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Token-Reflexive Presuppositions
and the De Se

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Inspired by Castañeda (1966, 1968), Perry (1979) and Lewis (1979) showed that a specific variety of singular thoughts, thoughts about oneself “as oneself”—de se thoughts, as Lewis called them—raise special issues, and they advanced rival accounts. Perry (1979, 33) presents his case with a celebrated example: “I once followed a trail of sugar on a supermarket floor, pushing my cart down the aisle on one side of a tall counter and back the aisle on the other, seeking the shopper with the torn sack to tell him he was making a mess. With each trip around the counter, the trail became thicker. But I seemed unable to catch up. Finally it dawned on me. I was the shopper I was trying to catch.” Before his epiphany, the shopper has a belief about himself (under the individuating concept or mode of presentation the shopper with the torn sack) to the effect that he is making a mess. This, however, is insufficient for him to have the reflexive, self-conscious belief that he would express in accepting ‘I am making a mess’, the one that leads him to rearrange the torn sack in the cart.

I find it adequate to classify theories of singular thought in two camps (cf. García-Carpintero, 2014a), relative to whether they allow for it to constitutively feature descriptive content. Millian theorists (cf., e.g., Soames 2002) appeal to extensions of Russell’s non-descriptive acquaintance relation to account for singular thought; true aboutness is, on the Millian view, constituted by some relation (perception, memory, testimony) non-descriptively linking the subject and the object of reference. Fregean theorists (cf., e.g., Hawthorne & Manley 2012) are typically latitudinarians who reject this, allowing for descriptively constituted singular thoughts. The messy shopper might already have a singular belief before his epiphany on the Fregean view, but not on the Millian one.

However, as Perry (1979, 42) points out, it will not help simply to espouse the Millian view: “Suppose there were mirrors at either end of the counter so that as I pushed my cart down the aisle in pursuit I saw myself in the mirror. I take what I see to be the reflection of the messy shopper going up the aisle on the other side, not realizing
that what I am really seeing is a reflection of myself.” Given that he is perceiving himself in the mirror, the Millian view now allows for the shopper to have a *de re* belief about himself, to the effect that he is making a mess; but this still falls short of the reflective, self-conscious belief manifested by acceptance of ‘I am making a mess’, and the act of cleaning up. Lewis (1979) presents a much discussed example involving two gods, one on the tallest mountain throwing down manna and the other on the coldest mountain throwing down thunderbolts, who, though omniscient about non-self-locating information, do not know where they are in their world. Castañeda (1966) has another famous example featuring an amnesiac war hero who reads a detailed biography without realizing that he is its subject. Cases like these additionally suggest that rich descriptive concepts are not only insufficient, but also unnecessary; for the amnesiac *is* able to think thoughts about himself in a fully self-conscious reflexive way, by using and understanding “I” and related expressions for first-personal reference while knowing precious little about himself.

These examples raise the problem of *de se* thought—to wit, how to characterize it so as to give an accurate account of the data, tracing its relations to singular thoughts in general. After rehearsing the main tenets of two contrasting accounts—a Lewisian one and a Perrian one—in the first section of this chapter, in the second I will present a proposal of my own, which is a specific elaboration of the Perrian account. In the first section I will indicate some weaknesses of Perry’s presentation of his view; the proposal I will articulate in the second overcomes them. I will conclude with a brief discussion of reasons for preferring one or another account, in particular regarding the issue of the communication of *de se* thoughts, but that will not be the main focus of the chapter.

1. *De Se* Thoughts: Two Conflicting Accounts

Propositional attitudes and speech acts are individuated by representational contents that are traditionally assumed to be shareable between thinkers and have absolute truth-values (given a full specification of a possible way for the world to be, contents thus understood acquire a definite truth value with respect to it). I will call such contents ‘propositions’. Propositions can be simply identified as classes of possible worlds, those with respect to which they are true. Thus, in believing that snow is white one represents worlds in which snow is white, and places the actual world among them. Lewis and Perry take *de se* thoughts to question this picture.

1 These are the two assumptions abandoned by the two rival accounts of *de se* thoughts that Perry (1979) discusses before advancing his own, allegedly compatible with the traditional view of propositions; cf. also Perry (2006, 206). I argue below that Perry’s account is insufficiently developed and leaves important questions unanswered; and that, if developed along the lines I’ll suggest, we get a form of the “limited accessibility” doctrine that rejects the second tenet of the traditional view. (Not that he would disagree; cf. Perry (1979, 49; 2006, 216.).)

2 This is a mere terminological decision; one might use “proposition” in the neutral way in which I use “content”, and then call *de se* contents thus.
Lewis rejects the traditional theory, taking contents to be *properties* instead of propositions; Sosa (1981) and Chisholm (1981) advance essentially the same view. Contents would be entities that are true or false, given a full characterization of a way for the world to be, only relative to a subject and a time. Alternatively, the contents of propositional attitudes are, or at least select, not classes of worlds, but rather classes of *centered worlds*: worlds with a designated subject and a time. In coming to believe what he would express by accepting “I am making a mess”, Perry locates himself among all subjects making a mess at a given time and world.

On the traditional conception of contents the actual world is not typically part of them (unless, say, they are the propositions expressed by an utterance including “actually”). In believing a proposition one ascribes it to the actual world at which the believing occurs; it is the attitude of believing, or the act of judging, which, as it were, as part of their “illocutionary” nature, fixes the world at which the belief occurs as the one relevant for the evaluation of the truth of the belief. A mere *imagining* with the same content would not similarly bring the actual world to bear, because imaginings are not constitutively evaluated as true or otherwise relative to whether the actual world at which the imagining occurs is correctly represented by their contents.

Similarly and by analogy, on the Lewisian property view it is the attitude of believing itself, as opposed to its content, which brings to bear the subject and time relevant for the evaluation of its truth or falsity. Subjects who come to believe what they would express in English by uttering “I am making a mess” believe the same contents, in the way that subjects who believe at different worlds that snow is white believe the same contents. It is the attitude of belief that, as part of its illocutionary force, fixes the subject of the attitude and the time and world at which this attitude is entertained as the ones relevant for the truth-evaluation of the belief. This provides a nice solution to the initial problem of *de se* thought. If no conception of the subject (including those allowing for *de re* thought on Millian stances) appears to be sufficient for *de se* thought, and none appears to be needed, this is because the subject *is not represented as part of the content*, but is brought to bear for purposes of evaluation by the act of judging itself, not by its content.

Let us move now to Perry’s alternative *state* view. We should distinguish, Perry contends, the *content* of a belief from the *belief-state* through which it is accessed. The content is a proposition—say, that Perry is making a mess. The state is a condition of the subject, by being in which the content is believed. Contents answer to the role that propositional attitudes constitutively have in appraising the rationality of the subject, the adequacy of his beliefs to his evidence and of his actions to his beliefs and desires, the value of his desires, etc. But only, on Perry’s view, in a coarse-grained way: a full account of rational action needs to mention not just the content, but

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3 For a dissenting view, cf. Schaffer (2012). In putting the point in this way, I am assuming a "structured proposition" framework, corresponding to Lewis’s description of contents as properties (as opposed to centered possible worlds).
also the state through which the content is accessed. The above cases involving de se thoughts show that traditional contents are not enough to appraise rationality and cognitive significance; ways of accessing them should also be taken into consideration. On Perry’s view, this is just a particular case of what obtains in Frege’s puzzles in general: exactly the same lesson should be learned concerning the different cognitive significance of “Superman flies” and “Clark Kent flies”, or “Hesperus is visible in the afternoon” and “Phosphorus is visible in the afternoon”.

Belief-states themselves must hence have some kind of meaning or significance if they are to have a role in appraising the rationality of actions or inferences. In his original account, Perry (1979) appeals to Kaplan’s (1989) distinction between character and content to characterize the significance of states. Utterances of “he is making a mess” and “I am making a mess” might have, in their contexts, the same singular content, but they have different characters. Similarly, the messy shopper’s belief-state when he looks at what is in fact his own reflection in the mirror, and later when he catches up, are different states with the same content; given the differences in rational action to be expected from one and the other, states themselves must have a role in the explanation of action, the appraisal of the rationality of the subject and the cognitive significance of the belief in virtue of their character-like meaning.

Stalnaker (1981, 145–8) questioned Lewis’s account and the one by Perry just sketched on the grounds that they cannot give the most straightforward account of exchanges of information involving utterances with essential indexicals. He went on to advance an alternative account appealing to the “diagonal propositions” that he (1978) had introduced earlier. Now, in spite of the efforts of Stalnaker and others, there are very good reasons not to take possible worlds as primitive entities in our semantic endeavors. It is perfectly OK, in my view, to use them as a semantic tool, and not just for instrumental reasons; the presence of modal expressions in our languages, in addition to the need to account for semantically grounded modal notions like logical validity, sufficiently establishes that. But possible worlds need not be primitive entities. They might be determined by structured propositions. I also think we find it easier to think in terms of such propositions. Thus I will not present Stalnaker’s considerations in terms of diagonal propositions, but instead in terms of what I take to be the finer-grained token-reflexive structured propositions that have them as their intensions or “modal profiles”.

Let us imagine a variation on Perry’s supermarket story in which, contemplating the situation and realizing what is going on, a benevolent shopper tells him what is happening, which leads to the shopper’s epiphany. He thereby comes to accept “I am making a mess” after being told “you are making a mess”. On Perry’s original view the contents of the beliefs thereby expressed are the ordinary, coarse-grained de re propositions which are conveniently identical for the two utterances. However, as we

know, this singular content does not account for what the shopper comes to know after the epiphany: he already believed it beforehand. Nevertheless, it seems that whatever explains his distinctive behavior after the epiphany was, in this variation of the story, *communicated to him* by the other shopper’s utterance.

How could Perry’s or Lewis’s proposals account for this? The character-like content of the Perrian state expressed by the shopper’s utterance, “you are making a mess”, is very different from that of the sentence by means of which the shopper would express his acquired knowledge, “I am making a mess”. The Lewisian properties that the samaritan shopper and the messy shopper rationally self-attribute (*addressing someone who is making a mess; making a mess*) differ. Otherwise put, it would be absurd for the messy shopper to self-attribute the property that the samaritan shopper expresses on the Lewisian view. For Lewis and Perry to deal with this consistently with their accounts, they should elaborate them so as to explain how it is that, in virtue of what the samaritan expresses, the shopper comes to learn something new.

On the simplest account of successful communication, the episode should be explained by the messy shopper learning the *very same content* that the samaritan expressed.5 This “belief-transfer” model of Communications is what Stalnaker’s account in terms of diagonal propositions (token-reflexive contents, in a structured proposition account) purports to offer. We can think of the meaning of indexicals like “I” or “you” as token-reflexive rules, which, given a particular token, fix its referent relative to some contextual property: being the speaker who produced it, or its (most salient) addressee. This provides a descriptive conception of the referent; in the case of the samaritan’s utterance of “you are making a mess”, we have a token-reflexive conception associated with the particular case of “you”, the addressee of that token.6 Both the samaritan shopper and the messy shopper can share this way of representing the latter. So this is an ordinary content, determining a traditional proposition, which is communicated from one to the other: the one we could explicitly articulate with “the addressee of that token of ‘you’ is making a mess”. Perry (1993) accepts that these token-reflexive contents provide a better representation of the significance of belief-states than the non-propositional one he had earlier advanced in terms of Kaplanian characters. But as he (2006) explains, this refined version of his account can be taken in two different ways, only in one of which it is at least *prima facie* successful as a way of accounting for *de se* thoughts. Let us examine this carefully.

On the first interpretation, the proposal is to think of what in Perry’s earlier account was the character-like significance of belief-states as the proper *contents* of *de se* attitudes. The proposal would thus be to take token-reflexive propositions as the con-

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5 This is the most straightforward version of what Pagin (2008) calls the *classical view*, and Egan (2007) the *belief-transfer* model of communication.

6 I have discussed the role of these contents in detail elsewhere (1998, 2000, 2006); the elaboration of Perry’s account I offer in the next section borrows from these previous discussions.
tents of *de se* attitudes, capable by themselves of accounting for the data on traditional views on psychological explanation. I think this is the way Stalnaker took his proposal. However, taken in this way, for reasons Perry (2006, 209–12) convincingly states, it does not work. The reason is that it is possible to reproduce the original problem, now with token-reflexive contents. The very same token-reflexive propositions can be accessed in different ways, and, in some of them, they could not possibly have the rational role that *de se* thoughts do. Thus, for instance, the messy shopper can hear the samaritan’s utterance of “you are making a mess,” without realizing for whatever reason that it is addressed to him (perhaps the samaritan is behind him), but accepting on its basis that its addressee is making a mess at the time. The samaritan’s utterance would have the token-reflexive content we have been considering; but accepting it could not have the epiphanic role that accepting the samaritan’s utterance had for the messy shopper in our variant of the story.

On the second interpretation—the one that Perry subscribes to—the proposal is just a refined way of understanding the significance of belief-states; but an adequate account of *de se* contents (of the nature of attitudes and speech acts in general) still requires the distinction between belief-contents and belief-states (ways of accessing the content). The modification of Perry’s original proposal lies only in that now the significance of belief-states is taken to be specifiable in the traditional propositional way that token-reflexive contents afford. My own proposal aims to develop this second interpretation, allowing us to understand better how states have cognitive significances and why that helps with our problems.

Stalnaker (1981), who was espousing the first interpretation,7 was well aware of Perry’s objection. He deals with it by appealing to the holism that he attributes to belief-states. Thus, even though in accepting the samaritan shopper’s utterance of “you are making a mess” in both versions of the story (with and without the realization that he is the addressee) Perry may well accept the same proposition, his full belief-state in each case can hardly be the same. The goal of the account is then that of characterizing full belief-states. More recently (2008, 55–9; cf. also his contribution to this volume) Stalnaker recants, providing an account in the spirit of the second interpretation that replicates Perry’s distinction between content and state with a formally elegant centered-worlds apparatus.8

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7 Among other things, this is clear in that, as I will explain shortly in the main text, only on the first interpretation can the proposal solve the communication problem along traditional lines.

8 Holism does not suffice to deal with Lewis’s two gods example, because they are supposed to be equally omniscient relative to traditional propositional knowledge. Stalnaker (1981, 144–5) appeals to haecceitism (posing qualitatively indiscernible different worlds) to deal with the case, rejecting as incoherent an objection made by Lewis that this does not solve the problem—to assume the coherence of the objection, he suggested, is just to beg the question against his proposal. In more recent work (2008, 56–8, and his contribution to the present volume) he is less sanguine about the incoherence of Lewis’s objection. To motivate his change of heart, in his contribution to the present volume (cf. his Albert & Boris example) he develops a point that Weber (2015, 658; cf. also his contribution to the present volume) also makes, namely, that even when the gods’ ignorance is eliminated and (given their omniscience) they come to accept a proposition including only the actual world, they still have different cognitive perspectives on the world.
Adopting the second interpretation thus evades the straightforward objection to the first, but it raises thorny issues of its own. The most serious one is that we need to explain how it is that states themselves have cognitive significances, and how such cognitive significances interact with those encoded by their contents. Perry usually talks at this juncture about different “classificatory practices” we have for representational states/acts, relative to different purposes. He argues that states are mental particulars that may be classified by their “official contents” (the coarse-grained singular propositions, in our examples) but also by a plurality of other finer-grained propositional contents, useful for different explanatory purposes. This might suggest an unwelcome instrumentalist stance. Cognitive significances should rather flow, I think, from constitutive features of the explanatory posits themselves. In any case, the appeal to taxonomical practices is itself in need of further elaboration.9

We also need a justification for preferring a Perrian state view to the Lewisian property account. Stalnaker's criticism of Lewis's and Perry's proposals was not that they cannot account for the transmission of information in cases like the one we were considering—correctly so, because they could indeed do so.10 The objection rather was that the view that it is the token-reflexive content that is communicated affords a simpler classical explanation, compatible with the “belief-transfer” model. But this would be so only if we adopted the first interpretation of Stalnaker's proposal, which, as we have seen, we should reject. Once we stick to the state/content distinction, this virtue is lost; for shared content (be it the singular proposition that Perry is making a mess, or the token-reflexive proposition) is not explanatorily relevant, while the truly explanatory belief-states accounting for the samaritan shopper's utterance and the messy shopper's acceptance have different significances. In the former's state, he is presented as one addressing a messy shopper with a produced token of “you”; in the latter's, as one addressed as a messy shopper by an attended token of “you”. The classical model of communication cannot hence offer any basis for preferring the state view; the defender of the Perrian account is as much in need of an alternative account of de se communication as defenders of the property view.11

As I explain below, the main concession Stalnaker needs to make is that holism is not a folk-psychologically adequate way of understanding rationalizing explanations.

9 Cf. Perry (2012) for his most developed presentation so far; cp. his use of the distinction above between the first and second interpretation of the role of token-reflexive contents in accounting for de se phenomena, to deal with general Fregean cases in de re beliefs Perry (2012, 146–50). Some passages are at least suggestive of the presuppositional account provided below; cf. for instance his appeal to belief-like states that are not quite beliefs, just “positive doxastic attitudes” (Perry 2006, 218), and passages like this: “Whenever we ask about the conditions under which some act or project will succeed, we take certain facts as given. What we want to know is what else, what additional facts, have to obtain, for the thing to have that property, given the facts we assume” (Perry 2012, 95).

10 Ninan (2010), Torre (2010), and Weber (2013) offer accounts in the centered worlds framework; see also the contributions by Kinderman, Maier, Recanati, and Stojanovic to this volume.

11 Kinderman also stresses these points in his contribution to this volume.
In the next section I will offer an elaboration of Perry’s proposal that aims to deal with these worries, providing a defense of the state view vis-à-vis the property alternative.\(^{12}\)

2. States and Contents: the Presuppositional View

In previous work (cf. García-Carpintero (2000, 2006, 2010)) I have defended an account of singular terms that is an elaboration of the state view.\(^{13}\) The proposal offers a general account of Frege cases. This is as it should be because, as it was obvious to Castañeda, Chisholm, Lewis, Perry, and Sosa—whose accounts of de se thoughts are all part of general accounts of singular attitudes—and was pointed out by many other writers (cf. Böer & Lycan 1986 and Stalnaker 1981) well before present-day skeptics (Cappelen & Dever 2013, Magidor forthcoming) built their cases on it, the stories motivating their introduction (like Perry’s messy shopper) are just such cases.\(^{14}\)

However, against the skeptics, the proposal I will develop highlights what makes de se thought philosophically distinct and important: while any full folk psychological action explanation presupposes such thoughts, they falsify the assumption that rationalizing contents should be shareable.\(^{15}\) Building on the previous account, my present suggestion for de se thoughts has two main ingredients: an appeal to reference-fixing presuppositions, and an appeal to metarepresentational individuators. Let me briefly introduce these two ingredients focusing on the linguistic case, before extending them to our target, de se propositional attitudes.

(i) Reference-fixing presuppositions. Although the state of information we end up in by accepting “John stole the camera” and “it was John who stole the camera” is the same, these two sentences pack up that information they convey in different ways. The second, cleft sentence presupposes that someone stole the camera, but not the former, plainer sentence. For present purposes, it will do no harm to think of presuppositions along the well-known lines that Stalnaker (1978) has suggested.\(^{16}\) Speech acts like assertion take place relative to a common ground, a set of already


\(^{13}\) Cf. Böer & Lycan (1986), Crimmins (1992), and Richard (1990) for other “two-factor” proposals in a similar spirit.

\(^{14}\) Cf. also Moss (2012, 226–31).

\(^{15}\) Cf. Dilip Ninan’s contribution to this volume for an account of what the problem that de se thoughts pose is in response to the skeptics with which I sympathize.

\(^{16}\) My own views, although strongly influenced by him, differ at some points (cf. García-Carpintero 2014b). I think of all speech (and mental) acts, including ancillary acts such as presupposing and referring, as constitutively normative; in particular, I think of presuppositions as normative requirements, constitutive of some representational acts, that their contents are already known. I also think that some linguistic presuppositions are semantically triggered.
accepted propositions. Linguistic presuppositions are requirements on the common ground, whose satisfaction should be checked at an ideal time just after the utterance is made (because it might well be that it is the utterance itself that generates the common ground information that satisfies them) but before the ensuing assertion is accepted—in which case it then goes to conform the common ground, licensing further presuppositions in the ensuing discourse. The difference between our two sentences lies in that an utterance of the cleft sentence will feel inappropriate (at presupposition evaluation time) if it is not common ground that someone stole the camera. But the state of information that we get into by accepting either of our sentences will be the same.

Consider then an utterance of “he is hungry”. The proposal agrees with the direct reference theorist that the asserted content is a singular proposition, \( x \text{ is hungry} \), for some contextual assignment to \( x \). It is expressed, however, in a context in which another singular proposition is presupposed—in this case, one semantically triggered by something akin to a Kaplanian character for “he”—which we could express thus: \( x \text{ is the male picked out by the demonstration associated with he} \). where the bold-faced “he” refers to the relevant token. This semantically triggered presupposition will typically be supplemented by further pragmatically triggered presuppositions, specifying additional features of the intended demonstrated referent, perceptually accessible or accessible from previous discourse. (These presuppositions, by the way, illustrate the point made in the previous paragraph about the time at which presuppositions are to be appraised.) The descriptive identification embodied in such presuppositions is “reference-fixing” and not “meaning-giving”, in Kripke’s (1980) sense.

This is not, it should be clear, a reductive view: far from aiming to reduce singular representational states/acts to descriptive general ones, it assumes primitively singular attitudes. The suggestion is only that general descriptive information helping to fix the individuals the utterances are about is a constitutive feature of them. This information figures in associated presuppositions. But the presuppositions are themselves singular, and not just because they may mention singular token representational states; the intended referents, if there are any, also figure in their contents. Singularity, like presuppositionality, is here understood as a constitutive feature of the representational devices, a “semantic requirement” (Fine 2007) on them—a fact to be embedded in a theory of such representations, which must be grasped for them to be fully comprehended. It is thus that singular terms are de jure rigid, in Kripke’s (1980) sense.

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17 This statement of the presupposition contains another presupposition associated with the definite description, which I do not unpack further for the sake of perspicuity.

18 Proposals along these lines are quite standard nowadays in the linguistic semantics literature; cf. Heim & Kratzer (1998), Maier (2010), and Hunter (2013). Cf. also Maier’s contribution to this volume, which extends that sort of account to mental states in a way that I take to be entirely compatible with the proposal I outline below.

19 Singular representations thus understood may fail to have an object; there are, e.g., singular presuppositions associated with singular terms in fictions that are merely pretend. Our theoretical claims are to be understood as made in the framework of a free logic. Also, the proposal raises the question whether
(ii) **Metarepresentational individuators.** The presuppositions described in the previous paragraphs are *de lingua* (Fiengo & May 2006); they are about linguistic expressions—in fact, in that particular case, reflexively about tokens of the very linguistic expressions conveying them.

The outlined proposal applies to utterances paradigmatically expressing *de se* thoughts. Thus, an utterance of “I am hungry” asserts that *x* is hungry, presupposing that *x* is the utterer of *I*. I will now extend these two features to the underlying *de se* propositional attitudes.

(i) **Reference-fixing presuppositions in mental acts.** Our target is not total, holistically undivided mental states (the *explananda* for possible world theories such as Lewis's and Stalnaker's), but distinct mental states/acts in them. Folk psychology supports this choice. The most compelling consideration of Davidson's (1963) immensely influential causal account of rationalizations is that "a person can have a reason for an action, and perform the action, and yet this reason not be the reason why he did it" (Davidson 1963: 691); the force of this argument depends on distinguishing specific potential rationalizations (combinations of beliefs and desires, or what have you) in the full mental state of the subject. Similar considerations have been provided for a causal element in doxastic justification—the *basing* relation (Audi 1986):20 a subject might have an undefeated propositional justification for a belief he has in fact formed, and the belief still be unjustified, if he in fact formed it on the basis of wishful thinking or other irrational beliefs.21

Frege puzzles can arise at the level of the presuppositions themselves, which after all are ultimately nothing more than background attitudes: if this man is Joseph, how come I do not make the connection when I presuppose in one context, of him, that he is the demonstrated male when a given token is produced, and, in another, that he is picked out by the naming practice to which a given token of 'Joseph' belongs? In reply, as it will transpire below, I am assuming something like the apparatus of Fine's (2007) Semantic Relationism (cf. also Heck 2012). In some cases we assume anaphoric relations among the singular terms we deploy in thought, in some others we don't; in the latter cases, but not in the former, the variables we use in the metalanguage to characterize the presuppositions can be assigned different values. Unlike Fine, I think these anaphoric dependences are token-reflexive monadic properties, invoked in additional presuppositions; see below. This raises the further worry whether the initial presuppositions are needed: am I putting forward a redundant, overdetermined set of explanations? But they are independently needed, to capture contextually valid inferences (*he is Bolivian, therefore a male is Bolivian*) which we are disposed to make as part of our full linguistic competence.

20 *Doxastic* justifications are reasons why one has the beliefs one does; *propositional* justification, reasons for which one's beliefs would be justified, if one were to form them in the proper way on their basis. Of course, there might be ways for holists to grant that, for some purposes, we can isolate specific states in a whole belief state.

21 As indicated above, in his contribution to the present volume Stalnaker motivates his adoption of a Perrian account with the point that even when Lewis's two gods' ignorance is eradicated and (given their omniscience) they come to accept a proposition including only the actual world, they still have different cognitive perspectives on the world. In the proposal I’ll make, this is predicated on the different presuppositions they might associate with the judgments they both accept—say, the ones (with the same content) they would express, respectively, with “I am on the coldest mountain” and “He is on the coldest mountain”. This account requires abandoning Stalnaker's holism, crucially distinguishing in our explanations specific parts of a subject's full mental state. I understand that, in using centered base worlds to model Perry's belief states in his more recent framework, and in motivating it with the consideration just rehearsed, he is granting that his earlier appeal to holism to defend the first interpretation of the token-reflexive proposal will not do.
I’ll be discussing presupposition-like states related to mental acts, such as judgments and decisions;\(^2\) it is mental acts of this sort that figure prominently in the examples motivating the category of \textit{de se} thoughts, such as the realization and consequent decision in the messy shopper’s epiphany. Consider for illustration and motivation one of the examples typically used in discussion of the compatibility of anti-individualism and self-knowledge (cf. Schroeter 2007 for a recent discussion, influential in what follows). Long ago you once saw Domingo singing \textit{Othello}, and now remember him singing the same opera last night; you put together the two thoughts: \textit{Domingo’s voice is now darker than it was}. In doing this, you are assuming that the relation of \textit{internal (de jure) coreference} obtains between the two Domingo-representations occurring in your comparative thought (the second embedded in the anaphoric “it” in its expression). That assumption might be wrong: you might be confused. Perhaps, unbeknownst to you, you are now on Twin-Earth, having been transported there in your sleep some time ago.

Now, on the one hand, there are very good reasons—elaborated by Schroeter (2008)—to think that the contribution of representations such as the one for “Domingo” to the thought-content in our example should be the referent (if there were one); they add to the traditional reasons for direct reference applied to thoughts—say, the rigidity of those representations, established by considering their intuitive possible-world truth conditions. They have to do with our impressions about what would be the sensible policy when discovering a case of confusion—not necessarily one as dramatic as the previous one: it may just be a more ordinary one in which information originating in two twins has been lumped together. The intuitively rational thing to do will be to split the Domingo-file into two, a \textit{Domingo} for the Earth one and a \textit{Domingo} for the new one, keeping in each one the information clearly coming from each, and getting rid of the pieces that cannot be ascribed.\(^3\) This sensible policy suggests that the representational system is constitutively intended to keep track of objects, which individuate the contents of states deploying them when everything goes well.

On the other hand, the links of internal coreference just described are merely assumed; they are not explicit judgments of identity. There of course are such explicit identity judgments; the initial Domingo identification in the example might have been like that—I might have suddenly come to judge in the middle of yesterday’s performance that \textit{this is the same guy I once listened to in this same opera}. But I could be a true fan, who bought the tickets simply assuming this. In any case,

\(^2\) In “Belief and Presupposition”, a talk that Josep Macià gave at the XXI conference of the ESPP (Granada, Spain, 12/7/2013), he argued that only mental acts such as judgments, as opposed to tacit beliefs, can have presuppositions, and he suggested some tests to establish their presence based on their verbal expression.

\(^3\) Cf. Recanati 2013 for a recent examination of the substantive content behind the helpful metaphor of mental terms as files or dossiers, which I will be using. Pryor (ms) provides good reasons to replace the metaphor with an account in terms of nodes in (something like) graphs.
whatever originally happened last night, today's judgment *Domingo's voice is now darker than it was* simply assumes coreference with previous representations. As has often been pointed out, any well-functioning system intended to inferentially put together information from persistent individuals needs such implicit identifications, on pain of launching a regress.²⁴

On the proposal I am making, internal coreference is understood as a mental presupposition, i.e., as an intentional, contentful state that is a constitutive ancillary part of some mental acts, judgments, decisions, etc.²⁵ This contrasts with views on which the relation is explained as a purely formal, quasi-syntactic one.²⁶ Such formal relations should underpin it, to the extent that some form of physicalism is correct, as I think it is. But this is not what *de jure* coreference is. Let me provide some intuitive considerations in support of this claim. Thus, consider how Schroeter (2012) characterizes internal coreference:

First, obviousness . . . the subject matter is simply served up to your conscious attention as the same . . . Second, rational incontrovertibility. Given your understanding of the name, you cannot rationally accept the claim ['Domingo ≠ Domingo'] . . . The relevant standard is one of minimal rationality: to deny the simple *de jure* identity claim is so obviously irrational that it would call into question your basic logical capacities . . . Third, epistemic primitiveness. When you take two of your own words as *samesaying*, the question of independent justification seems out of place.

In discussing the linguistic case, defenders of a syntactic approach to *de jure* coreference such as Fiengo & May (2006) are encouraged by the fact that in formal languages the relation is indicated by occurrence of the same expression-type, and in natural language this might be so in some cases.²⁷ But in other cases it is indicated by using expressions of a different type—to the extent that we classify types in a non-question-begging way. Thus, the reflexive pronoun in “Óscar loves himself” internally corefers

²⁵ As part of a general argument against accounts of *de jure* coreference like the one I am assuming, Pinillos (2011, 308) questions this suggestion. Recanati (2013, 104–12) and Goodsell (2014, 310) offer good critical discussions, although Goodsell (2014, 295–6) also objects to an account along the lines of the one I am assuming. I cannot go into a full defense of the view here; I mention it only to motivate the appeal to presuppositions of mental states by means of an example that is independently useful for our discussion.
²⁶ Cf. Sainsbury & Tye (2012) and Heck (2012) for recent defenses, and references there to previous work in the same direction, by Fodor and others. Heck posits “formal relations” among thoughts, which he elucidates by appeal to logically significant relations between symbols in formal languages. But, as I have argued elsewhere (cf. García-Carpintero 2004), those relations themselves have semantic significance. My reasons there are very similar to Fine’s (2007, 41).
²⁷ Of course, most proper names are common names, or they could be; but there is a default that uses of the same name throughout a discourse corefer, when their occurrence does not violate Binding Principles. (In ordinary discourse, an utterance of “Domino is Domingo” presupposes that the two are prima facie different names; otherwise, it would be a violation of Principle C of Binding Theory. In some contexts—say, in philosophical or logical discussions—such violations are allowed: "if everybody hates Óscar, then Óscar hates Óscar"; cf. Fiengo & May (2006, 44–5).) The fact that the principle applies only by default questions the assumption that it is a *formal* one, strictly speaking. Heim (1998) and Macià (2002) offer sensible accounts of the semantic import of the Binding Principles in terms of presuppositions.
with “Óscar”, and so does the pronoun in “Óscar loves his mother” in the proper context—i.e., when the communicative referential intentions of the speaker make it so. Fiengo & May introduce a technical notion of \textit{sameness of expression}, on which the name and the pronouns would count as tokens of the same type when they occur co-indexed. That notion might be syntactically justified, and relative to it this claim might be correct: “Speakers cannot knowingly intend to use tokens of the same expression-type to refer to different things. That occurrences of the same expression-type corefer is inherent in the design of the language” (Fiengo & May (2006), 20). But, obviously, ordinary speakers cannot have intentions involving Fiengo & May’s technical notion of \textit{identity of type}, because they are not aware of it; while, on the other hand, in alternative contexts they might use tokens of the same expression “his” (in an intuitive sense of sameness of expression that speakers can intentionally advert to) in “Óscar loves his mother” to intend a disjoint reference with “Óscar”. It might be true that when speakers intend coreference they are deploying a grammar with coindexing and type-identity of the sort Fiengo & May defend; but it would beg the question to take this as sufficient to establish that “anaphora is a matter of grammar” (Fiengo & May (2006), 41), or that there is “nothing intensional” (Heck (2012), 144) when speakers/thinkers intend \textit{de jure} coreference.

I have illustrated the claim that mental acts also involve presuppositions with a sort of example central for my discussion. But of course, if the idea works at all, there will be many other, more familiar examples. In the linguistic case, presuppositions are on the Stalnakerian account propositions that must be accepted as part of the common ground for the speech acts to which they are related to be felicitous. In the psychological case, presuppositions would be pieces of background (mis-)information, invoked for some reason in making a given judgment or decision. Thus, in the way my interlocutor would be presupposing that my football team suffered a humiliating defeat yesterday when he says “I’m sure you didn’t enjoy the match”, I was also presupposing it in thinking when I woke up, \textit{I should have gone to the movies instead}. And, on the present view, when I judge \textit{I am hungry} I presuppose that the person of whom I am predicating \textit{being hungry} is the thinker of this very judgment.

(ii) \textbf{Mental metarepresentational individuators.} The presuppositions of coreference described in the previous paragraphs are crucially about the mental representations that are vehicles for the mental acts of which they are ancillary components. This assumes a language of thought, but for our present purposes we do not need to make very controversial assumptions regarding its nature.\textsuperscript{28} We only need to ascribe to ordinary thinkers an implicit understanding of the token-reflexive contents we claim they assume; they could manifest it simply by saying things like “that which I am thinking about now is what I was thinking about before”. The temporal indexicals

there would be referring to the token representations that serve as vehicles for their thoughts. They do not need to have developed concepts of tokens vs. types, or mental representational vehicles.

As I have mentioned before, other writers have advanced views of de se thoughts that I take to be related to the present elaboration of the Perrian view. Peacocke (2014, ch. 2 and 4) further develops a view he had already defended in previous work about the concept associated with “I” in reason-sensitive thoughts such as beliefs and intentions, and also in more primitive “I”-representations in perceptual or bodily experiences to which the former harks back. As in Perry’s work and in the present proposal, he also characterizes the cognitive significance of such representations by means of a (token-reflexive) reference rule, which he is at pains to distinguish from content-constituents of the relevant attitudes. Alas, like Perry he also says precious little of a positive nature about the role the reference rule is supposed to play in characterizing the personal-level, conscious first-personal awareness that the subjects of those states are supposed to have; while it is quite clear at crucial junctures that he is assuming this awareness.

Castañeda coined a technical device, quasi-indicators such as “he*”, dedicated to signal de se ascriptions in attitude-attributions. He (1968, 441) characterizes quasi-indicators as follows (to stick to our examples, I slightly modify the passage so that it concerns “he*” in the ascription “Perry has learned that he* is making a mess”, which I assume to be made to report the messy shopper’s epiphanic utterance of “I am making a mess”):

(i) [I]t does not express an indexical reference made by the speaker; (ii) it appears in oratio obliqua; (iii) it has an antecedent, namely [“Perry”], to which it refers back; (iv) its antecedent is outside the oratio obliqua containing “he*”; (v) “he*” is used to attribute, so to speak, implicit indexical references to [Perry]; that is, if [Perry] were to assert what, according to [the ascription], he knows, he would use the indicator “I” where we, uttering it, have used “he*”.

Castañeda considered the possibility that “he himself” might play that role in English, but this has been compellingly questioned. Interestingly, at that time, some linguists were independently exploring the presence in natural language of so-called logophoric expressions, more or less with the same features that Castañeda ascribed to his theoretically posited quasi-indicators; cf. Schlenker (2011) and references there. Chierchia (1989) and Higginbotham (2003) have shown that PRO (the implicit subject of infinitive clauses linguists posit following Chomsky) also appears to behave in English like a quasi-indicator. Thus (to borrow a common example from the literature), imagine that John, a candidate in an election, entertains a thought that he would express by uttering “I will win the election”. In that case, we could accurately report his thought by both (1) and (2):

(1) John expects that he will win the election.
(2) John expects PRO to win the election.
However, imagine now that John is so drunk that he has forgotten that he is a candidate in the election. He watches someone on TV and thinks that that person is a terrific candidate, who should definitely be elected. Unbeknownst to John, the candidate he is watching on TV is John himself. In that situation, it intuitively seems that only the purely de re report (1) would be correct; (2) feels like an incorrect description of the situation, a false report.

Higginbotham (2003) advances a token-reflexive proposal like the one developed here to characterize the attitudes ascribed in these constructions. I am avoiding here a discussion of the semantics of attitude-ascriptions, focusing only on the nature of the ascribed attitudes. With respect to that, Higginbotham's proposal is ambiguous in the way Stalnaker's (1981) was, between the first and the second interpretation discerned by Perry; in fact, he also seems to have in mind the first one. This exposes his account to the objections raised by O'Brien (2007, 70) and Recanati (2007, ch. 25). Both consider the case of a schizophrenic patient who believes that some mental states he is consciously aware of are not really his, but those of some other person that have somehow been implanted in him. In Recanati's example, the patient is introspectively aware of the occurrence of the judgment that in normal circumstances he would express by "I am good and omnipotent". He may as a result accept that the owner/judger of this state is good and omnipotent, but he does not accept that he is the owner of that thought; the owner is "the other" who has implanted it. Recanati (2007, 183–4) contends:

...this is a counterexample, because the subject is in a certain state (he consciously entertains a certain thought), the content of the state reflexively refers to the subject of the state (whom the deluded subject takes to be different from what it actually is), yet the subject does not entertain a de se thought, to the effect that he himself is good and omnipotent. What this shows is that being in a state with a reflexive content is not sufficient to ground a self-ascription. 

Recanati is right that being in a state with a reflexive content is insufficient for first-personal thought; this is just the point that Perry makes about the inadequacy of Stalnaker's suggestion on the first interpretation. We should distinguish between

29 Some discourse reports (ascriptions of saying, telling and so on) "plug" presuppositions in their ascribing clauses—which then are not projected as presuppositions of the ascriptive discourse itself—ascribing them instead to the reported discourse: "Peter said that it was John who stole the camera". Similarly, attitude ascriptions can report material presupposed on the present view in the ascribed attitude. That would be the role of indicators of features of modes of presentation in general in theories such as Richard's (1990), Crimmins's (1992), or Pietroski's (1996), and in particular of the token-reflexive material contributed by PRO in reports such as (2), which in Higginbotham's apparatus is represented as 'r(e)'.

30 Higginbotham (2010, 262–3) discusses these cases, in connection with the relation between de se thought and immunity to error through misidentification, to be mentioned below. He represents himself as providing what seems to be an alternative defense of the token-reflexive account, but I fail to see how it works. In my view (developed in García-Carpintero forthcoming), the case of the schizophrenic shows that mental actions such as the judgment that I am good and omnipotent, as much as physical actions such as making a mess, are only de facto IEM. In abnormal circumstances, the ordinary grounds one has to self-ascribe them survive as grounds for the existential generalization, someone is making a mess, someone is judging that he himself is good and omnipotent, while still leaving it open whether it is oneself who is doing them. For this to be possible, some other state has to be genuinely de se and immune to misidentification error (the impression of being executing those actions, in the suggestion in the main text).
two different mental states. There is, in the first place, the judgment \( j \) about \( x \), to the effect that \( x \) is good and omnipotent, made by deploying a representation that constitutively triggers the token-reflexive reference-fixing presupposition, \( x \) is the judger of \( j \). There also is the impression \( i \) about \( x \), to the effect that \( x \) is judging the judger of that very judgment \( j \) to be good and omnipotent, had by deploying another reference-fixing token-reflexive presupposition about \( i \), \( x \) is the owner of \( i \). Normally, when one is in the latter belief-state, one is thereby also in the former; but this is not so in the case of the schizophrenic patient. Hence, as indicated Recanati is right that to be in a state with a reflexive content is not sufficient to ground a self-ascription. The proposal, however, is that the reflexive content provides the constitutive first-personal reference-fixing presupposition associated to an element of the state’s representational vehicle. It provides the way through which the corresponding content-constituent is accessed in virtue of the subject’s being in that state. No such presupposition is in place in the case of the schizophrenic patient that Recanati considers, who fails to assume that he himself makes the relevant judgment. (A more complex token-reflexive content does capture the significance of the impression-state of the patient: the owner of this thought is under the impression of judging that he himself is good and omnipotent.)

In the previous pages I have offered an elaboration of Perry’s account of de se thoughts. To sum it up, these are representational states including de jure referential items (mental files, dossiers, or nodes in a sort of graph), which constitutively refer through an associated ancillary reference-fixing presupposition—a contentful state identifying the referent as the owner of that very state. The same schema applies to Frege cases in general; the difference between “Hesperus”-thoughts and “Phosphorus”-thoughts lies also in associated ancillary reference-fixing presuppositions. Skeptics about the de se are right that examples like Perry’s messy shopper are just Frege cases. But the proposal shows why de se thoughts are philosophically important. While they are ubiquitous (as Castañeda’s, Lewis’s, and Perry’s examples vividly illustrate, any full rationalizing explanation of our actions will involve them), if the proposal is correct we should abandon one of the traditional tenets about intentional contents, namely, their shareability. For although anybody can have a thought about the owner of a given mental state of mine, only I can have a thought about myself by correctly presupposing that my thought is about the owner of the very thought of which this presupposition is an ancillary constituent. This is a form of Perry’s (1979, 44–6) “limited accessibility” doctrine, although mild by his lights (Perry (1979), 49).31 Even if the proposal is wrong, the fact that a forceful contender to account for a ubiquitous type of thought has this feature suffices to make it philosophically significant: it points to a clear sense in which thought is necessarily from a particular perspective.

31 What is the advantage of this proposal over Frege’s own “limited accessibility” view? Why is it milder? It is not so much that it is milder, but that it is clearer when it comes to its commitments about the source of the limitation. Its main advantage lies in its generality; I take it to be an application of a general account of indexical expressions in thought and language.
To be sure, the present proposal might benefit from further elaboration. We need to explain better how it is that mental acts like judgments and decisions involve forms of presupposing, and what it takes for subjects to presuppose in the relevant sense. However, I take it that it is of some help in making progress on the issues I raised at the end of the previous section for Perry’s account, and related proposals by Higginbotham and Peacocke. In particular, it answers the problem of explaining how states intrinsically have cognitive significances of their own, and how they interact with those constituted by contents in a straightforward way: states are themselves attitudes with content, ancillary to the mental acts whose full cognitive significance they help to characterize.

We are left with the issue of justification. The form of limited accessibility the account involves implies that the proposal, as I indicated above, is saddled with the same problems in accounting for de se communication as Lewis’s or Perry’s original proposals. To deal with it, we can easily co-opt some of the accounts provided on behalf of centered-worlds accounts; cf. Kinderman’s contribution to this volume. But can we say anything of a positive nature in defense of the account? Relevant here are global considerations concerning the way it handles the data for Frege cases in general, in comparison with alternative views. I think the data require positing modes of presentation—although a fuller defense of this would require dealing with syntactic accounts like Fiengo & May (2006), Sainsbury & Tye (2012), and Heck (2012) at greater length than I have done above. As earlier defenders of “two-factor” proposals like Boër & Lycan (1986), Richard (1990), or Crimmins (1992) insisted, and contemporary two-dimensionalists such as Chalmers admit, such accounts are better placed than straightforward descriptivists such as Lewis to do justice, inside an essentially Fregean framework, to the data for direct reference, some of which I highlighted previously. Two-factor accounts, however, have an integration problem, of which the one I raised in the previous section for Perry’s is a particular case; the present proposal is well placed to overcome it.

Another relevant piece of datum has to do with the explanation of epistemic features that appear to be related to de se thoughts, such as cogito thoughts and the phenomenon unveiled by Wittgenstein (1958) and Shoemaker (1968) that the latter calls “immunity to error through misidentification”—even though the connection is not straightforward, for there are de se thoughts that do not exhibit these features, and

32 In a passage (mentioned above) that shows that my elaboration of his views does not depart too far from them, Perry (2006, 218) distinguishes belief from a different attitude: “we have a lot of ‘positive doxastic attitudes’ towards various kinds of propositions. For example we are attuned to propositions about the strength of gravity on earth, or the correct manner for keeping one’s balance while bicycling, or the way English syntax works, that we don’t believe.” Perry’s distinction here, like the one I envisage, is analogous to the one Ortega y Gasset (1940) makes between “ideas” and “beliefs” (he uses the latter term for the presupposing attitudes), and the more famous but quite similar distinction made by Wittgenstein (1969). This is further developed in García-Carpintero (forthcoming), in connection with the relation between de se thought and the phenomenon that Shoemaker (1968) describes as immunity to error through misidentification.
there are non-*de se* thoughts that do exhibit them. While writers such as Higginbotham (2003, 2010) and Peacocke (2014, chs. 5 and 6) invoke these phenomena in favor of Fregean accounts, Recanati (2007, 2009, 2012) argues for a property account on the grounds that it better explains IEM. I have questioned those claims (García-Carpintero 2013), and in a companion piece (García-Carpintero forthcoming) I argue that the presuppositional account provides a satisfying explanation of the phenomenon.

All in all, I am not as much interested in arguing that the philosophical accounts I favor are better than their rivals, as I am in showing that they are at least as satisfactory. For all I can tell, the epistemic situation in philosophy is not unlike hermeneutical undertakings such as the interpretation of novels and films. While there definitely are wrong views, it might well be that different proposals deal comparably well with the data, and there is no philosophical evidence to establish the validity of one among them. That might well be ultimately the case when it comes to deciding between property and full-proposition accounts of *de se* thoughts.

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