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REFERENCE-FIXING AND
PRESUPPOSITIONS

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1 Introduction: Reference-fixing, Semantics, and Metasemantics

Kripke (1980, 55) distinguishes between using a description to fix the reference of an expression and using it to give its meaning. Kaplan and Stalnaker then articulated a distinction between semantics and metasemantics or foundational semantics, ascribing complementary roles to each. To the former category belong theories that assign meanings to their bearers, prominent among them linguistic expressions. To the latter belong theories that provide “the basis” for ascribing such meanings (Kaplan 1989b, 573–574) or state “what the facts are” that give these meanings to their bearers (Stalnaker 1997, 535). This is a metaphysical undertaking on the grounding of meaning-facts, on what determines, fixes, or constitutes them.1

This distinction is sometimes used to consign to “mere” metasemantics descriptive material that, on both intuitive and theoretical grounds, plays a linguistically significant role in the determination of the referents of names and other expressions.2 In previous work (García-Carpintero 2000, 2006a, 2018a), I appealed to reference-fixing presuppositions with the aim of undermining this application of the distinction. Following Heim, I assumed that linguistic presuppositions are features of linguistic meaning (García-Carpintero 2018b). Indeed, in the ensuing years the view that descriptive reference-fixing presuppositions are part of linguistic meaning has become mainstream in semantics (cf., e.g., Heim 2008; Hunter 2013; Maier 2010, 2016). For such descriptive material—I have argued—Kripke’s distinction only tracks a contrast between “planes” or “levels” of content—“at issue” vs. “backgrounded”.

However, it is not straightforward to understand how the relevant presuppositions that semanticists posit play the reference-fixing role that Kripke was envisaging. In this contribution I want to confront this issue. I will approach it by assuming an account of the semantics vs. metasemantics divide that I have provided elsewhere (García-Carpintero 2012, forthcoming-a). I advance there a version of the Austinian normative approach originally promoted by Alston (1964), Austin (1962) and Searle (1969).3 Although displaced for a while by the influence of Gricean and Chomskian views on the issue, it is becoming popular again among philosophers and linguists. On this view, meaning-facts about natural languages are determined by social norms and social conventions.

In what follows, I will articulate in that framework the distinction between semantic and non-semantic (“pre”- or “post”-semantic) facts in reference-fixing, presuppositionally understood.
A full argument for the view that I’ll present should be abductive. In addition to articulating it, I’ll offer a small portion of such an inference to the best explanation. A main consideration is that it assumes and contributes to vindicating an overarching, general account of semantic reference. It is an Austinian analog to the Gricean picture developed by Schiffer (1981) and Neale (2004, 2016), elaborating on Strawson’s (1950) ideas; I’ll highlight the parallel. Another consideration is how the proposal contributes to taking a principled stance on recent debates confronting “intentionalists” and “conventionalists” on the (derivative) metasemantics of tokens of indexicals and other referential expressions.

Metasemantic debates presuppose views on the underlying semantic facts. They thereby also presuppose views about what languages are. In keeping with the Austinian stance, here I’ll assume that natural languages are essentially social tools. More specifically, I’ll assume that, in an explanatorily prior sense, languages are conventional devices put in place and backed by social rules. I will assume a minimal characterization of conventions—a common core to the accounts by Lewis (1975), Bach and Harnish (1979, 120–134), Davis (2003, 204–219), Marmor (2009), and Geurts (2019). A convention is a social regularity in the behavior of a group, which serves a common interest (it solves a “coordination problem”, as Lewis puts it), and is arbitrary in that there is an alternative which would have solved it just as well.

2 Semantic Content: Character and Locution

On the Austinian metasemantic picture for linguistic types that I assume, languages are social tools devised for communicative purposes. Conventions concerning the specific lexical items and constructions of a particular language, grounded on a subpersonal combinatorial linguistic competence driven by our biology, assign to sentence-types semantic contents that it is apt to characterize as “speech–act potentials” (Bach and Harnish 1979; Alston 2000), in ways I’ll explain below. The underlying social and psychological facts determine which assignments are correct. The view of semantic content—“what is said”—on offer is thus “social” (Camp 2006, §6) or “forensic” (Perry 2009, 191). In what follows I’ll develop this rough picture.

I’ll start with a distinction of Lewis’s (1980) in what I undiscriminatingly described in the previous paragraph as “semantic content”. Yalcin (2014) disambiguates the two notions as “semantic value” and “content”; others refer to them as, respectively, “compositional” vs. “assertoric” content. I will here use the (from my perspective) descriptively more accurate “sentence character” (or just “character” for brevity), and “locutionary meaning” (“locution”). Character is ascribed to sentences, given the widespread context-dependence present in natural language, in order to fulfill central explanatory tasks for theories of natural languages, among them: accounting for facts about systematicity and productivity in understanding, communication, and acquisition, and explaining judgments about entailments, truth-value, or correctness relative to particular situations. Locutionary meaning is the linguistically determined speech–act potential assigned to sentences in context. Ultimately, the data in need of explanation in those cases (systematicity, etc.) concern locutions, and hence characters should properly relate to them; but, as Lewis (1980) points out, it doesn’t follow that they should be identified, and there are reasons against this that we will now examine.

On the Austinian picture of the basic metasemantic facts that I want to elaborate here, utterances play a central role. Utterances are intentional actions, speech acts. Ball (forthcoming) provides a compelling account of Austin’s (1962) notorious view of utterances as separable in different, but somehow embedded acts: a “phonic act”, a “rhetic”, a “locutionary”, an “illocutionary”, and a “perlocutionary” act. Rehearsing arguments from Moltmann (2018), Ball provides forceful replies to Searle’s (1968) criticism, and an account of the locutionary/illocutionary distinction that I find adequate. The rhetic act is the act of using lexical items and their grammatical modes of combination “with a certain more or less definite ‘sense’ and a more or less definite ‘reference’ (which together are equivalent to
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‘meaning’)’ (Austin 1962, 93). To individuate the locutionary act, as Ball construes it, we generalize away the specific lexical items.11

In contrast with Searle’s (1968) alternative view, locutions don’t merely consist on this picture of a propositional content, but they include specifications on illocutionary force too: they can be the presentation of a content with eretetic, directive, or assertoric force, and further forces to the extent that they are locuted, on which more below. Locutions don’t differ from standard propositional contents only in this; crucially for our topic, they also typically include separate “planes” of propositional content: “at issue” vs. backgrounded—presupposed or conventionally implicated (García-Carpintero 2006b, 43–47; 2008, 68–76).

Nonetheless, the locutionary act performed in an utterance should be distinguished from the illocutionary act.12 If someone utters ‘The vote was anonymous’, meaning that the vote was unanimous (Bach and Harnish 1979, 33), the locution is (let’s assume) the assertoric presentation of the at-issue propositional content that a vote was anonymous, on the background presupposition that there was one and only one such vote in the context; but it is at the very least unclear whether the speaker becomes thereby assertorically committed to that content.13 But this is what is required for the illocutionary act to occur. In the proper context (for instance, if the audience is familiar with the fact that the speaker systematically incurs in this malapropism), the speaker might well become assertorically committed instead to the claim that the vote was unanimous;14 but this is not his locutionary act.

Everybody in these debates wants to preserve the intuitive distinction between literal, or direct meanings, and nonliteral, implied, or indirect meanings.15 Locuted meanings are what is literally, directly conveyed: the presentation of a set of more or less well specified at issue and backgrounded contents with more or less specific forces. The previous case shows that the speaker need not be committed to the relevant content in the way constitutive of that force. Substitution implicatures and indirect speech acts in general (in contrast with additive implicatures, like Grice’s (1975) recommendation letter and gas petrol examples,16 cf. Meibauer (2009), Vandeveken (1991, 375–376)) also support the point, for in such cases the speaker is not illocutionarily committed to the locuted content.

Contemporary semanticists assign some semantic significance to at least the three moods apparently present in all languages: declarative, interrogative, and imperative (Charlow 2014; Starr 2014; Roberts 2018). Character, not just locution, thus includes information about potential illocutionary force. Hanks (2015, 9) rejects what he characterizes as the taxonomic version of Frege’s traditional force-content distinction, which I have assumed in the discussion so far. This is the idea influentially articulated by Stenius (1967) that there is a meaning-component (a truth- or fulfillment-conditional component) common to speech acts of different illocutionary types, including questions, directives, and assertions. As Collins (2018, 3538–3539) shows, Hanks’s reasons are not cogent. For current semantics also distinguishes meanings for noun phrases, meanings for verb phrases, and forceless meanings for phrasal combinations thereof, which are common constituents of the distinct semantic objects assigned to imperatives, interrogatives, and indicatives. The appeal to current semantics thus in fact legitimizes force-endowed sentential meanings as much as their forceless “parts”. My (at-issue or backgrounded) locuted contents are forceless traditional propositions.

Now, in contrast to Hanks and others who have written recently on the traditional topic of the “unity of propositions”, I think we should adopt an attitude towards them that is as minimalist as possible. Propositions are force-neutral, but they also lack any “structure”—whatever that might mean for abstract entities (Keller 2013). I will assume the Stalnakerian view that they are just properties of verifying circumstances of evaluation.17 What are such circumstances? For Stalnaker they are complete and consistent possible worlds, for Lewisians centered possible worlds. I will think of them as “smaller” than full possible worlds, as in Situation Semantics or in “truthmaker semantics” (Fine 2017).18

Let’s rehearse now the Lewisian distinction between sentential character and locutionary meaning. Consider indexicals. They typically have three types of uses. A sentence like ‘He is happy’ might be uttered on its own, the pronoun ‘he’ perhaps accompanied by a pointing gesture. In that case, philosophers after Kaplan (1989a) would think of its at-issue locutionary content as a singular
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proposition, ascribing the property of being happy to the male pointed at. The pronoun might be anaphoric on another expression, getting its referent from it: ‘Peter thinks that he is happy’. And it can be bound by an expression of generality: ‘Everybody/somebody thinks that he is happy’. These are not isolated facts; other expressions exhibit the same variations, and they systematically re-occur across languages.

Considerations of explanatory power promote a unifying explanation. Semanticists have advanced different sophisticated frameworks to account for the data in such an explanatorily powerful way. For our purposes, however, we can make the point we need by using the simple and hopefully familiar technical apparatus of First-Order Logic used in Tarskian-Davidsonian truth-conditional approaches. We can think that explicit indexicals like ‘he’, or the hidden counterparts linguists have reasons to posit in the logical forms corresponding to the sentences—the syntactically articulated representations that act as inputs to the semantic machinery—behave semantically like variables in first-order logic (FOL) languages. They are interpreted relative to assignments, which can be varied relative to (contextually specified) domains of quantification, suitable to capture the semantic behavior of expressions of generality. For ‘He is happy’, we get something like this representation:

(1) On the presumption that \( x \) is the “demonstrated” male, \( x \) is happy.

(1) is not right, in many ways. For one thing, the presupposed condition that the referent is male really belongs in a different content-plane. Also, ‘demonstrated’ is placed inside scare quotes to point in the direction of the complications to be discussed below. Details aside, what we thus obtain by way of the semantic, compositionally determined content for (1) is a property like the one denoted by (2):

(2) \( \lambda x. \) On the presumption that \( x \) is the “demonstrated” male, \( x \) is happy.

Lewis (1980) insists that there is no difficulty in deriving from semantic, compositionally given sentential meanings like (2) locutionary propositional contents that correspond better to what is intuitively said when our sentence is literally uttered. Writers in the semantic tradition I am rehearsing invoke at this point the following recourse: the “demonstrated” male in the context of a particular utterance is identified with the value of the relevant variable given by a particular assignment, which is said to have been selected by the utterance context \( C \) (Heim and Kratzer 1998, 243). We thus obtain representations like this for our locuted content:

(3) \( [\lambda x. \text{On the presumption that } x \text{ is the “demonstrated” male, } x \text{ is happy.}] a \), where \( a = \text{the } C- \text{“demonstrated” male, if any.} \)

This illustrates the distinction between sentential and locutionary meanings. I am calling the former ‘characters’, generalizing Kaplan’s (1989a) character/content distinction to all context-dependent expressions, along the lines illustrated here for ‘he’. Context-dependence is pervasive (Bach 2012). Quantifiers exhibit it (Stanley 2000), also tense and modals (Kratzer 2012), gradable adjectives (Kennedy 2007), and many other expressions. The potentially universal phenomenon of polysemy (Ludlow 2014) makes it even more pervasive.

Characters (expression-type meanings) are clearly semantic contents, and hence there is a metasemantics for them. As said, Lewis (1980) thought that locutions like (3) (expression-use meanings) are equally semantic, by assuming a principle that I will call \( (L)\)inking:

(\(L\)) The content communicated by a literal utterance of \( S \) in context \( C \) is \( cae\)t\(er\)s \(p\)ar\(ibus\) the semantic content of \( S \) in \( C \).
In spite of assuming (L), Lewis (1980) distinguishes character and locution. Doubts about (L) suffice to show that the distinction is well-taken, even if—as I’ll suggest—they should be defused. Contents like (2) are not those we intuitively put literally forward when we assert ‘He is happy’. Contents like (3) would uphold (L) for this case, as Lewis was assuming. But there are reasons for doubting that they are properly qualified as semantic. Nowak (forthcoming) offers some of them. On the one hand, even if (2) is all that counts as the semantic content of our sentence, there are conceptually and empirically solid ways to explain how speakers might nonetheless converge on something like (3); “postsemantic”, pragmatic resources—those involved in the derivation of implicatures—account for it. On the other hand, proposals to uphold (L) in these cases, outlined below, are highly controversial.

Harris (2017, forthcoming) nicely articulates the more general considerations behind Nowak’s argument—García-Carpintero (2006b) develops a similar view. Harris argues that the semantics/pragmatics divide traces a natural, real divide in cognition: one separating a sufficiently isolated Fodorian module (a Chomskian I-language), from central inferential capacities. On this view, semantics only provides constraints on the intuitively literally conveyed meanings—like (2) in our example—and (L) fails. Harris also provides a reply to compositionality-based objections to this view of semantics grounded on the fact that what it ultimately composes is the values of characters in context (cf. García-Carpintero 2006b, 51–52 and Michaelson and Woods (n.d.) for similar rejoinders). To account for systematicity and productivity, constraint semantics needs a characterization of compositionality that allows for “pragmatic intrusion” throughout the composition process; Pagin and Pelletier (2007) provide one such characterization.

This is the view that so-called “contextualists” in debates about the semantics/pragmatics divide—like Bach (1994), Carston (2002), Neale (2005, 2016), and Schiffer (2003)—have advanced, for reasons that Nowak (forthcoming) and Harris (forthcoming) bring to the fore. So-called “minimalists” like Borg (2012) and Cappelen and Lepore (2005) are sympathetic to such motivations, but they nonetheless want semantics to deliver truth-evaluable contents. It is unclear how stable the minimalist motivations and their proposals are: the motivations commit them to (L), but it is very unclear that their proposals in fact vindicate it.

What separates minimalists from contextualists is their take on (L). Minimalists—as much so as “indexicalists” like Stanley (2000) or King (2014)—aim to uphold (L); contextualists just dismiss it. I agree that there are very strong reasons to support (L). As I mentioned earlier, the main initial data that semantic theories aim to explain concern locutions. If (L) obtains, there is also a metasemantics for utterances (uses of sentences in context), in addition to that for sentence-types. Constraint semantics dispenses with it: no semantics for utterances, no need for a metasemantics. There might be a metasemantics for utterance meanings to the extent that there is one for pragmatically conveyed meanings, but there is none when it comes to the semantics of natural languages: utterances (or sentences-in-context) don’t have a distinctive one, i.e., any one beyond that for the sentence-types they instantiate.

This, however, is too cavalier an attitude to take. Even if semantic content reduces to character, we do need to define characters, and this requires a well-supported view on what the contents they determine relative to contexts are; (L) offers the most straightforward one. To illustrate this with the sort of case we have been discussing: Nunberg (1993) offers compelling examples of indexicals—‘I am traditionally allowed to order whatever I like for my last meal’ uttered by a condemned prisoner—that do not seem to contribute objects to what is communicated, but rather properties. Why are these cases irrelevant to the semantic content of the relevant sentences, if indeed they are? Why do writers like Nowak who reject (L) nonetheless assume that characters for demonstratives assign them objects in context? What do they mean when they give an important theoretical role in their accounts to a notion of literal content (Harris 2017, 338; forthcoming)? It seems that to answer such questions we need locuted contents along the lines of (3), not just (2).

There are two proposals to keep to (L) for indexicals and demonstratives, i.e., for their (utterance-) metasemantics: an intentionalist view, and a conventionalist account; Kaplan (1989a) first endorsed the
latter, switching later to the former (Kaplan 1989b). *Conventionalists* hold that the semantic value of a demonstrative in context is given by cues in the conversational context, paradigmatically pointing gestures, but more in general salience or *attentional prominence*. Wettstein (1984), Reimer (1991), Gauker (2008, 2018), and Stojnić, Stone, and Lepore (2013, 2017) defend such views. *Intentionalists* appeal instead to what speakers have in mind, along lines suggested by Donnellan (1970) for proper names. Intentionalists base their view on cases in which the demonstrative succeeds in referring without any apparent cues (cf. Speaks 2016). We will now examine how these issues replicate when it comes to the semantic significance of *force*-indicators, which will help presenting in section 4 my Austinian take on these issues. As it will transpire, the view has both intentionalist and conventionalist features, although it strongly verges towards the latter.

### 3 Force-Indicators: Semantics and Metasemantics

The declarative, interrogative, and imperative moods are identified by morphosyntactic paradigms and functional roles (König and Siemund, 2007, 282–284). They are universal in human languages (Roberts 2018, 319). There are distinctive marks of the three moods under embeddings (‘John said that he was happy’, ‘John wondered whether he was happy’, ‘John told him to be happy’, Roberts 2018, 321). Conjunctions, disjunctions, or conditionals mix them (Murray and Starr forthcoming, §2.3). These are initial reasons to think that the distinction has compositional significance, and hence that each of the three moods make a distinctive contribution to locutions (Pendlebury 1986; Chierchia and McConnell-Ginet 1990, 4.3).

On a currently popular view, sentences of each of the three types are assigned three allegedly different types of semantic object: a proposition to declaratives, a set of sets of propositions to interrogatives (encoding the class of possible answers), and a “to-do list” for conversational participants to imperatives (Roberts 2018, 320; Portner 2018, 180–181). The determination of the actual illocutionary force of an utterance of a sentence of any of these types is then left to the “postsemantics”, given a *force-linking* principle that connects their distinctive semantic values with “default”, “typical” speech acts made with them (Roberts 2018, 320–321, 327, 349). The principle is a particular application of (L) to the case at hand.

The three default speech acts are characterized by means of a generalization of Stalnaker’s (1978) influential account of assertion and presupposition. On Stalnaker’s view, contexts are understood as a common ground of accepted propositions. The proposal generalizes this, including in addition questions under discussion (the questions mutually adopted for the conversation), and “to-do lists” for the participants in the conversation—for each agent, the properties it is mutually assumed that the agent is to make true. The three default speech acts are then understood as proposals to update the relevant “parts” of such contexts.

I have argued (García-Carpintero forthcoming-a) that this “force-linking” principle is not adequate, for reasons like those mentioned in the above discussion of the Bach-Harris-Nowak view of demonstratives. The declarative can be used to make many different specific speech acts, including guesses and suppositions, for instance. The imperative can be used for commands, requests, invitations, to give permission, and so on. As Chierchia and McConnell-Ginet (1990, 173) contend, there is nothing nonliteral or indirect about these uses. Moreover, the compositional grammar appears to serve to indicate them, in English, Spanish, and other languages by means of appositive hedges like ‘I guess’, ‘I suppose’, or ‘I beg you’ (Benton and van Elswyk 2019); and these hedges appear to be semantic counterparts of evidentials in languages that have them, in which they clearly are part of the compositional machinery (Murray and Starr forthcoming, §2.3).

The Portner-Roberts view of moods thus fails to meet (L), and hence to explain how the semantics fixes the literal, conventional meaning of utterances of sentences in context. The semantics should provide more specific constraints on the objects that are the values of characters in context. The semantic objects ascribed to *force*-indicators should identify specific forces conveyed by literal,
conventional utterances. This is what writers in the speech-act tradition have been offering, either in a Gricean, descriptive-psychological setting (Bach and Harnish 1979) or in an Austinian, normative one (Alston 2000; Austin 1962; Searle 1969).

In a popular recent development, Williamson (1996)—like Roberts—also suggests that the universal moods have “default” meanings: “In natural language, the default use of declarative sentences is to make assertions” (Williamson 1996, 258). However, Williamson argues that there is a very specific speech act that is default-conveyed; he refers to it as flat-out assertion (1996, 246), and he offers an account that distinguishes it from other specific speech acts that we also make in conventional, literal uses of declarative sentences, like guesses, swears, or suppositions. The account is provided in the Rawlsian tradition of constitutive rules (García-Carpintero 2004). Williamson claims that the following norm or rule (the knowledge rule) is constitutive of assertion, and individuates it:

$$(KR) \quad \text{One must } ((\text{assert } p) \text{ only if one knows } p).^{36}$$

In the course of the debate that this proposal has generated, other writers have accepted the view that (flat-out) assertion is defined by constitutive rules, but have proposed alternative norms; thus, Weiner (2005) proposes a truth rule (TR), Lackey (2007) a reasonableness rule (RBR), and I myself (García-Carpintero 2004, 2018b) a knowledge provision rule (KPR):

$$(TR) \quad \text{One must } ((\text{assert } p) \text{ only if } p).$$

$$(RBR) \quad \text{One must } ((\text{assert } p) \text{ only if it is reasonable for one to believe } p).$$

$$(KPR) \quad \text{One must } ((\text{assert } p) \text{ only if one’s audience is put thereby in a position to know } p).$$

The obligations these rules impose are sui generis, like those constitutive of games, the model on which Williamson bases his account: they do not have their source in norms of morality, rationality, prudence, or etiquette. They are not all things considered, but pro tanto; in any particular case, they can be overruled by stronger obligations imposed by other norms. They are intended to characterize what is essential or constitutive of assertion (and not, as it may seem at first glance, of correct assertion). The view is that assertion is an act essentially constituted by its being subject to the relevant norm. On Williamson’s view, assertion is the unique representational act such that, in performing it, one is committed to knowing the represented proposition; i.e., the propositional act such that, if one performs it without knowing the intended proposition, one is thereby contravening an obligation. There are additional features or rules contributing to a full characterization of assertion, as in Searle’s (1969) well-known account or in Alston’s (2000) elaboration, i.e., the “sincerity” or “preparatory” conditions. The rules are intended to characterize what an act must “count as” for it to be an assertion, i.e., what Searle describes as its “essential rule”.

As said, it is common ground among participants in these debates that assertion is what is done by default (i.e., unless conditions in an open-ended list apply, such as those creating irony, fiction, or the presence of canceling parenthetical remarks such as ‘I conjecture’, etc.) by uttering declarative sentences. This gives us a pre-theoretical handle on the phenomenon that we aim to characterize, and hence an independent standpoint from which to appraise them: it is the act, whatever its proper definition is, that is in fact associated with the indicative mood in natural languages as used on some occasions (the default, “flat-out” cases), and which speakers intentionally purport to make by such means on such occasions. Intuitively, these are cases in which we mean to be taken “at our word”; i.e., cases in which we aim to impart information merely on the basis of our saying-so. We thus present ourselves as believing what is said, and as assuming that our audience might be interested in the information. Answering a request for information, reporting on our day to our family, or reporting current events in a newspaper would thus be such default uses.

We can similarly think of corresponding default uses for the imperative (say, cases in which someone with authority tells somebody under her authority to do something) and the interrogative (requests for flat-out assertions, cases in which somebody asks for information). These are precisely
the sort of circumstances proffered to give the functional roles of the three moods in standard typological research (König and Siemund 2007, 282–284).

Gutzmann (2015) offers a revision of Potts’s (2005) multidimensional semantics, with the goal of providing a compositional formulation of Kaplan’s (1999) ideas on expletives and pejoratives such as ‘damn’. The idea is that a literal utterance of a sentence like ‘that damn Kaplan was promoted’ contributes to ‘at issue’-located content the non-evaluative proposition that Kaplan was promoted, but it also conventionally contributes a condition on felicitous use: that the utterance context is such that the speaker has a derogatory attitude regarding Kaplan. In addition to preserving compositionality, Gutzmann’s system has the great virtue of allowing for the semantic interaction between the two planes.

In my view, Gutzmann’s proposal is not, however, fully adequate. In the first place, Gutzmann offers Gricean psychological conditions to characterize forces, inadequate to capture the proper normative conditions on the felicitous use of the relevant sentences. For a declarative like ‘Homer is bald’, for instance, Gutzmann (2015, 203) has the use condition that the speaker wants the hearer to know that Homer is bald. However, a literal utterance of that sentence can be perfectly felicitous even if the speaker doesn’t care in the least whether the hearer comes to know that Homer is bald, and it can be infelicitous even if the speaker does want that (say, if he lacks the knowledge). Use-conditions should rather concern a normative conversational scoreboard of the kind envisaged by Lewis (1979) and Thomason (1990). The default use condition for declaratives is that in felicitous uses the speaker meets the specific norm that defines the illocutionary force of flat-out assertion—in my view (KPR). Hedges like ‘I guess’ or ‘I think’ alter this, weakening the commitment.

Second, Gutzmann’s framework doesn’t handle presuppositions, but it is essential for my proposals here that we preserve the benefits on this score of dynamic approaches. A distinctive part of the scoreboard should gather the propositions to whose truth participants are committed as a result of previous utterances accepted as felicitous (same for shared questions under discussion or shared plans, García-Carpintero 2015). Accepted declaratives (‘Homer is bald’) update this scoreboard constituent; presuppositions down the conversational line may then felicitously target it (‘Homer regrets that he is bald`). I will have to just assume that a fully adequate formal system can be developed, along the lines just outlined. Let’s now see how to account on that basis with semantic reference and reference-fixing.

4 Semantic Reference in an Austinian Framework

The universality of the three sentential moods suggests that the kinds they conventionally indicate are “natural”. Here ‘natural’ is not used in opposition to ‘social’, but rather to refer to properties and kinds in Lewis’s (1983) “sparse” (as opposed to “abundant”) sense. Illocutionary types such as assertion (like games) are “social constructs”, definable by social rules (García-Carpintero forthcoming-b). They have “Platonic” essences, in the terminology of Newman and Knobe’s (2019) generalized essentialism, as opposed to “causal” essences like that of water. Natural properties and kinds are those that play substantive explanatory roles, and hence have a “hidden nature” which only reveals itself through inquiry. The commonly known stereotypical features that allow us to pick up the kind are (in the case of flat-out assertions) those mentioned above: they are utterances whose speakers present themselves as meaning to be taken at their word. The explanatory proposal I favor is that they are “tellings” (Fricker 2017): occasions in which speakers come to be beholden to the (KPR) norm. Tellings—flat-out assertions—are conventionally default-indicated by the declarative mood, as explained, but they could be made by other means; for instance, indirectly—by gestures, rhetorical questions, irony, fiction-making, or implicatures (García-Carpintero 2019a).

Griceans need not disagree with any of this: they accept that moods conventionally convey illocutionary types, which are social natural kinds that can equally be conveyed in other ways. The disagreement concerns only the nature of the kind in question—a psychological one for Griceans, normative for Austinians. All these points carry over to reference, which, like Searle (1969, ch. 4) and
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Strawson (1950), I’ll treat as an ancillary speech act. Schiffer (1981) makes a proposal—endorsed and elaborated by Neale (2004, 2016)—of which my own is a natural Austinian counterpart, as I’ll now explain.

In previous work (García-Carpintero, 2019b) I have argued that to understand how kinds whose essence is given by constitutive rules impose their defining obligations, we need to assume a further, as it were “external” normativity. I have used this point to explain why Williamson’s (1996, 239) argument that such kinds cannot be conventional is not compelling. Williamson overlooks the fact that only normative kinds that are in force are really normative; and it might be by convention that they come to be so. Many kinds defined by constitutive norms are not in force, and hence are not really normative: they don’t give anybody a reason to act. Think of variations we can concoct on the rules that define actual games, and the “possible” games they define. They define putative kinds; but, if they are not in force, nobody is really obligated by them, and hence they are not truly normative.

What would make such merely putative rule-constituted kinds “actual” in a given community, practices whose constitutive norms players are beholden to? What this requires, I suggested, might just be a convention or agreement; more generally, this is determined by social norms (Bicchieri 2006), whether or not they are conventions. Applying this to our case, it is in virtue of such social norms that mood-indicating devices like the three clause types—declarative, interrogative, and imperative—get associated with kinds defined by constitutive rules, respectively (flat-out) assertion, question, and command; and this is a central procedure through which the relevant normative kinds come to be in force.

On these grounds, the Austinian view helps itself for metasemantic purposes to a version of the knowledge-based Principle of Charity that Williamson (2007, 264) promotes, avoiding its pitfalls (McGlynn 2012, 398–400; García-Carpintero 2018a, 1125). The social norms that explain the conventional association of the declarative clause type and the constitutive norms defining flat-out assertion in fact afford a teleological explanation of why the norm is in force. Such a teleological explanation comes with a specification of “normal functioning”: the way in which past tokens of the type functioned when the type acquired its function. Of course, it is not just the illocutionary force that was conveyed in such cases: it came together with particular contents. Cases of normal functioning are those in which the norm was observed, and hence the content was known and therefore true. These contents were compositionally determined. Our present concern has to do with the systematic truth-conditional contribution of the expressive devices that linguists mark with the +ref feature (Glanzberg 2018b) like indexicals and names, whose job is to conventionally indicate what a given discourse is about.

Schiffer (1981) argues that what is distinctive of referential expressions is that they conventionally contribute to locutions whose contents are singular propositions—singular in particular with respect to their compositional truth-conditional contribution. It may be thought that the minimalist view of propositional contents endorsed before prevents us from capturing the relevant singularity, but this is not the case. As Russell (1903, 316) pointed out, even attributively used descriptions make truth-conditional contributions that intuitively are “about” the things that satisfy them. However, unlike them, conventional referential expressions convey this in a “direct” way (García-Carpintero and Palmira n.d.). This intuition of “directness” can be spelled out firstly in terms of the medi eval intuitions that Quine (1956) invokes to distinguish attitudes directed at particular sloops from attitudes merely directed, say, towards relief from slooplessness, and secondly by Kripkean intuitions of rigidity (Quine 1956).

Neale (2016) and Schiffer (2016) set into relief the well-known difficulties that Gricean intentionalist views have to confront to properly develop Schiffer’s just outlined account. Neale focuses on an especially problematic issue, that of “aphonics”—the unpronounced referential “expressions” that current semantics pose: PRO, movement traces, indicators for domain of individuals or worlds, scales for quantities and degrees in them, and so on. I’ll say below how the Austinian account handles the issue, but I’ll present it first.
As indicated above, I take it as well established that some expressions in natural language semantically trigger presuppositions, and hence that the locutions they help to convey specify them. For instance, descriptions like 'the King of France' conventionally trigger the presupposition that there is a unique King of France. In previous work (García-Carpintero 2018b), I have argued that these linguistic presuppositions should be viewed as ancillary speech acts of their own, defined in "flat-out" uses by a common knowledge rule (PR):

(PR) One must ((presuppose p in a context C) only if p is common knowledge in C).

In the Gutzmann-inspired framework suggested above, such norms would be additional conditions on the felicitous use of sentences including their triggers.

Note that we should sharply distinguish descriptions of how conversations involving these expressions proceed from the normative account—even though, of course, if correct the account should contribute to explaining it. Even in the case of communication involving only exchanges of flat-out assertions (the central case for the empirical validation of our proposals, on the teleological account just suggested), conversations can proceed smoothly when presuppositions are infelicitous, and when they are known to be so, as Donnellan's (1966, 14) famous 'King in his counting house' example witnesses:42 the presuppositions in those cases are said to be commonly "accepted", even if they are not believed and fail to be knowledge. There is also the phenomenon of accommodation (I can impart information with 'the king is in his counting house' to someone who doesn’t know that there is a king) and there are exchanges of other kinds (say, irony, fiction), not bound by the norms for flat-out uses of the moods. García-Carpintero (2018b) discusses these issues.

Referential expressions are a particular kind of presupposition trigger on the account I have been defending. They carry presuppositions of acquaintance or familiarity (García-Carpintero 2000; cp. Roberts 2002; Cumming 2014; Maier 2010, 2016). What this comes to is, I suggest, that they trigger the application of norm (RR) below—which I take to be a specification of (PR) for referential expressions—as a felicity condition on their uses:

(RR) One must ((refer to o by means of e in making an act thereby about o) only if it is commonly known who or what o is, for such representational purposes).

(RR) acknowledges the need to relativize knowing—which/who ascriptions to certain interests, which Boër and Lycan (1986) pointed out.43 The interest at stake is that of conveying a specific singular content. Now, descriptive accounts in the semantic tradition started by Karttunen (1976) add to contexts’ abstract discourse referents, which are then invoked to characterize presuppositions of familiarity in semantic accounts closely related to mine (cf., e.g., Roberts 2002; Cumming 2014; Maier 2010, 2016). Such discourse referents correspond to pieces of information that would prima facie allow for the norm (RR) to be met. They are conditions presumed to pick out individuals such as: playing the relevant utterance role (being its speaker, hearer, time, day, location) in the case of indexicals ('I', 'you', 'here', 'now', 'today'); being explicitly demonstrated or otherwise perceptually salient, plus fulfilling the relevant φ-features (being proximal or distal, male or female, plural or singular, and so on), in the case of deictic uses of demonstratives and pronouns ('this', 'that', 'he', 'she'); meeting the relevant specifications laid down in previous discourse, plus perhaps being had in mind by the speaker, in the case of anaphoric uses of the same expressions; being picked out by the relevant naming-practice, in the case of names.44

Discourse referents—conditions or pieces of information—are usually understood to be parts of attitudinal Stalnakerian contexts. In sync with the Austinian view, I instead think of them as further presuppositional constituents of the Lewisian scoreboard, beholden to the condition that they do pick out unique referents. The reader should keep in mind the remark above on the difference between
descriptions of conversations, and the normative account. In the relevant cases (discourses involving flat-out assertions), if the conditions in question fail to pick out a unique object, the locuted content is ‘gappy’ and the assertion cannot be evaluated as true or false. Nonetheless, there are cases in which it will be “accepted” that the discourse referent picks out something, and the conversation will proceed smoothly. And there are other cases, like those mentioned above: irony, fiction, and so on. Finally, the previous remarks about assertion apply also to reference. What I have been characterizing is something like Kripke’s (1977) semantic reference: reference contributing to locuted contents, made by means of expressions conventionally designed for that purpose. But the account leaves open that there are further cases, including Kripke’s speaker’s reference.

In his much-discussed account of de jure coreference, Fine (2007, 50) speaks of “semantic requirements”. If we think of such requirements along the lines of Broome’s (2014) for related talk of rationality requirements, we conceive their sources—semantics and rationality, respectively—as particular codes, like legal regulations. This is what the Austinian account I have outlined suggests. The locutionary meaning of ‘The King of France is bald’, say, includes as normative use-conditions the presence in the scoreboard of the discourse referent that a referent for ‘France’ is picked out by a particular naming-practice; the satisfaction of the presuppositional requirement for it to be common knowledge that there is a unique king of that place; and the illocutionary requirement that the speaker knows that he is bald. In a literal use, these norms will be actually in force, participants being committed to them. It is in this clear-cut sense that meanings (locutions) are speech-act potentials.

For norms to be in force in a community, there must be a “collective acceptance” of them in it (Kutz 2000). Norms should somehow “guide” the behavior of those bound by them, and hence speakers should agree to be committed to the ones advocated here. Fine (2007) does assume that semantic requirements are known by speakers with full understanding of the language. At least fully competent speakers should thus intend, say, the indexicals they use to refer to the object picked out by the relevant discourse referent. Intentionalism and conventionalism are hence not really incompatible; conventionalists should at most deny that intentions have a distinctive role to play in metasemantics. Lepore and Stone (2015, 200–220) indeed argue that—as Keiser (2018, 148) and Simons (2018, 285) aptly put it—the only intention that plays a role in meaning-determination is the generic one to contribute the grammatically specified meaning of the utterance.

However, this goes beyond what the outlined Austinian proposal requires. In their rejection of the Gricean intentionalist picture, Lepore and Stone go as far as to reject that there are conversational implicatures, speaker’s reference, and indirect meanings, whose metasemantics distinctively depends on speakers’ intentions. This is unwarranted, as I have argued (García-Carpintero 2016). There is no reason why the conventions determining locutions cannot rely on speakers’ intentions, at least to the extent that they are properly made manifest to conversational participants—as Griceans have traditionally insisted, by relying on some form of the well-established belief constraints on rational intentions (cf. Neale 2016, 275–278). As Heck (2014, 336–343) and Mount (2015, 11–12) point out, if they do not ensue from referential communicative intentions, contextual cues such as pointing gestures, etc., do not determine referents; and the enormous variety and open-endedness of “cues”, or forms of “salience” or “attentional prominence” by means of which speakers manage to commit themselves to singular claims by using demonstratives doesn’t fit well with the generality of norms, conventions, or rules. Furthermore, by allowing for semantic contributions whose metasemantics depends on specific speakers’ intentions, we make room for adequate explanations of lexical innovations compatible with sensible forms of conventionalism (Armstrong 2016), and more in general for explanations of how semantic-determining conventions come to be in place (Carston 2016; Harris 2016, §6).

Nonetheless, I think that Lepore and Stone (2015) are right to point out—and have made a very good case—that the conventional resources constituting natural languages go well beyond what is sometimes presumed, including prosody, intonation, discourse coherence, narrative structure,
systematic polysemy, and so on. The Austinian picture I have been outlining here is entirely compatible with all these being resources that allow for the expression of semantic meanings. While Harris (forthcoming) relies on a psychological natural kind (the I-language module) to trace the semantics/pragmatics divide, the Austinian view instead trusts social kinds—on the proposal I just made, flat-out assertions (tellings) and the form of the Principle of Charity that depends on their being in force. If consistently taken, Harris’s proposal leads to the meager views of semantics of the sort advocated by true Chomskians like Pietroski (2018)—a direction that, sensibly, Harris is not prepared to take. I don’t need to deny that there are interesting explanatory distinctions among meanings that are just determined by the “language faculty”, and those that require more “pragmatic-looking” resources like coherence relations (Pagin 2014); but on the Austinian view I have been promoting, this is compatible with their being distinctions in the class of semantic content.

Although intentions thus may also play a distinctive role in metasemantics on the form of conventionalism I am advocating, their job is still subsidiary in contrast with the one they play in Gricean proposals. I lack the space here to go into any detail, but this alleviates well-known objections to bare intentionalist accounts. In general, facts about what it takes to be intentionally subject to a code may help with the case of non-fully competent speakers, including children. More specifically, consider the locution “refer to o by means of e in making an act thereby about o” in (RR) above. Neale (2016) provides a good explanation why we need it to characterize the semantic role of expressions, and the exchange between Neale (2016) and Schiffer (2016) manifest the difficulties that “aphonics” (unpronounced referential “expressions” contributing to semantic, truth-conditional content) create. Bach (2017) emphasizes the problem such “encoding intentions” pose for giving intentions any role in the determination of semantic content. Viebahn (2018), however, offers good replies, clearly available I think given the role of intentions in the present account.

Conclusion

In this paper I have articulated a version of the Austinian conception of metasemantics on which the semantic meanings of sentences are speech-act potentials. On the suggested view they are complex, including different layers of propositional contents presented with different quite specific illocutionary forces. They are fit to be the meanings (including forces) to which speakers intuitively commit in literal uses. The proposal supports a reply to the invocation of the semantics/metastemantics divide by anti-descriptivist philosophers to relegate to the later role all descriptive reference-fixing material: presuppositions of acquaintance, those related to φ-features and “being-named” metalinguistic descriptions in the case of names remain semantic, even though they don’t belong in “at-issue” semantic content. Such semantic descriptive reference-fixing material may be judged “weak and trivial” (Gómez-Torrente 2019, 17), but it nonetheless shows that fully-fledged anti-descriptivism, Millianism in particular, is wrong, which is philosophically significant. I have referenced a considerable amount of recent work on the semantics of names and indexicals, including their semantic contributions to attitude-ascriptions that supports the proposal. Other than that, it amounts to an overarching account of linguistic reference in the tradition of Strawson (1950; cf. also Justice 2007). That, I submit, should be a crucial piece in a full abductive argument for it.

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Notes

1 Burgess and Sherman also point this out in their introduction to a recent compilation (Burgess and Sherman 2014, 3).
3 This tradition owns more to the later Wittgenstein’s views than is sometimes acknowledged; cf. Harris and Unnsteinsson (2017).
4 The proposal to be developed cashes out in a particular way the slogan “meaning is normative”, which has of course been the topic of massive controversy. Glüer and Wikforss (2018) and Liebesman (2018) offer a good up-to-date picture. García-Carpintero (2012, 411–418) has my own take on it.
6 Borrowing and generalizing from Kaplan (1989a), although I am not committed thereby to Kaplan’s entire panoply of views on context-dependence. I mean the term as synonymous with sentence standing meaning (Maitra 2007).
7 Cf. Yalcin (2014, 18–23) for more details on those explanatory goals. Systematicity concerns the fact that speakers who, say, competently understand ‘John loves Mary’ can equally understand ‘Mary loves John’; productivity, the fact that competent understanding is in principle unbounded: ‘the son of Mary swims’, ‘the son of the son of Mary swims’.
8 The utterances taken here into consideration involve the deployment of expressions, linguistic tokens— which should deflate concerns about “utterance semantics” (Neale 2016, 235) and still preserve an important theoretical role for them. My previous work on these matters (strongly influenced by Perry (cp. e.g. Perry 2012) emphasizes token-reflexivity, but I was assuming tokens to be uttering events.
9 Korta and Perry (2011) and Recanati (2013) offer related accounts.
11 To the extent that the expressions themselves are not part of what is conventionally meant; I am here putting aside issues raised here by token-reflexivity, considered below; cf. Braun (2018) and Radulescu (2018a, 2018b) for good discussions.
12 My distinction here corresponds to the one between sentence force and utterance force by Chierchia and McConnell-Ginet (1990, 171) and Murray and Starr (forthcoming, §1).
13 Cf. Davis (1999, 35 n), Unnsteinsson (2017). Unnsteinsson makes the very good point that, due to structural or lexical ambiguity, the located content will be in such cases typically too underspecified for the speaker to assertorically commit to it. In our example, nothing in the context rules out the interpretation that the vote lacked “individuality, distinction, or recognizability”, which is one of the meanings of “anonymous”.
14 Unnsteinsson (2017) claims that the speaker said (in a Gricean sense) that the vote was unanimous. This is consistent with the view advocated here (cf. García-Carpintero 2019a).
15 Perhaps Cappelen and Lepore (2005, 57) are an exception; Travis is also a doubtful case (Fisher 2019, n 24). Unlike Bach and Harnish (1979, 70), I don’t distinguish between ‘literal’ and ‘direct’—I consider that distinction otiose.
16 The first features a person who writes just “his command of English is excellent, and his attendance at tutorials has been regular” as a letter of reference for a pupil’s application for a philosophy job; the second, a man who, when speaking to someone who has run out of petrol, says “There is a garage around the corner”, thereby implicating that the garage is open and selling petrol (Grice 1975, 32).
18 “Smaller” not just spatiotemporally (say, events in our light cone), but also at the level of detail (say, domain of individuals, relevant features, etc.) at which events are specified.
19 Crucially for the present proposal, in a descriptively adequate framework the locution should also include another, not-at-issue propositional content, specifying a presupposition triggered by the pronoun including the φ-feature that the individual in question is male (Heim 2008; García-Carpintero 2000) (see section 4). Cf. Del Prete and Zucchi (2017) for a sophisticated formal proposal compatible with the view developed here; cf. also Maier (2010, 2016).
20 See the works referenced in the previous note, and others referenced in them.
21 Larson and Segal (1996) is an excellent text-book introduction to Davidsonian truth-conditional semantics; Heim and Kratzer (1998) provides the standard text-book introduction to the ideas I am about to summarize.
23 Cp. Kaplan’s (1989a, 525 n) nice metaphor that the semantic referent of a demonstrative is whoever appears in the ‘demonstration platform’.
The lambda operator is a formal procedure to construct complex predicates; for (2), being such that, on the presumption that it is the “demonstrated” male, it is happy.


Cf. also Smit (2012, 63–64) and Speaks (2017). The early pages of Heck’s (2014) go in the same direction, but he seems to me overall closer to endorse some version of (L).

Cf. also Pagni and Westerståhl (2010). Philosophers who assume (L) also have reasons to invoke this notion of compositionality, cf. Glanzberg and King (forthcoming, n 40).

Yalcin (2014), Glanzberg (2018a), and Pietroski (2018) adopt a more radical view, close to Chomsky’s take on these issues, by making semantic contents even thinner than (2).


Cf. Stojnić (2017, 169), García–Carpintero (2006b, 59, 62). Rabern (2017) appears to reduce semantic content to character content. He argues for the minimalist suggestion that contents like (2)—or rather corresponding “diagonal” contents—are what we literally convey, so that (L) is after all satisfied (2017, 196 n, 202–205; cf. also García–Carpintero 2006b, 56, 64). The determination of contents like (3) intuitively closer to what is literally communicated is left to “postsemantics”, i.e., pragmatics. I find this problematic, as suggested in the main text.

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(2019, 45); the suitability at stake is imposed by a condition that reference-fixing rules should be known by competent speakers (2019, 46). The Austinian account can, I think, accommodate the requirement and resulting indeterminacy in its proper light.

Del Pinal (2018) provides a multiple-level semantics focusing on polysemy that, like Gutzmann’s, I take to be highly congenial to my proposals here. Del Pinal doesn’t mention the case of moods, but in fact I take the difference between using declaratives to convey flat-out assertions and using them to convey, say, guesses as a case of polysemy.

References


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Manuel García-Carpintero


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