Research Group
in Analytic Philosophy

Abstract

Both introspection and empirical studies suggest that visual attention can affect the phenomenology of our visual experience. However, the details regarding the character of the effect on our experience are far from clear. The main obstacle to achieving a clearer view of the effect of attention on the phenomenology is the fact that in order to introspect aspects of our experience (e.g., the way a certain green shape appears to one) one needs to attend to the object or feature this aspect is an experience of (e.g., the green shape). My aim in the talk is to explore how, despite this obstacle, we might nonetheless be able to learn more about the character of the effect of attention on the phenomenology. I shall discuss the potential insights we might gain from empirical findings regarding the ways visual attention modulates neuronal activity and information processing. In addition, I shall argue that there are no good reasons for the view that visual attention has a distinct effect on visual phenomenology, where the effect in question cannot be explained by modulations of neuronal activity. (Such a view has been recently defended by Watzl). The criticism of potential reasons for the view in question will enable me to draw some useful lessons regarding the relationship between visual attention and visual phenomenology.