Double-duty Quotation, Conventional Implicatures and What Is Said*

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1. Introduction

In my previous work on quotation (1994, 2004 and 2005 – this paper partly overlaps with and partly overrides the last of these three publications) I have defended a version of Davidson’s (1979) Demonstrative Theory, which I call the Deferred Ostension theory (DO henceforth) given its affinities with Nunnerg’s (1993) general views on demonstratives. With respect to what Recanati (2001) calls open quotation and I, following Davidson, call double-duty quotation (because the descriptive suggestions of the latter expression are, I think, more theoretically appropriate to the nature of the phenomenon than those of Recanati’s), as in (1) below (from the New York Review of Books, May 27 2004, p. 10), I argued that it is entirely consistent with DO:

(1) Saddam Hussein did not pose an “immediate threat to the security of our people,” as Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld said.

In what follows, I will outline the main aspects of DO and the account it suggests for double-duty quotation. To do so, I will appeal to an account of conventional implicatures. Although I will mention at some points rival accounts of quotation, I will mostly refrain from making fully-fledged comparisons or otherwise arguing for what I in fact think is the case, that is, that DO provides the theoretically more systematic and simpler account of the evidence; to a large extent, I have already argued for this in the previous papers. Here I will just take up

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2. The Deferred Ostension View of Quotation

On a plausible, Reichenbach-inspired account of indexicals, there are token-reflexive rules conventionally associated with demonstrative types, which distinguish semantically, say, ‘he’ from ‘you’. In virtue of them, when a competent speaker uses a token demonstrative, by default he thereby manifests an intention to refer to an entity of a given conventionally indicated type (male, in the case of ‘he’), in virtue of the fact that it stands in some contextually specific existential relation (Peirce’s term) to the token he has produced, made manifest by the speaker’s communicative referential intentions. With demonstratives, sensible manifestation of those intentions will typically require the speaker to carry out a further case of some standardized intentional action (a demonstration: a certain pointing gesture, say) to instantiate the contextually specific existential relation determining the referent. This is because, in contrast to so-called pure indexicals, in typical contexts including the demonstrative there are several objects satisfying the conventionally indicated type. In some expedient cases, a unique such individual is already manifest, no demonstration being needed; this is in general the case with pure indexicals.

When a successful demonstration occurs, it picks out an object, the demonstratum, typically coinciding with the referent. In cases of deferred ostension, the demonstratum is not the referent, because it does not satisfy the conventionally indicated type; it is rather an index (Nunberg 1993), helping to determine the referent in ways not unlike those in which typically the token determines it: in virtue of further contextually specific existential relations, properly manifested by the speaker. By default, the referent (in successful cases) is the demonstrative’s contribution to the proposition constituting the main speech act it helps to convey. The mutually known descriptive condition that must also exist in successful cases rather contributes to characterizing a presupposed propo-

2. Most semanticists, following Kaplan (1989), think that there are philosophical problems with this mention of particulars in a semantic theory, and prefer a more abstract characterization in which the theory quantifies over types in context, as opposed to tokens. In previous work, I (1998) have argued that the alleged advantages of this are illusory, and the alleged problems non-existent. Although we should assume a relative abstract conception of tokens for semantic purposes, it is crucial that referents are determined through existential relations with particulars.
sition, by specifying the content of the presupposed speaker’s communicative referential intention.

All this seems to suitably fit the way quotation works in natural languages according to DO, a version of the demonstrative theory. Consider a written utterance of the sentence (2):

(2) ‘Barcelona’ is disyllabic.

According to DO, quotation marks are the linguistic bearers of reference, functioning like a demonstrative; the quoted material merely plays the role of a demonstrated index. The referent is obtained through some contextually suggested relation in which it stands to the quoted material; in the default case the relation will be: …instantiates the linguistic expression __, but there are other possibilities determined by speaker’s intentions. In this way, DO accounts for the fact that we do not merely refer with quotations to expression-types, but also to other entities related in some way to the relevant token we use: features exhibited by the token distinct from those constituting its linguistic type, features exhibited by other tokens of the same type but not by the one actually used (as when, by using a graphic token, we refer to its phonetic type), other related tokens, poems or songs including the instantiated types as in (3), and so on and so forth.

(3) Almost all English schoolboys used to know by heart ‘The curfew tolls the knell of parting day’, but not anymore; now they rather know ‘Imagine’.

3. I will henceforth use quoted material to refer to what is inside the outermost quotation-marks – Barcelona in (2) – reserving ‘quotation’ for the whole constituted by it and the surrounding quotation-marks.

4. Predelli (2008) provides a useful formalization of a demonstrative account. In part to deal with issues raised by Cappelen and Lepore (2007) that I will be discussing later, he argues for a distinction between the character and the meaning of quotation-marks, taken as demonstrative expressions, which I do not find required. Of course, the distinction is always there, in that character is a function – an abstract mathematical representation of a semantic property. However, to the extent that the function represents the semantic instruction whose default case has been described in the main text, I do not think the distinction is needed – in particular, as I argue below, it is not needed to deal with Cappelen and Lepore’s arguments.

On the contrasting Fregean *Identity* theory (IT), when an expression is referred to by means of quotation the quoted material itself is the linguistic referring expression. Quotation-marks are not needed; when they are used, they serve to make clearer the shift in syntactic and semantic properties effected on the quoted material by its occupying that linguistic context: whatever its usual syntactic function, the quoted material functions as a singular term; whatever its usual semantic function, in that linguistic environment the quoted material refers to itself. In this way, as Washington (1992) emphasized, IT accounts for those cases (particularly, although not only, in spoken language) where no form of quotation marks is used. DO entails that those sentences (say, a spoken version of ‘*cat* has three letters’ without any special intonation), missing an expression playing the syntactic role of subject, should sound syntactically defective in languages like English which lack the “pro-drop” feature. They are not perceived to be so, however; the presence of the quoted material is enough for speakers to feel no syntactic solecism.

In presenting the two views, I have also indicated what I take to be their main strengths. They also constitute the main problems for the rival view, which typically they deal with by appealing to the semantics-pragmatics divide. Thus, for instance, the defender of DO will argue that, while the semantic referent of the subject in spoken utterances of (2) without quotation-marks is a city, and therefore what is said in those utterances is false, typically the speaker’s referent will be an expression-type, and the thereby conversationally implicated content true. The defender of IT, on the other hand, will typically argue that, while the semantic referents of quotations are always the very same expression-types they include as parts, their speaker’s referents may well be on many occasions other related entities like those previously mentioned – poems and so forth.

I would like to emphasize for later use a point I have been careful to make in presenting the two views, namely, that they differ as regards what they count as the *linguistic* referring device in quotation. DO does not deny that the quoted material counts also as a referring sign, according to ordinary intuitive conceptions of *reference*. For we intuitively describe indexes in regular cases of deferred ostension as *referring* to whatever they help refer to. Moreover, as we just saw, in those cases in which no quotation marks are used, according to DO they are the vehicles of speaker’s reference. The real difference between DO and IT lies in that, according to the former view, in the strict sense of *referring device* in which only tokens of linguistic types that have a referring function in the system of a natural language, it is tokens of quotation marks that are the referring devices in quotation; only they convey semantic reference. According

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to IT, it is rather the token of the quoted type that is the referring device, in that strict sense. If, as happens in (2), the quoted type is itself conventionally a referring device, there is a systematic ambiguity involved. Quotation marks, or alternative contextual resources, help to disambiguate.

At first sight, quotation marks look much more like punctuation marks with a disambiguating role of this kind than like fully-fledged linguistic referring devices. The impression is even stronger if it is kept in mind that devices like italicization and, in spoken language, some sorts of intonation are (in my view, at least) among the different shapes that quotation marks can conventionally adopt. I share the feeling. But no theoretically compelling argument against DO can be based on it. For the assumption behind such an argument should be that only word-like expressions – lexemes – have semantic roles. But, of course, we indicate, say, co-reference not only with lexemes (anaphoric expressions), but also by using tokens of the same type, and the relation being of the same type is not a lexeme; we indicate thematic roles with lexemes (declensional inflection), but also by means of syntactical relations that are not lexemes at all; we indicate focus by means of intonation, and so on and so forth. And what we indicate in all these variegated ways are crucial semantic features of natural languages.

Nonetheless, there are important objections to DO. Some by Gómez-Torrente (2001) are among the most ingenious I have recently seen. I have offered replies to them in my (2004). All in all, as I argue there, I still think that DO is the best contender in the field. I will not rehearse here the reasons. I will just mention what I take to be the main problem for Reimer’s (1996) version of IT, which adopts aspects of DO; and then I will discuss Cappelen and Lepore (2007)

7. I understand that linguistic expressions are abstract entities, which might have, as it were, different physical embodiments. In this context, I am assuming that italicization and certain patterns of intonation are just two among the different devices for quotation, in addition to the many varieties of graphic marks that languages use. Perhaps this is a good point to note that in my view there is no non-theoretical way of telling what quotation is; it is for theoretical accounts of quotation to characterize the phenomenon. Of course, in pre-theoretical terms we can point to paradigm examples of the phenomenon we want to account for, such as (1) and (2), mentioning the pre-theoretical data that must be explained, including the facts we have already mentioned and those that will come out later, such as the “picturing” character of quotation.

8. I do not assume that all semantic devices alternative to lexemes conform a natural class of their own. The only relevant class is that of expressions with a semantic role, be they lexemes or not.
recent proposal (‘LTOI’ henceforth), which has some affinities with Gómez-Torrente’s views.

Reimer’s view shares with orthodox versions of IT the claim that the quoted material is the linguistic referring expression. Her version of IT differs from previous ones concerning the semantic subcategory of singular terms inside which this linguistic expression referring to itself is to be included: according to her proposal, the quoted material is a demonstrative; on her view, quotation marks play the role of a demonstration. This accounts for their absence – this occurs when the referential intentions of the speaker are sufficiently clear so that a demonstration is not required, and also for the fact that quotation marks are more needed in writing – because then context does not make the speaker’s intentions so perspicuous (Reimer 1996: 140).

However, this account of quotation does not fit the way demonstratives work in natural language. Two factors are needed to account for the semantics of indexicals and demonstratives: a linguistic rule associating distinct conventionally indicated types with distinct linguistic types (one, say, for ‘he’ and another for ‘you’), accounting for the semantic commonalities among different uses, and a truth-conditional import assigned to their tokens, or contextualized types, accounting for the potential differences in truth-conditional import. Given that Reimer’s proposal is a version of IT, on her view there cannot be anything playing the role of the first element common to all cases of mention; there cannot be a common rule associated with, say, the quoting expressions in (2) and (4):

(4) ‘Hombre’ is disyllabic.

On any identity view, the referring expressions in these two cases are different. Therefore, there is not a type instantiated in all cases of quotation, with which a common linguistic rule is associated. Given Reimer’s account, whenever tokens of different expression-types are used for mentioning, different demonstrative-types are also involved; otherwise, it would not be correct to say that the token of ‘Barcelona’ in an utterance of (2) lacking quotation marks is a linguistic expression that, by default, refers to itself, and the view would not be a version of IT. According to Reimer’s view, thus, every natural language includes as many demonstrative-types as it includes expression-types. Indeed, in view of the fact that we can use for indexical mention graphic and spoken material belonging to other languages, as in (4) – or even belonging to no used language – Reimer’s view entails that types they instantiate are further demonstrative expressions in English.

I do not think this is correct. The introduction of expressive devices like quotation marks reflects the perception that a common semantic procedure ap-
plies in all cases, which disregards the type of the quoted material: whenever any expression is quoted, a common token-reflexive “picturing” rule operates. Whenever ‘you’ is used, the same indexical rule operates, one different from the indexical rule operating whenever ‘he’ is used, associated with a specific conventionally indicated type, being the addressee. Reimer’s proposal has it that, analogously, whenever ‘Barcelona’ is quoted, the same indexical rule is operating, one different from the rule operating when ‘hombre’ is quoted, a rule which might then be associated with a specific conventionally indicated type. This is not the case. The same indexical rule, associated with a unique conventionally indicated type – something like being an expression, in a broad understanding of that notion, a determinable to be determined in context – operates when we quote any expression whatsoever, even when we quote material that does not instantiate any expression-type of our language. The models we have for indexicals suggest that the indexical rule operating here is one associated with a type that is present no matter what the quoted type is; quotation-marks are the obvious candidate.9

I will further elaborate on the comparative merits of DO by comparing it with the recent proposal in Cappelen and Lepore’s (2007) new book on the topic. Here they abandon their former Davidsonian view, in favour of a certain Minimal Theory (MT henceforth). They appear to have been impressed by one of the objections to Davidsonian theories in Gómez-Torrente (2001) that I alluded to before,10 and to have built MT in part as way of accommodating it. However, as I will show, their remaining sympathies towards Davidsonian accounts compel them to modify Gómez-Torrente’s view in ways that impair it considerably; in addition, for a book-length discussion of the topic (the first in print, they proudly declare: op. cit., 16), their presentation of MT leaves matters unclear at crucial points.

The criticism by Gómez-Torrente to which Cappelen and Lepore appear to be sensitive appeals to the intuitive truth of disquotational schemas for quotations such as the one this instantiates:

(5) ‘‘Socrates’’ stands for (refers to, denotes) ‘Socrates’.

The problem that (5) poses to Davidsonian theories such as DO is as follows. According to the Davidsonian, it is just quotation marks that are linguistic expressions, susceptible of being in the standing for or referring to relation; whole quotations are not, because they include what in fact is a mere extra-linguistic

9. I take this to be the core problem for Reimer’s proposal. Caplan (2001) presents more elaborated objections.
10. This is just my personal impression; they in fact do not acknowledge it.
index that helps determining the referent. The expression quoted by the grammatical subject of (5) is a whole quotation, the opening quote followed by ‘Socrates’ followed by the closing quote. But that, according to the Davidsonian account, is not a term being in the *standing for* relation to anything – only part of it, the quotation marks, are; and, all by themselves, out-of-context, they do not refer to ‘Socrates’ or to anything else.  

Cappelen and Lepore appear to have been impressed by this argument, so much as to make a schema close to the one that (5) exemplifies (I will comment on the differences presently) the main tenet of their non-Davidsonian new theory MT:

(4)   ‘e’ quotes ‘e’.

MT “is the view that QS is *the* semantic rule for quotation. It serves as the full semantic treatment for quotation expressions. (…) QS is the fundamental axiom schema governing the semantics of quotation expressions” (LTOI: 124). As we will presently see, the appeal to this “rule” does not make everything about MT as crystal clear as it should be.

The reader may have noticed an outstanding difference between QS and the schema that (5) instantiates: QS studiously avoids mentioning the reference relation, invoking instead a *sui-generis* quoting relation. Cappelen and Lepore (*ibid.*) note this difference, but do not justify it; they note also a second difference, which perhaps may in part account for the first. Gómez-Torrente (2005: 128) presents the likes of (5) as immediately accounted for by the Tarskian theory of quotation he defends, which characterizes pure quotation as governed by the following semantic *Tarskian Principle*: “by enclosing any expression

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11. In my (2004) I provide a rejoinder that Gómez-Torrente (2001: 134) anticipates, although he (2005: 148) thinks that it puts the Davidsonian in a somewhat less attractive position vis-à-vis the Tarskian proposal he defends – about which I will say something later in the main text. The reply is that the intuitions on which the argument relies are not sensitive enough to the distinction between a *properly linguistic expression*, part of the expressive system of a particular natural language, and any old expressive resource, a mere *sign*; the quotation referred to by the grammatical subject of (5) is indeed such a sign, “referring” in an equally extended sense to ‘Socrates’. A theoretical account does not need to honor such intuitions; the only issue is whether, overall, it provides a better explanation of all relevant facts. (It is doubtful whether, as Gómez-Torrente’s rejoinder assumes, *ceteris paribus* an account would be better off if it captured this, in my view spurious, intuition, but ultimately that does not matter, because *cetera* are not *paria* in the full appraisal of the two accounts.) For reasons that I am rehearsing here, DO in my view fares better than its rivals, including Gómez-Torrente’s Tarskian account.
within quotation marks one gets a singular term – a quotation – that stands for (refers to, denotes) the enclosed expression”. Cappelen and Lepore mention a similar principle offered by Mark Richard when they present MT (LTOI: 124). They note, however, that these principles take the denoting items to be expressions; this, as we have seen, is as it should be, because the relations that Gómez-Torrente mentions, referring or denoting, relate linguistic expressions to other items.

Unlike Gómez-Torrente, however, Cappelen and Lepore contend that it is not just expressions that appear between quotation marks in the quotations standing in the relation axiomatically characterized by MT, but, more generally, “quotable items”, including non-expressions. My guess is that they introduce the sui generis unexplained relation of quoting in their axiom QS in part because of this.12 Be this as it may, by relying on QS Cappelen and Lepore cannot apply Gómez-Torrente’s objection for to Davidsonian accounts. For they agree with their Davidsonian past selves that the first terms of the semantic relation that QS characterizes do not need to be linguistic expressions. Unlike Gómez-Torrente (who instead provides a pragmatic account of the data), they accept part of the evidence pointing to a demonstrative account, to wit, that quotations can refer to (“quote”, they would say) items which are not expressions of the language to which they belong (or indeed any other language – they contend that pictures can be quoted, LTOI: 23), and that quotation appears to manifest context-sensitivity. Now, if we substitute ‘quotes’ for ‘stands for’ in (5), the resulting claim is of course true even on Davidsonian accounts such as DO.

I say that they accept that quotation “appears to manifest” context-sensitivity because, in sync with their tirades against contextualist views in their recent work about the semantics-pragmatics divide, Cappelen and Lepore reject that quotations are context-dependent. More specifically, they reject the following principle (LTOI: 68), which DO certainly endorses:

\[(\text{QCS}) \quad \text{Let } S \text{ be a sentence with a quotation } Q, \text{ containing no context-sensitive expressions other than possibly } Q. \text{ Two utterances, } u \text{ and } u', \text{ of } S \text{ can express different propositions because } Q \text{ in } u \text{ and in } u' \text{ quotes different items.}\]

This denial notwithstanding, and at first sight paradoxically, they accept some of the data emphasized by demonstrative accounts such as DO that suggest the truth of QCS; for instance, they accept that, while in some context (6) might be

12. I guess that the other part of their motivation lies in the “syntactic chameleonism” that their treatment of mixed quotations ascribes to quotations, which I will discuss in the next section.
true, in more ordinary contexts it is rather its negation which is true (and this
is a semantic, not merely a pragmatic phenomenon as writers such as Gómez-
Torrente would have it), because at least one of the expressions (say, the one on
the right-hand side of the identity sign) does not refer to the linguistic expres-
sion ‘Madrid’ but merely to its written manifestation in a specific font, Verdana
(LTOI: 77–79):

(6) ‘Madrid’ = ‘Madrid’.

Cappelen and Lepore’s (LTOI: ch. 12) way of making their rejection of QCS
consistent with their acceptance of this contextualist datum goes as follows. It is
not necessarily linguistic expressions that do the quoting that QS characterizes.
Quotations might include “quotable items” which, although “signs”, are not
expressions. Quotations literally have those quotable items, some of them non-
expressions, as parts. Thus, to get the result that (6) is false, and its negation true,
according to QS, the quotable items included in the quotations on one and the
other side of the identity sign should differ; but this means that the quotations
themselves differ, which is how the rejection of QCS can be upheld: when the
quoted items differ, the quotations doing the quoting differ too.

As a way of semantically accommodating part of the data favouring context-
dependent, demonstrative proposals such as DO, while preserving the context-
independence of an account which relies on QS as the way of capturing what
is essential to quotation, Cappelen and Lepore’s suggestion is more of an id-
iosyncratic change of topic than a theoretically illuminating proposal. QS is
supposed to be integrated as an axiom in a semantic theory (LTOI: 130–131).
It is, I take it, a common assumption that semantic theories deal with the prop-
erties of linguistic expressions. This is, as I emphasized before, for better or
worse a crucial assumption behind the Davidsonian claim that only the quota-
tion marks are expressions, akin to demonstratives. All writers I know of make
this standard assumption, which linguists would of course make; as we have
seen, Gómez-Torrente anti-Davidsonian argument crucially depends on it. On
Cappelen and Lepore’s extraordinary view, however, the lexical items of nat-
ural languages on which semantic axioms such as QS range comprise in fact
all kind of “signs”, including pictures and what have you.13 If we disregard
this terminological idiosyncrasy, and interpret ‘expression’ in the same way as
everybody else in this debate, Cappelen and Lepore’s view validates QCS –

13. Although the whole proposal is too underdeveloped to validate conjectures, the treat-
ment of the “syntactic chameleonism” to be discussed in the next section might re-
quire that “quotable items” in general, including pictures, also have all kinds of syn-
tactic categories.
unlike accounts truly relying only on a principle akin to QS, such as Gómez-Torrente’s Tarskian Principle, which do reject QCS and instead account for the intuition that (6) might be false in pragmatic terms.

Let me develop this point a little more. QCS has a pre-theoretical interpretation, relative to which it is confirmed by examples such as (6); and a theoretical one that, depending on the theory, either embraces or rejects it. The pre-theoretical interpretation appeals to pre-theoretical notions of what expressions are and what identity conditions they have. On this interpretation, ‘Madrid’ is the same quotation in a context in which (6) is true (because it refers to the linguistic expression ‘Madrid’), and in another in which the negation of (6) is true (because it refers to its written manifestation in Verdana). The pre-theoretical interpretation thus confirms QCS. On a theory of quotation that appeals only to Gómez-Torrente’s Tarskian Principle, semantically the two expressions have the same referent in both contexts, and, in general, QCS is false. On a Davidsonian theory, on the other hand, only the quotation marks are (demonstrative) expressions in both contexts, and they do have different referents; thus, QCS is true. Versions of the Identity Theory such as Saka’s or Reimer’s have the same result, with the expressions being the relevant tokens of the quoted material (which has the problematic consequences I highlighted before). Washington’s version of IT, closer to Frege’s I think, only accepts linguistic types as expressions, and then entails the falsity of QCS, exactly as Gómez-Torrente’s view does. The important point to notice is that Cappelen and Lepore in fact do not disagree with any of this. They just introduce a different, idiosyncratic understanding of what an item in the range of a linguistic theory is, relative to which they can declare that they join anti-contextualists in rejecting QCS. But if we understand ‘quotation’ in a non-idiomatic way, they are fully in agreement with the contextualist, Davidsonian diagnosis. Thus their rejection of QCS is merely verbal.

In my previous work I provided examples showing that we can use quotations to refer not just to types distinct from linguistic expressions (such as, say, the Verdana written version of ‘Madrid’, in the case of the second occurrence of that expression in false utterances of (6)), but also to tokens. Thus, consider for example (7), about which Cappelen and Lepore say that they and their informants find impossible (or very difficult) to find a true reading (LTOI: 72):

(7) ‘I’ tastes like peach.

In spite of the difficulties that Cappelen, Lepore and their informants report, it is not hard at all to find a context in which an utterance of (7) appears to be true; just imagine that we are speaking about the items in a bag of sweets in the shape
of letters. In fact, at other places Cappelen and Lepore are more prudent and do not deny the intuitive data (“we have no complaint against an audience being directed to a token with an utterance of a quotation expression” (LTOI: 71).

However, although Cappelen and Lepore accept a semantic account of the former cases (as we have seen, what they end up providing is a terminologically idiosyncratic version of a contextualist account), they reject it when it comes to tokens, proposing instead to account for it by appealing to one of three familiar pragmatic strategies (LTOI: 76). I have difficulty in understanding the asymmetry. Firstly, if the arguments they provide against demonstrative accounts worked in the case of quotations referring to tokens, they would also apply to the cases of types other than the expression. Conversely, once one accepts as semantic the context-dependence they are prepared to grant (even if accounting for it by means of their terminological way of disowning context-dependence), it seems unprincipled not to incorporate the one they reject. Let us have a look at their arguments, because they will give the reader a fuller view of this new theory of quotation, before we move on to study double-duty quotations.

The first argument is related to the one by Gómez-Torrente that we discussed above, but, of course, for the reasons I have given, cannot be exactly like it. They argue that demonstrative views accepting the wide-ranging context-dependence that DO assumes “cannot guarantee the truth of (dis)quotational sentences”, such as instances of QS like (8), because, on such views, it “should be on a par with” (9) (LTOI: 69):

(8) ‘‘Quine’’ quotes ‘Quine’.
(9) ‘that’ demonstrates that.

To begin with, unlike Gómez-Torrente’s argument, this one is very weak. There is a significant difference between (9) and (8), which demonstrative views such as DO highlight: instances of (8) always include adequate indexes to act as demonstrata, unlike instances of (9). As a result, what I characterized above as the default demonstrative rule for quotations can always safely operate in any context in which (8) is uttered; on that rule, a quotation refers to the linguistic expression instantiated by the demonstratum. On this interpretation, utterances of (8) are true.14 I think that this explains perfectly well the intuitions of an asymmetry between (8) and (9), and also the intuition that (8) is true “as a matter of meaning alone”, as they put it (LTOI: 70). It is certainly the case that,

14. Cp. the response to Cappelen and Lepore provided by Predelli (2008: 566) on behalf of the version of the demonstrative account that he formalizes there.
given DO, there are false instances of QS;\(^1\)\(^5\) (10) might be a case in point, in an appropriate context:

\[
(10) \quad \text{‘Quine’} \text{ quotes ‘Quine’}.
\]

However, we should not make too much of this; I bet that ordinary speakers would feel confused if we ask them whether an utterance of (10) is true (even if we substitute the more colloquial ‘refers to’ for Cappelen and Lepore’s technical ‘quotes’), and also that many would find it false if we set the context so that it is clear that the second quotation refers to the Verdana version of the expression. But, putting this aside, what makes their argument truly amazing is that, of course, Cappelen and Lepore agree that some utterances of (10) are false.

As one would expect by now, they (LTOI: 153–4) resort to their terminological trick to argue that this does not contradict the truth of (8) “as a matter of meaning alone”, because in false utterances of (10) different quotations are at stake: the quotation that is part of the subject is not the same as the one used as object. But this, as shown above, is just the result of verbal stipulations. According to DO, there are false instances of QS, such as an utterance of (10) in the indicated context; and what determines whether we have a true or a false instance of QS is whatever determines the interpretation of demonstratives in context (in my own view, not just any old intention but the referential communicative intentions of the speaker). According to Cappelen and Lepore’s manner of speaking, all proper instances of QS are true; an utterance of (10) could either be an instance of QS, and then true, or false, and then not a true instance of QS; and what determines whether is one or the other is …well, I suppose the (not referential but) “quotational” communicative intentions of speakers. So, once again we just have an idiosyncratic terminology disguising the modest measure of philosophical illumination we have been given, relative to what can already be found elsewhere.

I have argued that the anti-contextualist argument is not good, and that, in any case, a similar argument could be mounted against Cappelen and Lepore. Thus, it is very difficult to understand the asymmetry that they claim exists between the case of quotational reference to different types, in addition to the linguistic expression itself, and that of reference to other tokens. The argument that we have rehearsed does not work any better when we have in mind contextual variation due to reference of some quotation to a token, than when we have

\(^1\)\(^5\) Remember that what counts as an instance of QS depends on which theory of quotational expressions we appeal to; more about this in what follows.
contextual variation due to reference of some quotation to a type other than the linguistic type.

Perhaps the ultimate reason for the asymmetry in Cappelen and Lepore’s treatment is that when it comes to tokens, only false pseudo-instances of QS can be found (the context previously suggested to find a true utterance of (7) can be easily invoked to obtain one). By definition of ‘token’, it cannot be the case that the quotation playing the subject role in an instance of QS contains the same token as that playing the object-role. Nonetheless, this does not provide a principled reason to reject that quotations might semantically refer to tokens, but merely a theory-driven one. One, moreover, driven by an unstable theory: if we accept Cappelen and Lepore’s reasons for context-dependence in quotation, context-dependence should be extended to embrace reference to tokens, which points to a Davidsonian account, or to a context-dependent version of IT; if we instead become persuaded of the importance of disquotational axioms for the semantics of quotations by their reasons against contextualism, then we should go for Gómez-Torrente’s Tarskian account, or for the context-independent version of IT.

Two other arguments that they provide against demonstrative accounts have exactly the same problems, so we can go through them quickly. (1) Those accounts, they say, “over-generate”; they predict that instances of (11) can be true, exactly as instances of (12) can:

\[
\begin{align*}
(11) & \quad \text{‘a’} \neq \text{‘a’}. \\
(12) & \quad \text{that} \neq \text{that}.
\end{align*}
\]

In reply, we can make the same points as before: (i) the default rule explains why the schema feels as if its instances were true “as a matter of meaning”; (ii) there are exceptions, illustrated by contexts where (6) is false, but Cappelen and Lepore themselves can only validate the general truth of (11) by appealing to their terminological stipulation; if we instead use standard terminology they agree that (11) has counter-instances; (iii) to restrict counter-instances to cases involving reference to non-linguistic types is unprincipled. (2) Quotations, they argue, fail to pass two standard tests for context-sensitivity; firstly, the “Inter-context Disquotation Indirect Reporting Test”: If an occurrence of an expression \(e\) in a sentence \(S\) tends to block disquotational indirect reports (i.e., tends to render them false), then that’s evidence that \(e\), and so \(S\), is (semantically) context-sensitive (cf. LTOI: 73), and secondly the Collectivity Test: If a noun \(e\) is (semantically) context-sensitive (i.e. if it changes semantic value from one context of utterance to another, then on the basis of merely knowing there are two contexts of utterance, one in which ‘\(e\) is \(F\)’ is true and the other in which
‘e is G’ is true, we cannot automatically infer that there is a third context in which ‘e is F and G’ (cf. LTOI: 74). The three points I have made in reply to the over-generalization argument apply here as well, mutatis mutandis: (i) the appearance that quotations fail the two tests is accounted for by cases in which the default rule applies; (ii) there are cases in which quotations pass the two tests, as Cappelen and Lepore would acknowledge if we frame the cases in the standard terminology invoked by context-sensitive theories; (iii) to restrict an account otherwise accepting context-dependence (when stated in the standard terminology) to cases in which types, not tokens, are referred to by the quotations is unmotivated.

I conclude this section by discussing Cappelen and Lepore’s fourth argument. Intuitively, unlike other referential devices, quotations have a “picturing” feature; but, they argue, “[i]t is hard to see how a semantic construal of QCS” can account for this, for “[t]here is no requirement built in that secures any kind of picturing or hieroglyphic relationship between the quotation and its semantic value. Given that the speaker’s intention (together with other facts about what is contextually salient) determines the semantic value of a quotation, it also remains a mystery how we are able to go from a quotation to what it quotes” (LTOI: 71). MT, in contrast, allegedly explains this in that, by sticking to QS, it contends that the semantic value of a quotation is already contained in the quoting expression itself.

Now, it is fair to say that, given the variety of quotable items their own account envisages, it is not descriptively adequate to represent this relation between quotation and quoted item as “picturing”; first and foremost, a quotation can hardly be said to “picture” the embedded linguistic expression, as I pointed out in my (1994). I guess this is why Cappelen and Lepore, given their penchant for terminological redescription, characterize the datum as one of proximity rather than “picturing” (LTOI: 71). Now, the very fact that they themselves have to resort to redescription shows that, although there is a fact to be accounted for here – one suggested by the talk of pictures or hieroglyphs – this talk cannot be taken at face value. In my own view, as I explained in my (2004), the best account is provided by the fact that quotations are demonstrations that incorporate their index or demonstratum, so that, in paradigmatic cases where the default rule applies, mere linguistic knowledge is enough to identify the referent.

In this section we have considered how four different theories of quotation (IT, DO, Gómez-Torrente’s Tarskian proposal (TT), and Cappelen and Lepore’s related MT) handle the data of (i) the apparent context-sensitivity of quotation, (ii) quotation without quotes, (iii) the apparent truth of sentences like (5) – including a recursively generated one with an additional pair of quotes – and
(iv) the apparent pictoricity of quotation. IT and TT provide straightforward accounts of (iii), and explain (iv) in terms of containment or plain identity between referring expression and referent. IT explains straightforwardly (ii), while TT and DO appeal to pragmatics here. DO provides a straightforward account of (i), while IT and TT should appeal to pragmatics here. I have made my preferences clear, but it is ultimately for the reader to evaluate the pros and cons of the relevant theoretical choices. MT, we have seen, is a theory combining features of TT and DO, which is sometimes disguised because of terminological idiosyncrasies. In this section we have not found any reason to prefer it to its models.

3. Double-Duty Quotation

Cappelen and Lepore (1997), following Davidson, called attention to uses of quotation marks (*mixed quotation*, in their terms) as in (1), repeated below, which combine direct and indirect discourse. They argued that a proper account of those cases requires deploying together a Davidsonian demonstrative treatment of quotation, and a Davidsonian paratactic treatment of indirect discourse. In their more recent work (2007), they have also abandoned this view, in ways we are about to examine.

(1) Saddam Hussein did not pose an “immediate threat to the security of our people,” as Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld said.

I agree with Recanati (2001: 660) that mixed quotation is but a particular case of a more general phenomenon, including also among other things scare quotes as (13):16

(13) A ‘fortnight’ is a period of fourteen days

Recanati describes all those cases as *open* quotations. I follow Davidson in using ‘double-duty quotation’. It is descriptively apt; for, at an intuitive level of description, the phenomenon consists in that the quoted expressions are both mentioned – i.e., used in order to explicitly call attention to themselves – and used – i.e., used in their standard ways, that of mentioning entities such as period of times in the case of (13). And I prefer to avoid the connotations of Recanati’s term, suggestive of his own account, which I (2005) have criticized elsewhere.

16. Cappelen and Lepore prefer to put aside the discussion of scare quotes (LTOI: 16–17).
Cappelen and Lepore (2007: 29) usefully classify theories of double-duty quotation in three groups, which we can descriptively label ‘use-only theories’, ‘dual theories’ and ‘mention-only theories’. Dual theories respect the initial intuition; according to them, “the semantics for a mixed quotation require that the quoted words be both used and mentioned” (LTOI: 29). Use-only theories “deny the initial intuition by saying that in mixed quotation, the semantic content doesn’t recognize quotation marks – at the semantic level the quotation marks are superfluous” (ibid). Finally, mention-only theories “deny the initial intuition by saying that in mixed quotation, the semantic content doesn’t imply that the quoted words are used – only quoted” (ibid). On the latter view, which is the one they advocate now (against their previous selves, proponents of a dual account), “no corresponding indirect report [of Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, in the case of (1)] follows from the semantic content of [(1)]” (LTOI: 28–29).

(As we will see later, it is not that clear that Cappelen and Lepore defend in fact a mention-only account.)

Relative to Cappelen and Lepore’s classification, and in contrast to both their new mention-only and their previous dual proposals, my own account of double-duty quotation (which extends Predelli’s (2003) account of scare quotes) is a use-only theory;17 but I should emphasize that this is only relative to their own assumptions on the semantics-pragmatics divide, which – against what I find adequate – place conventional implicatures and lexically-based presuppositions into pragmatics. It will be convenient to examine this issue with more care, before discussing accounts of double-duty quotation.18

Consider first lexically based presuppositions. Without going into the details of how to articulate it into a precise, theoretical account, in my view a correct account of utterances such as (14) would distinguish an asserted content (14a) (the only content counted as semantic on truth-conditional views about the semantics-pragmatics divide such as Cappelen and Lepore’s) and a presupposed content (14b), both of which might well rely on context to fill up the constraints or indications conventionally associated with expression-types:

17. The view I propose is very close to those advanced by (in addition to the already mentioned Predelli (2003)) Geurts and Maier (2005), Gómez-Torrente (2005) and Potts (2007a), particularly the latter. Gómez-Torrente is very careful and merely suggests a view along the lines of the one I propose, while Geurts and Maier advocate a presuppositional account; I defend that the quotational contents in mixed quotations are conventional implicatures and not presuppositions – but Gómez-Torrente’s nuanced attitude is advisable in this area, where the kinds at stake are not very “natural”, to say the least.
(14) It was not John who stole the bicycle.
   a. Asserted content: John did not steal the bicycle
   b. Conventionally presupposed content: Someone stole the bicycle

Consider now cases of what I take to be conventional implicatures, rather than lexically based presuppositions. I follow Potts (2005) in assuming that conventional implicatures differ from lexically based presuppositions only in being correctly used to provide new information – i.e., information which is not presented as already part of the “common ground”. As we will see, what they share, and what distinguishes both of them from asserted or purely “truth-conditional” contents is their “projectibility” beyond operations such as negation, conditionalization, modalization or questioning; both the lexically based presuppositions and the conventional implicatures of a sentence are typically preserved when the sentence is negated, made the antecedent of a conditional, embedded in modal operators, interrogated, etc. Following Potts, I will use non-restrictive relative clauses as an example of conventional implicature (the reader can replace it with implicatures generated by ‘but’, expressives or any other favourite):

(15) John, who lives in Barcelona, did not steal the bicycle.
   a. Asserted content: John did not steal the bicycle.
   b. Conventionally implicated content: John lives in Barcelona.

Although the important point for our purposes, with respect to Cappelen and Lepore’s classification of accounts of double-duty quotation, is that on the present view conventionally implicated contents are not part of the asserted contents, and therefore not part of what they count as properly semantic, truth-conditional content (which, as I said, makes the present proposal a use-only one on their terminology, in contrast with the dual account their earlier selves advocated and the mention-only one they defend now), I would like to indicate the main reasons why, on what I take to be a theoretically more accurate account of the semantics-pragmatics divide, conventionally indicated contents should count as semantic, not pragmatic. The main assumption justifying this

19. Of course, presuppositions can also be informative in some contexts, as in the classic example: ‘I cannot go with you, I have to pick up my sister at the airport’. However, I assume that this is a pragmatic phenomenon: the speaker relies on the hearer to “accommodate” him; cf. von Fintel (2008). Conventional implicatures may provide new information without relying on accommodation processes; it is only that this potentially new information is somehow ancillary, subordinate or otherwise secondary to the content of the main speech act, as witnessed by the “projectibility” data.
is one I have defended elsewhere.\textsuperscript{20} As Lewis (1980, 23–24) puts it, a semantic theory is “one suited to play a certain role in a systematic restatement of our common knowledge about language …the detailed and parochial part – the part that would be different …if we were Japanese”. Now, our semantic competence includes knowledge of conventionally implicated contents (and lexically based presupposed contents), as manifested by two pieces of data. Firstly, semantic competence underwrites the validity of inferences such as the following:\textsuperscript{21}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{align*}
(16) & \text{ It was not John who stole the bicycle.} \\
& \therefore \text{ Someone stole the bicycle} \\
(17) & \text{ John, who lives in Barcelona, did not steal the bicycle.} \\
& \therefore \text{ John lives in Barcelona.}
\end{align*}
\end{footnotesize}

Secondly, in accordance with their being conventionally generated, the contents in question cannot be cancelled:

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{align*}
(18) & \text{ It was not John who stole the bicycle, but it is not the case that someone stole it.} \\
(19) & \text{ John, who lives in Barcelona, did not steal the bicycle, but it is not the case that John lives in Barcelona.}
\end{align*}
\end{footnotesize}

Keeping thus in mind these differences in views with respect to the pragmatics-semantics divide, I move on now to present my use-only account of double-duty quotation. As I said, Predelli (2003) offers an account along these lines for a particular case of double-duty quotation – scare quotes – which I find entirely congenial; as he insists, one does not need to be particularly committal on the specifics of the framework for these purposes. Predelli usefully distinguishes the main asserted proposition in examples such as (15) on the sort of view we are canvassing, from the proposition that typically plays a subsidiary role relative to it, as, respectively, message and attachment. Now, compare (20) to (13), and (21) to (1):

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{align*}
(20) & \text{ A fortnight is, by definition of that term, a period of fourteen days}
\end{align*}
\end{footnotesize}


\textsuperscript{21} Of course, much more needs to be said to justify my claims here than bringing to bear intuitions about examples. For instance, I would like to count the inference from ‘Some students passed the exam’ to ‘Not all students passed the exam’ as a pragmatic generalized conversational implicature, but the mere appeal to intuitions of validity does not suffice to justify the distinction. My purpose here is to express my views while gesturing at least in the direction of the kind of considerations that could be used to support them.
(21) Saddam Hussein did not pose an – as Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld said – immediate threat to the security of our people

According to a view on which non-restrictive clauses such as those in (20) – which logicians typically abbreviate with the subscript ‘df’ attached to the defined expression – and (21) do not signify parts of the messages signified by the main sentences including them, but rather attachments, they express, respectively, (m)essages and (a)ttachments as follows:

(20)<sub>m</sub>) That a fortnight is a period of fourteen days
(20)<sub>a</sub>) That being a period of fourteen days defines ‘fortnight’
(21)<sub>m</sub>) That Saddam Hussein did not pose an immediate threat to the security of our people
(21)<sub>a</sub>) That Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld said it by using a sentence including ‘immediate threat to the security of our people’

Of course, in (20) and (21) reference to the expressions mentioned in the metalinguistic attachments is made not by quotation marks, but by expressions whose referential character is not under dispute, such as the demonstrative ‘that expression’ and the conjunction ‘as’ – analogous in this respect to the adverb ‘so’ in the notorious ‘Giorgione was so-called because of his size’. The present proposal is that, by including quotation marks around expressions that are otherwise used in their standard ways (as required by the syntax of the sentences including them), (13) and (1) come to express, in addition to messages like (20)<sub>m</sub>) and (21)<sub>m</sub>) respectively, attachments sufficiently close in context to (20)<sub>a</sub>) and (20)<sub>a</sub>). The view is not that quotation marks in those cases conventionally implicate meanings exactly like those of the non-restrictive clauses in (20) and (21); for the latter typically have more precise conventional meanings than what the use of quotation marks in those cases conventionally implicates. The conventional implication of such uses of quotation marks is just that some or other metalinguistic attachment about the quoted material is conveyed; the context determines what approximately the attachment is.22 Thus, we can put the proposal in the following way:

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22. See Predelli’s (2003: 16–17) for elaboration. Cf. also Gómez-Torrente (2005). I am not assuming a narrow notion of context, on which it consists of more or less objective features such as the speaker, the place and time of the speech, etc. I doubt that such a notion is adequate even to understand how pure indexicals such as ‘here’, ‘now’ or even ‘I’ work. I have in mind a wider notion, on which the communicative intentions of the speaker are a crucial part.
(13_m) Asserted content: That a fortnight is a period of fourteen days
(13_a') Pragmatically enriched conventionally implicated content: That the word ‘fortnight’ has in English the meaning being a period of fourteen days.
(13_a) Conventionally implicated content: That the word ‘fortnight’ is used in a contextually salient way.
(1_m) Asserted content: Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld said that Saddam Hussein posed an immediate threat to the security of his people.
(1_a') Pragmatically enriched conventionally implicated content: Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld uttered the words “immediate threat to the security of our people”.
(1_a) Conventionally implicated content: some contextually salient subject uttered words of which “immediate threat to the security of our people” is a contextually adequate version.

The distinction between the purely conventionally implicated content and the pragmatically enriched one helps us to respond to an objection to proposals like mine by Reimer (2005), drawing on Tsohatzidis (1998). Reimer claims that the cancellability test gives the wrong results, suggesting that the relevant contents can be cancelled and therefore are purely pragmatic as opposed to conventionally generated, by means of examples such as the following:

(22) Descartes said that man “is a thinking substance”, but he didn’t use those very words, as he wrote only in French and Latin.
(23) A “fortnight” is a period of fourteen days, but unfortunately nobody uses the word with that meaning anymore, although they should if English were used as in the old good days.

While examples like (22) and (23) show that the pragmatically originated part of pragmatically enriched contents can – understandably – be “cancelled”, they do not show at all that the more abstract conventionally implicated contents can; and, in fact, if we apply the cancellation tests to those more abstract contents, according to my own intuitions, we do get the result that they are conventionally associated with the expressions and cannot be cancelled.23

Given our discussion of different views about the semantics-pragmatics divide, we can distinguish two different kinds of use-only accounts; on one, any quotational content that mixed quotations such as (1) may convey is purely and straightforwardly pragmatic. This is the sort of view Reimer wants to push for,

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using the cancellation results in (22) and (23). In contrast, my own variety of a use-only account insists that part of the quotational content is conventional, and thus semantic in my own preferred sense. To defend the specifics of this view, as I have presented it, we have now two tasks. Firstly, we have to indicate the reasons for preferring this view to a dual one, such as Cappelen and Lepore’s earlier view. Second, we have to justify the characterization of the quotational content as a conventional implicature rather than a lexically based presupposition.

Bach (1999: 340) has argued that conventional implicatures are part of “what is said”; his main argument invokes embeddability considerations, in the form of an IQ test: An element of a sentence contributes to what is said in an utterance if there can be an accurate and complete indirect quotation of the utterance (in the same language) which includes that element, or a corresponding element, in the “that”-clause that specifies what is said. If we interpret “what is said” in terms of Cappelen and Lepore’s “truth-conditional content”, i.e., my “asserted content”, we could use an argument of this sort to argue for a dual account, on the basis of intuitions about cases such as (24), uttered in a context requiring strict standards of direct quotation:

(24) A. Lewis said in the NYB (2004, May 27, 10) that Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld said that Saddam Hussein posed an “immediate threat to the security of our people”.

However, as I (2007: 174–177) have argued in detail elsewhere, Bach’s “what is said” cannot be equated to Cappelen and Lepore’s “truth-conditional content”. And, in any case, the IQ test does not distinguish between asserted contents and contents conventionally implicated or presupposed, because ‘to say’ may well work like a “plug” for such contents;24 in fact, as I argue in the previously mentioned paper, Barker’s (2003) view, which uses the very same test in support of the view endorsed here that conventional implicatures are not part of truth-

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24. Gómez-Torrente (2005: 136–138) concurs. Unlike Karttunen’s (1973) presupposition holes (negation, conditionialization, modalization, questioning, see below in the main text for examples), a presupposition plug creates a context where secondary contents are not “projected” to the main sentence. Potts (2005, 2007b) shows that conventional implicatures such as those generated by appositives and non-restrictive clauses can escape plugs more easily than straightforward cases of presuppositions (distinguished by their being assumed to be part of the background). However, there are clear cases of plugged CI; cf. Amaral et al. (2007), and the examples below in the main text.
conditional content, is not in contradiction with Bach’s when the terminology is unified.

I said before that truth-conditional contents differ from conventionally implicated or presupposed contents in the “projectibility” of the latter under Karttunen’s (1973) standard “holes”, negation, conditionalization and other embeddings. It is straightforward to find examples for what I take to be the conventionally implicated quotational content in the case of scare quotes, such as (13), but, given that Cappelen and Lepore (LTOI: 16–7) put aside those cases (although they are happy to extend to scare quoting what they say about mixed quotation, if it turns out that the phenomenon has sufficiently semantic features, cf. ibid., 17, under option 2), the controversial cases are those involving mixed quotation. The problem with them, however, is that they already embed the quotation (which on the present view is the conventional trigger of the implicature), into a “saying” operator – a well-known “plug” for secondary contents. Bach’s IQ test shows that presuppositions and in some cases conventional implicatures, on very natural readings, stay under the embedding, without being projected to the main clause; thus, as Bach (1999) points out, if Marv said “Shaq is huge and agile”, it does not feel correct to report him with “Marv said that Shaq is huge but agile”.

In order to circumvent this obstacle, I propose to examine first cases in between mixed quotations and scare quotes, i.e., cases in which there is in the background a direct-discourse ascription to a speaker, but the utterance itself is not a saying-ascription. Thus, suppose we are speaking in a context in which we are assuming that Rumsfeld said: Saddam Hussein poses an immediate threat to the security of our people. In this context, (25)-(27) show that the quotational content can project out of negation, conditionalization, modalization and questioning; i.e., only the non-quotational content is negated (25), questioned (26), or remains in the antecedent (27):

(25) Saddam Hussein did not pose an “immediate threat to the security of our people”.
(26) Did Saddam Hussein pose an “immediate threat to the security of our people”? No, as the evidence we have gathered conclusively establishes.
(27) Even if Saddam Hussein had posed an “immediate threat to the security of our people”, the strategy pursued to deal with it was badly planned and dreadfully executed.

It is obvious in these examples that, in the intended interpretation, the quotational content is outside the scope of the negation, the antecedent of the condi-
tional, the modal and the question. The second clause in (26) also shows that that content can be projected outside the scope of a propositional attitude operator, if (as seems reasonable) we take ‘the evidence establishes that’ to be such. Now, with this context in mind, I think it is easy to find an interpretation of (28) where the quotational content is also projected out of the saying-ascription:

\[(28)\] Nobody with first-hand knowledge of what was going on in Irak (no UN-inspector, for instance) ever said that Saddam posed an “immediate threat”.

Thus, I think we have good evidence that quotational contents behave like conventionally implicated contents, even in the case of mixed quotations, which (in addition to general explanatory considerations) favour a common account for those cases, cases of scare or emphasizing quotes, and the mixed cases we have seen in the previous examples; and there is a natural explanation for the more usual cases of mixed quotation, where quotational contents are “plugged”: the subject to whom the saying is ascribed is the most natural contextual candidate for being the user to whom the partial direct quotation is ascribed.\(^{25}\)

Let us examine some additional reasons to distinguish quotational contents from asserted contents, which will also help to confirm them as conventional implicatures, rather than presuppositions (even while agreeing that, as I noted above, clear-cut joins in nature should not be expected in this area). Cases of what Yablo (2006) calls “non-catastrophic presupposition failure”, already known to Strawson, show that tests for presuppositions that probe intuitions about whether or not utterances have a truth-value when the candidate presupposed content fails are very unreliable; for instance, we may judge false ‘I had breakfast with the King of France’, and true ‘the King of France is identical to himself’. Von Fintel (2004: 271) proposes an alternative \textit{hey, wait a minute} test; consider the following dialogues, with ‘#’ being an indication of impropriety:

\[(29)\] It was not John who stole the bicycle.

\[\text{a. } # – \text{ Hey, wait a minute, I had no idea that John did not steal the bicycle.}\]
\[\text{b. Hey, wait a minute, I had no idea that someone stole the bicycle.}\]

Targeting the asserted content with the “hey, wait a minute” objection does not feel right, while objecting in that way to the presupposed content does.

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\(^{25}\) Cp. again Gómez-Torrente (2005: 138–141). As Gómez-Torrente shows, although there are cases in which the quotational content remains inside the scope of a negation, these could very well be a case of Horn’s (1989) “metalinguistic” negation.
This tracks the fact that presuppositions are represented as part of the common ground, while asserted contents are represented as new information. Given this, and on the assumption that not being taken to be in the common ground is the main difference distinguishing CI from lexically based presuppositions, on the present hypothesis this test should not be adequate to distinguish quotational contents from asserted contents; and this seems to be corroborated by intuition:

(30) Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld said that Saddam Hussein posed an “immediate threat to the security of our people”.
   a. # – Hey, wait a minute, I had no idea that Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld said that Saddam Hussein posed an immediate threat to the security of his people.
   b. ?? – Hey, wait a minute, I had no idea that Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld used the word ‘threat’.

Now, Glanzberg’s (2005: §2) provides another test for presuppositions, a repair-obligatory test, which improves on Strawson’s “truth-value-gap-judgment” criterion. Unlike von Fintel’s, this does not target the fact that presuppositions are represented as common knowledge, but rather the fact that their contents are projected out of negations, conditionalizations and so on; given that this is common to CI and presuppositions, we should expect this test to distinguish quotational contents from asserted contents if the present view is correct.

The repair-obligatory test appeals to the intuition that, unlike asserted contents, failed presuppositions require some repairs. Firstly, in echo-assessment; thus, if we know that the speaker is suffering a hallucination and there is no palm tree, we would not feel proper to reply to his question, “Is that palm tree about to fall?” with “No, that palm tree is not about to fall”, or with “Er …there is no palm tree, so I guess that palm tree is not about to fall”, unlike what would be the case if the presupposition did not fail; we would rather say “That palm tree is NOT going to fall – there is no palm tree”, or “Er …no …, there is no palm tree”. Secondly, in indirect speech report: in the previous context, we would not feel it proper to report, “George said that that palm tree is going to fall”; we would rather say, “George uttered ‘That palm tree is going to fall’, but there is no palm tree”. Conventional implicatures do appear to pass this test; thus, let us assume that John does not live in Barcelona:

(31) Did John, who lives in Barcelona, steal the bicycle?
   a. # No, John, who lives in Barcelona, did not steal the bicycle.
   b. ?? Er … John does not live in Barcelona, so I guess it is not the case that John, who lives in Barcelona, stole the bicycle.
c. It is NOT the case that John, who lives in Barcelona, stole the bicycle – he does not live in Barcelona.
d. Er … no …, John does not live in Barcelona.
e. # George said that John, who lives in Barcelona, stole the bicycle.
f. George uttered ‘John, who lives in Barcelona, stole the bicycle’, but John does not live in Barcelona.

As predicted, Glanzberg’s repair-obligatory test suggests that quotational contents are CI, rather than asserted contents. Because of the already mentioned problems with straightforward cases of mixed quotation, I appeal to mixed cases like (25)–(28) before, interpreted relative to the context described before, i.e., relative to a previous direct discourse ascription to Rumsfeld; (32c) and (32d) assume that Peter uttered (25):

(32) Did Saddam Hussein pose an “immediate threat to the security of our people”?
   a. ?? Er … no, Rumsfeld actually used the word ‘menace’, so I guess it is not the case that Saddam Hussein posed an “immediate threat to the security of our people”.
   b. Er … no …, in fact Rumsfeld actually used the word ‘menace’.
   c. # (Concerning Rumsfeld’s famous claim) Peter agreed that Saddam Hussein did not pose an “immediate threat to the security of our people”.
   d. (Concerning Rumsfeld’s famous claim) Peter uttered in agreement “Saddam Hussein posed an ‘immediate threat to the security of our people’”, but Rumsfeld had in fact said ‘menace’.

A sufficiently detailed development of the view here presented should provide a proper account of more difficult cases. Thus, in (33) – uttered in a context in which it is common knowledge that a terrible fight is being reported – it appears problematic to maintain that the expression inside the scare quotes is used in its standard way to convey the message, because it is only ironically used. Something similar applies to (34), this time because the expression inside the scare quotes does not belong to the language being used; and also to the expression in the mixed quotation in (35), now because the context relevant to interpret the quoted indexicals is not the context of the utterance (in fact, ‘our’ in (1) already illustrates this point). With (36), the problem lies rather with the metalinguistic attachment, in that the mentioned expressions do not belong to the language of the individual whose discourse is reported.
The ‘debate’ resulted in three cracked heads and two broken noses (Predelli 2003)

Nicola said that Alice is a “philosopher” (Cappelen & Lepore 1997)

Like Luther, Lucian Freud seems to attest that “Here I stand, I can do no other”

Descartes said that man “is a thinking substance” (Tsohatzidis 1998)

From the perspective of the present view, the reason why we resort to the illustrated procedures is clear. In these cases, we are putting forward two propositions, in both cases with the help of conventional, systematic resources provided by our language: a metalinguistic, quotational one plays a secondary, ancillary role with respect to the main speech act, while another, non-quotational, provides the content for that main act. In cases like (33)-(36) there is a prima facie conflict between the expressive requirements adequate to perform the first role, and those more adequate to perform the second; the examples show that under those circumstances we yield to the former requirements, at least when it is relatively easy for the audience to infer from it the expressions required for the second role.

There is some systematicity in the way we carry out this “choice”, explored by Cumming (2005) and Geurts and Maier (2005). Cappelen and Lepore (2007) invoke this fact in support of their mention-only view. However, we have by now evidence enough in favour of the view that the quotational content is not part of the truth-conditional, semantic content. On the other hand, the fact that what on the present view are secondary, ancillary contents have a conventional basis in the system of our language makes this form of use-only view compatible with the systematicity in the data; as I said, the present account is close to Geurts and Maier (2005) and Potts (2007a), both of which are provided as part of theories that emphasize the compositional, systematic basis for lexically-based presuppositions and conventional implicatures.

To conclude, I will briefly discuss Cappelen and Lepore’s (2007) recent, allegedly mention-only theory. First of all one must say that, for a work whose authors proudly declare it to be “the first book ever written on the topic of quotation and metalinguistic representation more generally” (LTOI: 16), the account itself is very sketchy; as the authors acknowledge, we are just given a few “observations” which are not “substitutes for a detailed analysis” (LTOI: 141). These observations include the rather surprising contention that quotations (of which, as the reader remembers, non-expressions might be part) can be, as it were, syntactically recruited to perform the syntactic role corresponding to any syntactic position that they might occupy in a mixed quotation; that is to say, any syntactic position at all. In addition to this, we get a very sketchy
description of the “logical form” corresponding to a particular example, and some gesturing to the consequences of semantic axioms that we are not given at all. It is very difficult with just these indications to obtain an adequate idea to appraise the theory. I will thus put my main objection to their mention-only account in the form of a dilemma.

Remember that, according to Cappelen and Lepore’s characterization, mention-only views “deny the initial intuition by saying that in mixed quotation, the semantic content doesn’t imply that the quoted words are used – only quoted” (ibid); “no corresponding indirect report [of Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, in the case of (1)] follows from the semantic content of [(1)]” (LTOI: 28–9). The dilemma I want to put to them depends on two possible ways of interpreting these remarks. Rumsfeld might have uttered something like (37), or rather something like (38):

(37) Bush told me that he thought that Saddam Hussein poses an immediate threat to the security of our people.
(38) Saddam Hussein does not pose any immediate threat to the security of our people.

On the first way of interpreting Cappelen and Lepore’s indications of what a mention-only account claims, it follows that, in both cases, (1) would be true. For, on that interpretation, (1) only claims that Rumsfeld said something concerning Saddam Hussein and concerning posing something, using in so doing the words ‘an immediate threat to the security of our people’; and this is made true not only by his uttering (38), but also (37). I think that this prediction is intuitively unacceptable, and also that no amount of sensible “alleviating pragmatics” can change the fact. On its most straightforward literal, semantic interpretation (1) is false if what Rumsfeld uttered was (37), as he might well complain to the newspaper if that was the case. In personal communication, Cappelen agreed with this, and provided an alternative interpretation of the just quoted remarks and of the suggested semantic. This alternative interpretation leads to the second horn of the dilemma.

On the alternative interpretation, the semantic truth-conditions of (1) do entail an indirect-discourse report, only one a little less specific than the one provided by use-only and dual accounts. This indirect report ascribes to Rumsfeld his having said a proposition which, using the structured-proposition jargon, consist of the semantic value (in context) of ‘Saddam Hussein’, the semantic value in context of ‘poses’, the semantic value of past tense, and, as it were, a gap corresponding to the position that an expression of the syntactic category to which the expression ‘an immediate threat to the security of our people’
belongs. Gappy propositions have been invoked by Millians to deal with the semantics of sentences including singular terms without referents. On this second interpretation of the remarks quoted above, which Cappelen said that he preferred in personal communication, the account has it that the truth-conditions of mixed quotations entail indirect discourse ascriptions with gappy contents. This avoids the intuitively outrageous consequence of the first interpretation; if Rumsfeld had in fact uttered (37), (1) would turn out to be false. The problem for it is this. Given that mention-only accounts, thus understood, do entail indirect-discourse ascriptions, as much as use-only and dual accounts do, it is difficult to justify their now distinguishing claim that those ascriptions have merely gappy contents, as opposed to the full-fledged contents we get by replacing the gap, in our example, by the semantic value (in context) of ‘an immediate threat to the security of our people’. It is true that, in order to obtain that semantic value, delicate operations should be performed on some parts of the quoted material (in our example, on the indexical ‘our people’). But speakers do perform those operations, whether they happen in their “semantic module” or rather in their “pragmatic module”. And in any case LTOI does not provide, as far as I can see, any specific argument in support of ascribing to truth-conditional, semantic content merely the indirect report with the gappy content, as opposed to that with the corresponding full one.

4. Conclusion

In this paper I have mostly discussed Cappelen and Lepore’s new minimalist proposals about quotation, introducing my preferred DO view as a useful foil. I have explored first their allegedly non-Davidsonian, anti-contextualist views about pure quotation, and then their new views on mixed quotation. I have complained in the first place that their proposals are not presented as perspicuously as they should be; and in the second place that, when we have a clearer picture of what appears to be the favoured account, the differences with their previous proposals and others already in the literature are not as great as they claim.

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