Research Group
in Analytic Philosophy

Workshop Content and Conceptuality

Program and schedule, click here.


Both perception and thought are frequently thought to have content that can be characterized by specifying its accuracy or truth-conditions. However, most philosophers think that these contents differ along two dimensions. On the one hand, perceptual content is commonly taken to be iconic or picture-like while thought content is taken to be propositional or sentence-like.  On the other hand, perceptual content is commonly taken to be non-conceptual, while thought content is taken to be conceptual. There seems to be widespread agreement on this. For example, even those who think that perception has a disunified metaphysics and thus has both iconic and propositional content seem to agree that the former is non-conceptual, while the latter is conceptual.


In this 2-day workshop we will focus on the question whether the distinction between Iconic vs. Propositional content indeed coincides with the distinction between Non-Conceptual vs. Conceptual content, and, if so, then why. We are especially interested in the following sorts of questions:


  • -Could some of perceptual content be non-propositional, yet conceptual content?
  • -Is all propositional content ipso facto conceptual? If so, why? 
  • -Is there some sort of essential or constitutive connection between propositionality and -conceptuality?





• Christopher Gauker (University of Salzburg)

• Alex Grzankowski (Birkbeck)

• Marta Jorba (Basque Country University)

• Jack Lyons (University of Arkansas)

• Jake Quilty-Dunn (University of Oxford)

• Indrek Reiland (UB)

• Joulia Smortchkova (University of Oxford)

• Josefa Toribio (ICREA-UB)