

## LOGOS Epistemology Reading Group 2019/2020

### Semester 1: Reasons, Evidence, Rationality, and Obligations

#### 1. Introductory: two views on what reasons are:

- a. Alvarez, Maria (2018). Reasons for action, acting for reasons, and rationality. *Synthese* 195 (8):3293-3310. (all reasons are facts)
- b. Schroeder, Mark (2008). Having reasons. *Philosophical Studies* 139 (1):57-71. (some reasons are not facts)
- c. If we are interested, there is also an exotic revival of once popular but now widely rejected view *psychologism*: Mitova, Veli (2015). Truthy psychologism about evidence. *Philosophical Studies* 172 (4):1105-1126.

#### 2. How reasons *speak in favour* of actions/beliefs? Logical models of the favouring relation:

- a. Horty, John (2007). Reasons as Defaults. *Philosophers' Imprint* 7:1-28.
- b. Bonevac, Daniel (2018). Defaulting on Reasons. *Noûs*:229-259.

#### 3. Having reasons and having obligation (perspectivism about obligations):

- a. Kolodny, Niko (2005). Why be rational? *Mind* 114 (455):509-563.
- b. Gibbons, John (2009). You gotta do what you gotta do. *Noûs* 43 (1):157-177.
- c. Kiesewetter, Benjamin (2016). You ought to  $\phi$  only if you may believe that you ought to  $\phi$ . *Philosophical Quarterly* 66 (265):760-82.
- d. Lord, Errol (2017). What You're Rationally Required to Do and What You Ought to Do (Are the Same Thing!). *Mind* 126 (504):1109-1154.
- e. Kearns, Stephen & Star, Daniel (2009). Reasons as Evidence. *Oxford Studies in Metaethics* 4:215-42.
- f. Littlejohn, Clayton (forthcoming). Being More Realistic About Reasons: On Rationality and Reasons Perspectivism. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*; <https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12518>.

#### 4. The fixed point of rationality: are judgements of rationality infallible?

- a. Titelbaum, Michael (2015). Rationality's Fixed Point (or: In Defense of Right Reason), *Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 5* (ed. Tamar Szabó Gendler and John Hawthorne).
- b. Dorst, Kevin (forthcoming). Evidence: A Guide for the Uncertain. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*; <https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12561>.
- c. Way, Jonathan & Whiting, Daniel (2016). If you justifiably believe that you ought to  $\Phi$ , you ought to  $\Phi$ . *Philosophical Studies* 173 (7):1873-1895.

#### 5. Falsehoods as reasons:

- a. Comesaña, Juan (forthcoming). A Plea for Falsehoods. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*; <https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12523>.
- b. Comesaña, Juan & McGrath, Matthew (2014). Having False Reasons. In Clayton Littlejohn & John Turri (eds.), *Epistemic Norms*. Oxford University Press. pp. 59-80.

- c. Alvarez, Maria (2018). False Beliefs and the Reasons We Don't Have, [in:] Mitova, Veli (ed.) *The Factive Turn in Epistemology*. Cambridge University Press.
- d. Sylvan, Kurt (2015). What apparent reasons appear to be. *Philosophical Studies* 172 (3):587-606.

**6. Responsibility to know (defeat of justification/reasons support by facts which are not possessed):**

- a. Cloos, Christopher Michael (2015). Responsibilist Evidentialism. *Philosophical Studies* 172 (11):2999-3016.
- b. Goldberg, Sanford (2017). Should have known. *Synthese* 194 (8):2863-2894.
- c. Lord, Errol (2018). *The Importance of Being Rational*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. (Chapter III)