Research Group
in Analytic Philosophy

The Shape of Metaontological Pluralism

Date: 14 June 2019

Time: 11:00

Place: Seminari Ramon Llull (UB, Barcelona)

Abstract

Ontological disputes seem too often end up in stalemate. We have several options, each of which upholds certain important theoretical virtues, but it’s not clear how to rank such virtues, and no further evidence seems to be forthcoming. What to do? Discontinue the dispute? Opt for a sweeping expressivism? In this paper I explore a popular alternative, which I call Metaontological Pluralism and that has already been defended in many shapes and sizes (the most popular being perhaps Hirsch’s Quantifier Variance). My goal here is to defend (what I take to be) the most general version of it, in order to assess its general tenability. I will especially focus on how to reconcile Metaontological Pluralism with a correspondence view of truth, in light of the many shapes and sizes such view has acquired (Tarski-style, truthmaker-style, etc.), aiming to show that Metaontological Pluralism is a tenable, reasonable position after all.