Research Group in Analytic Philosophy

About Ourselves

Duration: 2014 - 2017

Code: FFI2013-47948-P

Principal Investigator

Manuel García-Carpintero

Other researchers

Marta Campdelacreu (UB)
Ignacio Ávila Cañamares (Bogotá)
Gemma Celestino Fernández (UB)
Claudia Compte Vives (Valencia)
Josep Corbí (Valencia)
Kathrin Glüer-Pagin (Stockholm)
Marie Guillot (UB)
Alisa Mandrigin (Warwick)
Teresa Marques (UPF, Barcelona)
Ivan Milić (UB)
Peter Pagin (Stockholm)
Chiara Panizza (UB)
Francesc Pereña (UB)
Josep Lluís Prades (Girona)
Carlota Serrahima (UB)


In the 1960s and 1970s Castañeda, Perry and Lewis argued that, among de re or singular thoughts, thoughts about oneself “as oneself” – de se thoughts – raise special issues. Perry and Lewis offered contrasting accounts: while Lewis aims to account for de se thoughts by taking the subject away from de se contents, which are thus properties instead of complete traditional propositions, Perry offers an account compatible with traditional views. This issue has recently become a hot topic of debate, on different counts. First, there is a debate whether natural languages include expressions specifically devoted to the ascription of de se thoughts. Second, some recent proposals to relativize truth appeal to de se contents, understood along the lines that Lewis' suggested. Third, there have been proposals to characterize in such terms the content of conscious perceptual experiences and related matters, such as the primary/secondary quality distinction. This project aims at clarifying the nature of first-personal thoughts, investigating in particular whether the Lewisian view is required to account for the indicated phenomena, or a Perrian view could properly account for them. The project aims to investigate also whether an account of de se thoughts should be able to explain epistemological aspects of subjectivity such as the phenomenon of Immunity to Error through Misidentification, and, if so, how the Lewisian and Perrian accounts fare in that respect. Similarly, the project aims to investigate whether an account of de se thoughts presupposes an account of self-knowledge – the apparently privileged knowledge we have of our own states – and, if so, once again to compare how the Lewisian and Perrian accounts fare in that respect. Finally, we want to explore the relevance of accounts of de se thoughts for issues concerning the metaphysics of persons. 


  • Ivan Milić, Javier González de Prado Salas. 2018

    Recommending beauty: semantics and pragmatics of aesthetic predicates 

    Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 61 (2): 1-27

  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2017

    The Mill-Frege Theory of Proper Names

    Mind, doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzx010

  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2017

    The Philosophical Significance of the De Se

    Inquiry 2017, vol. 60(3), 253-276, DOI: 10.1080/0020174X.2017.1262003

  • Ivan Milić, Stefan Reining . 2017

    A Wittgensteinian Role-Based Account of Assertion 

    Philosophical Investigations 40 (2): 139-153

  • Ivan Milić. 2017

    Against Selfless Assertions 

    Philosophical Studies 174 (9): 2277-2295

  • Marta Campdelacreu. 2016

    Sutton's Solution to the Grounding Problem and Intrinsically Composed Colocated Objects

    Crítica 2016, pp. 77-92

  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2016

    Token-reflexive Presuppositions and the De Se

    García-Carpintero, M. & Torre, S. (eds.), About Oneself, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016, 179-199.

  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2016

    Relatar lo ocurrido como invención: una introducción a la filosofía de la ficción contemporánea

    Editorial Cátedra, Madrid

  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2016

    Mark Richard’s Truth and Truth-Bearers

    Notre Dame Philosophical Review 

  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2016

    Recent Debates on Learning from Fiction

    Teorema 35(3), 5-20

  • Marie Guillot. 2016

    Thinking of Oneself as the Thinker: the Concept of Self and the Phenomenology of Intellection

    Philosophical Explorations. Forthcoming.

  • Marie Guillot. 2016

    I Me Mine: on a Confusion Concerning Subjective Character

    Review of Philosophy and Psychology. [Download PDF ]

  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2015

    De Se Thoughts and Immunity to Error through Misidentification

    Synthese, DOI: 10.1007/s11229-015-0817-y.

  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2015

    Contexts as Shared Commitments

    Frontiers in Psychology, 6:1932, 2015, DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.01932.

  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2015

    Accommodating Presuppositions

    Topoi, DOI: 10.1007/s11245-014-9264-5

  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2015

    Is Fictional Reference Rigid?

    Organon F 22, suppl. 1, 145-168.

  • Ivan Milić. 2015

    A Note on Existentially Known Assertions 

    The Philosophical Quarterly 65 (261): 813-821

  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2014

    Understanding Anaphoric Dependence: A Reply to Glezakos

    Revista de Filosofía de la Universidad de Costa Rica 53, 136, suppl. vol. (2014), 119-124.

  • Marie Guillot, joint work with Alexandre Billon. 2014

    Can Fregeans Have I-Thoughts?

    In Juan Diego Moya Bedoya and David Suárez-Rivero (eds), Gottlob Frege’s Puzzle. A Reexamination of the Cognitive Significance Phenomenon. Rev. Filosofía Univ. Costa Rica. 53 (136 Extraordinary), 9-15, May-August 2014, p. 97-105. [Download PDF ]

  • Marie Guillot. 2014

    Identification-Free at Last. Semantic Relativism, Evans's Legacy and a Unified Approach to Immunity to Error through Misidentification

    Teorema, Vol XXXIII/3 (autumn 2014). Winner of the 2013 Teorema Essay Prize. [Advanced draft ]