

## Epistemology Reading Group 2018-2019

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### Knowledge and Justification: Dependence Relations, Definition and Analysis

Focusing on knowledge and justification, the RG will take up the following questions: Is epistemology concerned with concepts or properties? What's the difference between analysing, explaining, reducing, or defining knowledge and justification? When we put knowledge first, what does that exactly mean? Are knowledge and justification multiply realizable? What are their grounds? Is there any priority relation between propositional and doxastic justification? And if so, what kind of priority, and in which direction?

To take up these questions, we will begin with some general readings about analysis, explanation, grounding, reduction, and definition.

#### Toolkit:

Chalmers, D. and Jackson, F. (2001) "Conceptual Analysis and Reductive Explanation", *The Philosophical Review* 110(3): 315-360.

Rosen, G. (2010) "Metaphysical Dependence: Grounding and Reduction", In B. Hale & A. Hoffmann (eds.), *Modality: Metaphysics, Logic, and Epistemology*, Oxford University Press: pp. 109-36.

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Rosen, G. (2015) "Real Definition", *Analytic Philosophy* 56(3): 190-209.

#### Knowledge:

Elgin, S. Z. (2018) "Merely Partial Definition and the Analysis of Knowledge", *Synthese* doi: 10.1007/s11229-018-1846-0.

Ichikawa, J. & Jenkins, C. (2017) "On Putting Knowledge 'First'", in A. Carter, E. Gordon, and B. Jarvis (eds.), *Knowledge First: Approaches in Epistemology and Mind*, Oxford University Press.

Littlejohn, C. (2017) "How and Why Knowledge is First", in A. Carter, E. Gordon, and B. Jarvis (eds.), *Knowledge First: Approaches in Epistemology and Mind*, Oxford University Press.

Smith, M. (2017) "The Cost of Treating Knowledge as a Mental State", in A. Carter, E. Gordon, and B. Jarvis (eds.), *Knowledge First: Approaches in Epistemology and Mind*, Oxford University Press.

Williamson, Timothy (2000) *Knowledge and its Limits*, Oxford University Press.

Zangwill, N. (2017) "Epistemic/ Non-Epistemic Dependence" *Nous*, doi: 10.1111/nous.12197: 1-22.

#### The relation between justification and knowledge:

Bird, Alexander. (2007) "Justified Judging", *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 74: 81–110. [SEP]

Ichikawa, J. (2014) "Justification is Potential Knowledge", *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 44: 184-206.

Kelp, C. (2016) "Justified Belief: Knowledge First-Style", *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 113(1): 79-100.

McGlynn, A. (2014) *Knowledge First?*, excerpts from Part I: “Knowledge as the ‘Unexplained Explainer – Justification’, Palgrave.

Reynolds, S. (2013) “Justification as the Appearance of Knowledge”, *Philosophical Studies* 163: 367–83.

Silva, P. (2017) “Knowing How to Put Knowledge First in the Theory of Justification”, *Episteme* 14(4): 393-412.

Sutton, J. (2005) “Stick to What You Know”, *Noûs* 39: 359–96.

**Propositional and doxastic justification:**

Kornblith, H. (2017) “Doxastic Justification is Fundamental”, *Philosophical Topics* 45(1): 63-80.

Melis, G. (2018) “The Intertwinement of Propositional and Doxastic Justification”, *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 96(2): 367-379.

Turri, J. (2010) “On the Relationship Between Propositional and Doxastic Justification”, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 80(2): 312-326.

Vahid, H. “A Dispositional Analysis of Propositional and Doxastic Justification”, *Philosophical Studies* 173(11): 3133-3152.