Research Group
in Analytic Philosophy

Abstract

This paper proposes the development of scientific institutions that function independently of the existence of consensus on visions of the good society (‘the common good’) or factual claims about effective strategies to help realise any of these visions. Its starting point is the belief that disagreements about values are here to stay because (a) individuals value many things; (b) no agreement about the relative importance of different values is forthcoming; (c) nor is agreement about what it means to realise any given value in a specific situation forthcoming. The paper offers some empirical evidence in support of these claims. It is then argued that disagreement about values feeds through to factual beliefs because of fact-value entanglement. The paper concludes by criticising some recent proposals about the management of values in science on the basis of their presumption that there is such a thing as the ‘correct set of social values’ and developing the concept of ‘Robust Relevant Research and Innovation’ (R3I) in response, the main contention of which is that institutions of relevant research and innovation undertake active steps to represent a plurality of different value profiles.