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Department of Philosophy

University of Edinburgh

Josefa (Pepa) Toribio (PhD, Complutense University, Madrid) joined the Department of Philosophy at the University of Edinburgh in August 2004, having previously held research positions at the School of Cognitive and Computing Sciences, University of Sussex, and teaching positions at Washington University, St Louis (Assistant Professor), and Indiana University (Associate Professor).

Interests

Philosophy of Language, Philosophy of Mind, and Cognitive Science.

The focus of my most recent research has been on the notion of non-conceptual content, the debate between internalism and externalism, and the problematic assumptions underlying certain naturalistic approaches to meaning. Currently I am exploring the conceptualism vs. nonconceptualism debate as it arises at the barely-explored intersection between scientifically-informed Philosophy of Mind / Cognitive Science and what might be dubbed the ‘normative image’ of mind, according to which a proper account of the mental cannot be developed without attention to matters concerning value and responsibility. I have held fellowships from The British Council, the Royal Society of Edinburgh, and the Ministry of Education in Spain.

Selection of Publications

Toribio, J., “Causal Efficacy, Content and Levels of Explanation”. Logique et Analyse, 135-136, 1991, pp 297-318.

Toribio, J., “Why There Still Has to Be a Theory of Consciousness”, Consciousness and Cognition, 2 (1), 1993, 28-47.

Clark, A. & Toribio, J., “Doing without Representing?” Synthese, 101, 1994, pp, 401-431.

Toribio, J., “Ecological Content”, Pragmatics and Cognition, 5:2, 1997, pp. 257-285.

Toribio, J., “Twin Pleas: Probing Content and Compositionality”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 57, (4), 1997, pp 871-889.

Clark, A. and Toribio, J. (Eds.), Conceptual Issues in Artificial Intelligence and Cognitive Science. A Four Volume Readings Series. New York, NY: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1998.

Toribio, J., “Meaning and Other Non-Biological Categories”, Philosophical Papers, 27 (2), 1998, pp. 129-150.

Toribio, J., “Naturalism and Causal Explanation”, Communication and Cognition, 32 (3/4), 1999, pp. 243-258.

Toribio, J., “Meaning, Dispositions, and Normativity”. Minds and Machines, 9 (3), 1999, pp. 399-413.

Toribio, J., “Extruding Intentionality from the Metaphysical Flux”, Journal of Experimental and Theoretical AI, 11, 1999, pp. 501-518.

Toribio, J., “Semantic Responsibility”. Philosophical Explorations, 1, January 2002, pp. 39-58.

Toribio, J., “Modularity, Relativism, and Neural Constructivism”. Cognitive Science Quarterly. Vol. 2 (1) 2002, pp. 93-106.

Toribio, J., “Mindful Belief”. Theoria. A Swedish Journal of Philosophy. Volume 68, Part 3, 2002, pp. 224-249.

Toribio, J., “Perceptual Experience and Its Contents”, The Journal of Mind and Behavior. Autumn 2002, 23, (24), pp. 375-392

Toribio, J., “Free Belief”, Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 2003, 2 (2), pp. 327-336.

Toribio, J., “How Do We Know How?” Philosophical Explorations, March 2008.

For access to some of these articles, enter 'Toribio' into the Edinburgh Research Archive

Visiting positions

School of Cognitive and Computing Sciences, University of Sussex (1997)

LOGOS. Department of Logic, History and Philosophy of Science. University of Barcelona (Autumn 2007).