

Epistemology Reading Group 2017

Suggested Readings

1. Earl Conee & Richard Feldman (2004), *Evidentialism*, Oxford UP. Selection of chapters:
 - Ch. 3 Internalism Defended
 - Ch. 4 Evidentialism
 - Ch. 9 Having Evidence
 - Ch. 10 The Truth Connection
 - Ch. 11 Heeding Misleading Evidence
2. Thomas Kelly (2002), *The rationality of belief and other propositional attitudes*, *Philosophical Studies* 110 (2):163-96.
3. Mark Nelson (2002), *What Justification Could Not Be*, *International Journal of Philosophical Studies* 10(3), 265 –281.
4. John Gibbons (2006), *Access Externalism*, *Mind* 115 (457):19-39.
5. Crispin Wright (2008), *Internal—External. Doxastic norms and the defusing of sceptical paradox*, draft available [here](#).
6. Anthony Brueckner (2009), *Justification, Internalism, and Cream Cheese*, *Philosophical Papers*, 38:1, 13-20—a brief comment on Gibbons (2006).
7. Alvin Goldman (2011), *Toward a Synthesis of Reliabilism and Evidentialism? Or: Evidentialism's Troubles, Reliabilism's Rescue Package*, in: Trent Dougherty (ed.), *Evidentialism and its Discontents*, Oxford UP.
8. John Greco (2011), *Evidentialism about Knowledge*, in: Trent Dougherty (ed.), *Evidentialism and its Discontents*, Oxford UP.
9. Declan Smithies (2012), *Moore's Paradox and the Accessibility of Justification*, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 85 (2):273-300.
10. Clayton Littlejohn (2013), *A note concerning justification and access*, *Episteme* 10 (4):369-386—a reply to Smithies (2012).
11. Christopher Cloos (2015), *Responsibilist Evidentialism*, *Philosophical Studies* 172 (11):2999-3016.
12. Alexander Jackson (2015), *How you know you are not a brain in a vat*, *Philosophical Studies* 172:2799–2822.

13. Kevin McKain (2015), *Is Forgotten Evidence a Problem for Evidentialism?*, The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 53 (4):471-480.
14. Miriam Schoenfield (2015), *Internalism Without Luminosity*, Philosophical Issues, 25.
15. Michael Hatcher (2016), *Accessibilism Defined*, Episteme: doi:10.1017/epi.2016.36.
16. Jonathan Way (2016), *Two Arguments for Evidentialism*, The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 66, No. 265:805-818—comment on Kelly (2002).
17. [Breddor Bob](#), (2017) *Justification as faultlessness*, Philosophical Studies 174:901–926.
18. Tommaso Piazza (2017), *Problems for Mainstream Evidentialism*, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 47:1, 148-165.
19. Clayton Littlejohn, *Evidence and its Limits*, forthcoming in: Conor McHugh Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting (eds.), *Normativity: Epistemic and Practical*. Oxford University Press.
20. [Neta Ram](#), (forth.) *Access Internalism and the Guidance Deontological Conception of Justification*, American Philosophical Quarterly. draft available [here](#).