Research Group
in Analytic Philosophy

Abstract

Preventers prevent you from doing something. Some preventers are more robust than others. A jammed door prevents my escape (unless I put my weight into the effort); a locked door prevents my escape (even if I put my weight into the effort). Obstacles are robust preventers, restricting what an agent is able to do in a context even if things were "just a bit different" (Lewis 2020).

My aim in this paper is two-fold: first, I sketch a theory of *obstacles to knowledge*, the sorts of things that robustly prevent knowledge from being acquired, retained, or manifested. Second, I argue that theorizing in terms of obstacles to knowledge helps us recognize a wider range of epistemic excuses than can be accommodated in extant paradigms of epistemic responsibility (e.g., Boult (2017), Lasonen-Aarnio (forthcoming), Littlejohn (forthcoming), Williamson (forthcoming). I conclude by gesturing at a new way to think about * being in a position to know*.