Research Group
in Analytic Philosophy
Graduate Reading Group (GRG) 2009/2010
Graduate students run a graduate reading group where they present and discuss their ongoing research.
In academic year 2023/2024, the convenors of the GRG are Marcelino Botín and Markel Kortabarria.
Sessions
Natural Modalising (part 1 of 2)
Manolo Martínez (U. Barcelona)
The neo-rationalist account of modal epistemology (cf. Bealer (2002), Chalmers (2002), Yablo (1993)) has been extensively criticised in the last few years, but few alternative accounts of our access to modal facts have been proposed in its stead. In this chapter I try to do precisely that, by sketching the foundations of an Etiosemantic account of modal vocabulary. First, I try to diffuse a natural worry among friends of naturalistic accounts of content in general: what is merely possible is not the case, and what is not the case does not have a place in the causal order. That is, there is no possible (however broadly construed) causal-informational account of modal vocabulary. While this is true, the very explanatory facts that must be in place for a content attribution to be warranted - along the lines we have been discussing up until now - is enough to warrant modal content attributions. I then go on to explain what biological advantage can accrue from developing a sensitivity to such modal properties. The notions of in situ necessity and in situ possibility will emerge from the discussion. It is hoped that such notions can provide the announced foundation for the analysis of the more sophisticated modal notions we employ.
07 October 2009
11:00, Seminari del Departament, UB
Natural Modalising (part 2 of 2)
Manolo Martínez (U. Barcelona)
The neo-rationalist account of modal epistemology (cf. Bealer (2002), Chalmers (2002), Yablo (1993)) has been extensively criticised in the last few years, but few alternative accounts of our access to modal facts have been proposed in its stead. In this chapter I try to do precisely that, by sketching the foundations of an Etiosemantic account of modal vocabulary. First, I try to diffuse a natural worry among friends of naturalistic accounts of content in general: what is merely possible is not the case, and what is not the case does not have a place in the causal order. That is, there is no possible (however broadly construed) causal-informational account of modal vocabulary. While this is true, the very explanatory facts that must be in place for a content attribution to be warranted - along the lines we have been discussing up until now - is enough to warrant modal content attributions. I then go on to explain what biological advantage can accrue from developing a sensitivity to such modal properties. The notions of in situ necessity and in situ possibility will emerge from the discussion. It is hoped that such notions can provide the announced foundation for the analysis of the more sophisticated modal notions we employ.
14 October 2009
11:00, Seminari del Departament, UB
29 October 2009
11:00, Seminari del Departament, UB
12 November 2009
11:00, Seminari del Departament, UB
Intentionality: Husserl and Contemporary Philosophy of Mind
Marta Jorba (Universitat Pompeu Fabra)
Most contemporary discussions about intentionality within analytic philosophy of mind operate with the assumption of the separability between intentionality and phenomenal consciousness. My purpose in this talk is, firstly, to present the assumption. Second, I explore the husserlian theory of intentionality in the Logical Investigations in order to present a view which questions the separability assumption. Third, I end up discussing topic common to both approaches and related to the separability assumption: the experience or phenomenology of thought.
19 November 2009
11:00, Seminari del Departament, UB
26 November 2009
11:00, Seminari del Departament, UB
03 December 2009
11:00, Seminari del Departament, UB
A Not So Fine Modal Version of Generality Relativism
We discuss a modal version of generality relativism that has been put forward by Kit Fine and try to understand if this allows us to come up with a non self-defeating formulation of the generality relativist thesis. We will argue that Fine's modal version does not appear to be of much help in this task.
10 December 2009
11:00, Seminari del Departament, UB
Chihara's Inconsistency View
Sergi Oms (U. Barcelona)
Suppose we introduce into English the name 'The Liar' according to the following stipulation:
(The Liar) The Liar is not true
Now, by definition, we have
(1) The Liar = 'The Liar is not true'
Moreover, Tarski's biconditional for the Liar is
(2) 'The Liar is not true' is true if, and only if, The Liar is not true
But now, by substitutibity of identicals we can easily get a contradiction:
(3) The Liar is true if, and only if, The Liar is not true
This is, roughly speaking, the paradox of the Liar. One possible and possibly immediate position in front of any paradox is to claim that it is insoluble. Thus, a proponent of such a point of view about the Liar would claim that the notion of truth is inconsistent. That is what Chihara wants to defend. I will present Chihara's point of view and defend that it is not a proper solution and, even if it were, it would not be correct.17 December 2009
12:00, Seminari del Departament, UB
28 January 2010
11:00, Seminari del Departament, UB
11 March 2010
11:00, Seminari del Departament, UB
A Not So Fine Version of Generality Relativism: The Sequel
One way of arguing against absolute generality is to use a Russell style reasoning in order to show that, given a quantifier, it is always possible to define an object lying outside of its range. Timothy Williamson has pointed out that this strategy appears to be self-defeating, because in order to put forward his thesis, the generality relativist needs to be himself quantifying over these other objects. That is, it appears that in order to put forward his thesis, the generality relativist needs to be himself quantifying over absolutely everything. Kit Fine has proposed a modal version of generality relativism that tries to offer a more viable form of opposition to Williamson's argument. I will argue that Fine's modal version also is self-defeating.
18 March 2010
10:00, Seminari del Departament, UB
Artifactual Kind Terms Semantics
Following Kripke and Putnam, many authors agree in giving an externalist semantics to natural kind terms. But suh a semantics seems more difficult to defend for artifactual kind terms. Prima facie, it seems that, in this case, the correct semantics is an internalist one. I examine the viability of the Putnamian externalist model for artifactual terms. First, I review Putnam's model applied to artifatual kind terms and, then, the main internalist objections. These objections, however, can be responded. I conclude that, regarding arguments and problems of both sides, the Putnamian model is not excluded from being a plausible semantics for terms for artifacts.
25 March 2010
10:00, Seminari del Departament, UB
Frege y las dos caras del enígma del valor cognitivo
David Suárez Rivero (U. Barcelona)
En la charla quiero mostrar que el fenómeno del valor cognitivo planteado por Frege en su "On sense and reference" plantea dos desafíos, uno semántico y el otro cognitivo. Dicha defensa se fundamenta en que dicho fenómeno ha sido visto como un problema de orden meramente cognitivo -tal es el caso de François Recanati, Nathan Salmon y Howard Wettstein-. Lo que sostengo es que ha dicho fenómeno ha de darse también una respuesta de corte semántica -esta respuesta ha sido dada por John Perry y Robert Stalnaker-. Lo que intento entonces es simplemente hacer explicitas ambas tesis, la semántica y la cognitiva, y mostrar algunas razones que las fundamenten.
22 April 2010
10:00, Seminari del Departament, UB
13 May 2010
10:00, Seminari del departamento
Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology: The Whole Story?
The aim of this paper is to study in depth the explanatory schema on which Duncan Pritchard's Anti-luck Virtue Epistemology (ALVE) is based. The schema is governed by two explanatory resources: the anti-luck and the ability intuition. The analysis shows that for every case two different facts may be explained: the agent's holding of the target belief and its hitting on truth. As a result, a reformulation of the ability intuition is proposed. Further discussion of particular cases shows why Pritchard is compelled to give independent conditions for knowledge. Despite of the greater success of ALVE with respect to other theories, at least one counterexample proves that it is insufficient for knowledge. Finally, a particular construal of the independence of conditions in terms of the distinction between environmental and belief-forming conditions suggests that in order to amend that insufficiency ALVE needs a third condition for knowledge: one that incorporates the role played by meta-competences in the explanation of the cases.
20 May 2010
10:00, Seminari del Department, UB
Convenor:
Markel Kortabarria (markelkor96@gmail.com)
