions about immediacy.

diation, nor to a justification that applies to the cases at stake – which could only be given as a result of a more elaborate discussion – but I hope that they are sufficiently indicative of the view.

- (iii) The properties of  $s-d(E)$  (the sensuous sides of qualia) are correctly characterized by means of predicates for the corresponding manifest features of perceived objects (their intentional sides: shapes, colors, etc), this characterization being essentially analogical. Phenomenal properties have thus two aspects, sensuous and intentional.

This was explicated in the previous section, in connection with Sellars' views. The sense data theory I defend uses exactly the same account that we have seen in Sellars' proposal (involving the location of qualia in a qualitative space) according to which predicates for the manifest properties and their corresponding primed correlates attribute related properties.

Hence, to distinguish the manifest properties I would appeal to Sellars' idea that there is a structural similarity between some properties we perceive in material things, and the sensuous sides of phenomenal features. We have elucidated this structural similarity earlier by appealing to the view that phenomenal properties constitute a qualitative space. The sense data account coincides thus with the Sellarsian third way in counting as essential features of sensuous properties of experiences both the fact that they cause judgments in canonical circumstances, and that they are caused in canonical circumstances by material properties corresponding to them in an analogous qualitative space. It is the second constitutive aspect that we need for the definition of the manifest properties: they are, by definition, those constituting the space corresponding to the qualitative space in which sensuous sides of phenomenal features are placed. We will also appeal to it below, to characterize the nature of the causal relation which causal theories of perception appeal to.

The representationalist claim that ascriptions of phenomenal features constitutively entail propositions stating that manifest properties cause the corresponding primed properties under normal conditions in normal circumstances is disputed by Jackson (*op. cit.*, 35-39) on three counts. First, there is Hume's notorious missing shade of

blue; that is to say, phenomenal features that are experienced, but have not been caused by any instance of the corresponding observable property. The account in terms of qualitative spaces deals satisfactorily with this objection; the fact that the relations defining the phenomenal qualitative space are consciously experienced by subjects allows for extrapolation based on qualities whose instances have been involved in genuine cases of perception. Second, there is the problem of explaining “normal conditions” non-circularly; the adoption of a teleological explanation will deal with this difficulty.<sup>37</sup> Finally, Jackson points out well-known difficulties for counterfactual accounts provoked by “finkish” dispositions: “Consider a world created by a Cartesian evil demon who hates red things but tolerates non-red things looking red on odd occasions. Perhaps he has resolved to destroy the world if any red things come into existence. In this world, things look red on odd occasions, but nothing looks the way red things would if there were any; for if there were any, nothing would look any way to anyone” (*op. cit.*, 35). The reply to this is that, in contrast with reductive representationalist views, the present proposal is not to reduce categorical claims regarding the instantiation of sensuous properties to counterfactual claims involving potential instantiations of their material correlates, but only that the latter are constitutively entailed by the former. On the contrary, I take the counterfactual claim entailed by an ascription of a primed property to be explainable relative to the categorical bases implicitly ascribed in the attribution, such as neurological properties with which sensuous properties can be identified a posteriori.<sup>38</sup>

This second partial agreement with the Sellarsian third way is what the moderate externalism of the present sense data theory and its own form of disjunctivism – both mentioned at the end of the first section – comes to. Consider an ascription of phenomenal character, *it looks M to S* (where *M* is any manifest property). Under the present

37. See for instance Millikan 1984, but disregard any suggestion of biological reductivism.

38. See Lewis (1997) for a general account of finkish dispositions compatible with the sort of non-reductive line taken here for the example mentioned by Jackson. In this case, there are of course in addition the specific problems concerning the relation between phenomenal qualities and brain states. My line here would be essentially that defended by Loar (1997).



proposal, its truth-conditions incur ontological commitments. Firstly, to the existence of an instance of a corresponding sensuous property,  $M'$ . Secondly, to the existence of canonical cases in which other instances of the same type are caused by instances of  $M$ . In contrast to TA, the analysis does not require the existence of an instance of  $M$ , perceived by means of the experienced instance of  $M'$ . It thus overcomes the difficulties of TA, to be elaborated on in the next section. But the analysis does entail the existence of cases of  $M$  (or, at least, cases of other manifest properties in the space corresponding to the qualitative one). As David Lewis puts it, according to the view, when philosophically explicated it turns out that “folk psychology includes folk psychophysics” (Lewis 1994, 416). This leaves open whether primed properties, in their turn, have natures which can be fully analyzed in terms of the manifest properties that cause them in canonical circumstances. Against the reductivism of the Sellarsian third way, the view defended here has it that this cannot be done, in view of the possibility (and, I would say, the actual existence) of secondary properties. Thus, while manifest primary properties are constitutively prior to their corresponding primed properties, manifest secondary properties and their corresponding primed properties are constitutively on the same level.

Traditional sense data theories, like those we associated with the British empiricists, are Cartesian. They take phenomenal features to be fully intrinsic properties, and represent perception as the result of a risky inference (in the ordinary case, of course, one involving at least a premise constituting tacit knowledge). This is not the case in the proposal advanced here. Against the extreme relationalism represented by the theory of appearing, I have contended that a philosophically correct analysis of perceptual experiences requires us to separate two sides of phenomenal features. On the one hand, the constitutively merely intentional instances of the material properties perceived in virtue of an awareness of them, and, on the other, the actual instances of corresponding sensuous properties. As traditionally contended, this is needed to account for the commonalities between cases of hallucination and the corresponding veridical cases. But the requirement can be met while essentially considering hallucinations as parasitic on veridical cases. It can be met while refusing to offer an analysis involving non-factive states common to veridical

cases and hallucinations. This is what the present externalism about phenomenal features suggests.

It is important to emphasize this, because it is strict internalism about phenomenal features that is responsible for what is correct in criticisms of some sense data accounts, beginning with the private-language considerations. Friends of the questionable form of disjunctivism associated with the theory of appearing typically saddle their opponents with internalism.<sup>39</sup> We have seen that it is not mandatory. It is also relevant to mention that the best-known contemporary proponent of the causal theory of perception, Grice, far from embracing internalism, endorsed a moderate view such as the one supported here.<sup>40</sup>

- (iv) If  $S$  perceives  $O$ , a specific event concerning  $O$ ,  $s(O)$  (a “manifest scene concerning  $O$ ”) causes in  $S$  the perceptual

39. See, for instance, Snowdon 1990, pp. 128 and 125, and Hyman 1992, p. 283.

40. A long quotation might perhaps be justified: “(1) ... it is quite incorrect to describe many of my perceptual beliefs ... as “inferences” of any kind, if this is to be taken to imply that it would be incumbent upon me, on demand, to justify by an argument ... the contention that what appears to me to be the case actually is the case ... (2) The allegedly ‘fundamental’ case ... in which a perceptual claim is to be establishable purely on the basis of some set of sense datum statements, is a myth; any justification of a particular perceptual claim will rely on the truth of one or more further propositions about the material world ... (3) It might be questioned whether, given that I accept the existence of  $M$  on the evidence of certain sense-impressions, and given also that I think that  $M$  is causally responsible for those sense-impressions, it follows that I accept the existence of  $M$  *on the grounds that* its existence is required in order to account for the sense-impressions. (4) ... The non-contingent character of the proposition that the presence of a red (or round) object tends to make it look to particular people as if there were something red (or round) before them does not, of course, in itself preclude the particular fact that it looks to me as if there were something red before me from being explained by the presence of a particular red object; it is a non-contingent matter that corrosive substances tend to destroy surfaces to which they are applied; but it is quite legitimate to account for a particular case of surface-damage by saying that it was caused by some corrosive substance. In each case the effect might have come about in some other way” (Grice 1961, 245-7). The present view both elaborates upon, and endorses, each of these contentions.

experience  $E$  involved in  $S$ 's perceiving  $O$ .

For reasons given in the first section, the causal explanation in (iv) of the relation between sense data and perceived material objects makes the account incompatible with TA, which takes the relation of appearing to be primitive in a philosophical explication.

A notorious problem for defenders of the causal theory of perception has been to provide an adequate characterization of the intended causal relation, in a manner that is capable of handling the two kinds of cases which Lewis (1980) accurately describes as *veridical hallucinations* and *prosthetic vision*.<sup>41</sup> I think that Jackson (1977) is on the right track here; this in fact constitutes one of the main considerations in favor of claim (iii), that the sensuous sides of phenomenal properties are (analogically) square, green, hot and so on. According to Jackson's proposal, what is crucial "is what I call the *functional spatial dependence* of the sense datum on the object, a dependence which is consequent on the causal connection between the object and the sense datum. Suppose, to illustrate, that I am looking at an orange. There are four spatial properties at issue: shape, size, distance (away), and (relative) direction. If, say, all of these except size are kept fixed, what happens? Well, if the orange doubles in size, the sense datum doubles in size (approximately); if the orange halves, the sense datum halves, and so on. Thus, the size of the sense datum is a function of that of the material object. Likewise, if the orange changes direction while remaining constant in the other spatial respects, a similar dependence will be exhibited" (Jackson 1977, 170-1).

There is an important qualification that Jackson makes, which explains the reference in (iv) to a "manifest scene involving  $O$ ". As Jackson puts it, "I am correctly said to see someone in a tent dress, though my sense datum may be invariant to considerable changes in that person's shape ... we need to distinguish three entities seen and

41. Cases of veridical hallucination are cases such that, say,  $S$  has an experience as if there were a red sphere before his eyes, there actually is such a sphere before his eyes, but  $S$ 's experience has been caused independently of the presence of the sphere. A case of prosthetic vision is one where  $S$  has an experience as if there were a red sphere before his eyes, there is such a sphere actually causing  $S$ 's experience, but the causal mechanism is substantially different from the one typically operating in normal human beings.

two relations. When I see a reasonably sized opaque material thing, I see: (i) the sense datum, (ii) the thing's facing surface, and (iii) the thing. Now, the relation between the facing surface and the thing is common ground in the philosophy of perception ... [the account in terms of functional dependence] is designed to elucidate only the controversial relationship – that between sense data and the surfaces of material things ... when I see a person in a tent dress, the relation [which the account] is intended to capture is not that between the person's body and the dress, but that between the facing surface of the dress and the sense datum" (Jackson 1977, 172). The relation "between the facing surface and the thing" is the one to be explained by the form of mediation not to be disputed by anybody (like that obtaining between the perception of Venus and the perception of the bright luminous speck). It is just the mediation of the perception of the instantiation of *manifest* properties in the perceived scene by the consciously awareness of sensory features in the experienced sense datum that we want to explain in causal terms.

I said of the suggestion by Jackson only that it is "on the right track" because the proposal I believe to be entirely correct is somewhat different. In order to characterize that functional dependence of perception on sensory awareness, I think we should invoke all manifest relations among the manifest properties (chromatic relations like brightness, acoustic relations like loudness, and so on), not just the spatial ones. We take thus full advantage of the Sellarsian way in which we have explained the likeness of sensory and manifest sides of phenomenal features. We can see a white sphere by experiencing a pink, egg-shaped sense datum. It is the white sphere that is the perceptual object, in that variations in the shape and color of the sphere would give rise to corresponding variations in the sense datum. Invoking in this way all manifest relations, instead of merely the spatial ones, is the only way I envisage to generalize the account to cases of perception where spatial properties are not involved; for instance, perceiving a sound which one cannot locate in space except in the vaguest terms.

Thus, following Jackson's account (*op. cit.*, 171) I will say, more precisely, that in experiencing  $s-d(E)$   $S$  perceives a scene involving material object  $O$  just if (i)  $s(O)$  causes  $s-d(E)$ , and (ii) the sensuous properties of  $s-d(E)$  are functionally dependent on the correspond-

ing manifest properties of  $s(O)$ , as a consequence of the manner in which  $s(O)$  causes the having of  $s-d(E)$ .<sup>42</sup>

We are in a better position now to understand the sense in which, according to the present view, the manifest properties can be applied to sense data. Consider the most controversial case, the three-dimensional spatial properties. The intentional objects of some perceptual states are to be characterized in spatial terms: say, as an instance of a given shape. Our ability to represent objects of that kind is systematic, productive. Anybody able to represent an instance of a given shape would be able to represent also instances of the same shape in different sizes, in different directions and distances before him, and so on. This can only be explained by assuming that we bring to bear a tacitly possessed systematic knowledge of those properties – a naive geometry, a component of the naive physics psychologists ascribe to us. Now, we can indirectly perceive instances of some spatial properties (the three-dimensional shape of your armchair) by less indirectly perceiving the spatial properties of others (the two-dimensional drawing you made for me). The representational relation in cases like the latter involve the tacitly known functional dependence of the more indirectly represented spatial properties on the spatial properties less indirectly represented. We tacitly understand that the several different spatial properties we would have been equally able to identify in the drawing (by bringing thus to bear our tacitly known geometry) would have indicated different spatial properties we could have been equally able to attribute to the room.

The sense data account that I am supporting here contends that something like this obtains in any case of apparent perception, this time involving our conscious awareness of spatial (and other) properties of sense data. These properties are spatial in that we bring to bear, in recognizing them and in locating them in their proper place in qualitative space, a geometrical tacit knowledge. It is geometrical in that it shares relevant features with the knowledge by means of

42. The present proposal is closely related to the one by Lewis (1980, 283); whenever someone perceives the scene before his senses according to the present account, he perceives it, according to Lewis, although not the other way around. Focussing on the counterfactual dependence of primed properties of experiences on their corresponding manifest properties provides further precision, of which Lewis' proposal is in my view needed.

which we recognize, and place in their own undeniable space, the spatial properties instantiated in the material scenes we do perceive in canonical circumstances. The spatial properties of sense data are more specifically three-dimensional (in contrast with the two-dimensional ones of the previous example) in that the tacitly known geometrical knowledge we bring to bear is, more specifically, of the kind involved in representing to us perceptually three-dimensional properties of manifest objects.

(v) The object  $s-d(E)$  is mental.

This follows from the preceding consideration, by elimination of alternative possibilities. Sense data could only be material things (in cases of perception and misperception) if we accepted the claims of the theory of appearing; but not after rejecting it and subscribing the causal claim before. Sense data are mental in that as concrete tokens (not just the sensuous types they instantiate) they could not exist without the existence of a subject, potentially consciously aware of them. In this they differ from the tokens of manifest properties perceived by means of them. Even in the case of secondary properties, any particular token could exist without being the object of the perceptual conscious awareness of anybody; and each concrete token could be the object of the perceptual conscious awareness of more than one mind.

#### 4. *The Downfall of the Theory of Appearing*

The form of a sense data account of perception that has been just outlined is, I submit, not easy to rebut on the basis of traditional considerations. To conclude my defense of the account, let me now show the implausibility of the remaining rival, the theory of appearing. Robinson (1985, 1990) provides an argument that can be further developed so as to provide the decisive consideration against TA. He points out that neurophysiology might well find a common cause (or, better, a constitutive basis) for cases like Sellars' (a)-(c) of veridical perception, misperception and hallucination. According to the disjunctivist theory of appearing, the first and the third cases are,

however, ontologically apart; the first involves a relation with a material object, the hallucinatory case something else. Robinson argues against this by invoking a “same cause, same effect” (or “same constitutive basis, same constituted state”, as I would rather put it) principle. On the assumption that neurology finds a common physical constitutive basis for phenomenal states constituting perceptions and hallucinations, the principle would entail, against the theory of appearing, that the phenomenal states themselves have also a common ontological nature.

Emphasizing the distinction between facts about perception knowable by philosophical reflection, and facts knowable only a posteriori, Langsam (1997) plausibly retorts that the principle at stake only applies to intrinsic properties of the events discussed. According to TA, however, phenomenal features as discerned at the personal, philosophical level are relational at least in cases of veridical perception and misperception, and so extrinsic. Langsam (*op. cit.*, 41-48) then goes on to provide convincing examples involving relational properties to which the principle that Robinson appeals to intuitively does not apply.

This response works essentially in combination with the consideration concerning the proper level of theorizing at which the nature of phenomenal features is discussed. The issue of the nature of perceptual experiences concerns their status as postulated at the personal level of rationalizing, ultimately folk-psychological explanations. To the extent that the only plausible account of phenomenal features of experiences, at this level, is the one provided by TA, Langsam’s response is correct. At that level, the phenomenal features involved in perception would be *ta*-extrinsic properties; Robinson’s principle would not then apply to them. On the assumption that neurology does find a common factor to Sellars’ cases (a)-(c), the principle would only entail that there is some *ta*-intrinsic property common to the three cases playing an explanatory role at some empirical level of explanation. This is not in contradiction to the main tenet characterizing the theory of appearing.

Langsam’s response, however, sets into relief the most striking problem for the theory of appearing; it can then easily be seen that his argument backfires. When we classify two events as falling under a common *ta*-extrinsic property (say, the two occur a century af-

ter Hastings), we do not expect that they are thereby to be classified as falling under a common intrinsic property for purposes of placing them in a causal structure. Correspondingly, we do not have any tendency to feel our ta-extrinsic classification confirmed by finding out that the two events can be thus classified for such purposes of causal explanation. When we classify two events as falling under different ta-extrinsic properties (one occurs a century after Hastings, the other two centuries after Hastings), we similarly lack any tendency to be thereby surprised if they are classified as falling under a common intrinsic property for purposes of causal explanation.

It is altogether different in the case we are discussing. We find the suggestion on which Robinson's argument rests – that neurology will find a common factor to the likes of Sellars' cases (a)-(c) – eminently plausible; this is what we expect, this is the prediction we – ignorant of the scientific facts – would nonetheless make. Both the Sellarsian third way and our sense data theory provide an explanation for this expectation. What accounts for our expectation is that, at the proper folk-psychological level of rationalizing explanation, we feel it is appropriate to posit intrinsic (or ta-intrinsic anyway) commonalities to cases corresponding to Sellars' (a)-(c). We are disposed to this independently of any consideration having to do with the constitutive, physical (neurological) basis of the ta-intrinsic states we posit. The basis for our disposition must be in the assumptions constituting folk-psychological explanation, thus in the source of our relevant a priori intuitions. This prima facie inclination to find Robinson's principle of application to the posits of folk-psychological explication in cases corresponding to Sellars' (a)-(c) counts also as a prima facie indication that the ontology of the theory of appearing is wrong. I grant Langsam that this is only a prima facie consideration, which does not straightforwardly refute the theory of appearing. However, the prima facie consideration proves at least the following. To the extent that there is a coherent story whose ontology fits with our inclination to find the principle "same constitutive physical basis, same constituted psychological state" of application to the likes of cases (a)-(c), that alternative explication is to be preferred to TA.

There are cases in which, from a subjective point of view, it is impossible to tell whether the experience one is having is veridical, il-



lusory, or plainly hallucinatory.<sup>43</sup> If the experience is hallucinatory, and the subject is taken in by it, we would expect the same kind of behavior as in the corresponding veridical case, and would provide folk-psychological, rationalizing explanations of his behavior on that assumption by means of “appearance” talk. The *prima facie* correct explication is that there are explanatory commonalities, posited at the required personal level. Again, consider the case of a subject who has an overriding intention to touch a red sphere, has before his eyes a red sphere, and still remains undecided whether or not to move his arm. The reason, we would say, is that he is undecided whether his experience is the one he would have in a case of perception, or the one he would have in a case of hallucination. This explanation adverts to a commonality at the personal level in the two cases. It is provided independently of neurological knowledge, but leads us to expect a common neurological basis, whose finding would confirm our folk-psychological explanations. It is prospects regarding neurological findings such as this which suggest that the ontological nature of the phenomenal features we posit in providing explanations like those in the examples is at odds with TA. They are much better explained by accounts like the one provided by the Sellarsian third way or the sense data theory, which, against the main tenet of the theory of appearing, ascribe the same ontological nature to corresponding phenomenal features in perception, illusion and hallucination.

The force of this version of Robinson’s argument is strengthened by appreciating its modesty; this can be seen by realizing that no similar considerations could be given to support a claim that phenomenal features are, not just ta-intrinsic as we have argued that they are, but absolutely intrinsic as internalists want them to be. Part of the Sellarsian third way, I have suggested, is essentially right. What is right is the claim that an appearance-ascription *entails* the kind of relationality contemplated by Sellars; i.e., that that kind of relation-

43. At least one defender of disjunctivism has denied that “the psychological episodes which occur when I hear or see something and those which occur when I am subject to the corresponding ‘total illusion’ resemble each other perfectly” (Hyman 1992, 285-7). This is a bold empirical claim; I think we already have enough evidence to reject it (see the phosphene example in Jackson, *op. cit.*, 75).

ality is a *necessary* (in fact, constitutive) condition for the truth of an appearance-ascription. I thus reject the Cartesian claim that phenomenal qualities are, conceptually speaking, strictly intrinsic, purely internal affairs. This internalist view of qualia has been defended recently by writers such as Block (1995), Chalmers (1996), Loar (1997) and Peacocke (1983), but remains deeply problematic.

Now, could not an argument like the one deployed in this section against the theory of appearing be used against my proposal, given that it also makes phenomenal properties relational, even though not *ta*-extrinsic? I do not think so. Such an argument could not appeal to equally forceful intuitions regarding the kind of folk-psychological, rationalizing explanations concerning perfectly ordinary cases corresponding to Sellars' (a)-(c), and the expectations that those explanations create for the physical properties underwriting them. It would have to appeal to unfamiliar cases (brains in a vat, and so on). It is not obvious that we have sufficiently clear-cut intuitions concerning the required situations, incompatible with the modest form of extrinsicness which my proposal does support.

This concludes my case for sense data. Essentially, the argument reproduces the one given by Jackson (*op. cit.*, 96-99), which Langsam (*op. cit.*, 56, fn. 7) disregards. Against the main claim of TA, we have good reasons to provide an analysis of "looks" statements which finds a common factor in cases like those discussed by Sellars. Sellars provides a common intentional factor, and a "sensuous" one at the subpersonal level of scientific explanation. But finding the common sensuous factor at that level is not enough. It exists also at the personal level of (philosophically explicated) folk-psychological rationalizing explanation. This is corroborated by our expectations regarding the applicability to the cases at stake of the "same constitutive physical basis, same constituted folk-psychological state" principle.

In sum, I have presented a version of a sense data approach to perception, I have distinguished it from well-known versions like Jackson's, and I have offered an argument to show that it improves substantially on alternative theories of perception like TA, disjunctive approaches in general and reductive representationalist approaches. The form of the sense data theory I have advanced has four features which distinguish it from alternative theories, and allow us to count

it as a version of sense data theories. (i) Perception involves experiences, conceived as states relating subjects to mental particulars (event-tokens). (ii) Those particulars are analogically but correctly characterized as possessing the manifest properties of material particulars which we also access in perception, like colors, shapes and so on. (iii) Perception of an object occurs when it and the perceiving subject are causally connected in such a way that some manifest properties of the object cause corresponding properties in the experience of which the subject is aware, and variations in the manifest properties along their manifest relations would cause corresponding variations in the experienced properties. (iv) Experiences provide a fundamental rational justification for our empirical knowledge. Other features of traditional sense data theories are abandoned. Thus, it is also suggested, against tradition, (i) that experiences have propositional correctness conditions, (ii) whose constitutive characterization involves “local holism” (in Peacocke’s (1992) sense), and in particular (iii) relations with the material world.

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