Research Group in Analytic Philosophy

Workshop Content and Conceptuality

Both perception and thought are frequently thought to have content that can be characterized by specifying its accuracy or truth-conditions. However, most philosophers think that these contents differ along two dimensions. On the one hand, perceptual content is commonly taken to be iconic or picture-like while thought content is taken to be propositional or sentence-like.  On the other hand, perceptual content is commonly taken to be non-conceptual, while thought content is taken to be conceptual. There seems to be widespread agreement on this. For example, even those who think that perception has a disunified metaphysics and thus has both iconic and propositional content seem to agree that the former is non-conceptual, while the latter is conceptual.


In this 2-day workshop we will focus on the question whether the distinction between Iconic vs. Propositional content indeed coincides with the distinction between Non-Conceptual vs. Conceptual content, and, if so, then why. We are especially interested in the following sorts of questions:


  • -Could some of perceptual content be non-propositional, yet conceptual content?
  • -Is all propositional content ipso facto conceptual? If so, why? 
  • -Is there some sort of essential or constitutive connection between propositionality and -conceptuality?





• Christopher Gauker (University of Salzburg)

• Alex Grzankowski (Birkbeck)

• Marta Jorba (Basque Country University)

• Jack Lyons (University of Arkansas)

• Jake Quilty-Dunn (University of Oxford)

• Indrek Reiland (UB)

• Joulia Smortchkova (University of Oxford)

• Josefa Toribio (ICREA-UB)