

SECOND WORKSHOP:

Meaning, Translation and Context

Barcelona, October 5th, 2011

- 11.15 - 12.45 **Josep Macià** (Universitat de Barcelona)
"Meaning and Translation"
- 12.45 - 13.00 Coffee break
- 13.00 - 14.30 **Manolo Martínez** (Universitat de Barcelona)
"Norm Triplism – The Common Structure"
- 14.30 - 16.00 Lunch
- 16.15 - 17.45 **Jordi Fernández** (University of Adelaide)
"Self-Reference and the Meaning of Memory Statements"

Venue: Aula 404, Facultat de Filosofia, UB.

There is no need to register, but if you plan to attend all or some of the sessions please contact: josep.macia@ub.edu

Organized by Josep Macià, with the auspices of LOGOS, sponsored by Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación



Abstracts:

"Self-reference and the meaning of memory statements"

Jordi Fernández

Is memory immune to error through misidentification (IEM)? In this paper, I discuss Sydney Shoemaker's challenge to the view that memory is IEM based on the possibility of 'quasi-memories', and Gareth Evans's reply.

I put forward an account of the content of memories to arbitrate this debate.

I distinguish two varieties of IEM. I consider the significance of each of them, and I argue, with Evans, that memory enjoys the most interesting type of IEM.

"Meaning and translation"

Josep Macià

In this talk I will consider the question "What makes a text T' in language L' an adequate translation of a text T in language L?". I think that addressing this question might shed light on several distinct issues in philosophy of language and semantics. I will briefly consider three quite distinct such issues: (1) The different types, kinds or aspects of "meaning" or of "what is communicated" and the nature of communicative intentions, (2) the meaning of proper names and the cognitive value of the utterances that contain them, (3) The meaning of derogatory terms and, more generally, the nature of expressive meaning.

"Norm Triplism -- The Common Structure"

Manolo Martínez

Many different kinds of act appear to be governed by norms, either in the (weaker) sense that there is a perfectly legitimate sense in which these acts are proper or improper, or in the (stronger) sense that these norms fix what it is to be an act of the relevant kind. A widely discussed kind of act that seems to be governed by a norm in the stronger sense is assertion. A historically much more central case of the weaker kind is the appraisal of acts as morally good or bad.

In these cases, there are several contenders for the role of norm. For example, in the case of assertion, knowledge, truth, justification and rational belief in the target proposition have been suggested as underlying the relevant norm. A similar multiplicity of contenders may be found in normative ethics: consequentialism, deontology and virtue ethics may be seen as proposing different candidates for the role of norm by which to assess an action as morally proper or improper.

I argue that, in at least these two examples, norm pluralism is the correct position. Not any old pluralism will do, mind you: I will be arguing for the more interesting claim that many of these examples can be fruitfully seen as governed by three norms. Furthermore, while these three norms are different for the assertion case and the ethics case, they bear striking structural similarities; the three norms are coordinated among them in analogous ways, and each of the three occupies a functional role that has counterparts in the other kind of normative assessment.

I will present norm triplism by way of example, offering it as a solution to the debate surrounding the norm of assertion. After that, I will show how a similar triplism may be deployed in normative ethics. Finally, I will suggest that it is not a coincidence that norm triplism seems to be a sensible theoretical position about these different kinds of normative appraisal: the explanation might be found in the kind of facts that fix the content of the product of the act in question (when it is contentful), or the intention to act in that way (when it is not).