Research Group
in Analytic Philosophy

Publications (alphabetical order)

  • Anton Alexandrov. 2019

    An Outline of De Re Beliefs about Natural Numbers

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    G. Mras, P. Weingartner and B. Ritter (eds.), Proceedings of the 41st International Ludwig Wittgenstein Symposium: Philosophy of Logic and Mathematics, De Gruyter, Berlin.

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  • Javier Anta. 2018

    Scanning the Invisible: Framing Diagrammatic Cognition in Experimental Particle Physics

    In: Chapman P., Stapleton G., Perez-Kriz S., Bellucci F (eds) Diagrammatic Representation and Inference. Diagrams 2018. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 10871, pp-779-782. Springer Cham. 

  • Javier Anta. 2018

    Indispensability and Effectiveness of Diagrams in Molecular Biology

    Quaderns de Filosofía (Forthcoming)
  • Javier Anta. 2018

    Un Mundo de Estructuras: Simetrías Grupo-Teóricas desde el Realismo Infoestructural

    Metatheoria (Forthcoming)
  • Marc Artiga. 2016

    New Perspectives on Artifactual and Biological Functions

    Applied Ontology
  • Marc Artiga. 2016

    Teleosemantic Modeling of Cognitive Representations

    Biology and Philosophy
  • Marc Artiga. 2015

    Rescuing Tracking Theories of Morality

    Philosophical Studies
  • Marc Artiga, M. Martinez. 2015

    The Organizational Account of Function is an Etiological Accountof Function

    Acta Biotheoretica
  • Marc Artiga. 2015

    Review of 'Millikan and her Critics'

    Mind
  • Marc Artiga. 2014

    Signaling Without Cooperation

    Biology and Philosophy
  • Marc Artiga. 2014

    Teleosemantics, Info-telsemantics and Circularity

    International Journal of Philosophical Studies

  • Marc Artiga. 2014

    Prinz’s Naturalistic Theory of Intentional Content

    Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofia

  • Marc Artiga. 2014

    The Modal Theory of Function is not About Functions

    Philosophy of Science
  • Marc Artiga. 2013

    Reliable Misrepresentation and Teleosemantics

    Disputatio
  • Marc Artiga. 2013

    Teleosemantics and Pushmi-Pullyu Representations

    Erkenntnis
  • Marc Artiga. 2012

    The Singular Thought Strategy and the Content of Perception

    Proceedings of the VII Conference of the Spanish Society for Logic, Methodology and Philosphy of Science. Santiago de Compostela (Spain): USC Press.
  • Marc Artiga. 2012

    The Limits of Freedom as Non-Domination

    Astrolabio. Revista Internacional de Filosofia
  • Marc Artiga. 2011

    Re-Organizing Organizational Accounts of Function 

    Applied Ontology, Vol. 6, p. 105–124
  • Marc Artiga. 2011

    On Several Misuses of Sober's Selection for/selection of Distinction

    Topoi. An International Review of Philosophy
  • Marc Artiga. 2010

    Teleosemantics and the Indeterminacy Problem

    Proceedings of the VI Conference of the Spanish Society for Analytic Philosophy, Tenerife, Universidad de la Laguna, pp.29-30
  • Marc Artiga. 2010

    Learning and Selection Processes

    Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations for Science, Vol. 25:2, p. 197-210
  • Marc Artiga. 2009

    Against Original Intentionality

    Preceedings of the VI Conference of the Spanish Society of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science 

  • Andre Bazzoni. 2021

    Names in philosophy

    In Stalmaszczyk, P. (eds), The Cambridge Handbook of the Philosophy of Language. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

  • Andre Bazzoni. 2017

    Philosophical foundations of partial belief models

    Cognitive Systems Research 41: 116–129

  • Andre Bazzoni. 2016

    Pure quotation, metalanguage, and metasemantics

    Linguistics and Philosophy 39(2): 119–149

  • Andre Bazzoni. 2016

    Names and individuals

    In P. Stalmaszczyk & L.F. Moreno (eds.), Philosophical Approaches to Proper Names, 123–146. Peter Lang GmbH.

  • Andre Bazzoni. 2015

    Hintikka on the foundations of mathematics: IF Logic and uniformity concepts

    Journal of Philosophical Logic 44(5): 507–516.

  • Andre Bazzoni. 2015

    On the concepts of function and dependence

    Principia: International Journal of Epistemology 19(1): 1–15.
  • Delia Belleri. 2016

    The Underdeterminacy of Sentences and the Expressibility of Our Thoughts

    dialectica, Volume 70, Issue 1, pp. 29-48
  • Delia Belleri. 2016

    Verbalism and Metalinguistic Negotiation in Ontological Disputes

    Philosophical Studies (Online First: http://rdcu.be/kG8t
  • Delia Belleri. 2015

    Externalistic Derogation

    Linguistic and Philosophical Investigations, Vol. 14, 2015, pp. 70–81
  • Delia Belleri. 2014

    Semantic Under-determinacy and Communication

    London/Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan
  • Delia Belleri. 2014

    You Can Say What You Think: Vindicating the Effability of Our Thoughts

    Synthese, Volume 191, Issue 18, pp. 4431-4450
  • Delia Belleri. 2014

    Disagreement and Dispute

    Philosophia, 42 (2):289-307
  • Delia Belleri. 2013

    On What is Effable

    Thought: A Journal of Philosophy, Volume 2, Issue 4 (Dec), pp. 341–349
  • Delia Belleri, Michele Palmira. 2013

    Towards a Unified Notion of Disagreement

    Grazer Philosophische Studien, Vol. 88 (2013), pp. 124-139
  • Delia Belleri, Annalisa Coliva. 2013

    Some Observations on François Recanati's Mental Files

    Disputatio, Vol. V, n. 36: 107-117
  • Delia Belleri. 2013

    Meta-Representation in Utterance Comprehension: the Case of Semantically Incomplete Expressions

    Journal of Pragmatics 57(C): 158–169
  •  . 2015

    Luck as Risk and the Lack of Control Account of Luck (reprinted)

    In The Philosophy of Luck, (eds.) D. H. Pritchard & L. Whittington, Wiley-Blackwell: 3-26
  •  . 2015

    No Luck in the Distance: A Reply to Freitag

    Theoria: A Swedish Journal of Philosophy (forthcoming)
  •  . 2015

    Luck as Risk and the Lack of Control Account of Luck

    Metaphilosophy, 46 (1), 1-25.
  •  . 2014

    Anti-Luck (Too Weak) Virtue Epistemology

    Erkenntnis, 79 (4), 733-754.
  •  . 2014

    Is Safety In Danger?

    Philosophia 42 (1), 63-81
  •  . 2013

    Lies and Deception: A Failed Reconciliation

    Logos & Episteme: An International Journal of Epistemology, 4 (2), 227-230.

     

  • Oscar Cabaco. 2002

    Convencionalidad y significado sin uso

    Theoria vol. 17/3, pp. 417-434
  • Marta Campdelacreu. 2018

    'Constitutionalism, Cheap Indeterminism and the Grounding Problem', Metaphysica (forthcoming)

  • Marta Campdelacreu. 2016

    Sutton's Solution to the Grounding Problem and Intrinsically Composed Colocated Objects

    Crítica 2016, pp. 77-92
  • Marta Campdelacreu. 2015

    Review of 'The Double Lives of Objects' by Thomas Sattig, OUP2015. Disputatio (forthcoming)

  • Marta Campdelacreu. 2015

    'The Constitution Relation and Baker's Account of It'; International Journal of Philosophical Studies 2015, pp. 1-19

  • Marta Campdelacreu. 2015

    'Las paradojas de la coincidencia temporal y la individuación de los objetos materiales'; en Prades, JL. (ed.): Cuestiones de Metafísica. Tecnos 2015

  • Marta Campdelacreu. 2013

    'Do we need two notions of constitution?'; Philosophia 2013, pp. 503-519

  • Marta Campdelacreu. 2010

    'Naturalness, vagueness, and sortals'; Metaphysica 2010, pp. 79-91

  • Marta Campdelacreu. 2010

    'Stage universalism, voints and sorts'; Disputatio 2010, pp. 151-165

  • Marta Campdelacreu. 2005

    'El argumento de Sider para el tetradimensionalismo'; en Txapartegi, E. (ed.): Los objetos de la ciencia: el mundo que la ciencia contruye, 2005, pp.159-70. Córdoba: Brujas. 

  • Marta Campdelacreu. 2003

    'Un argumento contra la tesis de la identidad ocasional'; en Flagueras, J.L. (ed.): Palabras y pensamientos: una mirada analítica, 2003, pp.403-13. Santiago de Compostela: servicio de publicacións e intercambio científico

  • Marta Campdelacreu. 2002

    'Algunas consideraciones sobre modalidad e identidad'; Anábasisdigital 2002

  • Samuele Chilovi. 2018

    Grounding entails supervenience

    Synthese, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-1723-x
  • Samuele Chilovi, J.J. Moreso. 2016

    The Semantics and Pragmatics of 'According to the Law'

    Pragmatics and Law: Philosophical Perspectives, ed. by A. Capone and F. Poggi, part of a series of volumes called 'Perspectives on Pragmatics, Philosophy and Psychology', Springer.
  • Samuele Chilovi, J.J. Moreso. 2016

    to appear in 'Che cosa è il diritto. Ontologie e concezioni del giuridico', G. Bongiovanni, G. Pino and C. Roversi (a cura di), Giappichelli (forthcoming).
  • Samuele Chilovi. 2016

    The Speaker Dilemma in Legal Implicatures

    to appear in Anchoring Institutions. Democracy and Institutions in a Half-automated World, edited by Casanovas, P. et al.. Springer

  • Samuele Chilovi. 2016

    The Speaker Dilemma in Legal Implicatures: Comparisons and Further Issues

    in Ferreira Leite de Paula, A., Santacoloma, A. S., Villa Rosas, G. (Eds.) Truth and Objectivity in Law and Morals, Proceedings of the Second Special Workshop held at the 27th World Congress of the International Association for Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy in Washington D.C., 2015, Archiv für Rechts- und Sozial philosophie. Beiheft Num.  Stuttgart (Ge): Franz Steiner Verlag.

  • Samuele Chilovi, J.J. Moreso. 2016

    Interpretative Arguments and the Application of the Law

    Handbook of Legal Reasoning and Argumentation, (Bongiovanni, G.; Postema, G.; Rotolo, A.; Sartor, G.; Valentini, C.; Walton, D. (Eds.)), Springer.
  • Diana Couto. 2018

    Donald Davidson: subjetivo-objetivo. O retorno ao cogito.

    Col. MLAG Discussion Papers, Vol. 10. Porto: Faculdade de Letras da Universidade do Porto, pp. 208. ISBN: 978- 989-54030-1-1.
  • Diana Couto. 2018

    Del cartesianismo de Quine hacia el giro epistemológico intersubjetivo

    In: L. Valls, A. Meléndez, B. Fernández & A.L. Batalla. (edits.). Nuevas tendencias en la Filosofía Contemporánea. Valencia, pp. 21-43. ISBN: 987-84-09-00418-8.
  • Diana Couto. 2017

    Monismo. Anómalo?: Donald Davidson e o Problema da Causalidade Mental.

    Kínesis, 9(20), pp. 61-86.
  • Diana Couto, Brena Fernandez, Luís Veríssimo. 2017

    Em busca de boas razões.

    In: B. Fernandez, L. Veríssimo, D. Couto (edits), 2017. Por que Razão? Razões para acreditar, para agir e para preferir. Col. MLAG Discussion Papers, Vol. 8. Porto: Faculdade de Letras da Universidade do Porto, pp. 5-14.
  • Diana Couto, Brena Fernandez, Luís Veríssimo. 2017

    Por que Razão? Razões para acreditar, para agir e para preferir. 

    Col. MLAG Discussion Papers, Vol. 8. Porto: Faculdade de Letras da Universidade do Porto, pp. 200. ISBN: 978-989-99854-7-6.
  • Diana Couto. 2016

    (Book Review) D. Dahlstrom, A. Elpidorou, W. Hoop. (edits.). Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind: Conceptual and Empirical Approaches, Routledge 2016.

    Revista de Filosofia da Faculdade de Letras da Universidade do Porto, pp. 354-364. ISSN: 2183-6892. DOI: 10.21747/21836892/fil33r3.
  • Diana Couto. 2015

    Finalidade e funções da linguagem em Agostinho de Hipona.

    Civitas Augustiniana, 4, pp. 11-29. ISSNe 2182-7141. DOI: 10.21747/civitas/42015a1.
  • Diana Couto. 2014

    O Amor como Fundamento da Justiça em Agostinho de Hipona.

    Civitas Augustiniana, 3, pp. 9-32. ISSNe: 2182-7174. DOI: 10.21747/civitas/32014/a01.
  •  . 2014

    Is attention necessary for consciousness? A consideration of Prinz’s proposal. (Work in progress.)

  • Bartłomiej Czajka, Jędrzej Piotr Grodniewicz. 2017

    On the Cognitive Role of Singular Thoughts

    Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 8: 573. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-016-0327-y
  • Bartłomiej Czajka. 2016

    Review of Epistemic Angst by Duncan Pritchard

    Disputatio, Vol. VIII, No. 43, November 2016, pp. 296-302.

    PDF available here.

  • Roger  Deulofeu Batllori, Javier Suárez. 2019

    Equilibrium explanation as structural non-mechanistic explanations: The case of longterm bacterial persistence in human hosts

    under review. Teorema
  • Roger  Deulofeu Batllori, Javier Suárez. 2019

    Explaining the behaviour of random ecological networks: The stability of the microbiome as a case of integrative pluralism




    Under review. Synthese
  • Roger  Deulofeu Batllori, Javier Suárez. 2018

    When mechanisms are not enough. The origin of eukaryotes and scientific explanation”. 2018

     Philosophy of Science - Between Natural Sciences, the Social Sciences, and the Humanities. Ed. G. Schurz, Dordetch, Springer. EPSA Series
  • Esa Díaz-León. 2018

    "Kinds of Social Construction"

    In Pieranna Garavaso (ed.) Bloomsbury Companion to Analytic Feminism, Bloomsbury Academic, pp. 103-22.
  • Esa Díaz-León. 2018

    "On Haslanger's Meta-metaphysics: Social Structures and Metaphysical Deflationism"

    Disputatio, pp. 201-16.
  • Esa Díaz-León. 2017

    "Epistemic Contextualism and Conceptual Ethics"

    In Jonathan Ichikawa (ed.) Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Contextualism, Taylor & Francis, pp. 71-80.
  • Esa Díaz-León. 2017

    "Sexual Orientation as Interpretation? Sexual Desires, Concepts, and Choice"

    Journal of Social Ontology, 3(2), pp. 231-48.
  • Esa Díaz-León. 2017

    "Feminist Metaphysics and Philosophy of Language"

    In Carol Hay (ed.), Philosophy: Feminism. Macmillan Interdisciplinary Handbooks, Macmillan Reference USA, pp. 251-71.
  • Esa Díaz-León. 2016

    "'Woman' as a Politically Significant Term: A Solution to the Puzzle"

    Hypatia 31(2), pp. 245-58.
  • Esa Díaz-León. 2016

    "Norms of Judgement, Naturalism, and Normativism about Content"

    Philosophical Explorations 19(1), pp. 48-58.
  • Esa Díaz-León. 2016

    "Phenomenal Concepts: Neither Circular Nor Opaque"

    Philosophical Psychology, 29(8), pp. 1186-99.
  • Esa Díaz-León. 2015

    "In Defence of Historical Constructivism about Races"

    Ergo, 2(21), pp. 547-62.
  • Esa Díaz-León. 2015

    "What is Social Construction?"

    European Journal of Philosophy, 23(4), pp. 1137-52.
  • Esa Díaz-León. 2014

    "Do A Posteriori Physicalists Get Our Phenomenal Concepts Wrong?"

    Ratio 27(1), pp. 1-16
  • Esa Díaz-León. 2012

    "Social Kinds, Conceptual Analysis, and the Operative Concept: A Reply to Haslanger"

    Humana.Mente--Journal of Philosophical Studies 22, pp. 57-74.
  • Esa Díaz-León. 2012

    "Actors are not Like Zombies"

    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 112(1), pp. 115-22.
  • Esa Díaz-León. 2012

    "Are Ghosts Scarier than Zombies?"

    Consciousness & Cognition 21(2), pp. 747-8.
  • Esa Díaz-León. 2011

    "Reductive Explanation, Concepts, and A Priori Entailment"

    Philosophical Studies 155(1), pp. 99-116.
  • Esa Díaz-León. 2010

    "Can Phenomenal Concepts Explain the Epistemic Gap?"

    Mind 119(476), pp. 533-51.
  • Esa Díaz-León. 2009

    "How Many Explanatory Gaps Are There?"

    APA Newsletter on Philosophy and Computers 8(2), pp. 33-35.
  • Esa Díaz-León. 2008

    "We are living in a material world (and I am a material girl)"

    Teorema 27(3), pp. 85-101.
  • Esa Díaz-León. 2008

    "Defending the Phenomenal Concept Strategy"

    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86(4), pp. 597-610.
  • José Antonio Díez. 2017

    A (Fatal) Trilemma for Best Theory Realism

    European Journal for Philosophy of Science , https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-017-0185-1
  • José Antonio Díez, Karina Alleva, Lucía Federico. 2017

    Conceptual Reconstruction and Epistemic Import: Allosteric Mechanistic Explanations As a Unified Theory-Net

     

    Crítica, 49.146, pp 5-36
  • José Antonio Díez, Karina Alleva, Lucia Federico. 2017

    Models, Theory Structure and Mechanisms in Biochmestry: The Case of Allosterism 

    Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and
    Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Science, 2017, 63, 1-14 
  • José Antonio Díez, Andrea Iacona. 2016

    Del amor y otros engaños. Breve tratado filosófico sobre razones y pasiones

    AlfaDecay, Barcelona
  • José Antonio Díez. 2016

    Siete tesis metaestructuralistas

    in J. Díez (ed.) Exploraciones Pluralistas. Las filosofías de C. Ulises Moulines, UNAM, México 2016
  • José Antonio Díez, Andrea Iacona. 2015

    Amore a altri inganni. Tratello filosofico su ragioni e passioni

    Indiana, Torino
  • José Antonio Díez, Pablo Lorenzano. 2015

    Are Natural Selection Explanatory Models A Priori?

    Biology and Philosophy 30 (6), 887-809
  • José Antonio Díez. 2015

    Counterfactuals, the Discrimination Problem and the Limit Assumption 

    International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 23/1, 85-110
  • José Antonio Díez, C. Carman. 2015

    Did Ptolemy make novel predictions? Launching geocentrism to the scientific realism debate

    Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A, 52, 20-34
  • José Antonio Díez. 2014

    Scientific explanation as ampliative, specialized embedding: a neo-Hempelian account

    Erkenntnis 79/8, 1413-1443
  • José Antonio Díez, Pablo Lorenzano. 2013

    Who Got What Wrong? Fodor and Piattelli on Darwin: Guiding Principles and Explanatory Models in Natural Selection

    Erkenntnis 78/5, 1143-1175.
  • José Antonio Díez, Kareem Kahlifa, Bert Leuridan. 2013

    General theories of explanation: buyers beware

    Synthese 190/3, 379-396.
  • José Antonio Díez. 2011

    Can we dispense with mimesis in representation? Essay review of R. Frigg and C. Hunter (eds.) Beyond mimesis and convention. Representation in art and science

    Metascience 21/1, 105-110
  • José Antonio Díez. 2010

    On Popper's Strong Inductivism 

    Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 42, 105-116
  • José Antonio Díez. 2009

    History of Measurement Theory

    in Gallez, C., Lorenzano, P., Ortiz, E. y Rheinberger, H (eds.), History and Philosophy of Science and Technology,  Encyclopedia of Life Support Systems (EOLSS-UNESCO), Oxford 2009, [electronic edition: http://www.eolss.net] 

  • José Antonio Díez. 2007

    Rationality in Normal Science and the Structure of Theories

    Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 38, 2007 pp. 543 -554.

  • José Antonio Díez. 2006

    Rivalry and Comparability. Looking Outside the Theories

    G. Ernst and K-G Niebergall (eds.), Philosophie der Wissenschaft- Wissenschaft der Philosophie, Mentis, Berlin 2006, 31-50
  • José Antonio Díez. 2005

    The Ramsey Sentence and Theoretical Content

    in M. J. Frapolli (ed.), Belief, Truth and

    Probability. Essays to Mark the Centenary of Frank Plumpton Ramsey's Birth, Continuum, London 2005 pp. 70-103.

  • José Antonio Díez. 2004

    La explicación científica: causalidad, unificación y subsunción teórica

    L. E. Hoyos (ed.), Relativismo y racionalidad, UNC 2004, Bogotá, pp. 283-414
  • José Antonio Díez. 2002

    Iniciación a la Lógica

    Ariel, Barcelona
  • José Antonio Díez. 2002

    A Program for the Individuation of Scientific Concepts

    Synthese 130, 2002, pp. 13-48
  • José Antonio Díez. 2002

    Possession Conditions for Scientific Concepts

    in C. U. Moulines and K. Niebergall (eds.),

    Argument und Analyse, Mentis, Berlin 2002, pp. 83-108.

  • José Antonio Díez. 2002

    Measurement Theory

    Geneza, 2002, Kiev, pp. 24-41
  • José Antonio Díez. 2002

    Explicación, unificación y subsunción

    W. J. González (ed.), Pluralidad de la explicación científica, Ariel, Barcelona 2002, pp. 73-93
  • José Antonio Díez. 2000

    Structuralist Analysis of Fundamental Measurement Theories

    in W. Balzer, C. U. Moulines and J. Sneed (eds.), Structuralist Knowledge Representations. Paradigmatic Examples

    Poznan Studies 75, Rodopi, Amsterdam 2000, pp. 19-49.
  • José Antonio Díez. 2000

    Watermelonsand RedWatermelons. A Case Against Compositionality?

    Theoria, 15/2, San Sebastián, pp 281-285
  • José Antonio Díez. 1999

    A General Representation for Internal Proportional Comparison-combiantorial Systems When the Operation is Not Necessarily Closed

    Theoria 14/1, 1999, pp. 157-178
  • José Antonio Díez, C. U. Moulines. 1998

    Fundamentos de Filosofía de la Ciencia

    Ariel, Barcelona
  • José Antonio Díez. 1998

    Hacia una teoría general de la representación científica

    Theoria, 13/1, San Sebastián, pp. 157-178
  • José Antonio Díez. 1998

    Descripción, prescripción e interpretación

    C. Solís (ed.), Alta tensión: filosofía, sociología e historia de la ciencia, Paidos, Barcelona 1998, pp. 235-258
  • José Antonio Díez. 1997

    A Hundred Years of Numbers. An Historical Introduction to Measurement Theory. Part I: The Formation Period

    Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 21, 1, 1997, pp. 167-181.
  • José Antonio Díez. 1997

    A Hundred Years of Numbers. An Historical Introduction to Measurement Theory. Part II: Suppes and the Mature Theory

    Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 22, 2, 1997 pp. 237-265.

  • José Antonio Díez. 1997

    The Theory-Net of Interval Measurement Theory

    in A. Ibarra y T. Mormann (eds.),

    Representations of Scientific Rationality, Poznan Studies 61, Rodopi, Amsterdam 1997, pp. 135- 164
  • José Antonio Díez, C. U. Moulines. 1994

    Theories as Nets: Combinatorial Measurement Theory

    in P. Humphreys (ed.), Patrick Suppes,  Mathematical Philosopher, Kluwer Ac. P., Dordrecht 1994, pp. 275-297.
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2019

     On the Nature of Fiction-Making: Grice or Austin?

    British Journal of Aesthetics
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2019

    Assertions in Fictions: An Indirect Speech Act Account

    Grazer Philosophische Studien
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2019

    Normative Fiction-Making and the World of the Fiction

    Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2018

    Pure Quotation Is Demonstrative Reference

    Journal of Philosophy 115 (7): 361-381
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2018

    On the Nature of Presupposition: A Normative Speech Act Account

    Erkenntnis 10.1007/s10670-018-0027-3
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2018

    Co-identification and Fictional Names

    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Online First, DOI: 10.1111/phpr.12552
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2018

    Sneaky Assertions

    Philosophical Perspectives
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2018

    John Woods' Truth in Fiction

    Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2017

    The Mill-Frege Theory of Proper Names

    Mind, doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzx010
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2017

    The Philosophical Significance of the De Se

    Inquiry 2017, vol. 60(3), 253-276, DOI: 10.1080/0020174X.2017.1262003
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2016

    Token-reflexive Presuppositions and the De Se

    García-Carpintero, M. & Torre, S. (eds.), About Oneself, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016, 179-199.
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2016

    Relatar lo ocurrido como invención: una introducción a la filosofía de la ficción contemporánea

    Editorial Cátedra, Madrid
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2016

    Mark Richard’s Truth and Truth-Bearers

    Notre Dame Philosophical Review 
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2016

    Recent Debates on Learning from Fiction

    Teorema 35(3), 5-20
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2015

    Accommodating Presuppositions

    Topoi, DOI: 10.1007/s11245-014-9264-5
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2015

    Is Fictional Reference Rigid?

    Organon F 22, suppl. 1, 145-168.
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2015

    De Se Thoughts and Immunity to Error through Misidentification

    Synthese, DOI: 10.1007/s11229-015-0817-y.
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2015

    Contexts as Shared Commitments

    Frontiers in Psychology, 6:1932, 2015, DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.01932.
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2014

    Introduction: The Problem of Empty Representations

    García-Carpintero, M. & Martí, G. (eds.), Empty Representations: Reference and Non-Existence, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014, 1-22.
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2014

    Understanding Anaphoric Dependence: A Reply to Glezakos

    Revista de Filosofía de la Universidad de Costa Rica 53, 136, suppl. vol. (2014), 119-124.
  • Manuel García-Carpintero, Teresa Marques. 2014

    Disagreement about taste: commonality presuppositions and coordination

    Australasian Journal of Philosophy, DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2014.922592
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2013

    Critical Study: Relativism and Monadic Truth

    Philosophical Quarterly, 2013, DOI: 10.1111/1467-9213.12011 .
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2013

    Relativism, the Open Future, and Propositional Truth

    F. Correia & A. Iacona (eds.), Around the Tree, Synthese Library, Springer, 2013, 1-27.
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2013

    Explicit Performatives Revisited

    Journal of Pragmatics, DOI: 10.1016/j.pragma.2013.01.005
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2013

    Self-Conception: Sosa on De Se Thought

    J. Turri (ed.), Virtuous Thoughts: The Philosophy of Ernest Sosa, Philosophical Studies Series, Springer, Dordrecht 2013, 73-99.
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2013

    Referencia y Ficción

    Perspectivas en Filosofía del Lenguaje, David Pérez-Chico (coord.), Prensas de la Universidad de Zaragoza, Zaragoza.
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2013

    Insinuating Information and Accommodating Presuppositions

    Brevity, Laurence Goldstein (ed.), OUP: Oxford, 214-229.
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2013

    Norms of Fiction -Making

    British Journal for Aesthetics, DOI: 10.1093/aesthj/ayt021
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2013

    The Self File and Immunity to Error Through Misidentification

    Disputatio 36, (2013), 191-206
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2012

    Minimalism on Quotation?

    Philosophical Studies, 161 (2012) , 207-225. DOI: 10.1007/s11098-011-9730-5 .
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2012

    Foundational Semantics I: Descriptive Accounts

    Philosophy Compass 7(6), 2012, 397-409 DOI: 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2012.00484.x.
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2012

    Foundational Semantics II: Normative Accounts

    Philosophy Compass 7(6), 2012, 410-421 DOI: 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2012.00485.x
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2012

    Vindicating Analyticity

    Disputatio 33, 4 (2012), 495-513.
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2012

    Editorial Introduction: the History of the Philosophy of Language

    García-Carpintero, M. & Kölbel, M. (eds.), The Continuum Companion to the Philosophy of Language, Continuum, London, London, 2012, 1-1.
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2011

    Review of Assertion, Brown & Cappelen (eds.), OUP 2011

    Teorema 30 (2011), 167-17.
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2011

    Double-duty Quotation, Conventional Implicatures and What Is Said

    E. Brendel, J. Meibauer & M. Steinbach (eds.): Understanding Quotation, Mouton Series in Pragmatics 7, 107-138.
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2011

    A Genealogical Notion

    Teorema 30, 43-52.
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2011

    Truth-Bearers and Modesty

    Grazer Philosophische Studien, 82, 49-75.
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2010

    Supervaluationism and the Report of Vague Contents

    S. Moruzzi & R. Dietz. (eds.), Cuts and Clouds: Essays in the Nature and Logic of Vagueness, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 345-359.
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2010

    Fictional Entities, Theoretical Models and Figurative Truth

    Frigg, R, and Hunter, M. (eds.), Beyond Mimesis and Convention – Representation in Art and Science, Springer, 139-68.
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2010

    Fictional Singular Imaginings

    Jeshion, R. (ed.), New Essays on Singular Thought, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 273-299.
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2010

    Gaskin's Ideal Unity

     Dialectica 64, 2, 279-288.
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2009

    Voltolini’s Ficta

    Dialectica 63, 57-66.
  • Manuel García-Carpintero, Manuel Pérez-Otero. 2009

    The Conventional and the Analytic

    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 78, 2, 239-274.
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2008

    Homophonic Prejudices

    Crítica 40, 67-84.
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2008

    Singular Thought and the Contingent A Priori

    Revue Internationale de Philosophie, special issue “Contemporary Analytic Philosophy of Mind” edited by Joëlle Proust, 62, 79-98.
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2008

    Relativism, Vagueness and What Is Said

    In García-Carpintero, M. & Kölbel, M. (eds.), Relative Truth, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2007

    Recanati on the Semantics-Pragmatics Distinction

    Crítica 38, 35-68.
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2007

    Fiction-Making as an Illocutionary Act

    The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 65, 203-216.
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2007

    A Non-Modal Conception of Secondary Properties

    Philosophical Papers 36, 1-36.
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2007

    Bivalence and What Is Said

    Dialectica 61, 167-190.
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2006

    Logical Form: Syntax and Semantics

    Wittgenstein Today, A. Coliva & E. Picardi (eds.) Il Poligrafo, Padova, 2004, 63-87.
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2006

    Frascolla on Tractarian Logical Pictures of Facts

    Dialectica 59, 87-97.
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2006

    Nonconceptual Modes of Presentation

    European Review of Philosophy 6, 65-81.
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2006

    Two-Dimensional Semantics: A Neo-Fregean Interpretation

    In Two-Dimensional Semantics, M. García-Carpintero & J. Macià (eds.), Oxford University Press, Oxford, 181-204.
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2005

    Double-Duty Quotation: The Deferred Ostension Account

    Belgian Journal of Linguistics 17, 89-106.
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2005

    The Real Distinction between Descriptions and Indexicals

    Teorema 24, 49-74.
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2004

    Assertion and the Semantics of Force Markers

    The Semantics/Pragmatics Distinction, C. Bianchi (ed.) CSLI Lecture Notes, The University of Chicago Press Stanford, 2004,133-166.
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2004

    The Deferred Ostension Theory of Quotation

    Noûs 38, 674-692.
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2003

    Qualia that It Is Right to Quine

    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 63, 357-377.
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2002

    Sense-Data: the Sensible Approach

    Grazer Philosophische Studien, 62, 17-63.
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2001

    Gricean Rational Reconstructions and the Semantics/Pragmatics Distinction

    Synthese, 97, 93-131.
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2000

    A Presuppositional Account of Reference-Fixing

    Journal of Philosophy, 97 (3),109-147.
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 1999

    Searle on Perception

    Teorema 18/1, 19-41
  • Manuel García-Carpintero, Manuel Pérez Otero. 1999

    The Ontological Commitments of Logical Theories

    European Review of Philosophy 4, 157-182.
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 1998

    Fregean versus Kripkean Reference

    Teorema 17/1, 21-44
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 1998

    Indexicals as Token-Reflexives

    Mind 107, pp. 529-563
  • Manuel García-Carpintero, Manuel Pérez Otero. 1998

    Davidson, Correspondence Truth, and the Frege-Gödel-Church Argument

    History and Philosophy of Logic, pp. 63-81.
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 1998

    A Paradox of Truth-Minimalism

    C. Martínez, U. Rivas & L. Villegas-Forero (eds.), Truth in Perspective, Ashgate, Aldershott (UK), pp. 37-63.
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 1996

    What Is a Tarskian Theory of Truth?

    Philosophical Studies 82, pp. 113-144
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 1996

    The Model-Theoretic Argument: Another Turn of the Screw

     Erkenntnis 44, pp. 305-316
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 1995

    The Philosophical Import of Connectionism : A Critical Notice of Andy Clark’s Associative Engines

    Mind and Language 10, pp. 370-401
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 1994

    Dretske on the Causal Efficacy of Meaning

    Mind and Language 9 (2), 181-202
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 1994

    Ostensive Signs: Against the Identity Theory of Quotation

    Journal of Philosophy, 91, 253-264.
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 1993

    The Grounds for the Model-Theoretic Account of the Logical Properties

    Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, vol. 34, núm. 1, 107-131
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 0

    The Supervenience of Mental Content

    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,  Vol. 94 (1994), pp. 117-135
  • J.P.  Grodniewicz, B. Czajka. 2016

    On the Cognitive Role of Singular Thoughts

    Review of Philosophy and Psychology, doi:10.1007/s13164-016-0327-y.

  • Marie Guillot. 2016

    I Me Mine: on a Confusion Concerning Subjective Character

    Review of Philosophy and Psychology. [Download PDF ]
  • Marie Guillot. 2016

    Thinking of Oneself as the Thinker: the Concept of Self and the Phenomenology of Intellection

    Philosophical Explorations. Forthcoming.
  • Marie Guillot, joint work with Alexandre Billon. 2014

    Can Fregeans Have I-Thoughts?

    In Juan Diego Moya Bedoya and David Suárez-Rivero (eds), Gottlob Frege’s Puzzle. A Reexamination of the Cognitive Significance Phenomenon. Rev. Filosofía Univ. Costa Rica. 53 (136 Extraordinary), 9-15, May-August 2014, p. 97-105. [Download PDF ]
  • Marie Guillot. 2014

    Connaissance de soi et connaissance du mien

    In Jean-Marie Chevalier & Benoit Gautier (eds), Connaître. Questions d'épistémologie contemporaine . Editions d'Ithaque.   

  • Marie Guillot. 2014

    Identification-Free at Last. Semantic Relativism, Evans's Legacy and a Unified Approach to Immunity to Error through Misidentification

    Teorema, Vol XXXIII/3 (autumn 2014). Winner of the 2013 Teorema Essay Prize. [Advanced draft ]

  • Marie Guillot. 2013

    The Limits of Selflessness. Semantic Relativism and the Epistemology of De Se Thoughts

    Synthese Vol. 190, Issue 10 (2013), p. 1793–1816. [Download PDF ]
  • Marie Guillot. 2012

    Anscombe aurait-elle été relativiste?

    Repha (6). 55-72. [PDF ]
  • Carl Hoefer, Chris Smeenk. 2016

    Philosophy of Physical Sciences

    Paul Humphreys (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Science.  Forthcoming, Oxford University Press, 2016

  • Carl Hoefer, Albert Solé. 2015

    Introduction: Space–time and the wave function

    Intro to special issue of Synthese (eds. A. Solé & C. Hoefer), Synthese 192:10 (2015), pp. 3055-3070.  DOI: 10.1007/s11229-015-0826-x.
  • Carl Hoefer, Roman Frigg. 2015

    The Best Humean System for Statistical Mechanics

    Erkenntnis. Special issue edited by J. Berkovitz & P. Huneman. December 2015, Volume 80, Supplement 3, pp 551-574
  • Carl Hoefer. 2014

    Consistency and Admissibility: Reply to Meacham

    Chance and Temporal Asymmetry (ed. Alastair Wilson), Oxford University Press, 2014.
  • Carl Hoefer. 2014

    Mach's Principle as action-at-a-distance in GR: the causality question 

    Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics.  Online First Oct. 2014
  • John Horden. 2016

    Devious Stipulations

    Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, forthcoming
  • John Horden. 2014

    Ontology in Plain English

    Philosophical Quarterly, 64: 225-42
  •  . 2016

    Is predication an act or an operation?, in: Topics in Predication Theory, P. Stalmaszczyk (ed.), Studies in Philosophy of Language and Linguistics, Peter Lang GmbH, forthcoming. 

    Should propositions proliferate?, Thoughtvol. 4 (2015), 243-51.

    Introduction (with M. Duží), Synthese, vol. 192 (2015), 525-34.

    Transparent quantification into hyperintensional objectual attitudes (with M. Duží), Synthese, vol. 192 (2015), 635-77.

    Qualifying quantifying-in, in: Quantifiers, Quantifiers, and QuantifiersA. Torza (ed.), Synthese Library, vol. 373 (2015), 241-69.

    Structured lexical concepts, property modifiers, and Transparent Intensional Logic, Philosophical Studies, vol. 172 (2015), 321-45.

  • Marta Jorba, Maria Rodó-de-Zárate. 2018

    Beyond Mutual Constitution: the Property Framework for Intersectionality Studies

    Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society.
  • Marta Jorba, Agustín Vicente. 2017

    The Linguistic Determination of Conscious Thought Content

    Noûs DOI: 10.1111/nous.12239
  • Marta Jorba. 2017

    La fenomenologia cognitiva

    Quaderns de Filosofia 4 (2): 61-89. 
  • Marta Jorba. 2016

    Attitudinal Cognitive Phenomenology and the Horizon of Possibilities.

    Breyer, T. and Gutland, Ch. (eds.). The Phenomenology of Thinking. Philosophical Investigations into the Character of Cognitive Experiences. London: Routlegde: 77-96.

  • Marta Jorba. 2016

    Review of Semantic Perception, by Jody Azzouni

    Mind 125 (497): 290-297.
  • Marta Jorba, Dermot Moran. 2016

    Conscious Thinking and Cognitive Phenomenology: Topics, Views and Future Developments

    Philosophical Explorations 19(2): 95-113.
  • Marta Jorba. 2016

    The Conscious and Phenomenal Character of Thought: Reflections on Their Possible Dissociation

    Phenomenology and Mind 10: 44-56.
  • Marta Jorba. 2015

    Thoughts, Processive Character and the Stream of Consciousness

    International Journal of Philosophical Studies 23 (5): 730-753.
  • Marta Jorba. 2015

    Conscious Thought and the Limits of Restrictivism

    Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía 47 (141): 3-32.
  • Marta Jorba. 2014

    Perspectives sobre el contracte sexual-social: John Locke i Carole Pateman.

    Anuari de la Societat Catalana de Filosofia XXV, pp. 117-133. 
  • Marta Jorba, Agustín Vicente. 2014

    Cognitive Phenomenology, Access to Contents and Inner Speech

    Journal of Consciousness Studies, Vol 21, Issue 9-10, pp. 74-99. 
  • Marta Jorba. 2013

    Book review of Cognitive Phenomenology 

    Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, Vol 2, Issue 4, pp. 883-890. 
  • Marta Jorba. 2013

    Translation: Gallagher, S. y Zahavi, D. (2013). La mente fenomenológica. (The Phenomenological Mind, 2012. 2nd edition. London: Routledge).

    Madrid: Alianza Editorial.
  • Marta Jorba. 2013

    Intencionalitat (Intentionalität).

    Anuari de la Societat Catalana de Filosofia XXIV, 115-13.
  • Marta Jorba, Rodó-de-Zárate, Maria. 2012

    Commentary of The Complexity of Intersectionality

    Humana.mente. Journal of Philosophical Studies. Vol 22, pp. 189-197. 
  • Marta Jorba. 2012

    Book review of Heidegger and the Watches. Genetic Phenomenology of time measurement

    Continental Philosophy Review. Vol 45, Issue 4, pp. 597-602. 
  • Marta Jorba. 2011

    Thinking and Phenomenal Consciousness

    Balkan Journal of Philosophy, Vol 3, Issue 1, pp. 101-110.
  • Marta Jorba. 2011

    La Intencionalidad: entre Husserl y la Filosofía de la mente contemporánea

    Investigaciones Fenomenológicas: anuario de la Sociedad Espeñola de Fenomenología, Vol 8, pp. 79-91. 
  • Marta Jorba. 2011

    Book review of Cuerpo Vivido

    Investigaciones Fenomenológicas: anuario de la Sociedad Española de Fenomenología, Vol 8, pp. 217-224.
  • Marta Jorba. 2010

    Is There a Specific Experience of Thinking?

    Theoria. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science. Vol 25, No 2, pp. 187-196.
  • Max Kölbel. 2017

    "About Concerns "

    In Ilse Depraetere and Raphael Salkie (eds.), Semantics and Pragmatics: Drawing a Line, Amsterdam: Springer, 197–214.

  • Max Kölbel. 2016

    "Aesthetic Judge-Dependence and Expertise "

    Inquiry 59, 589–617.
  • Max Kölbel. 2016

    "Moralischer Relativismus " (German translation of "Moral Relativism" (2015).

    In Markus Rüther (ed.), Grundkurs Metaethik. Münster: Mentis Verlag.
  • Max Kölbel. 2015

    "Moral Relativism "

    In Tim Crane (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2015, London: Routledge.
  • Max Kölbel. 2015

    "Propositionen "

    In Nikola Kompa (ed), Handbuch Sprachphilosophie, Stuttgart/Weimar: Verlag J.B. Metzler.

  • Max Kölbel. 2015

    Review of John MacFarlane, Assessment Sensitivity [CORRECTED VERSION]

    Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews
  • Max Kölbel. 2015

    "Relativism 1: Representational Content"

    Philosophy Compass 10/1, pp. 38–51.
  • Max Kölbel. 2015

    "Relativism 2: Semantic Content"

    Philosophy Compass 10/1, pp. 52–67.
  • Max Kölbel. 2014

    "Agreement and Communication"

    Erkenntnis 79, pp. 101–120.

  • Max Kölbel. 2013

    "The Conversational Role of Centered Contents "

    Inquiry 56, pp. 97–121.

  • Max Kölbel. 2013

    Wörtliche illokutionäre Kraft. Eine Verteidigung der konventionalen Behauptung

    in Eva-Maria Konrad et al. (eds), Fiktion, Wahrheit, Interpretation, Münster: Mentis Verlag.
  • Max Kölbel. 2013

    "Should we be Pluralists about Truth?"

    in Nicolaj Jang Pedersen and Cory Wright (eds), Truth Pluralism: Current Debates, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2013.
  • Max Kölbel. 2011

    Objectivity, Relativism and Context Dependence (text book for master-level course)

    Fernuniversität Hagen.
  • Max Kölbel. 2011

    "Global Relativism and Self-Refutation "

    Steven D. Hales (ed.), The Blackwell Companion to Relativism, Oxford: Blackwell.
  • Max Kölbel. 2011

    "Conversational Score, Assertion and Testimony "

    in Jessica Brown and Herman Cappelen (eds), New Essays on Assertion, Oxford Oxford University Press.
  • Max Kölbel. 2010

    "Vagueness as Semantic "

    Dietz and Moruzzi (eds.): Cuts and Clouds: Vagueness, its Nature and its Logic, Oxford: Oxford University Press
  • Max Kölbel. 2009

    "The Evidence for Relativism"

    Synthese 166 (January 2009), pp. 375–95.
  • Max Kölbel. 2009

    "Literal Force: A Defence of Conventional Assertion "

    in Sarah Sawyer (ed.), New Waves in Philosophy of Language, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 2010.
  • Max Kölbel, Darragh Byrne. 2009

    Arguing about Language (edited by Darragh Byrne and Max Kölbel)

    London: Routledge.
  • Max Kölbel. 2009

    Sittenvielfalt und Moralischer Relativismus

    in Gerhard Ernst (ed.): Moralischer Relativismus, Paderborn: Mentis.
  • Max Kölbel. 2009

     English translation of pp. 25-36 as well as the last paragraph of Gottlob Frege: “Über Sinn und Bedeutung”. The translation is by Max Kölbel and may be used unchanged for non-commercial purposes, as long as the source is properly acknowledged. 

    This translation has appeared also in Darragh Byrne and Max Kölbel (eds), Arguing about Language, London: Routledge 2010, pp. 49–55.
  • Max Kölbel. 2008

    "Truth in Semantics "

    Midwest Studies in Philosophy 32 (2008), pp. 242–57.
  • Max Kölbel. 2008

    "' True' as Ambiguous "

    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (September 2008), pp.359–84.
  • Max Kölbel. 2008

    "Motivations for Relativism "

    in Garcia-Carpintero and Kölbel (eds.), Relative Truth, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2008, pp. 1–38.
  • Max Kölbel, Manuel García-Carpintero. 2008

    Relative Truth (edited by Manuel García-Carpintero and Max Kölbel)

    Oxford: Oxford University Press
  • Max Kölbel. 2007

    How to Spell Out Genuine Relativism and How to Defend Indexical Relativism

    International Journal of Philosophical Studies 15 (July 2007), p. 281–288.
  • Max Kölbel. 2006

    "Conventions in Language "

    Keith Brown (ed.), Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics, Oxford: Elsevier Publishers 2006. Reprinted in Alex Barber and Robert Stainton (eds),Concise Encyclopedia of Philosophy of Language and Linguistics, Oxford: Elsevier Publishers 2010.

  • Max Kölbel. 2005

    "Moral Relativism "

    in Dag Westerstahl and Torbjörn Tännsjö (eds), Lectures on Relativism, Göteborg University 2005.
  • Max Kölbel. 2004

    "Indexical Relativism vs Genuine Relativism "

    International Journal of Philosophical Studies 12 (Oct. 2004), pp. 297–313.
  • Max Kölbel. 2004

    Sainsbury’s Programme ”. Article for a Book Symposium on Departing from Frege by Mark Sainsbury

    Philosophical Books 45, (July 2004), pp. 187–96.
  • Max Kölbel. 2004

    Zwei Arten von Relativismus

    in R. Bluhm and C. Nimtz (eds.), Selected Papers Contributed to GAP.5, 5th International Congress of the Society for Analytical Philosophy, Bielefeld, 22-26 September 2003, Paderborn: Mentis 2004. (Shortened German version of "Indexical Relativism vs Genuine Relativism").
  • Max Kölbel. 2003

    "Faultless Disagreement "

    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104 (October 2003), pp. 53–73.
  • Max Kölbel. 2002

    "Wright on Disputes of Inclination "

    Unpublished paper, deposited here in order to continue to provide access.
  • Max Kölbel. 2002

    Truth without Objectivity (table of contents , introduction )

    London: Routledge
  • Max Kölbel. 2001

    "Two Dogmas of Davidsonian Semantics "

    Journal of Philosophy 98 (December 2001), pp. 613–35.
  • Max Kölbel. 2000

    "Edgington on Compounds of Conditionals "

    Mind 109 (Jan 2000), pp. 97–108.
  • Max Kölbel. 1999

    Saving Relativism from its Saviour

    Crítica 31 (April 1999), pp. 91–103.
  • Max Kölbel. 1998

    Lewis, Language, Lust and Lies

    Inquiry 41 (Sept 1998), pp. 301–15.
  • Max Kölbel. 1997

    Expressivism and the Syntactic Uniformity of Declarative Sentences

    Crítica 29 (December 1997), pp. 3–51.
  • Max Kölbel. 1997

    Wright’s Argument from Neutrality

    Ratio 10, (April 1997), pp. 35–47.
  • Dan López de Sa. 2017

    'Making Beautiful Truths'

    In JO Young (ed.), Semantics of Aesthetic Judgements, Oxford Univeristy Press, pp. 38-60
  • Dan López de Sa. 2015

    'Expressing Disagreement'

    Erkenntnis 80, 153–165
  • Dan López de Sa. 2014

    'Audience in Context'

    Erkenntnis 79, 241-253
  • Dan López de Sa. 2014

    'Lewis vs Lewis on the Problem of the Many'

    Synthèse 191, 1105-1117
  • Dan López de Sa. 2014

    ‘What Could Vague Objects Possibly Be?’

    in Akiba & Abasnezhad (eds.), Vague Objects and Vague Identity, Springer, 257-71
  • Dan López de Sa. 2013

    'Vagueness as Semantic Indecision: Metaphysical Vagueness vs Indeterminate Reference'

    Metaphysica 14, 197-209 (special volume: Vagueness and Ontology)
  • Dan López de Sa. 2013

    Rigid vs Flexible Response-Dependent Properties

    Hoeltje, Schnieder & Steinberg (eds.), Dependence, Philosophia Verlag
  • Dan López de Sa. 2013

    The Aposteriori Response-Dependence of the Colors'

    Croatian Journal of Philosophy 13, 65-79
  • Dan López de Sa. 2012

    'What does it Take to Enter into the Circumstance?'

    Philosophical Studies (2012) 159:147–153, DOI 10.1007/s11098-011-9695-4
  • Dan López de Sa, Elia Zardini. 2011

    'No-No. Paradox and Consistency'

    Analysis 71, 472-8
  • Dan López de Sa. 2011

    'The Many Relativisms: Index, Context, and Beyond'

    S. Hales (ed.), A Companion to Relativism, Blackwell, 102-17
  • Dan López de Sa. 2010

    'Relativismo y operadores'

    Teorema 29, 1, 81-93
  • Dan López de Sa. 2010

    'How to Respond to Borderline Cases'

    R. Dietz & S. Moruzzi (eds.), Cuts and Clouds, OUP, 327-39
  • Dan López de Sa. 2010

    'The Makings of Truth: Realism , Response-Dependence, and Relativism '

     C. Wright & N. Pedersen (eds.), New Waves in Truth, Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 191-204
  • Dan López de Sa. 2009

    'Disjunctions, Conjunctions, and their Truthmakers'

    Mind 118, 417–25
  • Dan López de Sa. 2009

    'Can One Get Bivalence from (Tarskian) Truth and Falsity?'

    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39, 273-282
  • Dan López de Sa. 2009

    'Relativizing Utterance-Truth?'

    Synthese 170, 1-5
  • Dan López de Sa. 2008

    Is the Problem of the Many a Problem in Metaphysics?

    Noûs 42, 746-752
  • Dan López de Sa. 2008

    Rigidity for Predicates and the Trivialization Problem

    Philosophers’ Imprint 8/1, 1-13
  • Dan López de Sa. 2008

    'Presuppositions of Commonality'

    M. García-Carpintero & M. Kölbel (eds.), Relative Truth, OUP, 297–310
  • Dan López de Sa. 2008

    'The Over-Generalization Problem: Predicates Rigidly Signifying the "Unnatural"'

    Synthese 163, 263–72
  • Dan López de Sa. 2008

    'Defending "Restricted Particularism" from Jackson, Pettit & Smith'

    Theoria 62, 133–143
  • Dan López de Sa, Elia Zardini. 2007

    Truthmakers, Knowledge, and Paradox

    Analysis 67, 242–50
  • Dan López de Sa. 2007

    Rigidity, General Terms, and Trivialization

    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107, 117–23      
  • Dan López de Sa. 2007

    The Chief Supreme Court Justice: A Metaphysical Puzzle?

    Critica 39, 61–68
  • Dan López de Sa. 2007

    On the Semantic Indecision of Vague Singular Terms

    Sorites 19, 88–91
  • Dan López de Sa. 2007

    'The Many Relativisms and the Question of Disagreement '

    International Journal of Philosophical Studies 15, 269–279

  • Dan López de Sa. 2006

    Is ‘Everything’ Precise?

    Dialectica 60, 397–409
  • Dan López de Sa. 2006

    Flexible Property Designators

    Grazer Philosophische Studien 73, 221–230
  • Dan López de Sa, Elia Zardini. 2006

    'Does This Sentence Have No Truthmaker? '

    Analysis 66, 154–57
  • Dan López de Sa. 2006

    'The Case against Evaluative Realism'

    Theoria 21, 277–294
  • Dan López de Sa. 2006

    'Por qué la aposterioridad no (basta, según Kripke, ni) basta'

    Theoria 21, 245–55
  • Dan López de Sa. 2006

    'Values vs Secondary Qualities'

    Teorema 25, 197–210

  • Dan López de Sa. 2003

    'The Non-Circularity Constraint: Peacocke vs Peacocke'

    Teorema 22, 85–93
  • Alisa Mandrigin. 2013

    Ambrosini, E., Blomberg, O., Mandrigin, A., Costantini, M.

    Social exclusion modulates pre-reflective interpersonal body representation. Psychological Research.

  • Alisa Mandrigin. 2013

    Serino, A., Alsmith, A., Costantini, M., Mandrigin, A., Tajadura-Jiménez, A., Lopez, C.

    Bodily ownership and self-location: components of bodily self-consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition, 22: 1239-1252.

  • Alisa Mandrigin. 2010

    Review of Todd E. Feinberg, From Axons to Identity

    Journal of Consciousness Studies, 17: 9-10: 248-254. 

  • Teresa Marques. 2019

    Talking of Beauty: Updating the Motivational Set

    in Daan Evers and Louise Hanson (eds), Meta-Aesthetics, forthcoming
  • Teresa Marques, Manuel García-Carpintero. 2019

    The Case against Semantic Relativism

    forthcoming in Martin Kusch (ed.) The Routledge Handbook to Relativism, Routledge.
  • Teresa Marques. 2019

    Hybrid Dispositionalism and the Law

     in D. Plunkett, S. Shapiro, and K. Toh (eds.), Dimensions of Normativity: New Essays on Metaethics and Jurisprudence. Oxford University Press.
  • Teresa Marques. 2018

    Retractions

    Synthese. 2018, 195 (8), pp 3335–3359 DOI:10.1007/s11229-015-0852-8
  • Teresa Marques. 2018

    This is not an instance of (E)

    Synthese, 195(3):1035–1063. DOI:  10.1007/s11229-016-1293-8
  • Teresa Marques. 2017

    Can metalinguistic negotiations and "conceptual ethics" rescue legal positivism?

    In A. Capone & F.Poggi (eds.), Pragmatics and Law: Practical and Theoretical Perspectives. Springer. pp. 223-241
  • Teresa Marques. 2017

    The Relevance of Causal Social Construction

    Journal of Social Ontology. 3 (1) DOI: 10.1515/jso-2016-0018.
  • Teresa Marques. 2017

    What metalinguistic negotiations can't do

    Phenomenology and Mind, 12: 40-48. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.13128/Phe_Mi-21104
  • Teresa Marques. 2017

    Pejorative Discourse is not Fictional

    Thought: A Journal of Philosophy. DOI: 10.1002/tht3.258
  • Teresa Marques. 2016

    Aesthetic Predicates: A Hybrid Dispositional Account

    Inquiry 59 (6): 723-751. DOI: 10.1080/0020174X.2016.1192484
  • Teresa Marques. 2016

    We can't have no satisfaction

    Philosophy South - Unisinos Philosophy Journal 17(3): 308-314
  • Teresa Marques. 2015

    Disagreeing in Context

    Frontiers in Psychology 6 (257):1-12.
  • Teresa Marques. 2015

    Construção Social

    in J. Branquinho and R. Santos (eds.) Compêndio em Linha de Problemas de Filosofia Analítica. Lisbon: CFUL.
  • Teresa Marques. 2014

    É o Género uma Construção Social?

    n A. P. Mesquita, C. Beckert, J. L. Pérez & Xavier M. L. L. O. (eds.), A Paixão da Razão. Homenagem a Maria Luísa Ribeiro Ferreira. Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa. 561-578.
  • Teresa Marques. 2014

    Desacordo

     in J. Branquinho and R. Santos (eds.) Compêndio Em Linha de Problemas de Filosofia Analítica.
  • Teresa Marques. 2014

    Doxastic Disagreement

    Erkenntnis. 79 (1): 121 - 142. doi: 10.1007/s10670-013-9448-1.
  • Teresa Marques. 2014

    Relative Correctness

    Philosophical Studies. 167 (2): 361 - 373. doi: 10.1007/s11098-013-0100-3
  • Teresa Marques, Daniel Cohnitz. 2014

    Disagreements, introduction

    Erkenntnis, 79 (1): 1-10. DOI 10.1007/s10670-013-9442-7
  • Teresa Marques, Daniel Cohnitz. 2014

    Disagreements

    Erkenntnis 79 (1) Supplement.
  • Teresa Marques, Manuel García-Carpintero. 2014

    Disagreement about taste: Commonality Presuppositions and Coordination

    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92(4): 701-723
  • Teresa Marques, Manuel García-Carpintero. 2012

    Filosofia da Linguagem

    in P. Galvão (ed.), Filosofia - Uma Introdução por Disciplinas, Lisboa, Edições 70.
  • Teresa Marques. 2010

    Truth and the Ambiguity of Negation

    in Rast, E & Baptista, L (eds.) Meaning and Context, Peter Lang.
  • Teresa Marques. 2010

    What Can Modes Do for (Moderate) Relativism?

    Crítica - Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía, vol 42, no. 124, pp. 77 -- 100. 
  • Teresa Marques. 2008

    The Square of Opposition and the Paradoxes

    Logica Universalis, vol II, no. 1, pp. 87-105.
  • Teresa Marques. 2007

    Normativity and Rationality

    (editor) Special issue of Disputatio, Vol. II, no. 23

     

  • Teresa Marques. 2006

    On an argument of Segal's against singular object-dependent thoughts

    Disputatio, volume II, no. 21, pp. 19-37.


  • Teresa Marques. 2006

    Pode o Deflacionismo Negar a Bivalência?

    Philosophica, 28, pp. 227-244

  • Teresa Marques. 2006

    Referência, Teorias da.

    in  Enciclopédia de Termos Lógico-FIlosóficos -- Nova Edição, J. Branquinho, N. Gomes and D. Murcho (eds.),São Paulo, Martins Fontes. 
  • Teresa Marques. 2006

    Tipo Natural

    in Enciclopédia de Termos Lógico-Filosóficos -- Nova Edição, J. Branquinho, N. Gomes and D. Murcho (eds.) São Paulo, Martins Fontes. 
  • Neri Marsili. 2018

    TRUTH AND ASSERTION: rules vs aims

    Analysis, 78 (4), 638–648, doi:10.1093/analys/any008

     

  • Neri Marsili. 2018

    LYING AND CERTAINTY

    J. Meibauer (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Lying. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • Neri Marsili. 2016

    LYING BY PROMISING: a study on insincere illocutionary acts

    The International Review of Pragmatics, 8 (2): 271-313. [DOI:10.1163/18773109-00802005]

  • Neri Marsili. 2015

    NORMATIVE ACCOUNTS OF ASSERTION: from Peirce to Williamson, and back again

    Rivista Italiana di Filosofia del Linguaggio
  • Neri Marsili. 2014

    LYING AS A SCALAR PHENOMENON: insincerity along the certainty-uncertainty continuum,

    Cantarini, Abraham & Leiss (ed.) Certainty-uncertainty – and the attitudinal space in between.  (John Benjamins Publishing).  [DOI:10.1075/slcs.165.09mar]
  • Genoveva Martí. 2017

    Names, predicates and the object-property distinction.

    M. de Ponte and K. Korta (eds.): Reference and Representation in Thought and Language. Oxford University Press, pp. 14-19.

  • Genoveva Martí, José Martínez-Fernández. 2017

    Editors' introduction. Special issue of Teorema on Experimental Philosophy

  • Genoveva Martí. 2017

    Names, Descriptions and Causal Descriptions. Is the Magic Gone?

    Topoi DOI. 10.1007/s11245-017-9525-1
  • Genoveva Martí, Lorena Ramírez-Ludeña. 2016

    Legal Disagreements and Theories of Reference

    Francesca Poggi (ed.): Pragmatics and Law. Philosophical Perspectives. Springer: 121-139.
  • Genoveva Martí. 2015

    Reference without cognition

    Reference. Oxford University Press
  • Genoveva Martí. 2015

    General terms, hybrid theories and ambiguitiy. A discussion of some experimental results

    Jussi Haukioja (ed.). Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Language. London. Bloomsbury, pp. 157-172
  • Genoveva Martí. 2014

    Reference and Experimental Semantics

    Edouard Machery and Elizabeth O’Neill (eds.): Current Controversies in Experimental Philosophy. New York. Routledge, pp. 17-26
  • Genoveva Martí. 2014

    For the Disunity of Semantics

    Mind & Language, 29/4: 485-489
  • Genoveva Martí. 2012

    Reference

    García-Carpintero, M. and Kölbel, M.: Continuum Companion to the Philosophy of Language. London. The Continuum International Publishing Group (2012), pp. 106-124.
  • Genoveva Martí. 2012

    On Modality and Reference. Ruth Barcan Marcus (1921-2012). Obituary

    Teorema, 31 (2102), pp.  203-212
  • Genoveva Martí. 2012

    Empirical Data and the Theory of Reference

    Kabasenche,  W.; O'Rourke, M.; Slater, M. (eds.): Topics in Contemporary Philosophy: Reference and Referring. MIT Press: 63-82
  • Genoveva Martí, José Martínez-Fernández. 2011

    General Terms, Rigidity and the Trivialization Problem

    Synthese 181, 2 (2011), pp. 277-293; doi:10.1007/s11229-010-9802-7
  • Genoveva Martí. 2011

    Review of Lecturas Filosóficas de Ciencia Cognitiva (edited by Luis A. Pérez Miranda)

    Investigación y Ciencia, Febrero 2011: 93
  • Genoveva Martí, José Martínez-Fernández. 2010

    General Terms as Designators: A Defence of the View

    H. Beebee & N. Sabbarton-Leary: The Semantics and Metaphysics of Kinds. Routledge, pp. 46-63
  • Genoveva Martí. 2009

    Against Semantic Multiculturalism

    Analysis, 69:42-49
  • Genoveva Martí. 2008

    Direct Reference and Definite Descriptions

    Dialectica, 62: 43-57
  • Genoveva Martí, José Martínez. 2007

    General Terms and Non-Trivial Rigid Designation

    C. Martínez, J.L. Falguera & J.M. Sagüillo: Current Topics in Logic and Analytic Philosophy. Universidad de Santiago de Compostela: 103-116
  • Genoveva Martí. 2007

    Weak and Strong Directness: Reference and Thought

    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LXXIV: 730-737
  • Genoveva Martí, José Martínez-Fernández. 2007

    General Terms and Non-Trivial Rigid Designation

    C. Martínez (ed.): Current Topics in Logic and Analytic Philosophy. Universidad de Santiago de Compostela, pp.103-116.
  • Genoveva Martí. 2004

    Rigidity and General Terms

    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 104: 129-146
  • Genoveva Martí. 2003

    The Question of Rigidity in New Theories of Reference

    Nous, 37: 161-179
  • Genoveva Martí. 1998

    The Significance of the Distinction between Concept Mastery and Concept Possession. Response to James Higginbotham

    Philosophical Issues, vol 9, pp. 163-167
  • Genoveva Martí. 1998

    Rigidity and the Description of Counterfactual Situations

    Theoria, vol 13: 3, pp.477-490
  • Genoveva Martí. 1997

    Rethinking Quine’s Argument on the Collapse of Modal Distinctions

    Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, vol 38:2, pp. 276-294
  • Genoveva Martí. 1995

    The Essence of Genuine Reference

    Journal of Philosophical Logic, 24, pp. 275-289
  • Genoveva Martí. 1994

    Do Modal Distinctions Collapse in Carnap's System?

    Journal of Philosophical Logic, vol. 23, pp. 575-593
  • Genoveva Martí. 1993

    The Source of Intensionality

    Philosophical Perspectives, vol 7 (1993). pp. 197-206
  • Genoveva Martí. 1989

    Aboutness and Substitutivity

    Midwest Studies in Philosophy. Vol. XIV (1989). pp. 127-139
  • Manolo Martínez. 2015

    Informationally-Connected Property Clusters, and Polymorphism

    Biology and Philosophy, 30:99-117
  • Manolo Martínez. 2015

    Deception in Sender-Receiver Games

    Erkenntnis, 80:215-227
  • Manolo Martínez. 2015

    Pains as Reasons

    Philosophical Studies, 172(9):2261-274
  • Manolo Martínez, Colin Klein. 2015

    Imperativism and Pain Intensity

    Forthcoming in The Nature of Pain (eds. D. Bain, M. Brady and J. Corns)
  • Manolo Martínez. 2015

    Disgusting Smells and Imperativism

    Journal of Consciousness Studies, 22(5-6):191-200
  • Manolo Martínez. 2015

    Modalizing Mechanisms

    Forthcoming in Journal of Philosophy
  • Manolo Martínez, Marc Artiga. 2015

    The Organizational Account of Function is an Etiological Account of Function

    Forthcoming in Acta Biotheoretica
  • Manolo Martínez, Peter Godfrey-Smith. 2015

    Common Interest and Signaling Games: A Dynamic Analysis

    Forthcoming in Philosophy of Science
  • Manolo Martínez, Colin Klein. 2015

    Pain Signals are Predominantly Imperative

    Biology & Philosophy
  • Manolo Martínez, Peter Godfrey-Smith. 2013

    Communication and Common Interest

    PLOS Computational Biology 9(11):e1003282
  • Manolo Martínez. 2013

    Teleosemantics and Indeterminacy

    Dialectica 67(4):427-453
  • Manolo Martínez. 2013

    Teleosemantics and Productivity

    Philosophical Psychology 26(1):47-68

  • Manolo Martínez. 2013

    Ideal Negative Conceivability and the Halting Problem

    Erkenntnis 78:979-990
  • Manolo Martínez. 2011

    Imperative Content and the Painfulness of Pain

    Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 10(1): 67-90

  • Manolo Martínez. 2011

    Travelling in Branching Time

    Disputatio, 4(26), 59-75

  • Manolo Martínez. 2009

    Review of C. Peacocke, 'Truly Understood'

    Disputatio, Vol. 3 (26),University of Lisbon, 2009, pp. 97-105

  • Manolo Martínez. 2008

    La 'P' de PANIC. Representacionalismo y fenomenología del dolor

    Teorema, Vol. 27 (3), Universidad de Oviedo, 2008, pp. 181-­195.

  • Manolo Martínez. 2007

    Review of M. Sainsbury, 'Reference without Referents'

    Crítica, Vol. 39 (116), UNAM, 2007, pp. 79-­99

  • José Martínez. 2007

    Maximal Three-Valued Clones with the Gupta-Belnap Fixed-Point Property

    Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 48, 4, pp. 449-472.
  • José Martínez. 2005

    El concepto de lenguaje universal

    Quaderns de Filosofia i Ciència, 35, pp. 13-18.
  • José Martínez, Anil Gupta. 2005

    Field on the Concept of Truth - Comment

    Philosophical Studies, 124, pp. 45-58
  • José Martínez. 2003

    The Gupta-Belnap Fixed-Point Problem and the Theory of Clones of Functions

    in Foundations of the Formal Sciences II: Applications of Mathematical Logic in Philosophy and Linguistics, edited by B. Löwe, W. Malzkom and T. Räsch, Kluwer, pp. 175-184.
  • Manolo Martínez. 0

    Pains as Reasons

    Philosophical Studies
  • Ivan Milić. 2018

    What Counts As an Insult? 

    Acta Analytica 33 (4): 539-552
  • Ivan Milić, Javier González de Prado Salas. 2018

    Recommending beauty: semantics and pragmatics of aesthetic predicates 

    Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 61 (2): 1-27
  • Ivan Milić, Stefan Reining . 2017

    A Wittgensteinian Role-Based Account of Assertion 

    Philosophical Investigations 40 (2): 139-153

  • Ivan Milić. 2017

    Against Selfless Assertions 

    Philosophical Studies 174 (9): 2277-2295

  • Ivan Milić. 2015

    A Note on Existentially Known Assertions 

    The Philosophical Quarterly 65 (261): 813-821

  • Ivan Milić. 2013