Research Group
in Analytic Philosophy

Abstract

According to moderate truth pluralism, truth is both One and Many. Truth is One because there is a single truth property that applies across all truth-apt domains of discourse. Truth is Many because this truth property is grounded in different ways. Propositions concerning medium-sized dry goods might be true in virtue of corresponding with reality while propositions pertaining to the law might be true in virtue of cohering with the body of law. In recent work Michael Lynch has suggested that a commitment to moderate truth pluralism supports logical pluralism. Lynch’s intended form of logical pluralism is significantly different from the kind of logical pluralism that has received considerable attention due to the work of Jc Beall and Greg Restall. This paper has three objectives. The first objective is to present Lynch’s argument from moderate truth pluralism to logical pluralism and to explain the difference between Lynch’s intended form of logical pluralism and Beall-Restall logical pluralism. This will make clear why the theoretical resources relied on by Beall and Restall cannot serve the purposes of moderate truth pluralists. The second objective is to give a general argument to the effect that there can be no path from moderate truth pluralism to logical pluralism—the reason being that moderate pluralists about truth should be monists about logic. The third objective is constructive in nature. I offer an account of what moderate truth pluralists should say about logic. I suggest that, just like moderate truth pluralists are committed to a distinction between truth proper and ‘quasi-truth’, they should endorse a distinction between logic proper and ‘quasi-logic’. Quasi-truth is truth-like in the sense that instances of quasi-truth ground instances of truth. Thus, quasi-truth is intimately related to truth, but is nonetheless distinct from it. Quasi-logic is logic-like in the sense that it concerns necessary truth-preservation of argument types. However, while logic proper concerns domain-general necessary truth-preservation of argument types, quasi-logic concerns necessary truth-preservation of argument types when restricted to specific domains. I suggest that moderate truth pluralists should be monists about truth proper and logic proper but pluralists about quasi-truth and quasi-logic.