The Mill-Frege Theory of Proper Names
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Abstract

This paper argues for a version of metalinguistic descriptivism, the *Mill-Frege* view, comparing it to a currently popular alternative, predicativism. The Mill-Frege view combines tenets of Fregean views with features of the theory of direct reference. According to it, proper names have metalinguistic senses, known by competent speakers on the basis of their competence, which figure in ancillary presuppositions. In support of the view the paper argues that the name-bearing relation – which predicativists cite to account for the properties that they take names to express – depends on acts of naming with a semantic significance. Acts of naming create particular words specifically designed for referential use, which they perform whether or not the language has other words articulated with the same sound or orthography. Like other forms of metalinguistic descriptivism, the Mill-Frege view affords responses to Kripke’s semantic and epistemic arguments against descriptivism. The view is *prima facie* more complex than predicativism; but the additional complexity is independently attested in natural languages and well motivated. Finally, the Mill-Frege proposal deals well with Kripke’s modal argument, and accounts for modal intuitions about names, both issues that pose serious trouble to predicativism.

1. Introduction: the Mill-Frege view

In this paper I elaborate an account of the semantics of proper names and argue that it compares favorably with related predicativist views that have recently become prominent. I call the account the *Mill-Frege* theory because it combines tenets of Fregean views with central features of the theory of direct reference. The view has two constitutive theses. First, proper names contribute their referents to the contents of the primary speech acts they help
performing, and are thus rigid designators; this makes the view Millian. Second, proper names have metalinguistic senses, known by competent speakers on the basis of their competence, which figure in ancillary presuppositions; this makes it Fregean. The theory thus rejects strict Millianism, as defined here: “According to Mill, a proper name is, so to speak, simply a name. It simply refers to its bearer, and has no other linguistic function. In particular, unlike a definite description, a name does not describe its bearer as possessing any special identifying properties” (Kripke 1979, 239-240). What’s perhaps surprising about the Mill-Frege view is that its Millian side is compatible with core Fregean tenets.

The debate between Millians and Fregeans on the semantics of singular terms hinges on the following dividing issue. For Fregeans, a correct semantic account of singular terms cannot associate with them only a referent. It must, in addition, associate with them a property that counts as a Fregean mode of presentation: known to competent speakers, and reasonably taken as individuative.1 The linguistic competence with singular terms of someone who has mastered a language, in other words, cannot be captured only by mentioning his knowledge of the term’s reference – unless this knowledge is characterized as constitutively involving some mode of presentation. Fregeans have defended further claims in addition to this. In particular, predicativists such as Bach (1987, 2002), Elbourne (2005), Geurts (1997), Katz (1994, 2001), Matushansky (2008) and Fara (2015) assume that referential names and a definite description capturing their sense are synonymous: substitutable everywhere salva significatione. Katz assumes further that Fregean senses are associated with types, rather than with tokens. Others, like Searle (1983), add internalism to the core Fregean view.

This paper is intended to contribute to a defense of the core Fregean claim, without any such additions. The issue on which the debate turns is not whether singular terms get associated with descriptive material. The name ‘New York’, for example, connotes that there was a place bearing the name ‘York’ that the new city was named after.2 The issue is whether the association is semantic, whether a semantic theory would be incomplete without capturing it. None of the following points are in dispute in the debate between Fregeans and Millians: (i) there is some explanation for why a given singular term refers to a given individual; (ii) it often has to do with properties of the referent, known by the speakers, and (iii) it belongs in a theory of language, broadly considered.3

Millians (cf. e.g. Soames 2005, 183) contend that their opponents confuse two different kinds of explanation, ‘semantic’ explanations answering ‘descriptive questions’ and ‘metasemantic’ explanations answering ‘foundational questions’.4 The former aim to provide a compositional account of how the meanings of sentences (in context) are determined out of
the contributions of their relevant parts and the way they are put together. The latter answer instead questions ‘about what the facts are that give expressions their semantic values, or more generally, about what makes it the case that the language spoken by a particular individual or community has a particular descriptive semantics’ (Stalnaker 1997, 535). In his earlier work, Kaplan classified core features of the means by which the referents of indexicals are determined (their characters) as belonging to semantics (Kaplan 1989, p. 575).^5

This paper defends the moderate Fregeanism contained in the core Fregean thesis. It is not part of the view that the referent is not linguistically essential; on the contrary, on the present view referents are meaning-constitutive. It is not part of the view that sense and reference are ascribed to types; on the contrary, they are to be ascribed to contextualized expressions, i.e., tokens. Finally, it is not part of the view that a singular term is synonymous with a description capturing its sense. In the phrase introduced by Kripke, the view is rather one according to which descriptive senses fix the referents of the terms with which they are associated. The view still counts as Fregean, in that it asserts the Fregean core. As Kripke (1980, p. 33) correctly points out, this poses a challenge: to explain how, if descriptions capturing senses are not synonymous with singular terms, the relation between the latter and the former is still semantic; and to explain how this descriptive material can contribute, as the Fregean claims, to the truth-conditions of singular existentials, identity statements, indirect discourse and so on. The presuppositional side of the view is intended to address this fair challenge.

This is the plan for the remainder of the paper. In §2 I classify varieties of metalinguistic descriptivism: first, I distinguish predicativism from referentialism, in that the former but not the latter takes names in referential uses to be predicates – constituents of the referring expressions – exactly like those explicitly used as predicates; second, I distinguish indexical from non-indexical referentialism, in that the former but not the latter agree with predicativists that David Hume and David Lewis bear the same (‘generic’) name. In §3 I outline a presuppositional view of referential expressions. On this view, they contribute their referents to the contents of the main speech acts that they help to create, while still making a descriptive contribution to a different semantically conveyed feature, a presupposition. In §4 I characterize the acts of naming on which the descriptive component of the semantics of proper names rely on the Mill-Frege view, and in §5 the presuppositions they help to convey. In §6 I make several objections to the view that ‘generic’ names occur in referential uses, shared by predicativism and indexical referentialism. Finally, §7 explains how predicative uses of names originate on the present view, and §8 offers a summary and conclusions.
2. Metalinguistic descriptivism and its varieties

The Mill-Frege account is a version of the metalinguistic descriptivism that Kripke (1980, 68-74) criticizes as circular. In this section I’ll classify along two dimensions views that share this feature, including predicativism, a view initially advanced by Sloat (1969) and Burge (1973) that has gained momentum recently through the work of Geurts (1997), Elbourne (2005), Matushansky (2008), Fara (2015) and others.

Predicativists call our attention to predicative uses of names (PU henceforth), as in (2)-(4), in which they behave like ordinary predicates, in contrast with ordinary referential uses (RU) as in (1) below, in which they intuitively refer to individuals:

(1) Alfred studies in Princeton.
(2) There are relatively few Alfreds in Princeton.
(3) An Alfred Russell joined the club today.
(4) The Alfred who joined the club today was a baboon.

Predicativism is the view that names uniformly have the semantic value of predicates (say, they express properties) in all uses, PU and RU alike. When they occur in referential positions as in (1), they are also predicates occurring as arguments of a covert determiner, a suppressed demonstrative (Burge 1973) or definite description (Elbourne 2005, Matushansky 2008, Fara 2015a). Which property do they express? To answer this, Fara (2015a, 64) appeals to the Being Called Condition, (BCC):

(BCC) When used as a predicate, ‘N’ is true of a thing just in case it is called N.

Note that ‘N’ as it occurs after ‘called’ in (BCC) is not mentioned, but used. Following Matushansky, Fara (2015a, 65-9) argues persuasively that ‘called o N’, ‘named o N’ and ‘dubbed o N’ are ‘small clauses’, not constructions with a ditransitive verb and two objects. How should we understand the predicate being called N, or the related ones that occur in such clauses? When replaced by a proper name in instances of the schema, ‘N’ must be understood metalinguistically: it is to be a bearer of ‘N’, to have ‘N’ as a name. When it comes to account for how proper names work in RU, predicativism is thus one more proposal in the metalinguistic descriptivism family. Such accounts have in common that they deal with Kripke’s (1980) objections to descriptivism by substituting metalinguistic descriptions (the
bearer of the name ‘Aristotle’) for “famous deeds” descriptions (‘the disciple of Plato, author of the Metaphysics’). I will now classify them relative to two criteria.

First, *predicativists* take names to be always predicates, while *referentialists* take them to be specific referential expressions in RU – either indexicals, or words in a category of their own. Second, *commoners* individuate name-words so that David Lewis and David Hume share the first name, while *properists* individuate them so that they have two different names articulated with the same spelling and pronunciation. Kaplan (1990) introduced a convenient terminology: *generic* names are individuated by their sound/spelling; *specific* names, by a historical event – a *dubbing* or *act of naming*. Commoners take generic names to be the words employed in all uses of proper names. Properists take specific names instead to be the words used in RU, true proper names; on this view, the first names of Lewis and Hume are homonyms. We thus have two orthogonal distinctions, allowing for the following taxonomy. First, some theorists are *commoner predicativists*. Others are *commoner referentialists*. Like Kripke’s and Kaplan’s, the Mill-Frege view is a form of *properist referentialism*. In principle there could be a *properist predicativism*; but the relevant predicates would apply at most to one individual, and hence it is difficult to find empirical motivation for it, given that an account of most predicative uses would anyway be needed.

A main difference between referentialists and predicativists lies in that the former recognize two different words in the case of names – those that occur in RU and those in PU – where the latter just see one. Predicativists thus deploy a methodological argument for their view. They contend that it affords a more systematic, simpler or more unified account of how proper names work in ordinary uses such as (1)-(4). Several writers have given a convincing rejoinder to this argument. They first point out other examples of uses of proper names as predicates, which cannot be explained by appealing to (BCC), such as:

(2’) There are relatively few Picassos in Barcelona’s Picasso Museum.

(3’) An Obama came to the Halloween party.

(4’) (At Madame Tussaud): The Hepburn is an amazing piece of work.

Some of these examples – they then go on to argue – can be accounted for pragmatically, perhaps as metonymical ‘meaning transfers’ (Nunberg, 1995) from referential uses; some others semantically, perhaps as conventionalized, lexicalized results of such processes, or other forms of polysemy. A similar account could be given for predicative uses of proper names that rely on (BCC); I will provide my own version in §7. Hence, facile appeals to
simplicity lack any force. A full account of natural languages should anyway encompass the processes just mentioned, also in cases involving proper names. Hence, no decrease of simplicity or unneeded complexity will manifestly result from appealing to them to account for (2)-(4) on behalf of referentialist views.

This is not, of course, an argument for referentialism, but only a rejoinder to an argument that has been made against it. In this paper I’ll outline some threads in a full argument for the Mill-Frege version of properist referentialism to be presented in §§4-5; the argument in full, which cannot be given here, should consist in a global comparison of the explanatory virtues of the alternatives. I’ll just mention an important motivation for metalinguistic descriptivism (cf. Hornsby 1976, 229, Katz 2001, 139), without details. Not recognizing the validity of the following inferences prima facie disqualifies one as a competent speaker of English:

(5) He is hungry.  
∴ Some male is hungry

(6) Peter is hungry.  
∴ Someone called Peter/some Peter is hungry

Competent speakers also recognize the trifling character of the following sentences:

(7) He is male, if he exists.
(8) Peter is called Peter/a Peter, if he exists.

While these arguments are not necessarily truth-preserving, on the view to be outlined below they are truth-preserving across felicitous contexts: some adequate adaptation of Kaplan’s (1989) validity in the logic of demonstratives to the presuppositional framework outlined in the next section. Roughly, the conclusion would be true in any context in which the presuppositional requirements of the premises are met and are also true.

3. Reference-fixing: the presuppositional account

An adequate Fregean account of names should answer a legitimate demand after the alleged conventional senses for, say, ‘Cicero’ and ‘Tully’ are: “Are not these just two names (in English) for the same man? Is there any special conventional, community-wide ‘connotation’ in the one lacking in the other?” (Kripke 1979, 244) The challenge is to provide descriptive material that can be plausibly taken to be semantically associated with proper
names, over and above their referents. As announced, I’ll address this challenge by resorting to metalinguistic conditions such as *being called Cicero* and *being called Tully*.\textsuperscript{18} In this section I’ll present the idea, and I’ll show how it addresses Millian challenges by briefly discussing the in my view related case of indexicals.

An influential argument for Millianism is modal: unlike descriptions, names are ‘rigid designators’. Now, many writers have noticed that this point by itself cannot establish the Millian view, because expressions that are semantically associated with descriptive material are also similarly rigid: indexicals, descriptions in some uses, and artificially devised descriptions rigidified by means of ‘actual’ or ‘dthat’ operators.\textsuperscript{19} In previous work I have developed a version of this suggestion, focusing on the case of indexicals.\textsuperscript{20} Two aspects of this particular version of the reply are important for our discussion; I will sum them up.

Firstly, there are general linguistic rules conventionally associated with indexicals along the lines of Kaplan’s (1989) characters; here are two examples:

‘I’: For any use *I* of ‘I’, *I* refers to *x* iff *x* is the utterer of *I*.

‘He’: For any use *he* of ‘he’, *he* refers to *x* iff *x* is the male ‘demonstrated’ when *he* is produced.\textsuperscript{21}

Reference is here assigned to concrete (actual or possible) uses in accordance with the linguistic rule for the types they instantiate. Moreover, there is a relational property involving any use, given the general features mentioned in the rule for its type (say, *whoever uttered I*, assuming now that the bold-face instance of ‘I’ refers to a particular use), which has the required features to count as a Fregean sense: it is reasonably individuative, and it is mutually known on the basis of linguistic knowledge alone. In most cases, this mode of presentation will include features obtained from context. In some cases, contextual supplementation may even be mandatory for understanding. *In all cases* the use-involving mode of presentation associated with a use is *linguistically constrained* or *guided*. Thus, another conventional rule for indexicals could be as follows:

‘That’: For any use *that* of ‘that’, *that* refers to *x* iff *x* is the unique entity (in a contextually specified class $\Phi$) ‘demonstrated’ when *that* is produced.

This puts aside of a possible ‘Millian’ view of indexicals that rejects for them the Fregean core. Surely, the Millian claim cannot be that the truth-conditional contribution of singular terms in natural language is usually not fixed by modes of presentation associated with their types solely by linguistic conventions.\textsuperscript{22} Many researchers accept that this applies across the
board: linguistic conventions only constrain or guide truth-conditional imports; their full determination depends on contextual features. Linguistic conventions restrict quantifiers to a certain domain, but the specific domain is usually only fully given contextually; likewise, linguistic conventions determine that attributive adjectives and adverbs (‘old’, ‘bad’, etc) qualify only relative to a given scale, which is only contextually given; and so on.

The second trait of my suggestions for answering modal argument is the specific way in which I proposed to incorporate direct reference. Direct reference theorists characterize the contribution of (a use of) ‘he’ to the truth-conditions asserted by means of an utterance of ‘he is rich’ as an individual which is a component of a ‘singular proposition’, encapsulating its possible-world truth-conditions. My proposal agrees: the contribution to asserted content of an indexical like ‘he’ should be abstracted away from the way that entity is presented. But there is in my view an additional reference-fixing element associated with singular terms, over and above its contribution to the signified proposition. I have argued that this reference-fixing aspect constitutes a lexically triggered presupposition (García-Carpintero 2000a, 2006) – say, that $x$ is the ‘demonstrated’ male when the token he is produced.

Although the state of information we end up in by accepting that ‘John stole the camera’ and ‘it was John who stole the camera’ are the same, these two sentences pack the information they convey in different ways. The second, cleft sentence presupposes that someone stole the camera, but the former, plainer sentence does not. For present purposes, we can think of presuppositions along the well-known lines that Stalnaker (1978, 2014) has suggested. Speech acts like assertions take place relative to a common ground, a set of already accepted propositions. Linguistic presuppositions are requirements on the common ground, whose satisfaction should be checked before acceptance of the resulting assertion is assessed. If accepted, it goes to conform the common ground, licensing further presuppositions in the ensuing discourse. The difference between the sentences lies in the fact that an utterance of the it-cleft sentence will feel inappropriate at presupposition evaluation time (Stalnaker 2002) if it is not common ground by then that someone stole the camera. But the state of information that we get into by accepting either of our sentences will be the same.

Consider an utterance of ‘he is hungry’. As indicated, the proposal agrees with the direct reference theorists that the asserted content is a singular proposition, $x$ is hungry, for some contextual assignment to $x$. It is expressed, however, in a context in which another singular proposition is presupposed which, given the general rule above, we could express thus: $x$ is the male ‘demonstrated’ when he is produced. These semantically triggered presuppositions are about linguistic expressions. They will usually be supplemented with additional features
of the referent, perceptually accessible or accessible from previous discourse. The descriptive identification thus presupposed is hence ‘reference-fixing’ and not ‘meaning-giving’.

This is not a reductive view: far from aiming to reduce singular contents to general ones, it assumes primitively singular representations. The suggestion is only that general descriptive information that helps to fix which individuals an utterance is about is among its semantically constitutive features. This information figures in ancillary presuppositions. But the presuppositions are themselves singular, and not just because they may mention singular representations; the intended referents, if there are any, contribute to individuating their contents. Singularity, like presuppositionality, is here understood as a constitutive feature of the representational devices, a ‘semantic requirement’ (Fine 2007, 50) on them – a fact to be embedded in a theory of such representations, which must be grasped for them to be fully comprehended. 26 It is thus that singular terms are de jure rigid, in Kripke’s (1980) sense. 27

There are two other arguments for Millianism. First, a semantic or error argument, that speakers use instances of a name to refer to an object even if the descriptions they associate with the name in fact identify a different object. Second, an epistemic or ignorance argument, that speakers competently use a name to refer to an object even if they ignore that it satisfies the alleged descriptions. In the case of indexicals they are not compelling. An error argument could not be persuasively mounted about descriptive material like our relational properties. Similarly, an epistemic argument is not obviously applicable. The claim that utterances along the lines of he is a male relevant when he is produced, if there is such a male are known on the basis of linguistic competence is at least not obviously disposed of. 28

In order to extend to proper names the strategy that the two points just outlined allow for indexicals, what is needed is some analogously reference-fixing material that is associated with proper names in a sufficiently ‘linguistic’ way. The next two sections are devoted to this goal: to characterize the linguistic senses of proper names in the outlined framework.

4. Acts of naming and appellative practices

Millians contend that proper names lack semantically associated Fregean senses. Any related descriptive material shows up only in metasemantic explanations. The Fregean view I defend claims in contrast that there is a Fregean sense associated with uses of proper names, which is part of a semantically triggered presupposition. An illusion that there are no such senses is explained by the fact that their semantic core is informatively meager. Mill, and
more recently Marcus (1961) and others appreciated a peculiarity of proper names, which indeed distinguishes them from other linguistic resources; it explains why they do not belong in dictionaries. This feature, however, does not justify the Millian claim that they refer without the help of a Fregean sense. A semantic theory must canvass these senses first because they account for some properties of utterances of ordinary sentences (as (6) and (8) above seek to illustrate); and second because they contribute to the asserted proposition in contexts such as attitude ascription, fiction, negative existentials, and so on.

As announced, the account to be defended is a metalinguistic proposal according to which the linguistic sense of proper name $N$ is (roughly) \textit{whoever is called }$N$. The proposal agrees to that extent with causal descriptivist views anticipated by Kripke, which turn his outline of a picture of how the reference of names is fixed into a form of descriptivism. In this section I articulate the concept of \textit{being called }$N$ that the Mill-Frege view assumes. I’ll explain how names are individuated on that view, as a form of \textit{properist referentialism}. I will argue on the basis of ‘Madagascar’-like cases that the acts of naming that individuate names have a \textit{semantic} and not merely an institutional, social character, in a sense to be explained. This will play a crucial role in an argument in §6.4 against commonerism, both referentialists and predicativists. In §5 I will present the reference-fixing presuppositions in which names thus individuated figure, and I will address circularity worries.

4.1 Acts of naming and their semantic role

I start by describing a subset of the conventions constituting natural languages, which I call \textit{appellative practices}, instituted by means of speech acts which I call \textit{acts of naming}. The proposal is similar to the most fully elaborated account of these practices so far, due to Sainsbury; it is closer to Sainsbury’s (2005, 106-124) earlier view than to his (2015) more recent one, although it differs substantively from both, as I’ll explain.

Following Kripke, views of this kind individuate practices by an originating event, a \textit{dubbing} or \textit{act of naming}, and causal links leading to it involving deferential intentions to established usage by those who acquire the name. The originating events are speech acts like assertions, commands, questions, promises and so on. I take them to be in core cases stipulations – acts in the genus of \textit{directives}, requests or pleas to assign meanings to lexical units and to subsequently use them in agreement with that assignment. They have the role of definitions: to endow an expression with a conventional meaning, for this to serve as a ground on which subsequent uses of the same expression to make other speech acts rely. They are perfectly common; I performed some a few pages above, when I wrote ‘(BCC)’, ‘(1)’ and
similar expressions before some sentence-types, to be able to refer to them in acts such as the ensuing assertions I made about them.

Many other lexical units are endowed with meaning in similar ways: adjective words, common nouns, etc. But there is a crucial difference between acts of naming and appellative practices relating to proper names, and those for predicates, which I’ll explain in §4.2 below; as I’ll put it, the former introduce purely nominal practices. Acts of naming adopt many forms, but I will assume a regimented, canonical one: \( N \) \( \text{is} \ldots \), or let us/we will call \( N \). Acts of naming can be descriptive, for instance in the case of theoretical terms: in this case, the ellipsis in the schema above will be filled up with a description. They can also be ostensive, in the case of terms whose semantic value can be reliably identified observationally. In this case, the ellipsis in \( N \) \( \text{is} \ldots \) is to be replaced with a demonstrative and a demonstration towards a (spatio-temporal stage of) the referent (in the case of singular terms), a paradigm case of the property (in the case of adjectives) or the kind (in the case of common nouns).\(^{32}\)

Like other speech acts, acts of naming are concrete events. They are purposeful events, instituting specific linguistic conventions, appellative practices. As is generally the case with purposeful activities, attempted acts of naming can be dysfunctional, failed (Austinian abuses) or merely putative (misfires). We individuate the acts by describing their felicity conditions, under which they would be performed successfully. Acts of naming are directives intended to grant permissions to members of the relevant linguistic community to use the name in the subsequent acts constituting the thereby created practice.\(^{33}\) Their constitutive goal is to coordinate acts of (speaker-)reference (Kripke 1977) to an object. If they are successful, it becomes the semantic referent of the thereby created name. This assumes that the notion of (speaker-)reference is explanatorily prior to that of reference by means of names. This is a general notion we need to understand representational acts in general.

The account of ‘Madagascar’-like cases below relies on there being unsuccessful, ineffectual but nonetheless obtaining acts of naming – Austinian abuses. Let us take an example, a variation on one by Ziff (1977, 321). We have been debating what to call the cat we recently adopted; I support ‘Whiskers’, other members of my household favor ‘Flaubert’. A visiting friend asks, what is the new cat like? Out of the blue, I answer:

\[
(9) \quad \text{Whiskers is adorable.}
\]

A supporter of the alternative name promptly objects: ‘hey, wait a minute, I did not know we had agreed on calling it Whiskers!’ The example prompts three remarks:
(i) The reply provides evidence for the presuppositional account articulated in §5 below. ‘Hey, wait a minute’ objections are a standard way to challenge presuppositions, taken as a test for their presence. The utterance presupposes that the intended object is called Whiskers, and hence that an act of naming by which the object becomes the bearer of the name has taken place. The presupposition is not necessarily wrong, because the speaker is (cheekily) expecting that, at ‘presupposition evaluation time’ (Stalnaker 2002) after the utterance, it has in fact become common knowledge that the cat is called Whiskers, in virtue of the audience graciously accommodating him; and he may well have succeeded.

(ii) Acts of naming need not explicitly occur for an appellative practice to be created. They might remain implicit; a way for this to happen is that speakers presuppose that they are in place. In our example, the mischievous maneuver has been undone. But how could it have succeeded in the first place, one might wonder? How could one make a fact to obtain just by presupposing that it does? This relies on the mechanism that Stalnaker (2002) has proposed to account for informative presuppositions, as when I utter ‘I am sorry I am late – my car broke down’ without assuming that previous to the utterance my audience knows that I have a car. Here the speaker relies on a pragmatic mechanism through which, at ‘presupposition evaluation time’, the audience comes to accept that the speaker has a car, thus rendering the presupposition felicitous. For this to work, the content should be sufficiently unexceptional and unquestionable; the strategy would probably not work if one utters ‘I am sorry I am late – my Ferrari Testarossa broke down’, meeting instead with a ‘hey, wait a minute’ objection. The envisaged protest against (9) is a case in point. However, this is not enough to answer the worry. The usurper doesn’t become the legitimate king just by being so powerful as to have everybody in the realm presupposing that he is, or making as if they did. Accommodation suffices to make utterances carrying presuppositions feel felicitous, but by itself doesn’t make those presuppositions true. It does here, however, on account of the special nature of names: the purely nominal character of their appellative practices, to be explained momentarily. In a nutshell, all that is needed for to bear is for members of the relevant group to be willing to coordinate their representational acts so that refers to .

(iii) The example illustrates how acts of naming might fail. The preparatory conditions for getting ‘Whiskers’ to semantically refer to the cat are in place: we are in need of a name in order to be able to talk about it, and that would do; the speaker is in a position to introduce a name for the cat. However, the refusal of the intended community to agree on using the name I implicitly aim to create nullifies the implicit act, so that I have failed to create one. This is a case of the failure of a merely implicit act of naming, but it is easy to think of analogous cases
involving explicit acts. Thus, I assume that if I gratuitously baptize the first sentence I want to refer to throughout a paper with a difficult-to-remember name, my act will be equally unsuccessful, because this will ensure that my subsequent claims about the sentence will meet with readers unwilling or unable to understand them. Likewise if I use expressions that are taboo or insulting to name people.  

Acts of naming might thus be unsuccessful in their constitutive aim of establishing a convention – endowing a name with meaning. What does the name refer to in the expression of the act, let us/we will call ... N? As indicated in §2, this is a predicative use; but, as shown there, the name is mentioned in the characterization of the intended property. Which name, however, given that there will not be any when the act fails? To put it in the Kaplanian terminology introduced before, what is primarily mentioned in the act of naming is a generic name that serves as a template for the specific one the act aims to introduce. On a pedantic elaboration, the directive is: let us hereby introduce a name articulated as ‘N’ for x.

Given that acts of naming might occur implicitly, they might also obtain inadvertently: ‘a parent calls a spindly child a beanpole, using the word as a common noun and with no intention to originate a practice, but it sticks as a nickname and for years is used as a proper name of a the child’ (Sainsbury 2005, 111). Or a speaker mishears an existing name, and inadvertently start a new referring practice with the name he uses, wrongly thinking he is just following established practice. The process in those cases is the one outlined above and discussed further below: a dubbing comes into existence just by being presumed to exist.

I side with Sainsbury (2005), against Evans and his more recent self (2015), in thinking of Madagascar-like cases along these lines. The original act of naming, apparently leading to present-day uses of ‘Mogadishu’, is nullified relative to the uses in the practice to refer to the island. Relative to them, it becomes an ineffectual act of naming, like the one for ‘Whiskers’ presupposed in the utterance of (9). (This, of course, doesn’t apply to those other uses, still obtaining, for the place for which it was originally introduced.) A new dubbing is instead inadvertently created, and a new appellative practice established at some indeterminate time. It is thus as when ‘Madagascar’ was used to name a 2005 film, except for the inadvertency. With respect to later uses down on the causal chain of deference, the effect of the previous ‘Madagascar’ dubbing is nullified; film uses instead depend on the new dubbing, whether implicit or explicit, here manifest to the speakers involved.

In his previous work, Sainsbury (2005) invoked a Davidsonian metasemantics in support of this view, appealing to the Principle of Charity. Systematic uses of ‘Madagascar’ for the film depend on a different act of naming than systematic uses of the expression for the island,
and hence belong in a different appellative practice. The reason is that the referent of the word ‘is to be judged in part in the light of how we can best make sense of a speaker’; ‘our verdict should not lead to a prolonged and robust divergence between speaker referent and semantic referent’ (Sainsbury 2005, 118). For the same reasons, systematic uses of the word for the island after Marco Polo’s error (or that of Renaissance cartographers partly relying on him, Burgess 2014, 196-7) should be thought of as depending on a different act of naming and as constituting a different appellative practice than those for the Somali territory.

I am not fond of Davidsonian views on meaning-determination (García-Carpintero 2012). I feel closer to Williamson’s proposal (2007, 264) to replace the maximization of true beliefs with that of knowledge in a content-determining principle of charity. Thus, one might say that utterances of declarative sentences are constitutively made to allow for the transmission of knowledge of their semantic contents. The assumption that our uses of ‘Madagascar’ still semantically refer to what uses of ‘Mogadishu’ do would excessively disrupt the knowledge-transfer potential that uses of declarative sentences including them should have. However, to my mind McGlynn (2012, 398-400) convincingly shows that Williamson’s proposal is too blunt. Someone might be referring with ‘she’ to a demonstrated female, even if the claims thereby made do not constitute knowledge about her, on account of safety considerations: the speaker is in fact pointing to a woman, but she is surrounded by woman-appearances created by a hallucinogen, so that such claims (or relevant counterparts, cf. Manley (2012)) might easily have been false. An adequate metasemantics should instead look in more detail at the role that knowledge plays in the semantic rules for particular expressions. For those whose truth-conditional import is determined by appellative practices, I think this will lead to focusing on maximizing the amount among what I call analytic statements in §4.2 that constitute knowledge. However, the issues are too complicated for them to be usefully addressed here, so I will just rely on Sainsbury’s (2005) Davidsonian justification.

Now, Sainsbury (2015) notes that Kripke’s ‘causal chain’ picture affords distinguishing between what makes a subsequent use one of the same name, and what makes a name retain its reference. He thus now says, as Evans did, that in Madagascar-like cases one and the same name changes its referent (ibid., 210-11). However, this ignores a semantic constitutive role that the previous considerations show acts of naming to have. In a nutshell: they are intended to introduce a word; words are individuated in part by their semantic features; names, like indexicals, are de jure, constitutively referential expressions, whose semantic referent is determined relative to what transpired at a particular act of naming.
Sainsbury now characterizes acts of naming – which he calls ‘originating uses’ – in negative terms: a use is originating ‘iff it does not look back to or defer to earlier uses of any specific name’ (2015, 199). Thus, the use of ‘Madagascar’ for the film was an originating one. But the ‘Whiskers’ example above shows that this condition is insufficient: the use doesn’t look back to earlier ones, but it is not originating. Examples of inadvertent naming show that the condition is not necessary either. Sainsbury still acknowledges some of them: ‘we must also allow for first uses which simply grow up’ (*ibid.*, 200), mentioning a case like his ‘beanpole’ example quoted above. These points raise two worries: (i) why ‘must we allow’ for such inexplicit originating acts? And (ii) why do some cases fail to be originating, even if they do not look back to earlier uses? These questions should be answered; and the answers my discussion suggests are in tension with Sainsbury’s current view. At (i): the semantic referents of names depend on what was picked out at particular acts of naming, on which they rely. The use of ‘Madagascar’ for the film manifestly allows for assertions that no sensible metasemantics should count as being about the island; but exactly the same applies to the relevant uses of ‘beanpole’, and to current uses of ‘Madagascar’ for the island. At (ii): the use of ‘Whiskers’ failed at creating a practice semantically dependent on it.44

I conclude that acts of naming have a semantic role, not merely a social or institutional one: they contribute to determine the semantic values (truth-conditional imports) of uses of names dependent on them along deferential chains, on condition that the potential failures in fulfilling this role in the language that nullifies them in ‘Madagascar’-like cases are absent.

4.2 The purely nominal character of appellative practices for proper names

I move now to explain how the appellative practices related to proper names have a purely nominal character, in contrast with those related to predicates. I call analytic statements assertions typically made with the same sentences (*N is …*, or *we call … N*) used in acts of naming (which are not assertions). They primarily aim to explain the meaning of the expression-type, or to introduce someone to the relevant linguistic convention. They do that by giving the referent or semantic value of the expression, in circumstances that allow for the sense to be also conveyed.45 In the case of natural kind terms such as ‘water’, for instance, together with most defenders of two-dimensional intensional theories I would argue that being the watery stuff (i.e., the odorless, colorless, tasteless substance the fills up rivers and lakes and falls as rain) is an aspect of the sense of the term. I would put this in the present framework, developing the idea that the term contributes the natural kind it picks out to the ‘at-issue’ content of utterances of atomic sentences in which it occurs, while it contributes its
descriptive sense to an associated presupposition. So an adequate analytic statement for water could be ‘water is the watery stuff’, or ‘we call this water’, demonstrating a quantity of the stuff manifestly instantiating the relevant descriptive properties.

There are thus acts of naming for common nouns exactly as for proper names, and hence the metalinguistic condition being called water is also an aspect of the sense of ‘water’. But here the condition is subordinated to being the watery stuff; something similar is typically the case with general terms. With names, however, the only descriptive condition that typically (i.e., putting aside for now descriptive names such as Evans’ ‘Julius’ and relates cases, see below) needs to be made salient in corresponding analytic statements is the metalinguistic one that there is an appellative practice for it. This is what the purely nominal character of these practices comes to; it reflects a feature of proper names that many researchers have pointed out, their being mere ‘tags’ or ‘labels’, which Strawson nicely captures here:

[I]t is convenient to have in circulation […] a tag, a designation, which does not depend for its referential or identifying force upon any particular […] position or relation, which preserves the same referential force through its object’s changes of position or relation and has the same referential force for communicators who know the object in different connections and for whom quite different descriptions would be uppermost. (Strawson 1974, p. 45-6)

A ‘just so’ evolutionary parable might bring this out. Imagine a linguistic community of people who already have expressions (like ‘water’) whose reference is determined with regard to descriptively rich material. They also have already, to signify singular states of affairs, some devices for singular reference other than proper names; say, they conventionally use indexicals for that purpose, and they use definite descriptions referentially. Occasionally they find themselves in a situation where none of those recourses helps them to signify the singular condition they intend. Say, they are a group of biologists studying a population of seals, who sometimes would like to refer to a particular seal when it is not contextually salient in any way. Seals are too undifferentiated to bring them into the discourse by means of referentially used descriptions, especially if the domain contains several hundreds of them. In this predicament, the mechanism of appellative practices offers a way out. By making sure that a distinguishing physical tag with an inscription of a given type is physically attached to each seal in the domain, an appellative practice involving instances of that expression-type can be circumstantially guaranteed to succeed.
This strategy resorts to an independently existing linguistic device, appellative practices, to give speakers a cognitively accessible descriptive material to signify conditions about specific objective individuals. Our biologists have relied, to solve their problem, upon their awareness that entities in the world can be circumstantially identified by the existence of certain linguistic acts related to them. Stereotypical traits allow entities like properties and kinds to be reliably identified, at least throughout particular environments; because of that, there are potential acts, analytic statements, in which they are authoritatively (even if fallibly) called by a given term, which secures an emergent, second-order metalinguistic identificatory trait for the property or kind. But no other individuative traits than the existence of the practice are involved in the seal case. In contrast with the appellative practices for ‘water’, no stereotypical non-linguistic material, conventionally associated with the expression-type, needs being made salient in making analytic statements.

The appellative practices associated with names are thus purely nominal in that analytic statements have merely the job of making salient an act of naming in which the label was assigned to the object; what they convey is the singular information that the object is called a given (specific) name. To be sure, the appellative practice in our parable is sustained by the fact that an inscription has been attached to each seal through its life. But this is neither here nor there: it is not important for the practice how analytic statements are made reliable, but only their very availability. It is essentially the acts of naming that play the identificatory role, and only accidentally the permanent labelings of seals that lead to them. The practice of referring to seals by the introduced proper names requires only that there exists some way or other to guarantee correct analytic statements, not any particular means for it.

When concrete analytic statements belonging in the practice are made, speakers typically have a perceptual presentation of the designated seal, which individuates the animal all by itself. Some seal lovers may even have a fallible but reliable recognitional capacity for particular seals, which they may come to associate with their names. But neither transiently individuating perceptual presentations nor recognitional capacities are required to understand the names we are considering. A competent speaker will fully understand an utterance of ‘1,237 is ill’ even if no concrete statement implementing the practice associated with this token of ‘1,237’ has in fact taken place, let alone one in which he himself has been present. And few (if any) speakers will have the imagined recognitional capacities, in spite of which they fully understand the names. The only piece of individuating knowledge which a competent speaker possesses about the seal being referred to in an utterance of ‘1,237 is ill’ is thus that an appellative practice involving the type ‘1,237’ has been put in place, on which the
uttered token relies, and the seal is the individual called 1,237 in statements instantiating that naming practice; and this she has on the basis of her linguistic knowledge.

It is this purely nominal character of the practices related to proper names that allows for the peculiarity we noticed above of the kind of accommodation that the ‘Whiskers’ speaker unsuccessfully attempts. No more is required for an object to bear a name than speakers’ willingness to coordinate their acts of speaker-reference by relying on the (inexplicit) act of naming. The object need not satisfy any other condition than being picked out in that act, for such coordination to obtain. They were unprepared to do so in our example, but they could easily have been, as they are in many others. Given our (admittedly sketchy) metasemantic considerations, this justifies positing successful inexplicit acts at such indeterminate time in the ‘Madagascar’ case, so that analytic statements intending the island might count as correct. Speakers who say ‘this film is Madagascar’ or ‘this island is Madagascar’ in the adequate circumstances should hence be taken as correctly assuming acts of naming (inexplicit and inadvertent in the latter case) by which two different specific names in the same generic template have been introduced.

Now, ‘Madagascar’-like changes can occur also with general terms. In a discussion of these issues, Quine mentions one: ‘David Lewis pointed out a nice example to me that brings this out. There was, in the nineteenth century, a French naturalist named Pierre Sonnerat, who was doing field work in Madagascar. A lemur went up a tree, and Sonnerat asked a native ‘Qu’est que c’est?’ The native said ‘in dri’, which in Malagasy means ‘There he goes’. Sonnerat thought that the native understood his question and had given the answer, and the animal is known as the indri to this day’ (Davidson et al., 1974, 500). We can imagine that the case was one in which ‘indri’ also referred in Malagasy to a (different) kind – the tree, say. In this case, the change prevents the correct, semantic application of ‘indri’ in uses deferential on Sonnerat’s inadvertent dubbing to all items in its previous extension, not just its use for the particular tree we are imagining the native to refer to with it. But this is not the case with proper names: the change in referent affecting uses dependent on Marco Polo’s (or the cartographers’) mistake leave unaffected other uses of the same generic name. Present day Mogadishu is a good case in point, for (if the Wikipedia story is correct, and ‘Mogadishu’ does come from the same expression as ‘Madagascar’) Mogadishu is called Madagascar in the same sense that Plato’s teacher was called Socrates.47

To sum up, in this section I have developed an account of appellative practices involving proper names on which successful instances of one and the same have the following features. First, tokens of $N$ in the acts instantiating the practice are instances of the same type – one
and the same word. Second, appellative practices may remain non-instantiated in some cases;\textsuperscript{48} but if there exist concrete ordinary acts implementing a practice, they \textit{belong in a common causal history: an act of naming}, causally independent of every other act in the practice, constitutes its origin; others are causally dependent on it, in virtue of speakers’ intentions to use the term in accordance with its already established use. Third, originating acts of naming \textit{have a constitutive semantic purpose}. Their primary purpose is to contribute to ‘fixing’ (to put it in Kripke’s terms) the semantic value, truth-conditional import of a given class of expressions in ordinary speech acts. The goal of the dubbing is to allow speakers to successfully coordinate their roles in the performance of the ordinary speech acts constituting the naming practice it is intended to establish, by relying only on the link between name and object established in it – as opposed to other distinguishing features of the object.

5. Metalinguistic descriptivism: the presuppositional account

I will now articulate the pressupositions and related senses the Mill-Frege view ascribes to names. In the rest of the section I will show how it deals with usual objections to (metalinguistic) descriptivism. On the view, names in RU are like common nouns and other constant expressions; they are not indexicals. To schematically distinguish specific names as they occur in RU, and generic names as they occur in PU, let me place henceforth a schematic index on the former.\textsuperscript{49} We can now state a conventional schematic character rule for proper names, analogous to the ones presented above for indexicals:

\begin{align*}
N_i; \quad & \text{For any use } n \text{ of proper name } N_i, n \text{ refers to } x \text{ iff } x \text{ is the unique individual picked out in the act of naming instituting the } N_i\text{-appellative practice to which } n \text{ belongs}
\end{align*}

Each instance of $N_i$ is a rule associated with a specific proper name: a word individuated by its linguistic features, in particular the semantic one constituted by the act of naming fixing its reference.\textsuperscript{50} Thus, $N_i$ is not a rule giving the linguistic meaning of an indexical type.

Tokens can be typed in many different ways; in addition to \textit{specific} names (constant expressions whose signification is fixed by a specific appellative practice), we can identify \textit{generic} names, identified merely by phonological or physical features. On the present view these are not the words occurring in RU. As in the case of indexicals, when a concrete token $n$ of a specific name $N_i$ is provided, the rule assigns it a purely linguistic sense involving the token, the type it instantiates and the general features mentioned in the linguistic rule. Such a
linguistic sense would exemplify this schema: *whatever individual is picked out in the act of naming instituting the N_i-appellative practice to which n belongs.* These senses are ingredients of presuppositions, of the following form: *x is the unique individual picked out in the act of naming instituting the N_i-appellative practice to which n belongs.*

The ‘hey, wait a minute’ objection to implicit introductions of names provided a reason in favor of the presuppositional view of the metalinguistic *being called* description associated with names. Maier (2015, 323-4) lists another three. The first (the ‘projection’ behavior of the description) requires going into issues I cannot discuss here, concerning the contributions of names to attitude ascriptions. A full argument for the view I am defending would have to address related matters, in particular how it deals with Frege puzzles and empty names; issues about the projection behavior of the metalinguistic condition would be very relevant. Like Hawthorne & Manley (2012, 236-8) and Rami (2014b, 131-3), I ascribe a limited significance to Maier’s third argument, involving alleged cases of binding involving names like the much-discussed ‘Bambi’ example in Geurts (1997, 321):

(10) If a child is christened *Bambi* and Disney Inc. find out about it, they will sue Bambi’s parents.

Maier’s second argument does provide additional support for the presuppositional account. There is a “givenness” or “accessibility” constraint on the use of names. As Maier (2009, 261) puts it – referring to Sommers (1982) – ‘just like third-person pronouns, names tend to pick up their referent from the common ground, established by previous discourse or otherwise. It is hard to imagine that I go up to a stranger talking about ‘Horace’ or ‘she’ without prior introduction or pointing’. This condition is naturally met in the following way:

(11) There is a gentleman in Hertfordshire by the name of ‘Ernest’. Ernest is engaged to two women.

The first sentence makes it common ground the condition required for the presupposition – of “acquaintance” or “familiarity”, as I (García-Carpintero 2000a) have called them – triggered by the name used in the second to be satisfied. Now, the speaker doesn’t typically provide information enough to independently individuate the relevant naming-practice, nor makes thereby any such information common ground. Rather, there is a particular practice that the speaker ‘has in mind’, one that he intends; and the audience is intended to defer to it.

Kripke (1979, 248, and 1980, 88n) points out that his ‘outline’ of an account of reference-fixing for names can be turned into a Fregean account of sorts, by taking the communicative chain to be the sense of a name-token. I already acknowledged that he there anticipates the
present account, which follows in the steps of Lewis (1983) and others. In a simple form (cp. Devitt 1989) such a maneuver would indeed trivialize a purportedly Fregean account. On non-trivial Fregean views, competent speakers know the senses of expressions; senses are their cognitive fixes on referents, which is why they may account for differences in the cognitive significance of expressions with the same reference.

The present proposal assumes a tacit knowledge of appellative practices; they are to be mentioned in Fine’s (2007, 50) semantic requirements for the language. The schematic rule $N_i$ makes explicit something that is to this extent ‘in the head’ of fully competent speakers; something tacitly known about the signification of proper names. Applied to a name embedded in an appellative practice, this general knowledge provides the purely linguistic ingredient of an individuating sense, which fixes the referent. There is thus a general sort of knowledge that competent speakers possess: proper names refer to whoever or whatever is picked out by the appellative practice on which utterances of them rely.

I offer three reasons in support of this claim. Firstly, I have given indications of speakers’ awareness of the metalinguistic descriptions I have appealed to, manifested in proposals to accommodate such as the one implicit in (9) and their rejection, and in intuitions of validity about (5)-(8); predicative uses, on the account given in §7, further manifest such awareness. Secondly, the seal parable suggests a sensible rationale for the specific linguistic conventions (purely nominal appellative practices) that distinguish this approach from the Millian one. In Lewis’s (1969) well-known account, conventions are regularities in the rational behavior of members of a community, which are “self-preserved” because they are mutually known to exist and to facilitate the attainment of some of the community’s goals. I have pointed out the goal that is served by naming conventions: to wit, bringing non-present, non-describable individuals into the discourse, and I have explained how they are an adequate means for it. Thirdly, although I cannot go into this here, the proposal can be used to account for intuitions about identity statements, negative existentials and indirect discourse.

These reasons justify adopting the view that many are prepared to take regarding something like the senses previously assigned to indexicals with regard to the metalinguistic senses based on appellative practices here attributed to proper names. Kaplan and others are prepared to count indexical senses as belonging in a properly semantic theory, to the extent that this is made compatible with the modal insights constitutive of direct reference. The three reasons support the claim that we should extend the same treatment to the senses here ascribed to proper names: they do not merely belong in a metasemantical account, but must be properly incorporated in our semantic theory.
Procedures of miscellaneous sorts secure analytic statements in purely nominal appellative practices. Some resemble the one in the seal parable above, resting on physical attachments of inscriptions of the name to the referent. Many proper names function in this way: names of streets and cities, names of hotel rooms, movie theaters, etc. Others are analogous, but more complex; they additionally involve, say, drawing maps with inscription of the names (in the case of some geographical names), or, in the case of the full names of persons as they are used in modern societies, official records where the names are correlated with identificatory information: place and time of birth, parents, etc. To fully understand a given proper name, it is of course not necessary to know the specific procedure that secures the ordinary acts implementing the practice on which the token relies, only that some or other does.

Some appellative practices rely on recognitional capacities; those involve the possession of a perceptual procedure on the part of some users to identify spatiotemporal stages of the referent. Names of people as we use them ordinarily (and no doubt as they were used in less complex societies) function in this way. The present proposal extends to them the point just made for names whose appellative practices do not depend on recognitional capacities, that is, that to fully understand tokens of them it is not necessary to know the specific recognitional procedure securing the practice. People with the relevant recognitional capacities play in practice the role of the physical labels in the other cases: their recognitional capacities are convenient but linguistically contingent resources required for the practice to be in place.

The acts of naming constituting practices related to ‘descriptive names’ (like Evans’s ‘Julius’, and proper names for abstract (‘pi’) or theoretical objects (‘Saggitarius A*’, the supermassive black hole at the center of the Milky Way) consist of stipulations of the signification of the proper name given by using descriptions of its referent. Although this case merits further discussion, the previous view will be tentatively extended here to these names: fully understanding a token of one of them requires only a general knowledge of appellative practices; it does not require the specific knowledge deployed in the act of naming instituting the relevant appellative practice.

The linguistic senses of proper names are obtained by instantiating the schematic rule $N_i$ above with a particular name. I have suggested that proper names may be fully understood without possessing a different mode of presentation of the referent in addition to the purely linguistic one: a capacity to recognize the referent, a perceptual way of presenting it, or an alternative description. What is required, as illustrated with (11), is to identify (perhaps deferentially on the speaker’s intentions) the relevant practice. ‘— I have to go. José María is very ill.’ ‘— Which José María do you mean?’ ‘— A dog I care about.’ As Evans said: ‘It is
true that people share names, but the supplementation of a name by some other piece of
information which by itself would have been virtually useless, is often adequate’ (Evans
1982, 380). This is so because we rely on the speaker to supply the individuation of the
relevant naming-practice.

This similarity between proper names and indexicals should not make us overlook their
differences. The ‘existential’ properties of an indexical that determine its referent, relative to
the semantic rule for the type it instantiates, typically vary with the context of utterance, from
instance to instance of the same type. Such reliance on roles typically filled in the context of
any linguistic utterance, but possibly filled differently from utterance to utterance, is a
defining feature of genuine indexicals. As Evans puts it, tokens of indexicals are ‘one-off’
expressions: uses of them are not necessarily part of a practice of using tokens of that type to
refer to a given object. Proper names, like other expressions that rely on appellative practices,
are crucially not so ‘one-off’: the same appellative practice may be relied upon in many
different contexts, securing the same referent for many different instances of a proper name-
type. It is essential to the way proper names (and most other non-indexical expressions)
linguistically function that they are (de jure) anaphoric devices, used to indicate that
reference is being made to the same entity already referred to in a different context.

Compatibly with its core Fregeanism, the present account thus accepts both the traditional
Millian intuition that proper names are mere ‘identifying tags’ (Marcus 1961, 11), and the
neo-Millian claim that proper names are rigid designators. The purely nominal character of
the appellative practices associated with proper names accounts for the traditional Millian
point. And the account acknowledges the rigidity of names for the reasons discussed earlier
for indexicals: the senses here attributed to proper names are merely assumed to
conventionally guide the fixation of reference in the metalinguistic triggered presuppositions,
not to individuate the primarily asserted state of affairs.

Commoners who identify names in referential uses with metalinguistic descriptions have in
contrast serious trouble. Rami (2014a, 853-4) and Schoubye (forthcoming, §3.1) provide
compelling arguments against predicativist proposals to deal with the rigidity data. They
either have empirical difficulties, or are ad hoc or otherwise lack explanatory value, given the
predicativist framework assuming the uniformity of names in RU and PU. Thus, Fara (2015)
appeals to the claim that most names in RU are incomplete descriptions, and incomplete
descriptions are typically rigid. But not all metalinguistic descriptions associated with names
are incomplete (‘Kristallnacht’), and not all incomplete descriptions are rigid. Elbourne’s
(2005) account appeals to singular restrictors. However, if generalized this maneuver would
eliminate the distinction between names and descriptions: unlike names in RU, the latter have non-rigid readings. Moreover, this account requires for a name to refer to an object relative to a possible world that the object bears the name also in that world, against clear-cut intuitions about the possible-worlds truth-conditions of sentences with names in RU.

As suggested at the end of §3, a proper reply to the modal argument for Millianism should be based on resources that also allow responses to the semantic and epistemic arguments. The Mill-Frege view provides them. Firstly, every competent speaker who understands a use of ‘Aristotle’ associates (tacitly) with it a description – that the referent is an entity called Aristotle. Hence, ignorance considerations do not apply to the descriptive material provided by the Mill-Frege theory. Nor does the point that when speakers do associate descriptions with a name, they may pick out something different from its intuitive referent, as illustrated by Kripke’s ‘Schmidt’ case. Even if Schmidt, not Gödel, proved the incompleteness theorems, according to the Mill-Frege theory our uses of ‘Gödel’ pick out Gödel and not Schmidt as their referent. Secondly, to count as a priori the proposition expressed by utterances of \( n \) is whatever individual is picked out in the acts of naming constituting the \( N \)-appellative practice to which \( n \) belongs, if some such exists is not as obviously objectionable as corresponding proposals based on the descriptive theories aptly criticized by Kripke.

Searle (1983) argues that the causal theory does not give the ‘essential character of the institution of proper names’. Although I have not defended the causal theory, his argument would also undermine the present account in terms of appellative practices if successful. I will show that it is not. Here is the example:

[...] imagine a primitive hunter-gatherer community with a language containing proper names. [...] Imagine that everybody in the tribe knows everybody else and that newborn members of the tribe are baptized at ceremonies attended by the entire tribe. Imagine, furthermore, that as the children grow up they learn the names of people as well as the local names of mountains, lakes, streets, houses, etc., by ostension. Suppose also that there is a strict taboo in this tribe against speaking of the dead, so that no one’s name is ever mentioned after his death. Now the point of the fantasy is simply this: As I have described it, this tribe has an institution of proper names used for reference in exactly the same way that our names are used for reference, but there is not a single use of a name in the tribe that satisfies the causal chain of communication theory. [...] Every use of the name in this tribe as I described it
satisfies the descriptivist claim that there is an Intentional content associating
the name with the object. (Searle 1983, 240)

Searle assumes that the referent of any use of a proper name is determined by descriptive
material that the speaker has in mind, independently of any acts of naming belonging to social
appellative practices. However, to the extent that the tribe’s institution of proper names is
really like ours, I think that Searle is wrong. Imagine that speaker S has been erroneously
introduced to lake A (which is big) as lake B: S’s teacher mistakenly told him in the presence
of a big lake – different from the small one called B – that it was called B. Now speaker S
says ‘B is big’. If Searle’s point were correct, S would be literally saying something true; for it
would be the representation of the lake to which S was introduced as ‘B’ and he has now in
mind, which in that case would determine the referent of this use of ‘B’. But clear-cut
intuitions that I think any good theory should honor indicate that the case is a malapropism:
the speaker has literally said something false. The utterance is correct about the speaker’s
referent of that use of ‘B’ (cf. Kripke 1977), but not about its semantic referent.

I will conclude this section by discussing Kripke’s circularity objection. The Mill-Frege
view can adopt a well-established line of reply. First, although a theory of reference in
general should not be circular, a theory of how names refer is not such a theory; Kripke’s own
‘outline’ would fail that requirement, because his account of baptisms assumes the notion of
reference by means of indexicals or descriptions. Second, the account is not circular, by
Kripke’s (1980, 70) characterization: the referent of a use of ‘Socrates’ in an utterance is not
explained in terms of the act of reference performed by that expression in that utterance, but
in terms of the property of bearing that name, which in turn depends on how the use relates to
acts of naming and to the practice in which it belongs. We do not explain the reference of a
use of $N_i$ as whatever that use refers to. We explain the reference of a use of $N_i$ in a speech act
in terms of other speech acts, acts of naming, in which the name-type $N_i$ is not used; the
referential use of other expressions in them is to be independently explained.

Now, the discussion of ‘Madagascar’ cases in the preceding section shows that matters are
more delicate than usually assumed, because acts of naming have themselves a semantic role,
not merely an institutional one: as we saw, whether the act of naming on which a use of $N_i$
relies remains in force depends on the referential role that $N_i$ might play there and elsewhere.
But explaining this role does not involve the concept of reference of any particular use of a
proper name either. In terms of Fine’s (1995) useful distinction, the reference of a particular
use of $N_i$, specifically depends on an act of naming; the fact that the act of naming sustains that
semantic reference \textit{generically depends} on its availability, and of others like it. These are reverse dependences of different kinds, and hence their reversal consistent.

To be sure, the present account does not help reduce intentional notions to non-intentional ones. Similarly, my explications of the senses of indexicals in fact use indexicals (the bold-face letters referring to uses), which makes it clear that they cannot help to promote a reductive account of indexical reference. This shouldn’t worry us. The Mill-Frege theory assumes that intentional notions involved in language use can be illuminatingly \textit{explicated} with the intentional notions of folk-psychological explanations. This undertaking is not aimed at producing conceptual or \textit{a posteriori} reductions of intentional properties to non-intentional ones, or of social intentional notions to psychological ones. The real objection would be that we have not explicated the nature of reference by means of proper names, not that we have not explained it by refraining from using intentional notions.\textsuperscript{65}

\section*{6. Problems for commonerism}

In this section I will raise several objections to different forms of commonerism, in its referentialist and predicativist incarnations, and I will also reply to some objections raised against properist views like the Mill-Frege account by commoners.

\subsection*{6.1 Specific names are sui generis words}

As I have been emphasizing, words are identified not just syntactically and phonologically, but also semantically.\textsuperscript{66} Commoners will take them, also when they occur in RU, to have a semantics that allows them to potentially apply to different individuals: indexicalists assimilate them to expressions like ‘she’, having a character that yields at a context the individual at the context bearing the name (Schoubye forthcoming, 16); predicativists take them to signify a property, applying to all individuals bearing the name (Bach 2002, 75). Now, Schoubye (\textit{ibid.}, 15) is right to point out a relevant intuitive difference between context-sensitivity and homonymy:

\begin{quote}
\[A\] reason to think that there is a difference between the context-sensitivity of pronouns and lexical ambiguity is this: it would be entirely unsurprising and unremarkable if some speaker $S$ was competent with only one meaning of a lexically ambiguous word. For example, $S$ might know that ‘bat’ is used to talk about a piece of sporting equipment, but not know that it is also used to talk
\end{quote}
about nocturnal animals. In contrast, it would be surprising and quite remarkable if, say, the word ‘she’ was part of S’s vocabulary (i.e. suppose S used the word to refer to his mother), yet S was unaware that it can be used to refer to different individuals. Indeed, one might think that S, in this case, is just not competent with the meaning of ‘she’. In contrast, in the previous case, it does seem that S is competent with one of the meanings of ‘bat’.

Similarly, a speaker who thinks that ‘cat’ applies to just one object, but not to others of the same kind would reveal lexical incompetence. Different lexical rules are posited for ‘you’ and ‘I’, ‘bat’ (at least two) and ‘cat’ precisely on account of facts like these. However, Schoubye never considers whether this is also true of names as they occur in RU; he just implicitly takes it for granted. But it seems clear to me that this is wrong.

Firstly, as Schoubye points out, someone who competently understands ‘you’ or ‘cat’ knows that these terms potentially apply to more than one individual. In contrast, someone who competently understands a referential use of a proper name might still fail to understand other uses of the same generic type, if she lacks the contextual information also necessary to understand them. In her discussion of predicativism, Jeshion (2015, 391) interestingly brings up names that we take to apply to a single entity, such as ‘Kristallnacht’ and ‘Watergate’. Were I talking to someone who assumes that ‘Kristallnacht’ applies to an event in the 19th century, I would say, *Hey, wait a minute, I did not know that there was any other Kristallnacht than the SA attacks in 1938*. I would not thereby be betraying any lack of competence, as I would be by objecting to an ordinary referential use of ‘you’ *Hey, wait a minute, I did not know that there was any other you than the person I was recently talking to.* Similarly, someone who assumed that names, like social security numbers, have only one bearer would not thereby be incompetent in their use. For commoners, these differences should just be answerable to contingent beliefs about how widespread is the extension of the predicative conditions with which the expressions are associated: being addressed, being male, being called John, being called Kristallnacht. That seems wrong.

Secondly, it is true that someone who understands any proper name applied to a particular entity, including ‘Kristallnacht’, is in a position to understand the expression when applied to a different one. This may happen by joining a conversation in which it is used, understanding that it is a proper name and understanding it deferentially, to refer to whatever the participants are taking it to refer to. As explained in the previous section, from the present viewpoint this would involve accommodating the presupposition that there is a supporting naming practice, deferring to speakers’ singular intentions. But someone who understands a proper name is in
this way in a position to understand any other one equally well. In this respect the types ‘John’ and ‘Albert’ do not differ, the way the types ‘I’ and ‘you’ do. There is a semantic rule associated with each of the latter, so that one might be competent in the use of one but not in the use of the other. Someone who is learning English may understand ‘I’ but not yet ‘you’. As a result, she will not understand concrete tokens of ‘you’; not for the reasons that someone who knows the conventional rule might yet fail to understand a specific token (viz., for lack of specifically contextual information that is additionally required), but for the more basic reason that she does not know the rule related with the type. The rules are also independent, in that a language could exist with one expression and not the other. Neither of this applies to ‘John’ and ‘Albert’. Thus, this point doesn’t justify ascribing them two different characters.

### 6.2 There are not just specific, but also generic names

Arguments that commoners typically level against properism have an easy reply; besides, on the basis of this reply, as I will show the tables are easily turned against them. Bach (2002, 89) summarizes approvingly those arguments, as given by Katz (2001, 148-154): the properists’ “way of individuating names entails that ‘namesake’ is an empty term, that it is redundant for a son named after his father to put ‘Jr.’ after his name, and that if Brenda Starr married Kenneth Starr, she would change her last name by taking his”. These apparent incongruities that Katz derives from the properist view as a *reduction* manifest the same intuitions behind predicative uses such as (2)-(4), and they call for the same explanation: the properist perspective acknowledges not only the *specific* names that on the view are the true words in RU, but also *generic* ‘names’. The intuitions that Katz relies on merely show that generic ‘names’ are also intuitively accessible: namesakes share generic names; sometimes sons put ‘Jr.’ after their generic name when they share it with their fathers, for obvious reasons; women in some cultures substitute their husbands’ last generic name for theirs – and hence Brenda Starr will not change her ‘name’ if she marries Kenneth Starr.

Now, I have been enclosing ‘name’ inside scare quotes in the above explanations because from the properist perspective generic names are not strictly speaking (proper) *names* (Kaplan 1990, 111); they only count as *words* in virtue of predicative uses, in which they are not proper names but common nouns. How we, as ordinary speakers, count them is of no consequence, because what words are is a highly theoretical matter, not to be decided just on the basis of intuitions of ordinary speakers. In order to deal with the legitimate aspects of Katz’s arguments, it is only required that positing generic names is not an *ad hoc* maneuver. But it is not, against what Rami (2014b, 123-5) contends. Let us see why.
The accounts we are considering are all metalinguistic, as we have seen, in that the condition they ultimately provide for the application of names mentions expressions. Now, as I have emphasized in my work on quotation, we have the practice of using that device to refer not just to the lexical items tokens of which they include (types in my view, as I said, abstract entities with instances), but also to other entities they relate to. Thus, for instance, in “‘gone’ is cursive” the quotation refers to a type constituted by italic inscriptions of the word ‘gone’ (García-Carpintero forthcoming-b). As this illustrates, we refer by means of quotations to types that are not words. Unlike words, which (even if response-dependent) I take to be sufficiently natural kinds (Wetzel 2009, 106), such types are highly unnatural. It might be said that only a ‘linguistically relevant type’ can be the semantic referent of a quotation, while all others are mere speakers’ referents (Gómez-Torrente 2011), but this hardly affects the point. We understand quotations that do not refer to lexical items as easily as we interpret predicative uses of proper names. In fact, these issues appear to be interrelated.

This allows for a second objection to commonerism. The point just made shows that there are many more generic names than we might initially have thought: in parallel to referents of quotations, generic names might be individuated in assorted ways, as our intuitions manifest. Consider the following variation on an example by Gray (2015). A group of Barcelona teachers often discuss name trends among their pupils. They have noted that ‘Julia’ has become fashionable, but that there are different tendencies regarding its pronunciation: some choose the Spanish /χu lja/, some the Catalan /dʒu:lja/. The first day of school, one of them reports: this year I have two (girls named) /χu lja(□)/ and three (named) /dʒu:lja(□)/. The utterance includes predicates expressing a property defined in terms of a type that for neither properists nor commoners is a lexical item. Whether the intended meaning has been conveyed pragmatically, as perhaps a particularized implicature derived from its semantic referent, is immaterial: even so, the example shows that, in the sort of context that commoners call our attention to, we refer to non-words. (And we intuitively find correct to call them ‘names’.) As Gray (2015, 121) points out, this shows that the appeal to simplicity can be turned against predicativism; for these examples can be accounted for by means of the very tools that referentialists use to deal with predicative uses.

Rami (2014b, 125) asks how generic and specific names are related. Words have semantic, syntactical and phonological features. They are pronounced and, in written languages, spelled in particular ways. As Wetzel (2009, 60-68) points out, they have different pronunciations and spellings in different groups of language speakers, located at different times or place. Given that words can be mispronounced/misspelled (Kaplan 1990, 105), just as musical works can
be misperformed, pronunciations and spellings might be thought of, like musical works (Wolterstorff 1980), as conditions on correct articulations. Generic names would thus be types such that, by instantiating them, names would be correctly pronounced or spelled.\(^{76}\)

Thus understood, they can certainly be shared by people otherwise bearing different names.

Rami (ibid.) also questions properists' accounts of the name-bearing relation. Let me take up this additional challenge. In a perfectly good sense of ‘being called’, to be called a given term is to have that term applied to one – to be referred to by means of it. In that sense, clearly one can be called Albert (or, rather, ‘Albert’, as Fara (2011, 493) suggests), without bearing the name ‘Albert’ and without being an Albert. This is why we should put aside this sense for our purposes (Bach 2002, 83; Fara 2015a, 74; Rami (2014a, 856-8); cp. Burge (1973, 428-30) on ‘appropriately being given a name’).\(^{77}\) In the relevant sense, to be called Albert is to have ‘Albert’ as a name of yours, to be a bearer of the name ‘Albert’ (Fara 2015, 73-4). Now, properists should take the quotations in these phrases, in their most fundamental sense, to refer to a specific name. As we have seen, there is a serious indeterminacy issue concerning the generic name that a quotation like ‘Albert’ refers to; but let us assume that there is a sufficiently stable precisification – say, Gómez-Torrente’ (2011, 149) ‘linguistically relevant type’. Then, from the properist perspective we can say that, in an extended sense, one bears\(_G\) (is being called\(_G\) or named\(_G\) by) a generic name just in case there is a specific name instantiating it that one bears\(_S\) (is called\(_S\) or named\(_S\)) in the fundamental sense.

6.3 Which characters do generic-names-taken-as-indexicals have?

I have raised doubts in §6.1 about indexicalist commoner referentialism, questioning the notion that generic names are words with a distinctive semantics in RU; i.e., that they have a character, or there are rules of use for them. Now I want to raise some additional serious difficulties, and critically examine a recent sophisticated form of it: Rami’s (2014b).

Characters are functions that provide the semantic value of an expression relative to some contextual feature. Which feature, in the case of generic names understood as indexicals? An obvious possibility is Recanati’s (1993, 141, 166): a naming-practice or naming-convention.\(^{78}\) However, as Rami (2014b, 137) points out, this proposal presupposes the non-indexical, properist form of referentialism; because it assumes that there are linguistic conventions that endow specific names with a referent.\(^{79}\) Hence, on this elaboration the indexical proposal is a cog turning idly. It assumes that there are specific names – lexical items working according to the properist account. It then uses this to ascribe a character to an additional lexical item, the generic name. This is unnecessary; it is more economical to consider the relevant contextual
factors as presemantic disambiguation mechanisms. We might as well claim that generic ‘bank’ is an “indexical”, a further lexical item with a character that in some contexts selects financial institutions as extensions and in others geographical features.

Now, Recanati is aware of this problem, and confronts it by declaring that the conventions assigning reference to specific names are not ‘linguistic’ (1993, 138), in that ‘it does not seem necessary to know the bearers of all proper names to be linguistically competent, as far as natural languages are concerned’. However, as he admits (1993, 144-6), in the ordinary sense of *being competent* concerning which we have relevant intuitions, this does not distinguish names from other expressions, in particular common nouns: except perhaps in that, in the case of proper names, there are many more expressions about which competent speakers have no more than the deferential understanding we have already pointed out we might have of all proper names. But this is just an accidental result of the fact that, while a language is a general tool to be used in many different circumstances, proper names are intended to serve communicative needs concerning concrete entities circumscribed to a more or less limited spatiotemporal range. This is, as far as I can see, what the *localness* that Recanati (1993, 146-9) takes to be distinctive of names comes to. As he candidly admits, this is just a matter of degree: many common nouns are also highly ‘local’, used to communicate information about tools, plants or food to which very few speakers have access. This is obviously no reason for denying them the character of *linguistic* expressions. We should remind ourselves of the plain fact that names occur in well-formed sentences, with a distinctive syntactic and semantic profile. How can they fail to be linguistic expressions?

Pelczar & Rainsbury (1998, 294-5) appeal to a (salient, or prominent) contextual ‘dubbing in force’, which they characterize in these terms: ‘A dubbing is a speech-act whereby a name acquires a referent, and a dubbing is in force in a given context if in that context the item that was dubbed in that dubbing bears the name it received in that dubbing’. The condition that the dubbing is ‘in force’ is there for ‘Madagascar’-like cases; the initial baptism for a portion of the continent is supposed not to be ‘in force’, because that portion of the continent no longer bears the name. This is subject to the objection against Recanati’s account, namely, that it presupposes the non-indexical, properist form of referentialism if *bearing a name* is to be ultimately explained relative to that account. That aside, the obvious concern is that too many dubbings involving most (generic) names are ‘in force’ when we use tokens of them. Pelczar & Rainsbury (*ibid.*, 295) appeal to a dubbing in force being raised to prominence.

Now, as Rami (2014b, 138-9) and Sainsbury (2015, 197-8) wonder, how does a given dubbing or act of naming become salient in a context? As said above, items such as ‘(1)’ in
this article are fleeting proper names we use to refer to sentences. Their initial dubbings can be said to be salient in the context of the article in which they occur. But what about the dubbing introducing the ‘Saul Kripke’-practice that I have also been invoking in this paper? I do not directly know anything about it, and I do not expect my readers to; so how can it be salient in the present context? We do have indirect access to it, as the dubbing that created the practice that I am relying on; but appealing to this fact is subject to the difficulty raised for the previous proposal, namely, that it presupposes the properist view. Pelczar & Rainsbury also confuse facts about how we find out who is referred to by a name, with facts about its determination. It may well be that in a context a dubbing is most salient, but nonetheless the true referent of the name is not the one picked out by it.84

Rami (2014b) articulates a sophisticated version of indexicalist commonerism. He assumes Predelli’s (2013) framework, on which, in addition to their meaning, expressions come associated with ‘conditions of use’ determining proper or correct uses. This is similar to the present framework; in fact, Rami allows for these conditions to have a presuppositional status. As in other indexicalist accounts, such conditions of use are on Rami’s view associated with generic names, and they rely on speakers’ intentions. But, firstly, his (2014b, 148-9) account invokes the name-bearing relation: the referent of N must be a bearer of (generic) N. As we are seeing, that relation appears to presuppose the properist account. Secondly, as I’ll explain now it is unclear that the full view is extensionally adequate.

Rami contends that the referents of correct uses of names are determined in a plurality of ways. In some cases, it is just deference on previous users; but in many cases, the referent must, in addition to fulfilling the name-bearing condition, fit an act of demonstration, or a conveyed descriptive condition. This is reminiscent of Searle’s (1983) and McKinsey’s (1984, 2011) views critically discussed in §5 above. Consider this variation on an example Rami (2014b, 127) gives. It has been announced that Bob Dylan is giving a performance tonight. As someone comes on stage, the host utters: ‘We are proud to present Bob Dylan’. Imagine, however, that the person on stage is not Bob Dylan, the composer of Blowing in the Wind, but an impostor who nonetheless bears the (generic) name ‘Bob Dylan’. This creates a dilemma. On the first horn, Rami’s account entails that the proper referent of this use of ‘Bob Dylan’ is the person on stage, because it fits the generic name-bearing condition, and is the object made salient by a demonstration. As in the case of Searle’s and McKinsey’s views, this seems to me a confusion of speaker and semantic reference. Similar counterexamples can be produced for Rami’s cases of descriptive identification of the name bearer.85 On the second horn, it is not the generic name-bearing condition that must be satisfied, but a more restricted one,
individuated by the specific act of naming involving Bob Dylan, the singer.\textsuperscript{86} In that case the account is subject to the objection already raised for Recanati’s.\textsuperscript{87}

The same issues recur for predicativist commoners who, like Bach (2002, 92-3) and Fara (2015a, 106-8), take names in referential positions to be incomplete descriptions, like ‘the table’ or ‘the book’. They do not say how the relevant contextual restriction comes about; as far as we can tell, the options are those just discussed: (i) an act of naming is made either directly salient, or indirectly through a specific naming practice of which the token used in the context is part. But the first option is not generally available, and the second presupposes the referentialist account. (ii) The referent is made salient by demonstration or description, and semantic reference to it is constrained by its being a bearer of the generic name, as in Rami’s proposal. But this generates a potential confusion of semantic and speaker reference.

### 6.4 Circularity issues

As argued at the end of §5, the Mill-Frege referentialist metalinguistic descriptivism does not succumb to Kripke’s circularity objection. What about predicativist versions? They confront the same issues (Gray 2014, 213-6); and it is unclear that they have the resources to deal with them on their own terms. Predicativists elucidate the property that they take names to express by appealing to the name-bearing relation. They tend to argue that this relation is extra-linguistic, so there should be no circularity issue (Geurts 1997, 326-7; Bach 2002, 83; Rami 2014a, 858). But these writers do not provide an account of naming practices and the acts of naming instituting them that justifies this claim. We have given reasons in §4.1 to conclude that naming practices – involving acts of reference performed with names in RU – and the acts of naming instituting them are dependent on each other. On the one hand, in RU uses of (specific) names semantically refer to the individual, if any, picked out in the act of naming instituting the practice to which the use belongs. On the other hand, acts of naming are purposeful activities, tools intended to allow for the successful performance of acts of reference based on the just stated condition; it is because of this that in Madagascar-like cases an act of naming ceases to be in force in the relevant contexts – and is replaced by one constituting another name, on the view articulated above.

Can predicativists deal with the potential circularity that this creates in the way I have done, using their own resources? Gray (2014) aims for this. For predicativist, the relevant word is the generic name, applying to all its bearers. In bare RU, the predicate occurs together with a covert definite determiner. Now, Gray notes that when speakers use descriptive noun phrases such as ‘the table’, they ‘typically presuppose that some satisfier of the predicate is
uniquely identifiable by the participants in the discourse’ (ibid., 216). Inspired by this, he suggests to ‘understand name-bearing in terms of what is typically presupposed about the extensions of nominal predicates’ (ibid., 217). So he submits that an individual \( x \) satisfies (generic) ‘Alfred’ (i.e., is a bearer\(_G\) of ‘Alfred’) iff there is a group of speakers such that in relevant contexts they presuppose that \( x \) satisfies (i.e., bear\(_G\)) ‘Alfred’ (ibid., 218, 227).

Now, this obviously doesn’t work in general. At a certain point, users of ‘fish’ and ‘the fish’ presupposed that it applied to whales, but it did not; and, as in Donnellan’s (1966) famous example, users might have good reasons to presuppose that ‘king’ and ‘the king’ apply to \( x \), without \( x \) being more than an usurper, and without their believing otherwise. But Gray thinks that names are exceptional. He takes an act of naming \( x \) Alfred to be ‘a public avowal to act as if \( x \) satisfies “Alfred”’ (ibid., 224), and dismisses circularity worries with considerations like those I made in §4.2 above, owning only a ‘practical circularity’:

why do such avowals, under the right circumstances, bring it about that other speakers will presuppose the same thing? … if I say I’m going to act as if \( x \) satisfies ‘Alfred’, given your interest in grasping my referential intentions, you should take utterances of mine involving ‘Alfred’, under the right circumstances, as reflecting my intention to speak about \( x \), and you should, given your interest in having me grasp your referential intentions, use ‘Alfred’ if you wish me to conclude that you intend to say something about \( x \). Given their interest in achieving referential communication, each speaker has a reason to act as if \( x \) satisfies ‘Alfred’ just in case every other speaker is likely to act the same way. An avowal, under the right circumstances, to act in that way by a single speaker can give a group of speakers decisive reason to act in the same way … there is a kind of circularity here, but it is a form of practical circularity that is characteristic of cooperative conventional behavior. A given speaker is willing to act as if \( x \) satisfies ‘Alfred’ because he knows that other speakers are typically willing to act in the same way – and this willingness is not based on some antecedent match between the descriptive condition associated with the predicate and speakers’ conception of the properties of the individual. Nominal predicates are, as it were, empty vessels, waiting to be filled with the coordinated intentions of a group of speakers (ibid., 224-5)

This is well taken. But when we look into the details, they conflict with predicativism. The crucial feature of the account in §4 above relevant here is the ‘purely nominal’ character
ascribed there to acts of naming, which elaborates, I take it, on the point Gray makes with the ‘empty vessels’ metaphor. This explicitly concerns the referential role of names. As argued above, on any sensible metasemantics the systematic disparity between the speaker-referent of a series of uses of a given name, and the referent assigned at the dubbing that \textit{prima facie} historically grounds it, results given the ‘purely nominal’ character of these practices in that the effect of that dubbing is nullified – and also in that a new, inexplicit and inadvertent dubbing goes into effect by a peculiar sort of accommodation.

Now, as indicated above, there are similar cases involving general terms, such as the one I imagined for ‘indri’. But there is a crucial difference, which is explained by the fact that these practices are not ‘purely nominal’. The annulment of the effect of the dubbing to which the uses systematically at variance historically lead doesn't affect other uses of the same generic name, including present-day uses of ‘Mogadishu’ with the same origin. If ‘indri’ had been introduced in the original use we imagined for a kind of tree, by pointing to an exemplar, once the word comes to be used for lemurs it doesn’t just fail to apply to that particular tree, but to any other of the kind also. This fails to happen with ‘Madagascar’. It shows that uses of a given generic name can be grouped together into different sub-types, relative to different baptisms, identified by their potential nullification if a Madagascar-like systematic disparity comes about. But this is just a multiple-homonyms, properist view.

In sum, then, a referential use of a generic name \(N\) refers to an object \(o\) only if the object bears the name; hence (using Pelczar’s & Rainsbury’s notion) only if a particular dubbing involving \(N\) is ‘in force’; hence, only if it is permissible to use the specific name created with that dubbing to perform ordinary speech acts about \(o\) with it, in particular correct analytic statements. It is specific names that are thus deployed in referential uses of proper names.

7. Predicative uses as metalinguistic meaning-transfers

I will conclude by presenting the account I favor for predicative uses. Nunberg’s (1995) proposal, which Leckie (2013) and Jeshion (2015) apply to the present issue, has it that a \textit{target} new predicative interpretation for a given term is derived from a \textit{source} meaning the term has on the basis of a \textit{manifest relation} between the entities to which the term applies in its source meaning and those to which it is intended to apply in the target interpretation. Thus, in ‘the ham sandwich left without paying’, the relation is \textit{target ordered source}; in ‘three Picassos hang at the exhibition’, \textit{source produced target}. In some cases the process by
which uses of expressions acquire these new interpretations is purely pragmatic; in others they
should be understood as codified in the lexicon, hence inducing polysemy – perhaps as a
result of *standardization* – and to that extent ‘semantic’. 89

Now, both Leckie (2013, 1152-3) and Jeshion (2015, 379-81) argue that it would not do to
take the source meaning for predicative uses of proper names to be their referential uses (as it
clearly is in ‘three Picassos hang at the exhibition’). 90 A reason in addition to those they
mention is that there are many predicative uses in which it is either implausible or utterly out
of the question to think that the speakers might be using the names in their referential uses (cf.
Gray ms, §3.2 on ‘source-arbitrariness’). The following variations on much-discussed
examples in the literature illustrate it this:

(12) I bet Aaron Aardvarks, if there are any, always come first in directories. 91
(13) If I ever met a Gerontius, I would suggest that he change his name. 92

Leckie and Jeshion suggest that names in sources for predicative uses are mentioned, not
used: the true sources for such uses are not their ordinary referents, but the ‘expressions’ that
the quotations they in fact are in those cases refer to. 93 The relation which on their view
underwrites the metonymical transfer in predicative uses is: target bears/has been given the
(name) source. This is close to the view I favor. Before presenting it, I’ll discuss some
objections by Rami (2015, 414) to such accounts, and his alternative proposal.

A first objection Rami makes is that ‘it might be doubted that competent speakers really
are confused about the correct interpretation of [(2)-(4)], and that the correct use of “Alfred”
in such a context requires the use of quotation marks’. But as far as I can see the present
proposal doesn’t need to ascribe any unwarranted confusion to competent speakers. First, it is
common to quote without quotation marks; in spoken language there is no standard way to
indicate them. The so-called ‘use theory’ of quotation, arguably first defended by Frege, relies
on that fact in support of its distinctive claim that quotation marks do not play any semantic
role: all expressions are systematically ambiguous between their ordinary meanings and a
quotational use. Leckie (2013, 1153) in fact considers that view appealing. I myself have
argued against it (SUPPRESSED), in favor of a version of a Davidsonian demonstrative view on
which quotation marks are indeed required in fully literal, explicit quotational uses. But even
on such a view, as far as I can tell, the point that we standardly quote without using quotation
marks suffices to answer Rami’s qualm. Moreover, there are other cases such as
metalinguistic negation, metalinguistic uses of gradable adjectives to fix the standard in a
particular context and so-called ‘metalinguistic negotiations’ (cf. SUPPRESSED for discussion
and further references), which some theorists treat as involving quotation. If I understand well Rami’s objection, he should extend the complaint to such proposals, which I think would be methodologically unsupported. Which uses are quotational appears to be a theoretical issue, not always transparent to competent speakers just on the basis of their linguistic competence.

In order to show that their proposal is not ad hoc, Leckie and Jeshion provide examples of predicative uses of words other than names, based on manifest quotational uses of such words, like ‘four “awesome”’s is more than enough in a blog-post’ (Jeshion 2015, 381). A second objection by Rami that I want to discuss (for it will help me to introduce my own account of the predicativist data, based on the Mill-Frege view) is a response to this point. In a nutshell, he argues that such cases are much more flexible and context-sensitive than standard predicative uses of proper names. He (2015, 414) considers the following example:

(14) There are two ‘Alfred’(s) in this room.

In his objection he (ibid.) says:

There might be a situation where we find two inscriptions of the word ‘Alfred’ on a blackboard in a certain room and where two bearers of the name ‘Alfred’ are also present. If the given interpretation of [(2)-(4)] is correct, then one might use the sentence [(14)] relative to such a situation with two different readings: One can either convey that there are two inscriptions of the name ‘Alfred’ in the mentioned room or that there are two bearers of the name ‘Alfred’ in this room. In general, a sentence like [(14)] can have a number of different readings that depend on the specific contextually salient transfer relation. Hence, these are examples of occurrent [i.e., pragmatic] meaning transfer. But intuitively the mentioned original uses of proper nouns do not have this kind of flexibility and contextual variability.

The ‘Frege’ metalinguistic descriptivist side of the Mill-Frege account helps with the response to Rami here. I will elaborate on this indirectly, by critically examining first the explanation Rami (2015, 425) goes on to provide after formulating these objections, based on his own account of names (Rami 2014b). As indicated above, his account has some parallels with the Mill-Frege view; in particular, it is a form of metalinguistic descriptivism that has the metalinguistic descriptive condition figuring not in truth-conditional content, but as a ‘condition on use’. However, there is a crucial difference: Rami’s view is a sophisticated form of indexicalism, i.e., of commoner referentialism, discussed in §6.3. Against properism, he takes generic ‘Albert’ to be the true word in RU, having a ‘character’ like ‘she’ or ‘he’. His
account of the sort of meaning-transfer at stake in predicative uses relies on this view. He mentions examples like (15) in support of it:

(15) Jules is a she/her, not a he/him.

Here the manifest relation is (to put it in my own terms) something like *target is what source is presupposed to be*. This is the relation that he takes to explains predicative uses of names.

Properist referentialists like proponents of the Mill-Frege view cannot adopt this suggestion, because the metalinguistic presuppositions we posit involve specific names. What is strictly speaking presupposed in referential uses connects the referent with a specific name, while, as we have seen, in general in predicative uses no such relation is directly at stake. The name-bearing relation that Rami’s proposal assumes, on the other hand, is not presupposed on the Mill-Frege view in RU, and hence is not available. Instead, we need to appeal to a metalinguistic derivation, as Leckie and Jeshion suggest. This is thus my proposal for the relation that underwrites the metonymical transfer: *target bears a name articulated as source*; the source is thus a quotational use of the name. This raises the objection from instability and context-dependence that, as we have seen, Rami makes. Interestingly, Gray (ms) makes a related objection to Rami’s account, a version of which Rami (2015, 426 fn.) discusses. I will argue that Rami’s reply in fact suggests a similarly compelling way of dealing with his own objection to metalinguistic derivations of predicative uses.

The objection, in the way that Rami considers it, is that his proposal overgenerates; most other expressions which also conventionally express presuppositional/use-conditional meanings lack corresponding predicative uses. Thus, in contrast with (15), we cannot out of the blue utter ‘there are many yous but few Is/mes here’ to mean that there are many addressees but few speakers. In reply, Rami (ibid.) plausibly contends that for his proposal to work he does not need that ‘every expression that has a use-conditional meaning that constrains the adequate contexts of use of such an expression automatically [also has] an additional derived predicative use whose truth-conditional content is determined by some component of the original constraining condition. It requires an established use of competent speakers that exploits the use-conditional meaning … conventionalized by a lexical rule’.

This is well taken. We have the practice of using names of cities for the governments of the countries whose capital they are (‘Vienna will support the proposal’). This is so standard that it may make sense to take it as a form of polysemy, explained as a conventionalized form of meaning transfer as suggested above. However, there are many other manifest relations that could allow for conventionalized meaning transfers, and can be occasionally used for related
pragmatic effects, which have never been exploited for any such practice. Thus, there are
people who have a strong preference for visiting a particular city, and we can easily think of
contexts in which we could use city names to classify them (‘today we have two Viennas and
three Barcelonas’, said of participants in a television contest who have to select a trip to a city
as prize). There could be interesting sociolinguistic explanations for these differences. But it
is no objection to a Nunbergian explanation of the polysemous character of the one based on
the city-for-government relation that it overgenerates a non-existent polysemy based in the
city-for-person-choosing-it.

However, the proponent of the metalinguistic explanation that I am suggesting for
predicative uses can say something similar in reply to Rami’s second objection. We should
agree that (14) has the two readings he mentions in the context that he describes. This is a
pragmatic fact, as he points out, in that the reading concerning the tokens written on the
blackboard is only contextually generated. However, on the view I have been articulating here
a use of a name N_i semantically triggers the presupposition that N_i is called_S N_i, which in its
turn implies, or allows one to derive (in the way I explained above), that N_i is called_G N. So it
is not difficult to understand how it can become customary to use a quotation that refers to a
generic name, in order to metonymically apply it to people who bear_G it, and how this can
become standardized into a lexical rule. Thus, although (14) has two readings in the
envisaged context, and although perhaps the pragmatic one is the most salient in it, this is
compatible with there being another not similarly context-dependent reading which has the
stability that predicative uses have. There might still remain an explanatory cost, as a referee
pointed out, in that there doesn’t seem to be a standardized procedure to turn homonymous
expressions such as ‘bank’ into a predicate true of all entities to which it applies in any of
their senses – although we could create such a predicate ad hoc in special contexts. If this is
indeed a cost, it should be taken into consideration in a global comparison of the explanatory
virtues and deficits of each theory.

8. Concluding remarks

In this paper I have elaborated and defended a version of metalinguistic descriptivism, the
Mill-Frege view. Like other forms, the Mill-Frege view offers prima facie acceptable answers
to Kripke’s semantic and epistemic arguments against descriptivism, and, related, is directly
supported by intuitions about entailments and claims such as those illustrated by (5)-(8) at the
end of §2. Considerations about the semantics of attitude ascriptions and identity statements would provide additional support, but I couldn’t go into them here. In separating the role as *words* (to be distinguished from their commonalities as *roots*, or lexical items) of proper names in RU and common names in PU, the view is *prima facie* more complex than predicativism. However, on the proposal made in §7 the additional complexity lies in that the two sorts of words, proper and common names, belong in polysemous families, generated on the basis of quotational uses of the former. There are good reasons to believe that the different strands of this mechanism (quotational uses, type-shifting meaning transfers) are exploited elsewhere in the language, and the semantics ascribed to proper names here naturally explains why we resort to them in this case; hence, the additional complexity involved is well attested, and independently required in a full account of natural languages.

The presuppositional side of the Mill-Frege proposal (§§3, 5) allows clear-cut responses to Kripke’s modal argument, an issue that poses serious trouble for predicativists. Rigidity points also in favor of the invidious treatment of names in RU and PU. This is also suggested by some of the evidence that predicativists rely on: the fact that, both in English and in other languages, when names occur as predicates definites are natural and other determiners are marked. Last but not least, predicativists appeal to naming practices (§2) in explicating the property that common names signify. But they should be accounted for by positing acts of naming that, against what they suggest, have a semantic significance (§4.1). The appellative practices such acts create, unlike those for predicates, have a ‘purely nominal character’: they are intended to coordinate acts of speaker’s reference by relying on the act of naming itself, independently of any further descriptive feature (§4.2). The treatment of ‘Madagascar’-like cases in any sensible metasemantics links acts of naming for proper names to acts of reference in uses further down the communicative chain to an individual, independently of any others that might bear the same generic name. Acts of naming would become Austinian ‘abuses’ – their effect in constituting semantic reference nullified – if speakers systematically intended them for a different (speaker-)referent (§4.1). Acts of naming create thereby words specifically designed for use in RU, performing that semantic function independently of whether or not others with the same sound or spelling exist in the language. Commonerist proposals to explain how the reference of the indexicals or descriptions they assume in RU is determined either fail, or presuppose such specific-names-creating naming practices (§6.3).
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Notes

1 I assume that definite descriptions are not singular terms, because I take the latter to be *de jure* referential – i.e., it is a *semantic requirement* (Fine 2007, 50) that they refer – and I think that referential uses of descriptions are non-literal (García-Carpintero 1998a). But as explained below (fn. 14), nothing in my arguments here hinges on this.

2 I owe the example to a very helpful anonymous referee.

3 ‘Millianism does not entail that a proper name has no features that might be deemed, in a certain sense, intensional or connotive. Unquestionably, some names evoke descriptive concepts in the mind of a user. Some may even have particular concepts conventionally attached […] It does not follow that this connotive aspect of a name belongs to semantics, let alone that it affects the propositions semantically expressed by sentences containing the name’ (Salmon 1998, 311).

4 García-Carpintero (2012) provides further discussion, and a particular take on the nature of the distinction, which I will rely on below in §4.

5 In more recent work, Kaplan (ms) questions this, by appealing to a distinction between *meanings* and *rules of use*; indexicals would be associated with the latter, which somehow fall short of constituting fully-fledged descriptive meanings. Cf. Larson & Segal (1996), ch. 6, and Dorr (2014, 55) on ‘What’s-his-face’, for a similar view.

6 This is a view with a long historical pedigree: ‘proper names connote the property of possessing a name which sounds like the given proper name’ (Lesniewski 1992, 6). (I owe the reference to Arianna Betti.)

7 Thus, in a double-object construction like ‘Maria gave Carlos a book’ both ‘Carlos’ and ‘a book’ can be passivized, but not ‘Delia’ in ‘we called/dubbed/named her Delia’

8 Maier (2015, 323) and Rami (2016, §4.1) concur. Also Fara, who in p.e. tells me that the analysis for *being called F* she intended was this: $x$ calls $y$ F iff $x$ does or says something that entails or presupposes that $y$ is in the extension of ‘F’. Cf. also Fara (2015b, 363).

9 Words have phonological, syntactical and semantic features (Wetzel 2009, 114; Bromberger 2011, 499). On the view developed below, §7, names are polysemous; PU are related to RU in the way that ‘to google’ is to ‘Google’. On some views of polysemy (Borer, 2005), lexical items are more abstract than words; they are assigned syntactic category externally, by the independently generated syntactic structures that embed them. I will use
‘root’ for abstract lexical items, and ‘word’ for roots together with the phonological, syntactical and semantic features assigned by grammar, however this comes about.

10 I take words to be abstract entities – cultural artifacts that serve as ‘model particulars’ (Strawson 1959, 232-4) rather than Platonic entities: types, potentially with instances, identified by linguistic features as indicated above. No sensible theory can identify linguistic types with physical shapes; in physical terms, types are highly disjunctive kinds. Just consider morpho-phonological alternation: the occurrence of ‘nation’ in ‘national’ is one of the same root that also occurs without the affix, in spite of the altered pronunciation. Words are response-dependent kinds, constitutively related to speakers’ recognitional capacities. Kaplan (1990) offers what he calls a ‘common currency conception’ of specific names, and says: ‘utterances and inscriptions are stages of words, which are the continuants made up of these interpersonal stages. I want to give up the token/type model in favor of a stage/continuant model’ (op. cit., 98). Even though I agree with him that name-words in RU are his ‘specific’ names, as opposed to ‘generic’ ones, I stick to the type/token model for both. An essential part of our linguistic knowledge is to be described by appeal to types, and to our ability to identify their instances (Wetzel 2009, ch. 3, Bromberger 2011, 490). Taking names to be specific is compatible with the type-token model (Hawthorne & Lepore 2011, 452): they just are types individuated by relational features, in particular by historical ones.

11 They include Bach (1987, 2002), Geurts (1997) and Katz (1994, 2001), who discuss mostly names in RU and take them to be disguised metalinguistic descriptions, and more recent the-predicativists like Elbourne (2005), Matushansky (2008) and Fara (2015).

12 Maier (2009, 2015), Pelczar & Rainsbury (1998) and Recanati (1993) take names in their primary referential uses to be indexicals. On a variabilist variant (Schoubye forthcoming), names, like pronouns, are variables that refer relative to assignments that can be shifted by operators, subject to presuppositional requirements that the assigned object is, say, male (‘he’) or called Albert (‘Albert’) (Heim 2008). Perry (2012) argues for a form of commoner referentialism that is hard to assimilate to those just mentioned, because he rejects that names are indexicals. I discuss his view below, fn. 80.

13 Cumming’s (2008) view is another. He defends a non-indexical, variabilist form of properism. He takes names to be variables, referring like pronouns relative to shiftable contextually available assignments, in order to deal with “binding” data – cf. the discussion about (10), §5. Like me, he does not take generic ‘Albert’ to have a character as ‘I’ does (op. cit., 526, 541-2). Justice’s (2001) view is another example; I’ll discuss it below, fn. 60.
As a referee points out, Quine (1960, §§37-9) appears to defend such a view for his regimented language. Perhaps (as Quine suggests) names in utterances like ‘I am/this is Van’ are predicates (Bach 2002, 77), understood along properist lines. But the syntactic issues are complex, the context idiosyncratic, and a generalization to other predicative uses would be required. I can now explain why I earlier (fn. 1) dismissed the issue whether descriptions have a semantic referential use. It is compatible with the view defended here that in RU names are predicates accompanied by an unpronounced definite determiner, to the extent that these descriptions are understood as \textit{de jure} referential and it is bearing the specific name that is predicated of the referent. The view would still be a \textit{properist referentialism}, because it is not a \textit{generic name} that occurs as a predicate in referential uses.

As Hinzen (2016) notes, there is a long tradition in syntax (going back to Chomsky’s “Aspects”, which Sloat (1969) argues against) for acknowledging these two types of words; cf. Longobardi (1994) and Borer (2005, 70-85). (Borer has in the lexicon a common item (“listeme”) for homophonic proper and common nouns, but this is a \textit{root}, not a \textit{word}, cf. fn. 9.) As Hinzen also points out, and Delgado (ms-a) and Jeshion (forthcoming, ms) equally note, the syntactic evidence is far from clearly supporting the predicativist view on the syntax of names, against Matushansky’s (2008) and Fara’s (2015a) claims.


This is the suggestion that Kripke considers and rejects in a footnote to the quoted text; I’ll discuss at the end of §5 below his arguments there and in \textit{Naming and Necessity}.

See Kaplan (1989), for the semantic behavior of those operators.


I place ‘demonstrated’ inside scare quotes to acknowledge the point Kaplan (1989, 525, fn.) makes with the nice metaphor that the referent of a demonstrative is whoever appears in the ‘demonstration platform’; namely, that no explicit demonstration needs to occur. I’ll get back to this in the discussion of metasemantics in §4. Cf. King (2014).

As Burge (1979) and Künne (1992) have noted, this was well known to Frege.

My own views, although strongly influenced by him, differ at some points (cf. García-Carpintero 2015). I take \textit{presupposing} and \textit{referring} to be ancillary speech acts, and I think of such acts as constitutively normative (García-Carpintero, 2004a, 2015, forthcoming-a); in particular, I think of presuppositions as constituted by normative requirements that their
contents are already common knowledge. I also think that some linguistic presuppositions, in particular those we are discussing, are semantically triggered.

24 This statement of the presupposition contains another presupposition associated with the definite description, which I do not unpack further for the sake of perspicuity.

25 They are de lingua beliefs, like Fiengo’s & May’s (2006, 62, 86) assignments. Proposals along these lines are quite standard nowadays in the linguistic semantics literature; cf. Heim (2008), Maier (2010) and Hunter (2012) for related vies.

26 Singular representations thus understood may fail to have an object; there are, e.g., singular presuppositions associated with singular terms in fictions that are merely pretend. Our theoretical claims are to be understood as made in the framework of a free logic.

27 I do not mean to suggest, however, that establishing that indexicals (and names) behave like rigid designators is straightforward given a presuppositional account; cf. Hunter (2013) and Maier (2015) for discussion.


30 As said above, I endorse normative accounts of speech acts like the one that Williamson (2000, ch. 11) has advanced for assertion (Garcia-Carpintero, 2004a, forthcoming-a), both for main speech acts and for other ancillary to them such as presupposing and referring. Not to overload this paper, however, I will present neutrally my proposal about acts of naming.

31 In some cases (hiring and firing, marrying, meeting adjourning or sentencing), acts of naming are institutionalized – they belong in Austin’s category of exercitives, Searle’s (1975) declaratives. A distinctive feature they have is that for their conventional effect to occur, the speaker should have ‘some special position, status, or role, as defined by nonlinguistic rules, conventions or institutions’ (Alston 2000, 87). But even though such acts of naming are the first that come to mind, there are many other (e.g., those for ‘(1)’ or ‘(BCC)’ in this paper, nicknames, the seal names in the parable in §5 below; cf. Ziff 1977, 320-1) to which this does not apply – except in an undiscriminating wide sense on which the authority of any speaker to propose the introduction of a term already puts her in a ‘special’ position.

Perry (2012, 117) also speaks of *permissive conventions* in relation with names, but he means something different. He rejects the multiple homonyms view of proper names that I adopt from Kaplan and Kripke, in favor of a view on which it is *generic* names that truly name. His naming conventions are *permissive* in that they allow the use of the *generic* name ‘David’ for a particular person; mine concern instead uses of a *specific* ‘David’.

Cf. García-Carpintero (2015) for discussion both of the “hey wait a minute” test and of the ensuing point about accommodation, and references there.

Perishing practices also attest to the presuppositional character of the metalinguistic description, to be articulated in §5. Rami (2014b, 143) points out that ‘Leningrad has more than hundred thousand inhabitants’ now sounds bad. In my view, the explanation lies in that it is unclear whether the metalinguistic presupposition that there is a ‘Leningrad’ naming practice in force is correct: ‘hey, wait a minute, I didn’t know it was still called that’.

As Ziff (1977, 319-321) points out, implicit naming is a very common phenomenon. The introduction of nicknames is a case in point. Related, fictional names come with the pretense that relevant acts of naming have taken place.


Cp. Donnellan’s (1966) famous example, ‘Is the king in his countinghouse?’ Cf. Gray’s (2014, 223-5) discussion of a ‘practical circularity’ involved here, to which I’ll come back below, §6; I have benefited from discussion with him on this point.

Ziff (1977, 322) notes that there are in many countries official restrictions on dubbings; an attempt to name one’s child ‘Disgustingfreak’ would fail to meet them. One could succeed in initiating a non-official practice with these expressions, but even this can fail, as envisaged in the main text; cf. Ziff, *op. cit*, 321, on the ‘strong glue’ needed for an act of naming to initiate a practice, and how the name’s ‘appositeness’ supplies it. Arguing for the view that dubbings are exercitives, Mikhail Kissine pointed out to me that even in such cases an informed audience will be able to understand what I intend to refer to when I use an expression articulating the name I have tried to create. But this just shows that the expression has a speaker referent, not that it has become a word endowed with semantic reference.

Thanks to Sven Rosenkranz for raising the issue.

No specific name instantiating the template needs to exist, for this to be meaningful; cf. the discussion of the ‘Aaron Aardvarks’ example in §5 below.

McKinsey (2011, 330) mentions these cases to argue that acts of naming and causal chains based on them are ‘irrelevant’ to determine the referents of names. But this conclusion does not follow. The presuppositional data shows that speakers assume acts of naming also in those cases. McKinsey (ibid., 336; see also p. 341) in fact gives a prominent role to ‘individual’ naming practices; he rejects their social character, mentioning cases in which someone introduces a name for one’s own use. I of course agree that one can introduce a name for one’s own use, but I do not think we need to make any exception for such cases.

Sainsbury’s helpful discussion of ‘propagation’ (ibid., 204-8) raises similar issues. He distinguishes ‘syntactic’ from ‘semantic’ deferential intentions (using the same name as others vs. using it with the same meaning). But this is a theoretical artifact; the intuitions manifest in data about accommodation and its failure that I have brought up link the two: going on in the same semantic way is referring to what was picked out in the originating event selected by the syntactic intention to use the name as others do.

Dummett and (following him) Evans and Peacocke insist that senses are presented by signifying the referents they determine in canonical ways associated with them. The distinction between sentences of the same shape intended as acts of naming, or as meaning-explanations, figures prominently in the later writings of Wittgenstein.

Evans (1982, 382-3) makes a related claim: “Although many utterances […] in the kind-term practice have other functions, there will be a subset of utterances involving the term in which some particular tree or trees may be said to have been (authoritatively) called by that term. It is these utterances involving the term – which may be regarded as the point of contact between the practice and the world – that determine which kind the term, as used through the practices, refers to.”

This is why commoners also need to individuate generic names not just by perceptual features, but by historical ones too; cf. Jeshion (2015, 381fn.), Rami (2014b, 125; 2016, 63).

McKinsey (2011, 336) gives an intriguing example: ‘in some cultures, a person’s “real” name is kept secret, known only to a certain religious authority, and it is positively forbidden that anyone should ever use that name to refer to the person whose name it is.’ He thinks this provides further support for a claim I questioned above (fn. 43), that naming practices are irrelevant to determine the referents of names. He does not give details, but I can only make sense of the claim that the names are ‘real’ if it is only a subpart of the community (no matter how proportionally big) that is forbidden to use them. I assume that the ‘religious authorities’ can and do employ them in their secret communicative dealings about the referents.
Fiengo & May (2006, 12) make a related distinction between *expressions*, which – like predicative generic names on the present view – may have different bearers, and their indexed *occurrences* in referential positions in discourses, which are intended to refer to a unique individual. Borer (2005, 78–81) also assumes that her abstract, syntactically and semantically undifferentiated name-roots (‘listemes’) get an index when they occur in RU in a syntactic frame, which indicates an anaphoric relation to a discourse referent – on the present view, this would be the one given by the relevant act of naming, see the ‘José María’ example below.

The rule assumes that for each (specific) name there is a unique act of naming. There are objections to this based on alleged cases of multiple baptisms in a single act (as in an example ascribed to Hans Kamp, in which a tyrant decrees that all babies born on a given day are to be called ‘Vladimir’. Sainsbury (2015, 203) shows in my view that these cases do not contradict the assumption after all.

The example comes from Cumming (2008, 535), who refers for earlier examples of this sort to Dever’s (1997) dissertation; cf. also Geurts (1997, 321).

A referee makes an interesting objection, which I could best confront at this point: ‘If I say that the names in the narrative to follow have been changed to protect the innocent, it is then perfectly consistent to say that Arthur (as he appears in the story) is not called Arthur. This in turn suggests that it must not be a presupposition of the context that Arthur is called Arthur.’ But I do think that this is a presupposition of the relevant context. ‘Arthur’ is in the story like ‘(1)’ in this paper; there has been an act of naming, but (in principle at least) a short-lived one, relevant only for the discourse in question. The innocent at stake does bear ‘Arthur’, and also bears his more permanent name; he is both called Arthur (in the story), and called that other name, in a wider and more socially significant range of circumstances. When we say that Arthur is not called Arthur, we just mean that it is not so-called in the less fleeting, more socially significant practice. I’ll discuss related circularity worries below.

The mechanism here is the very same one involved in reference anaphoric on indefinites, on which there is a huge literature in discourse-representation theories and elsewhere. Cf. Hawthorne & Manley (2012, ch. 4) for a detailed discussion, and an account that I sympathize with. Thanks to an anonymous referee for raising this issue.

Matushansky (2008, 594, 603–4) raises interesting issues about the relation between full names for people, their parts (first and last names), and variants such as standard nicknames or diminutives (‘Manolo’ for ‘Manuel’, in my own case.) She claims an advantage for predicativism in dealing with them but, as she acknowledges (*ibid.*, 605), the specific account
she proposes – using a general intersective rule of interpretation for Predicate Modification – wrongly entails that ‘Sherlock Holmes’ and ‘Holmes Sherlock’ have the same meaning. My inclination is to think that people primarily receive in acts of naming their full names as specific names, on the basis of different rules including decisions by those with the required authority in the case of the first name, and social conventions for the last names. There also are lexical rules for generic names of people, establishing possibilities to address them by their first names in some cases, their last names in others, nicknames, and so on, which are exploited in some cases in dependent or subordinate naming practices. On this view, specific cases of ‘Manolo’, ‘García-Carpintero’ and ‘Manuel’ are synonymous (Davis 2005, 239).

55 Perhaps ‘Hesperus’ is a descriptive name: We call the first luminous body to be seen on some days in the year after sunset ‘Hesperus’ would then express an act of naming belonging to the practice. However, I share the doubts expressed by Kripke (1979, fn. 43). Goodman (2016) objects to the assumption I am making, that participation in communication chains involving a name is enough to fully understand the singular thoughts it helps to express. Her objections however assume a questionable negative characterization of singular thought, as excluding any descriptive identification of their targets. She also ignores the crucial role that deference to the speaker’s identification of a specific appellative practice plays, as mentioned in the next paragraph in the main text. Last but not least, she doesn’t address the serious concerns that her Donnellian position on understanding singular thoughts raises; cf. Jeshion (2001) and García-Carpintero (2008).

56 I share Evans’s (ibid., 374) intuitions concerning his ‘Jack Jones’ example; cf. my criticism below of Rami’s (2014b) indexicalist views, fn. 85.

57 I fully agree with Perry’s (2012, 170-181) account of the role of names in ‘conditional networks of co-reference’, in spite of the disagreement about whether names are specific or generic that I have already mentioned and will discuss further below, fn. 80. McKinsey is wrong to object to causal theories (1984, 501-3) that they wrongly turn names into indexicals. His argument conflates two sorts of properties that our rules invoke. There are, in the first place, Peirce’s ‘existential properties’ invoked in rules for indexicals (the place and time in which tokens occur, the producer, contiguous objects and so on), which not two tokens are to be expected to share just by virtue of being of the same type. Then there are properties like the appellative practice to which a token belongs; these might be legitimately appealed to in rules intended for anaphoric devices like proper names (types) and common nouns.
As acknowledged, establishing that indexicals and names behave like rigid designators given a presuppositional account is not trivial; cf. Hunter (2013) and Maier (2015). Burgess (2012) defends a Millian metasemantic form of metalinguistic descriptivism. He criticizes Geurts’ (1997) presuppositional proposal to handle the modal argument. He is right that just having the metalinguistic condition contributing to a presupposition is not enough to solve the problem. But properly developed the presuppositional account does have the resources to deal with the modal argument. Consider the modal disparity between ‘Aristotle is not the bearer of “Aristotle”’ and ‘the bearer of “Aristotle” is not the bearer of “Aristotle”’. Burgess wonders how, on a presuppositional account, the former can correctly describe a possible situation – one such that Aristotle doesn’t bear the name he does in actuality: after all, the claim ‘has a false presupposition in this sort of situation [… it] effectively presupposes its own negation’ (2012, 454, my italics). But we must disambiguate ‘this sort of situation’. The presupposition is to be met at the world of the context where the utterance is made; the name might not exist in worlds with respect to which the assertoric content is true, or someone else might bear it there, while Aristotle bears a different name or is nameless. A two-dimensional account along these lines is not very different from the one that Burgess provides, by appealing to Adams’ (1981) well-known distinction between propositions true at a world and those true in a world. Burgess contends that the appeal to presuppositions is at the very least superfluous; but I have been providing independent motivation for it. I also think it provides a better, more general justification than Burgess’ for resorting to something like Adams’ distinction.

Rothschild (2007) spots a relevant distinction in the discourse role of definite descriptions, which he thereby classifies as ‘role-type’ vs. ‘particularized’. In typical uses of those in the former category (‘the mayor’, ‘the president’), it is common ground that there is one potentially different person satisfying the descriptive content across a range of possible situations; not so in typical uses of the latter. The distinction might explain why particularized descriptions are typically understood in discourse as rigid, while role-type are understood as non-rigid. This suggests a line for metalinguistic descriptivists to deal with the rigidity data, for such descriptions are in normal contexts particularized. An account in these terms predicts however that names would get narrow readings in contexts in which corresponding metalinguistic descriptions are role-type, and as a result do easily get narrow-scope reading; cf. Schoubye (2016, §4) and references there for discussion. I am unclear that they do.

Justice’s (2001) account makes names synonymous to metalinguistic descriptions, and as a result has also difficulties in accounting for the rigidity data. He (ibid., 362) argues that ‘a
name with any other bearer would be another name with its own origin in the naming of that other bearer. Having the bearer it has is an essential property of a name. I doubt this; but be it as it may, I do not see how it follows from it that ‘Aristotle is not the bearer of “Aristotle”’ ‘is not true and could not have been true’. Justice’s reason is that ‘[t]here is no circumstance in which a name designates anything other than its bearer’ (ibid). But even if this is so, there are circumstances in which Aristotle exists, while the dubbing introducing his actual specific name fails to do so – he is nameless, or bears some other name. Justice argues ‘it is not possible that Aristotle exist in a circumstance and not be the referent of “Aristotle” when it is evaluated with respect to that circumstance’ (p. 364). But even if in those circumstances Aristotle is the referent of our specific name when evaluated with respect to them, he fails to bear the name there, as indicated. Justice is here overlooking Adams’ (1981) distinction between claims true at a world and claims true in a world; cf. also Burgess 2012, and fn. 58 above. This suffices for ‘Aristotle is not the bearer of “Aristotle”’ to be true with respect to such a world, and it establishes the truth at the actual world of ‘Aristotle might not have been the bearer of “Aristotle”’.

García-Carpintero (2006, 2008) presents a form of two-dimensionalism that allows for a more positive version of the suggested reply to the epistemological argument. Cf. also Chalmers’ (2014, 254-6) discussion of these issues.

McKinsey’s (1984, 2011) partially similar ‘private rule’ proposal is also challenged by the example below in the main text. McKinsey’s is a descriptive theory that appeals in some but not all cases to metalinguistic descriptions. Cases in which the view relies on other descriptions that a particular speaker associates with a name would allow for a similar conflation of speaker’s referent and semantic referent. This discussion anticipates the critical examination in §6.3 of Rami’s (2014b) recent related but more sophisticated ‘pluralist’ view.


These points also apply in the ‘Arthur’ example discussed in fn. 52 above; uses of the name in the relevant discourse are not circular either, in the way that my uses of ‘(1)’ aren’t. Cf. fn. 77 below for an example of a view on name bearing which, unlike the one developed here, is circular in Kripke’s sense and clearly objectionable because of that.

See the illuminating remarks in this regard by Loar (1976, ix). Kripke’s proposal, as already indicated and as he makes clear (1980, 97), is not reductive either; it uses reference at least at two points: in the account of baptisms, and in that of name-transmission.

Of course, the person making the *Hey, wait a minute* objection manifests thereby competence with predicative uses of expressions, but it is not in question here that all names, including those at stake, have predicative uses.

Dolf Rami suggested to me this explanation. One of the claims that Cohen (1980, 144) invokes against properism (what he calls the ‘idiosyncratic’ view of name-individuation) goes as follows: ‘it is far from being the case, as the idiosyncratic conception implies, that a natural-language proper name normally has a unique designation, or that in an ideal natural language it would have one. Just the opposite. It would be a real imperfection in a natural language to prohibit the reuse of any proper name’, emphasis in the original. But the practical reasons he mentions in support are manifestly extralinguistic.

Noticing this, Recanati (1993, 142) appears to go for an eccentric indexicalism, on which it is only some abstract feature *common to all proper names* that has a character. He himself (*ibid.*, 139) points out the main difficulty for this: indexicalists, like friends of metalinguistic descriptivism in general, want something more specifically related to different names to be (also) known as part of linguistic competence. Hence I take his considered view to be that of other indexicalists such as Maier (2015) or Schoubye (forthcoming), namely, that it is generic names that are indexicals like ‘she’ with a Kaplanian character.

I will discuss only true arguments, as opposed to question-begging unsupported claims. Take this assertion by Cohen (1980, 145): ‘Learning the given names of our new neighbors, or even their full names, does not necessarily add anything to our knowledge of English: we might well have known already that the names John and Mary … are English names’. But learning their names allows us to refer to them in a particularly suitable way, which is one of the main functions one can take languages to be tools for. I’ll say more about names and the individuation of languages below.

Such reasons would be articulated differently by the different views at stake. For properists, the aim is to ease the ‘presemantic’ task of discriminating among homonyms. (In its *presemantic* role, context is ‘regarded as determining what word was used’ rather than as ‘fixing the content of a single context-sensitive word’ (Kaplan 1989, 562).) For commoners, the goal rather is to facilitate the identification of the relevant contextual parameter


One of the late Oliver Sacks’s last poignant articles contains this nice example: ‘I misheard “tonsillitis” as “pontillitis”, … a nonexistent word’. ‘Mishearings’, *New York Times*

74 I appeal to Nunberg’s work in my account of quotation (García-Carpintero 2004b, forthcoming-b), as I’ll do below to account for predicative uses of names.

75 Cf. also the wonderful ‘Katherine’ example from John Green’s novel *An Abundance of Katherines* in Jeshion (2015, 381 fn.).

76 Their individuation might also include historical/etymological features; cf. Jeshion (2015, 381 fn.), Rami (2014b, 125; 2016, 63).

77 Maier’s (2015, 315) explanation of the apriority of *Albert is called Albert* seems to presuppose this inadequate understanding of ‘being called’: ‘arguably, knowing the truth of a statement like [‘Albert is called Albert’] does not require any empirical justification: uttering [it] is like a self-fulfilling prophecy, by saying it you are calling him thus, which makes it true’. This makes him vulnerable to Kripke’s circularity objection, as indicated in fn. 64.

78 Maier (2015, 317) and Schoubye (forthcoming, §2.2) also appear to have this feature in mind; they appeal to the contextually relevant object bearing the (generic) name, or being called by it, although they do not develop the proposal at any length.

79 Matushansky (2008, 592-4) refers to Recanati, but she argues that naming conventions are relations between multiple bearers and multiple phonological strings: the same naming convention links many individuals to, say, (generic) ‘Bob’, ‘Robert’ and ‘Robert Smith’. I cannot make sense of the contextual salience that according to her allows speakers to select a particular referent (ibid., 595, 599), unless she assumes that the unique naming convention linking multiple individuals with several names is after all grounded on, or can be somehow subdivided into, multiple conventions assigning names to specific individuals. But if so, her view is subject to the objections raised against Recanati.

80 I can now comment on Perry’s view – the closest to my own, which was influenced by his work. The main difference lies in that he wants to consider words only generic names, not specific ones. But otherwise his claims (cf. the summary in Perry 2012, 116-9) are very similar to the ones I have been making. He also takes the metalinguistic descriptive content of names to be use-reflexive. And he also locates such contents at a different level than that of ‘at issue’ representational acts, although he does not resort to the notion of presupposition. He rejects the assimilation of names to indexicals with a character, with considerations similar to the ones I have been providing here and in §6.1. He counts generic names as ambiguous, although he registers differences with the ambiguity of homonyms like ‘bank’ by coining
‘nambiguity’ for the one of proper names, invoking the kind of (bad, I argued in §6.2) arguments that commonerist use against properism (2012, 118 fn). This entails nonetheless that specific names are also words, I contend; even more given that he reserves a crucial semantic relation for them and the objects they stand for in RU, which he calls ‘reference’ (2012, 117). Delgado (ms-b) articulates and defends a ‘polyreferential’ view of names, which might be a nice defense and elaboration of Perry’s account.

81 McKinsey (2011, 337-340) reproduces the usual philosophical arguments why proper names are not words of any language; he goes on to defend the to me self-contradictory claim that names are non-words that nonetheless have not just speakers referents, but semantic referents (341). Davis (2005, 233-245) provides a thorough refutation of such arguments.

82 This is in fact not the case, as we saw above: the name a corrupt form of which became our ‘Madagascar’ is the one currently articulated as ‘Mogadishu’. Both dubbings are thus in force in current contexts, and hence the ‘salience’ condition below will have to be invoked.

83 Cf. also Tiede (2011, 714-5).

84 Cf. Rami (2014b) and Sainsbury (2015). Davis (2005, 257-61) also makes the objection.

85 Evans’s (1982, 374) ‘Jack Jones’ example, which has been bestowed in the relevant community upon two individuals who look alike and are regularly confused, raises a similar issue. I agree with Evans’s diagnosis that in such a case the name lacks a semantic referent. On the first horn of the dilemma, Rami must reject this diagnosis, because in particular contexts his conditions for demonstrative or descriptive identification will be fulfilled, and both are bearers of the generic name. Cohen’s account (1980, 160) has the same problems. Let me grant however that these cases are complicated, and intuitions about them less clear-cut than I make them seem. They deserve both deeper critical scrutiny, and also empirical test – cf. for related issues about cases of conflicting intentions King (2013) and Speaks (2017).

86 Rami (2016, 69-70) offers a new account of naming practices allegedly consistently with his commonerism. As we have seen, on his account naming practices do not fix the referent of a use of a given (generic) name; they merely constraint it. Further acts (demonstrations, descriptive appositions), contribute also to determining the referent. However, in order to articulate the constraint provided by naming practices, he now disregards the full historical practice related to a generic name, focusing on what he calls ‘conventionalized branches’. As far as I can tell, the objections to Recanati and others raised above (which he shares) apply thus also to him, because for all purposes these ‘branches’ create specific names.
Rami’s account (2014b, 148-9) is also unnecessarily complex. His conditions (b) and (c) are intended to deal with cases that should be accounted for as instances of accommodation and its failure, cp. the discussion of cases of inexplicit dubbings and cases involving perishing practices in §4.1, especially fn. 35. This establishes the advantages of a presuppositional account over the Predellian one that Rami assumes.

I have suggested a related model to explain the generation of different interpretations for quotations, in the framework of a demonstrative account (García-Carpintero, 2004b).

Cf. Bach & Harnish 1979, 192-5 on standardization. Leckie (2013, 1150-1) and Jeshion (2015, 386-8) provide some suggestions on criteria for the polysemy view.

Cf. also Gray ms, §3.2, and Rami 2015, 416-418.


I use scare quotes because I take the quotations in question to refer to generic names, at least typically (predicative uses in sentences such as ‘I am/he is Barack Obama’ might be exceptions), which as we have seen in §6.3 need not be words.

De Brabanter (2002) provides many similar examples: ‘They use the editorial “we”...’; ‘Think of it [...] as the nameless Subject of so much that happens, like the It in “It is raining”’. Objecting to the metalinguistic account of the meaning-transfer below, Laura Delgado and Dolf Rami pointed out to me that ‘An “Alfred Russell” joined the club today’ sounds odd, unlike (3). But as I say below, I take the transfer to have become conventionalized, like others (literary work for a copy thereof, tree for fruit and otherwise). The generic name has become a conventional term for bearers of specific names articulating it; the use of a quotation for the same goal has not a similarly conventional status, even if such uses explain (by meaning-transfer standardization) the constitution of the conventional predicative use.

Gray (ms., §3.2) has a similar objection.

As indicated in §6.3, Rami assumes Predelli’s (2013) framework.

Cohen (1980, 150) refers to a discussion in the OED of examples like ‘that cat is a he’.

The relevant quotation is assumed to refer to the generic name, and the transfer relation involves specific names articulating it, if there are any.

But there are contexts in which we can felicitously say such things. I distribute tasks among my colleagues and myself: you will do X, I’ll take care of Y, you will do Z … . One of them complains: “as usual, far too many vous and too few mes in your task assignments”.
A version of this paper was written in the mid 1990’s, and given at talks and conferences then; García-Carpintero (2000) was originally part of it, and briefly sketches it. After hapless publication efforts, I decided that the material could only be published in a monograph. Recently I realized that, although many of the original ideas have by now been defended by others (the presuppositional account of reference-fixing and sense by Maier, Hawthorne & Manley and others, the grounding on primitive singular reference by Elbourne and Hawthorne & Manley, the appeal to naming practices by Sainsbury and others), it still holds original takes on the different aspects of the problem and on how they fit together; and also that it could be fruitfully compared with the now popular related predicativist accounts. Earlier drafts of the current version of the paper were presented at the PhiLang2015, University of Łódź, BCAP2015, University of Bucharest, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Universität Göttingen, 2º Congresso Português de Filosofia, Porto, SEFA 2016, Oviedo, and LOGOS Seminar. There are many people I should thank for very useful suggestions; I’ll just mention Philippe de Brabanter, Gregory Bochner, Aurélien Darbellay, Martin Davies, Laura Delgado, José Antonio Díez, Kathrin Glüer-Pagin, Aidan Gray, Mikhail Kissine, Wolfgang Künne, Josep Macià, Genoveva Martí, Michael McKinsey, Kevin Mulligan, Peter Pagin, Manuel Pérez, Dolf Rami, Sven Rosenkranz, Marco Santambroggio, Ernest Sosa and Mark Textor. I am very much indebted to comments and suggestions by the editors and referees for this journal. Thanks also to Michael Maudsley for his grammatical revision. Financial support for my work was provided by the DGI, Spanish Government, research project FFI2013-47948-P, and through the award ICREA Academia for excellence in research, 2013, funded by the Generalitat de Catalunya, and from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation program under Grant Agreement no. 675415, Diaphora.