Research Group
in Analytic Philosophy

Publications (alphabetical order)

  • Anton Alexandrov. 2019

    An Outline of De Re Beliefs about Natural Numbers

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    G. Mras, P. Weingartner and B. Ritter (eds.), Proceedings of the 41st International Ludwig Wittgenstein Symposium: Philosophy of Logic and Mathematics, De Gruyter, Berlin.

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  • Aarón Álvarez González. 2023

    Emotional Phenomenology: A New Puzzle

    Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, forthcoming
  • Aarón Álvarez González. 2023

    Isolating Primitive Emotional Phenomenology in the 'Lab' of Fiction 

    Inquiry: an Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy, forthcoming
  • Aarón Álvarez González. 2021

    An Argument from Normativity for Primitive Emotional Phenomenology

    Philosophical Papers 50 (1-2):31-52.
  • Javier Anta. 2021

    Can informational thermal physics explain the approach to equilibrium?

    Anta, Javier (2021). Can informational thermal physics explain the approach to equilibrium?, Synthese: 1-22. 
  • Javier Anta. 2020

    An inferential account on theoretical concepts in physics

    Anta, Javier (2020) An inferential account on theoretical concepts in physics. Critica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía: 1-20. 
  • Javier Anta. 2020

    Paradojas epistémicas en la aproximación informacional a la física térmica 

    Anta, Javier (2020). Paradojas epistémicas en la aproximación informacional a la física térmica. Principia: an international journal of epistemology: 1-21.
  • Javier Anta. 2019

    Indispensability and Effectiveness of Diagrams in Molecular Biology

    Anta, Javier (2019a). Indispensability and Effectiveness of Diagrams in Molecular Biology. Quaderns de Filosofia 6 (1):29-46.
  • Javier Anta. 2019

    Explicaciones Geométrico-Diagramáticas en Física desde una Perspectiva Inferencial (An Inferential Approach to Geometric-Diagrammatic Explanations in Physics)

    Anta, Javier (2019b) Explicaciones Geométrico-Diagramáticas en Física desde una Perspectiva Inferencial. Revista Colombiana de Filosofía de la Ciencia, 19(38).

  • Javier Anta. 2019

    Un mundo de estructuras: simetrías grupo-teóricas desde el realismo infoestructural

    Anta, Javier (2019c) Un mundo de estructuras: simetrías grupo-teóricas desde el realismo infoestructural. Metatheoria, 10 (1):1-11.
  • Javier Anta. 2018

    Scanning the Invisible: Framing Diagrammatic Cognition in Experimental Particle Physics

    In: Chapman P., Stapleton G., Perez-Kriz S., Bellucci F (eds) Diagrammatic Representation and Inference. Diagrams 2018. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 10871, pp-779-782. Springer Cham. 

  • Javier Anta. 2018

    The explanatory power of topo-geometric diagrams in modern physics

    Anta, Javier (2018b) The explanatory power of topo-geometric diagrams in modern physics. In Saborido, C., Oms, S., González, J. (eds) Proceedings of the IX Conference of the Spanish Society of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science: 279-286. ISBN: 978-84-09-06054-2.
  • Javier Anta. 0

    Tras el laberinto Humeano: Una concepcion material de la induccion sin tesis ontologicas

    Anta, J. (forthcoming). Tras el laberinto Humeano: Una concepcion material de la induccion sin tesis ontologicas. Ideas y Valores.
  • Marc Artiga. 2016

    New Perspectives on Artifactual and Biological Functions

    Applied Ontology
  • Marc Artiga. 2016

    Teleosemantic Modeling of Cognitive Representations

    Biology and Philosophy
  • Marc Artiga. 2015

    Review of 'Millikan and her Critics'

  • Marc Artiga. 2015

    Rescuing Tracking Theories of Morality

    Philosophical Studies
  • Marc Artiga, M. Martinez. 2015

    The Organizational Account of Function is an Etiological Accountof Function

    Acta Biotheoretica
  • Marc Artiga. 2014

    Signaling Without Cooperation

    Biology and Philosophy
  • Marc Artiga. 2014

    Teleosemantics, Info-telsemantics and Circularity

    International Journal of Philosophical Studies

  • Marc Artiga. 2014

    Prinz’s Naturalistic Theory of Intentional Content

    Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofia

  • Marc Artiga. 2014

    The Modal Theory of Function is not About Functions

    Philosophy of Science
  • Marc Artiga. 2013

    Reliable Misrepresentation and Teleosemantics

  • Marc Artiga. 2013

    Teleosemantics and Pushmi-Pullyu Representations

  • Marc Artiga. 2012

    The Limits of Freedom as Non-Domination

    Astrolabio. Revista Internacional de Filosofia
  • Marc Artiga. 2012

    The Singular Thought Strategy and the Content of Perception

    Proceedings of the VII Conference of the Spanish Society for Logic, Methodology and Philosphy of Science. Santiago de Compostela (Spain): USC Press.
  • Marc Artiga. 2011

    Re-Organizing Organizational Accounts of Function 

    Applied Ontology, Vol. 6, p. 105–124
  • Marc Artiga. 2011

    On Several Misuses of Sober's Selection for/selection of Distinction

    Topoi. An International Review of Philosophy
  • Marc Artiga. 2010

    Teleosemantics and the Indeterminacy Problem

    Proceedings of the VI Conference of the Spanish Society for Analytic Philosophy, Tenerife, Universidad de la Laguna, pp.29-30
  • Marc Artiga. 2010

    Learning and Selection Processes

    Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations for Science, Vol. 25:2, p. 197-210
  • Marc Artiga. 2009

    Against Original Intentionality

    Preceedings of the VI Conference of the Spanish Society of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science 

  • Andre Bazzoni. 2020

    Names in philosophy

    In Stalmaszczyk, P. (eds), The Cambridge Handbook of the Philosophy of Language. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

  • Andre Bazzoni. 2017

    Philosophical foundations of partial belief models

    Cognitive Systems Research 41: 116–129

  • Andre Bazzoni. 2016

    Pure quotation, metalanguage, and metasemantics

    Linguistics and Philosophy 39(2): 119–149

  • Andre Bazzoni. 2016

    Names and individuals

    In P. Stalmaszczyk & L.F. Moreno (eds.), Philosophical Approaches to Proper Names, 123–146. Peter Lang GmbH.

  • Andre Bazzoni. 2015

    Hintikka on the foundations of mathematics: IF Logic and uniformity concepts

    Journal of Philosophical Logic 44(5): 507–516.

  • Andre Bazzoni. 2015

    On the concepts of function and dependence

    Principia: International Journal of Epistemology 19(1): 1–15.
  • Delia Belleri. 2016

    The Underdeterminacy of Sentences and the Expressibility of Our Thoughts

    dialectica, Volume 70, Issue 1, pp. 29-48
  • Delia Belleri. 2016

    Verbalism and Metalinguistic Negotiation in Ontological Disputes

    Philosophical Studies (Online First:
  • Delia Belleri. 2015

    Externalistic Derogation

    Linguistic and Philosophical Investigations, Vol. 14, 2015, pp. 70–81
  • Delia Belleri. 2014

    Semantic Under-determinacy and Communication

    London/Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan
  • Delia Belleri. 2014

    You Can Say What You Think: Vindicating the Effability of Our Thoughts

    Synthese, Volume 191, Issue 18, pp. 4431-4450
  • Delia Belleri. 2014

    Disagreement and Dispute

    Philosophia, 42 (2):289-307
  • Delia Belleri. 2013

    On What is Effable

    Thought: A Journal of Philosophy, Volume 2, Issue 4 (Dec), pp. 341–349
  • Delia Belleri, Michele Palmira. 2013

    Towards a Unified Notion of Disagreement

    Grazer Philosophische Studien, Vol. 88 (2013), pp. 124-139
  • Delia Belleri, Annalisa Coliva. 2013

    Some Observations on François Recanati's Mental Files

    Disputatio, Vol. V, n. 36: 107-117
  • Delia Belleri. 2013

    Meta-Representation in Utterance Comprehension: the Case of Semantically Incomplete Expressions

    Journal of Pragmatics 57(C): 158–169
  • Marcelino Botín. 0

    Botin, M. (Forthcoming). "Russellian Physicalists Get Our Phenomenal Concepts Wrong". Philosophical Studies. 

  • Marcelino Botín. 0

    Botin, M. (2022). “The phenomenal concept strategy cannot explain problem intuitions”. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 29(7-8), 7-31.

  • Fernando Broncano-Berrocal. 2023

    Is Lucky Belief Justified?

    forthcoming in Inquiry
  • Fernando Broncano-Berrocal. 2023

    Pluralistic Summativism about Group Belief

    forthcoming in Oxford Handbook of Social Epistemology. J. Lackey & A. McGlynn (eds.) Oxford University Press
  • Fernando Broncano-Berrocal, Moisés Barba. 2022

    Collective Epistemic Luck

    Acta Analytica  (Special Issue: Epistemic Luck)
  • Fernando Broncano-Berrocal, Mona Simion. 2022

    Knowledge and Disagreement

    forthcoming in The Routledge Handbook of Disagreement, M. Baghramian, A. Carter, and R. Rowland (eds.), Routledge.
  • Fernando Broncano-Berrocal, Moisés Barba. 2022

    Group-Deliberative Competences and Group Knowledge

    Philosophical Issues: A Supplement to Noûs (Themed Section: Collective Epistemology)
  • Fernando Broncano-Berrocal, J. Adam Carter. 2021

    The Philosophy of Group Polarization. Epistemology, Metaphysics, Psychology


  • Fernando Broncano-Berrocal, J. Adam Carter (eds.). 2021

    The Epistemology of Group Disagreement 


  • Fernando Broncano-Berrocal, J. Adam Carter. 2021

    Deliberation and Group Disagreement 

    In The Epistemology of Group Disagreement. Broncano-Berrocal, F. & Carter, J.A. (eds.). Routledge 

  • Fernando Broncano-Berrocal, Mona Simion. 2021

    Disagreement and Epistemic Improvement

    Synthese (Special Issue: New Directions in Social Epistemology)
  • Fernando Broncano-Berrocal. 2021

    Habilidades y Riesgo en Epistemología de Virtudes

    In Epistemología de Virtudes. In Ernesto Sosa: Conocimiento y Virtud. D. Pérez Chico & M. Gómez (eds.). PUZ
  • Fernando Broncano-Berrocal. 2020

    Epistemic Care and Epistemic Paternalism

    In Epistemic Paternalism Reconsidered. Axtell, G. & Amiel, B (eds.). Rowman and Littlefield
  • Fernando Broncano-Berrocal. 2020

    Difficulty and Knowledge

    In Virtue Theoretic Epistemology: New Methods and Approaches. ​C. Kelp & J. Greco (eds.). Cambridge University Press
  • Fernando Broncano-Berrocal. 2019

    Knowledge, Safety, and Gettierized Lottery Cases: Why Mere Statistical Evidence Is Not a (Safe) Source of Knowledge

    Philosophical Issues. A Supplement to Noûs
  • Fernando Broncano-Berrocal. 2019

    Epistemic Dependence and Cognitive Ability

    Synthese (Special Issue: Epistemic Dependence)
  • Fernando Broncano-Berrocal, J. Vega. 2019

    A Taxonomy of Types of Epistemic Dependence: Introduction to the Synthese Special Issue on Epistemic Dependence

    Synthese (Special Issue: Epistemic Dependence)
  • Fernando Broncano-Berrocal. 2019

    Luck as Risk

    In The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy and Psychology of Luck. I. Church & R. Hartman (eds.). Routledge
  • Fernando Broncano-Berrocal. 2018

    Knowledge and Tracking Revisited

  • Fernando Broncano-Berrocal. 2018

    Purifying Impure Virtue Epistemology

    Philosophical Studies 
  • Fernando Broncano-Berrocal, C. Boult, P. Dimmock, H. Ghijsen, C. Kelp, & M. Simion. 2017

    Hoops and Barns: A New Dilemma for Sosa

    Synthese (Special Issue: The Epistemology of Ernest Sosa)
  • Fernando Broncano-Berrocal. 2017

    A Robust Enough Virtue Epistemology

  • Fernando Broncano-Berrocal, J. Adam Carter. 2017

    Epistemic Luck

    Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
  • Fernando Broncano-Berrocal. 2016

    Well-Founded Belief and Perceptual Justification

    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 
  • Fernando Broncano-Berrocal. 2016


    Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
  • Fernando Broncano-Berrocal. 2016

    No Luck in the Distance: A Reply to Freitag

    Theoria: A Swedish Journal of Philosophy
  •  . 2015

    Luck as Risk and the Lack of Control Account of Luck

    Metaphilosophy, 46 (1), 1-25.
  •  . 2015

    Luck as Risk and the Lack of Control Account of Luck (reprinted)

    In The Philosophy of Luck, (eds.) D. H. Pritchard & L. Whittington, Wiley-Blackwell: 3-26
  •  . 2015

    No Luck in the Distance: A Reply to Freitag

    Theoria: A Swedish Journal of Philosophy (forthcoming)
  • Fernando Broncano-Berrocal. 2015

    Luck as Risk and the Lack of Control Account of Luck

    In The Philosophy of Luck, D. H. Pritchard & L. Whittington (eds.). Wiley-Blackwell
  • Fernando Broncano-Berrocal. 2015

    Luck as Risk and the Lack of Control Account of Luck

  •  . 2014

    Anti-Luck (Too Weak) Virtue Epistemology

    Erkenntnis, 79 (4), 733-754.
  •  . 2014

    Is Safety In Danger?

    Philosophia 42 (1), 63-81
  • Fernando Broncano-Berrocal. 2014

    Anti-Luck (Too Weak) Virtue Epistemology

  • Fernando Broncano-Berrocal. 2014

    Is Safety in Danger?

  •  . 2013

    Lies and Deception: A Failed Reconciliation

    Logos & Episteme: An International Journal of Epistemology, 4 (2), 227-230.


  • Fernando Broncano-Berrocal. 2013

    Lies and Deception: A Failed Reconciliation

    Logos & Episteme: An International Journal of Epistemology 
  • Chiara Brozzo, Andy Hamilton. 2022

    Art, Beauty and Morality

    In M. Hopwood & S. Panizza (eds.), The Murdochian Mind. Routledge.
  • Chiara Brozzo. 2021

    Against the Distinction between Intentions for the Future and Intentions for the Present.

    Philosophical Quarterly, 58(4), 333-346
  • Chiara Brozzo. 2021

    A Role for Conscious Accessibility in Skilled Action.

    Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 12, 683-697.
  • Chiara Brozzo. 2020

    Are Some Perfumes Works of Art? 

    The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 78(1), 21-32.
  • Chiara Brozzo. 2020

    Categorically Perceiving Motor Actions. 

    In F. Calzavarini & M. Viola (eds.), New Challenges in Philosophy of Neuroscience. Springer, pp. 465-482.
  • Chiara Brozzo. 2017

    Motor Intentions: How Intentions and Motor Representations Come Together. 

    Mind & Language, 32(2), 231-256.
  • Oscar Cabaco. 2002

    Convencionalidad y significado sin uso

    Theoria vol. 17/3, pp. 417-434
  • Marta Campdelacreu, Sergi Oms. 2023

    (forthcoming) Qua-Objects, (Non-)Derivative Properties and the Consistency of Hylomorphism. Metaphysica

  • Marta Campdelacreu, F. Contesi, E. Terrone, G. Martí, R. García-Moya. 2023

    (forthcoming) The Problem of Taste to the Experimental Test . Analysis.

  • Marta Campdelacreu. 2021

    'Colocationist Answers to the Grounding Problem'

    Theoria. A Swedish Journal of Philosophy 87 (6): 1444-1467.
  • Marta Campdelacreu. 2020

    'Una Nueva Solución al Problema de la Fundamentación' 

    Revista de Humanidades de Valparaíso, 16:61-87. Número monográfico "Metafísica analítica contemporánea"
  • Marta Campdelacreu, Ramón García-Moya; Genoveva Martí; Enrico Terrone. 2020

    'How to Test the Ship of Theseus'

    Dialectica 74(3): 551-559
  • Marta Campdelacreu. 2018

    'Constitutionalism, Cheap Indeterminism and the Grounding Problem'

    Metaphysica 19 (1): 19-37
  • Marta Campdelacreu. 2018

    'Objetos materiales' en Enciclopedia de la Sociedad de Filosofía Analítica 

  • Marta Campdelacreu. 2016

    Sutton's Solution to the Grounding Problem and Intrinsically Composed Colocated Objects

    Crítica 2016, pp. 77-92
  • Marta Campdelacreu. 2015

    'The Constitution Relation and Baker's Account of It'; International Journal of Philosophical Studies 2015, pp. 1-19

  • Marta Campdelacreu. 2015

    'Las paradojas de la coincidencia temporal y la individuación de los objetos materiales'; en Prades, JL. (ed.): Cuestiones de Metafísica. Tecnos 2015

  • Marta Campdelacreu. 2015

    Review of 'The Double Lives of Objects' by Thomas Sattig, OUP2015. Disputatio (forthcoming)

  • Marta Campdelacreu. 2013

    'Do we need two notions of constitution?'; Philosophia 2013, pp. 503-519

  • Marta Campdelacreu. 2010

    'Naturalness, vagueness, and sortals'; Metaphysica 2010, pp. 79-91

  • Marta Campdelacreu. 2010

    'Stage universalism, voints and sorts'; Disputatio 2010, pp. 151-165

  • Marta Campdelacreu. 2005

    'El argumento de Sider para el tetradimensionalismo'; en Txapartegi, E. (ed.): Los objetos de la ciencia: el mundo que la ciencia contruye, 2005, pp.159-70. Córdoba: Brujas. 

  • Marta Campdelacreu. 2003

    'Un argumento contra la tesis de la identidad ocasional'; en Flagueras, J.L. (ed.): Palabras y pensamientos: una mirada analítica, 2003, pp.403-13. Santiago de Compostela: servicio de publicacións e intercambio científico

  • Marta Campdelacreu. 2002

    'Algunas consideraciones sobre modalidad e identidad'; Anábasisdigital 2002

  • Samuele Chilovi. 2018

    Grounding entails supervenience

  • Samuele Chilovi, J.J. Moreso. 2016

    Interpretative Arguments and the Application of the Law

    Handbook of Legal Reasoning and Argumentation, (Bongiovanni, G.; Postema, G.; Rotolo, A.; Sartor, G.; Valentini, C.; Walton, D. (Eds.)), Springer.
  • Samuele Chilovi, J.J. Moreso. 2016

    The Semantics and Pragmatics of 'According to the Law'

    Pragmatics and Law: Philosophical Perspectives, ed. by A. Capone and F. Poggi, part of a series of volumes called 'Perspectives on Pragmatics, Philosophy and Psychology', Springer.
  • Samuele Chilovi, J.J. Moreso. 2016

    to appear in 'Che cosa è il diritto. Ontologie e concezioni del giuridico', G. Bongiovanni, G. Pino and C. Roversi (a cura di), Giappichelli (forthcoming).
  • Samuele Chilovi. 2016

    The Speaker Dilemma in Legal Implicatures

    to appear in Anchoring Institutions. Democracy and Institutions in a Half-automated World, edited by Casanovas, P. et al.. Springer

  • Samuele Chilovi. 2016

    The Speaker Dilemma in Legal Implicatures: Comparisons and Further Issues

    in Ferreira Leite de Paula, A., Santacoloma, A. S., Villa Rosas, G. (Eds.) Truth and Objectivity in Law and Morals, Proceedings of the Second Special Workshop held at the 27th World Congress of the International Association for Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy in Washington D.C., 2015, Archiv für Rechts- und Sozial philosophie. Beiheft Num.  Stuttgart (Ge): Franz Steiner Verlag.

  • Patrick Connolly, Sanford C. Goldberg, Jennifer M. Saul. 2024

    Conversations Online: An edited collection (forthcoming)

  • Patrick Connolly. 2024

    Conversations with Chatbots (forthcoming)

    in Conversations Online, OUP
  • Patrick Connolly. 2022

    Trolling as Speech Act

    The Journal of Social Philosophy, Volume 53, Issue3, Fall 2022 Pp. 404-420
  • Patrick Connolly, Emma Borg. 2022

    Exploring Linguistic Liability

    Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Language Volume 2 (eds. Lepore, E & Sosa, D), OUP
  • Filippo Contesi. 2023

    Stylistic Appearances and Linguistic Diversity

  • Filippo Contesi. 2022

    The Affective Nature of Horror

    in M. Ryynänen et al. (eds), Cultural Approaches to Disgust and the Visceral, Routledge [open access]
  • Filippo Contesi. 2022

    Balance or Propel? Philosophy and the Value of Unpleasantness

    Journal of Philosophy of Emotion [open access]
  • Filippo Contesi, Louise Chapman, Constantine Sandis. 2022

    Analytic Philosophy has a Language Problem

    Institute of Art and Ideas News, 2022 [Chinese translation]
  • Filippo Contesi. 2022

    La conversione tragica in Hume

    Odradek, 8, 2, 2022,
  • Filippo Contesi. 2022

    La metafora considerata nei suoi molteplici usi

    Itinera, 24, 2022,
  • Filippo Contesi, Louise Chapman, Constantine Sandis. 2021

    Unconscious Bias or Deliberate Gatekeeping?

    The Philosophers’ Magazine 95
  • Filippo Contesi. 2021

    Peter Lamarque

    in A. Giovannelli (ed.), Aesthetics: The Key Thinkers, Bloomsbury
  • Filippo Contesi, Maryellen Stohlman-Vanderveen. 2021

    Barcelona Principles for a Globally Inclusive Philosophy: Interview with Filippo Contesi

    American Philosophical Association Blog [open access]
  • Filippo Contesi. 2021

    Il disgusto tra arte e scienza

    Mimesis, 2021
  • Filippo Contesi, E. Terrone, M. Campdelacreu, R. García-Moya & G. Martí. 0

    The Problem of Taste to the Experimental Test

    "The Problem of Taste to the Experimental Test" (with E. Terrone, M. Campdelacreu, R. García-Moya & G. Martí), Analysis, forthcoming
  • Diana Couto. 2022

    Can There be Thought Without Words?—Donald Davidson on Language and Animal Minds 

    Topoi. An International Review of Philosophy. 
  • Diana Couto. 2020

    Conceptos Fenoménicos

    Enciclopedia de la Sociedad Española de Filosofía Analítica. URL: <>.

  • Diana Couto. 2019

    (Re-)Interpretando "Thought & Talk": Donald Davidson acerca das mentes animais

    Sofia (Brazil), 8(1), pp. 81-107. In: César Meurer, Nara Figueiredo & Raquel Krempel (eds.), Special issue “Philosophy of Mind and Language”. 

  • Diana Couto, Sofia Miguens & João Alberto Pinto. 2019

    Filosofia da Mente: Uma Antologia

    Porto: University of Porto Press
  • Diana Couto, Sílvia Bento. 2019

    (Book Review) Sofia Miguens, Uma Leitura da Filosofia Contemporânea. Figuras e Movimentos. Lisboa: Edições 70, 2019. 433 pp., Isbn: 978-972-442-1612. 

    Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia, 2019, Vol. 75 (3): 1979-1996. DOI:
  • Diana Couto. 2018

    Donald Davidson: subjetivo-objetivo. O retorno ao cogito.

    Col. MLAG Discussion Papers, Vol. 10. Porto: Faculdade de Letras da Universidade do Porto, pp. 208. ISBN: 978- 989-54030-1-1.
  • Diana Couto. 2018

    Del cartesianismo de Quine hacia el giro epistemológico intersubjetivo

    In: L. Valls, A. Meléndez, B. Fernández & A.L. Batalla. (edits.). Nuevas tendencias en la Filosofía Contemporánea. Valencia, pp. 21-43. ISBN: 987-84-09-00418-8.
  • Diana Couto. 2017

    Monismo. Anómalo?: Donald Davidson e o Problema da Causalidade Mental.

    Kínesis, 9(20), pp. 61-86.
  • Diana Couto, Brena Fernandez, Luís Veríssimo. 2017

    Em busca de boas razões.

    In: B. Fernandez, L. Veríssimo, D. Couto (edits), 2017. Por que Razão? Razões para acreditar, para agir e para preferir. Col. MLAG Discussion Papers, Vol. 8. Porto: Faculdade de Letras da Universidade do Porto, pp. 5-14.
  • Diana Couto, Brena Fernandez, Luís Veríssimo. 2017

    Por que Razão? Razões para acreditar, para agir e para preferir. 

    Col. MLAG Discussion Papers, Vol. 8. Porto: Faculdade de Letras da Universidade do Porto, pp. 200. ISBN: 978-989-99854-7-6.
  • Diana Couto. 2016

    (Book Review) D. Dahlstrom, A. Elpidorou, W. Hoop. (edits.). Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind: Conceptual and Empirical Approaches, Routledge 2016.

    Revista de Filosofia da Faculdade de Letras da Universidade do Porto, pp. 354-364. ISSN: 2183-6892. DOI: 10.21747/21836892/fil33r3.
  • Diana Couto. 2015

    Finalidade e funções da linguagem em Agostinho de Hipona.

    Civitas Augustiniana, 4, pp. 11-29. ISSNe 2182-7141. DOI: 10.21747/civitas/42015a1.
  •  . 2014

    Is attention necessary for consciousness? A consideration of Prinz’s proposal. (Work in progress.)

  • Diana Couto. 2014

    O Amor como Fundamento da Justiça em Agostinho de Hipona.

    Civitas Augustiniana, 3, pp. 9-32. ISSNe: 2182-7174. DOI: 10.21747/civitas/32014/a01.
  • Bartłomiej Czajka, Jędrzej Piotr Grodniewicz. 2017

    On the Cognitive Role of Singular Thoughts

    Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 8: 573.
  • Bartłomiej Czajka. 2016

    Review of Epistemic Angst by Duncan Pritchard

    Disputatio, Vol. VIII, No. 43, November 2016, pp. 296-302.

    PDF available here.

  • Nicolò D'Agruma. 2023

    From the epistemic perspectives in experimental semantics to the ambiguity of proper names: Is the inference warranted? A critical notice of Jincai Li's The referential mechanism of proper names

    Mind and Language, 38(4), 2023, 1138–1146.
  • Nicolò D'Agruma. 2022

    Riferimento dei nomi propri e filosofia sperimentale

    APhEx. Portale italiano di filosofia analitica, 25, 2022
  • Roger Deulofeu, Javier Suárez. 2023

    Pluralism and Complexity Without Integration? A Critical Appraisal of Mitchell’s Integrative Pluralism

    Deulofeu, R. & Suárez (Forthcoming). Theoria. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science
  • Roger Deulofeu. 2023

    Natural selection and the nature of statistical explanations

    Crítica. (Forthcoming). Revista hispanoamericana de filosofía 
  • Roger Deulofeu, Javier Suárez. 2021

    Explaining the behavior of random ecological networks. The stability of the microbiome as a case of integrative pluralism. 

    Synthese 198.3: 2003-2025.
  • Roger Deulofeu, Javier Suárez. 2019

    Equilibrium explanations as structural non-mechanistic explanations: the case of long-term bacterial persistence in human hosts 

    Teorema. Revista internacional de filosofía
  • Roger Deulofeu, Javier Suárez. 2018

    When mechanisms are not enough. The origin of eukaryotes an mechanistic explanation

    In Christian, A., Hommen, D., Retzlaff, N., Schurz, G. (eds.) Philosophy of Science: Between the Natural Sciences, the Social Sciences, and the Humanities. Springer.
  • Roger Deulofeu, Jordi Deulofeu. 2017

    Pascal. Los fundamentos de la probabilidad

    Coleccion grandes matemáticos. RBA
  • Roger   Deulofeu Batllori, Javier Suárez. 2019

    Equilibrium explanations as structural non-mechanistic explanations: the case of long-term bacterial persistence in human hosts

    Teorema. Revista internacional de filosofía
  • Roger   Deulofeu Batllori, Javier Suárez. 2019

    Explaining the behavior of random ecological networks. The stability of the microbiome as a case of integrative pluralism. 

    • Synthese
  • Roger   Deulofeu Batllori, Javier Suárez. 2018

    When mechanisms are not enough. The origin of eukaryotes an mechanistic explanation

    In Christian, A., Hommen, D., Retzlaff, N., Schurz, G. (eds.) Philosophy of Science: Between the Natural Sciences, the Social Sciences, and the Humanities. Springer.

  • Roger   Deulofeu Batllori, Jordi Deulofeu . 2017

    Pascal. Los fundamentos de la probabilidad

    Coleccion grandes matemáticos. RBA
  • Esa Díaz-León. 2022

    "Substantive metaphysical debates about gender and race: Verbal disputes and metaphysical deflationism"

    Journal of Social Philosophy, 53(4), 556-574.
  • Esa Díaz-León. 2022

    "The Meaning of 'Woman' and the Political Turn in Philosophy of Language"

    In D. Bordonaba, V. Fernández-Castro & J.R. Torices (eds.) The Political Turn in Analytical Philosophy, De Gruyter, pp. 229-255.
  • Esa Díaz-León. 2022

    "Sexual Orientations, Sexual Desire, and Choice"

    In Brian D. Earp, Clare Chambers & Lori Watson (eds.) The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Sex and Sexuality, Routledge, pp. 102-116.
  • Esa Díaz-León. 2022

    "Sexual Orientations: The Desire View"

    In K. Maitra & J. McWeeny (eds.) Feminist Philosophy of Mind, Oxford University Press, pp. 294-310.
  • Esa Díaz-León, Saray Ayala-López. 2021

    "On Language and Sexuality"

    In Routledge Handbook of Social Philosophy of Language, edited by J. Khoo & R. Sterken, pp. 377-88.
  • Esa Díaz-León. 2020

    "Pejorative Terms and the Semantic Strategy"

    Acta Analytica, 35(1), pp. 23-34.  DOI: 10.1007/s12136-019-00392-2

  • Esa Díaz-León. 2020

    "Descriptive vs Ameliorative Projects: The Role of Normative Considerations"

    In A. Burgess, H. Cappelen & D. Plunkett (eds.) Conceptual Engineering & Conceptual Ethics, Oxford University Press, pp. 170-86, January 2020.
  • Esa Díaz-León. 2020

    "The Meta-Problem of Consciousness and the Phenomenal Concept Strategy"

    Journal of Consciousness Studies, 27 (5-6), pp. 62-73.
  • Esa Díaz-León. 2020

    "On the Conceptual Mismatch Argument: Descriptions, Disagreement, and Amelioration"

    In T. Marques & A. Wikforss (eds), Shifting Concepts: The Philosophy and Psychology of Concept Variability, Oxford University Press, pp. 190-212, May 2020.
  • Esa Díaz-León. 2020

    "Is Feminist Pornography Possible?"

    American Philosophical Association Newsletter in Philosophy and Feminism, 20(2), pp. 8-10.
  • Esa Díaz-León. 2019

    "Relativism and Race"

    In M. Kusch (ed.) Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Relativism, Routledge, pp. 265-71.
  • Esa Díaz-León. 2019

    "On how to achieve reference to covert social constructions"

    Studia Philosophica Estonica, 12.1, pp. 34-43.
  • Esa Díaz-León. 2019

    "Response-Dependence, Misgendering, and Passing: A Comment on Ásta's Categories We Live By"

    Journal of Social Ontology, 5(2), 245-49
  • Esa Díaz-León. 2018

    "Kinds of Social Construction"

    In Pieranna Garavaso (ed.) Bloomsbury Companion to Analytic Feminism, Bloomsbury Academic, pp. 103-22.
  • Esa Díaz-León. 2018

    "On Haslanger's Meta-metaphysics: Social Structures and Metaphysical Deflationism"

    Disputatio, vol. X (50), pp. 201-16.
  • Esa Díaz-León, Jennifer Saul. 2018

    "Feminist Philosophy of Language"

    In Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by E. Zalta, Fall 2018 edition.
  • Esa Díaz-León. 2017

    "Epistemic Contextualism and Conceptual Ethics"

    In Jonathan Ichikawa (ed.) Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Contextualism, Taylor & Francis, pp. 71-80.
  • Esa Díaz-León. 2017

    "Sexual Orientation as Interpretation? Sexual Desires, Concepts, and Choice"

    Journal of Social Ontology, 3(2), pp. 231-48.
  • Esa Díaz-León. 2017

    "Feminist Metaphysics and Philosophy of Language"

    In Carol Hay (ed.), Philosophy: Feminism. Macmillan Interdisciplinary Handbooks, Macmillan Reference USA, pp. 251-71.
  • Esa Díaz-León. 2016

    "'Woman' as a Politically Significant Term: A Solution to the Puzzle"

    Hypatia 31(2), pp. 245-58.
  • Esa Díaz-León. 2016

    "Norms of Judgement, Naturalism, and Normativism about Content"

    Philosophical Explorations 19(1), pp. 48-58.
  • Esa Díaz-León. 2016

    "Phenomenal Concepts: Neither Circular Nor Opaque"

    Philosophical Psychology, 29(8), pp. 1186-99.
  • Esa Díaz-León. 2015

    "What is Social Construction?"

    European Journal of Philosophy, 23(4), pp. 1137-52.
  • Esa Díaz-León. 2015

    "In Defence of Historical Constructivism about Races"

    Ergo, 2(21), pp. 547-62.
  • Esa Díaz-León. 2014

    "Do A Posteriori Physicalists Get Our Phenomenal Concepts Wrong?"

    Ratio 27(1), pp. 1-16
  • Esa Díaz-León. 2012

    "Actors are not Like Zombies"

    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 112(1), pp. 115-22.
  • Esa Díaz-León. 2012

    "Are Ghosts Scarier than Zombies?"

    Consciousness & Cognition 21(2), pp. 747-8.
  • Esa Díaz-León. 2012

    "Social Kinds, Conceptual Analysis, and the Operative Concept: A Reply to Haslanger"

    Humana.Mente--Journal of Philosophical Studies 22, pp. 57-74.
  • Esa Díaz-León. 2011

    "Reductive Explanation, Concepts, and A Priori Entailment"

    Philosophical Studies 155(1), pp. 99-116.
  • Esa Díaz-León. 2010

    "Can Phenomenal Concepts Explain the Epistemic Gap?"

    Mind 119(476), pp. 533-51.
  • Esa Díaz-León. 2009

    "How Many Explanatory Gaps Are There?"

    APA Newsletter on Philosophy and Computers 8(2), pp. 33-35.
  • Esa Díaz-León. 2008

    "Defending the Phenomenal Concept Strategy"

    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86(4), pp. 597-610.
  • Esa Díaz-León. 2008

    "We are living in a material world (and I am a material girl)"

    Teorema 27(3), pp. 85-101.
  • José Antonio Díez, Gonzalo Recio, Christian Carman. 2022

    Does Explaining Past Success Require (Enough) Retention?  The Case Of Ptolemaic Astronomy

    Journal for General Filosofy of Science, July 2022
  • José Antonio Díez, C. Ulises Moulines. 2022

    Guiding Principles and Special Laws

    Theoria (Sweden), vol 88, issue 4, 782-794

  • José Antonio Díez, Pablo Lorenzano. 2022

    Scientific Explanation as Ampliative, Specialized Embedding: The Case of Clasical Genetics

    Synthese 2022 (forthcoming)

  • José Antonio Díez. 2022

    Scientific explanation as ampliative, specialized embedding: New developments

    forthcoming in C. Abreu (ed.), Philosophy of Science in the 21st Century: Contributions of Metatheoretical Structuralism, UFSC, Brasil

  • José Antonio Díez, Javier Suárez. 2022

    How do network explanations explain? A neo-Hempelian approach to network explanations of the ecology of the microbiome


  • José Antonio Díez, Albert Sole. 2022

    On the Formal Elisiveness of the Risky Condition for Hypothesis Testing

    International Studies in Philosophy of Science, July 2022
  • José Antonio Díez, Ariel Roffe. 2022

    Is It Possible to Empirically Test a Metatheory?

  • José Antonio Díez, Andrea Iacona. 2021

    Laws, Reasons and Replaceability

    Crítica 53/158, 3-21

  • José Antonio Díez. 2021

    Modeling Nature. Review of Frigg and Nguyen "Modeling Nture: An Opinionated Introduction of Scientific Representation"

    The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Review of Books
  • José Antonio Díez. 2020

    Modeling as Ensemble-Plus-Standing-For: A Moderate Fictionalist Account            

      A. Cassini and J. Redmond: Models and Idealizations in Science: Fictional and Artifactual Approaches, Springer

  • José Antonio Díez, A. Iacona. 2020

    Fallacies of Love. A Short Philosophical Guide

    Bloomsbury P.
  • José Antonio Díez. 2020

    Siete tesis metaestructuralistasralistas

    J. Díez (ed.), Exploraciones Pluralistas. Las Filosofías de  C. Ulises Moulines, UNAM/Tecnos
  • José Antonio Díez. 2020

    Between Structure and Function:  A Syncretic, Pragmatist Account of Scientific Representation           

  • José Antonio Díez, Nuria S. Miras. 2019

    Recensión de "Las Mentiras de la Ciencia" 

    Crítica 51/151, pp 117-128
  • José Antonio Díez. 2019

    An Ensemble-Plus-Standing-For Account of Scientific Modeling: No (Strong) Need for Abstract Objects            

      X. Donato, C. Martínez and J. L. Falguera (eds.), Abstract Objects in Scientific Practice, Synthese Lybrary

  • José Antonio Díez, Karina Alleva, Lucia Federico. 2017

    Models, Theory Structure and Mechanisms in Biochmestry: The Case of Allosterism 

    Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and
    Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Science, 2017, 63, 1-14 
  • José Antonio Díez. 2017

    A (Fatal) Trilemma for Best Theory Realism

    European Journal for Philosophy of Science ,
  • José Antonio Díez, Karina Alleva, Lucía Federico. 2017

    Conceptual Reconstruction and Epistemic Import: Allosteric Mechanistic Explanations As a Unified Theory-Net


    Crítica, 49.146, pp 5-36
  • José Antonio Díez, Andrea Iacona. 2016

    Del amor y otros engaños. Breve tratado filosófico sobre razones y pasiones

    AlfaDecay, Barcelona
  • José Antonio Díez. 2016

    Siete tesis metaestructuralistas

    in J. Díez (ed.) Exploraciones Pluralistas. Las filosofías de C. Ulises Moulines, UNAM, México 2016
  • José Antonio Díez, Pablo Lorenzano. 2015

    Are Natural Selection Explanatory Models A Priori?

    Biology and Philosophy 30 (6), 887-809
  • José Antonio Díez. 2015

    Counterfactuals, the Discrimination Problem and the Limit Assumption 

    International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 23/1, 85-110
  • José Antonio Díez, C. Carman. 2015

    Did Ptolemy make novel predictions? Launching geocentrism to the scientific realism debate

    Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A, 52, 20-34
  • José Antonio Díez, Andrea Iacona. 2015

    Amore a altri inganni. Tratello filosofico su ragioni e passioni

    Indiana, Torino
  • José Antonio Díez. 2014

    Scientific explanation as ampliative, specialized embedding: a neo-Hempelian account

    Erkenntnis 79/8, 1413-1443
  • José Antonio Díez, Pablo Lorenzano. 2013

    Who Got What Wrong? Fodor and Piattelli on Darwin: Guiding Principles and Explanatory Models in Natural Selection

    Erkenntnis 78/5, 1143-1175.
  • José Antonio Díez, Kareem Kahlifa, Bert Leuridan. 2013

    General theories of explanation: buyers beware

    Synthese 190/3, 379-396.
  • José Antonio Díez. 2011

    Can we dispense with mimesis in representation? Essay review of R. Frigg and C. Hunter (eds.) Beyond mimesis and convention. Representation in art and science

    Metascience 21/1, 105-110
  • José Antonio Díez. 2010

    On Popper's Strong Inductivism 

    Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 42, 105-116
  • José Antonio Díez. 2009

    History of Measurement Theory

    in Gallez, C., Lorenzano, P., Ortiz, E. y Rheinberger, H (eds.), History and Philosophy of Science and Technology,  Encyclopedia of Life Support Systems (EOLSS-UNESCO), Oxford 2009, [electronic edition:] 

  • José Antonio Díez. 2007

    Rationality in Normal Science and the Structure of Theories

    Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 38, 2007 pp. 543 -554.

  • José Antonio Díez. 2006

    Rivalry and Comparability. Looking Outside the Theories

    G. Ernst and K-G Niebergall (eds.), Philosophie der Wissenschaft- Wissenschaft der Philosophie, Mentis, Berlin 2006, 31-50
  • José Antonio Díez. 2005

    The Ramsey Sentence and Theoretical Content

    in M. J. Frapolli (ed.), Belief, Truth and

    Probability. Essays to Mark the Centenary of Frank Plumpton Ramsey's Birth, Continuum, London 2005 pp. 70-103.

  • José Antonio Díez. 2004

    La explicación científica: causalidad, unificación y subsunción teórica

    L. E. Hoyos (ed.), Relativismo y racionalidad, UNC 2004, Bogotá, pp. 283-414
  • José Antonio Díez. 2002

    Iniciación a la Lógica

    Ariel, Barcelona
  • José Antonio Díez. 2002

    A Program for the Individuation of Scientific Concepts

    Synthese 130, 2002, pp. 13-48
  • José Antonio Díez. 2002

    Possession Conditions for Scientific Concepts

    in C. U. Moulines and K. Niebergall (eds.),

    Argument und Analyse, Mentis, Berlin 2002, pp. 83-108.

  • José Antonio Díez. 2002

    Measurement Theory

    Geneza, 2002, Kiev, pp. 24-41
  • José Antonio Díez. 2002

    Explicación, unificación y subsunción

    W. J. González (ed.), Pluralidad de la explicación científica, Ariel, Barcelona 2002, pp. 73-93
  • José Antonio Díez. 2000

    Structuralist Analysis of Fundamental Measurement Theories

    in W. Balzer, C. U. Moulines and J. Sneed (eds.), Structuralist Knowledge Representations. Paradigmatic Examples

    Poznan Studies 75, Rodopi, Amsterdam 2000, pp. 19-49.
  • José Antonio Díez. 2000

    Watermelonsand RedWatermelons. A Case Against Compositionality?

    Theoria, 15/2, San Sebastián, pp 281-285
  • José Antonio Díez. 1999

    A General Representation for Internal Proportional Comparison-combiantorial Systems When the Operation is Not Necessarily Closed

    Theoria 14/1, 1999, pp. 157-178
  • José Antonio Díez, C. U. Moulines. 1998

    Fundamentos de Filosofía de la Ciencia

    Ariel, Barcelona
  • José Antonio Díez. 1998

    Hacia una teoría general de la representación científica

    Theoria, 13/1, San Sebastián, pp. 157-178
  • José Antonio Díez. 1998

    Descripción, prescripción e interpretación

    C. Solís (ed.), Alta tensión: filosofía, sociología e historia de la ciencia, Paidos, Barcelona 1998, pp. 235-258
  • José Antonio Díez. 1997

    A Hundred Years of Numbers. An Historical Introduction to Measurement Theory. Part I: The Formation Period

    Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 21, 1, 1997, pp. 167-181.
  • José Antonio Díez. 1997

    A Hundred Years of Numbers. An Historical Introduction to Measurement Theory. Part II: Suppes and the Mature Theory

    Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 22, 2, 1997 pp. 237-265.

  • José Antonio Díez. 1997

    The Theory-Net of Interval Measurement Theory

    in A. Ibarra y T. Mormann (eds.),

    Representations of Scientific Rationality, Poznan Studies 61, Rodopi, Amsterdam 1997, pp. 135- 164
  • José Antonio Díez, C. U. Moulines. 1994

    Theories as Nets: Combinatorial Measurement Theory

    in P. Humphreys (ed.), Patrick Suppes,  Mathematical Philosopher, Kluwer Ac. P., Dordrecht 1994, pp. 275-297.
  • Ryan Doran. 2022

    Sullying Sights.

    Philosophical Psychology, 35, 2: 177-204.
  • Ryan Doran. 2022

    Aesthetic Animism.

    Philosophical Studies, 179: 3365-3400.
  • Ryan Doran. 2022

    Thick and Perceptual Moral Beauty.

    Australasian Journal of Philosophy. OnlineFirst.
  • Ryan Doran. 2022

    Aesthetic Animism.

    Philosophical Studies. OnlineFirst.
  • Ryan Doran. 2022

    Ugliness Is in the Gut of the Beholder.

    Ergo: An Open-Access Journal of Philosophy, 9, 5: 88-146.
    Winner of the American Philosophical Association's 2024 Arthur Danto/ASA Prize
  • Ryan Doran. 2021

    Moral Beauty, Inside and Out.

    Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 99, 2: 396-414.
  • Ryan Doran. 2017

    Restorative Aesthetic Pleasures & Restoring the Unity of Pleasure

    Australasian Philosophical Review, 1, 1: 73-78.
  • Alfonso García Lapeña, David Ferragut. 2023

    Antes de los Game Studies

    Forthcoming. Anaitgames
  • Alfonso García Lapeña. 2023

    Nikolaus Geyrhalter y la superposición de estados: Creencia e imaginación en Homo Sapiens

    (Nikolaus Geyrhalter and the superposition of states: Belief and imagination in Homo Sapiens). In Lo que dura una película. Una antología sobre slow cinema. Co-edited by David Ferragut and Iona Sharp-Casas. Ed. Laertes.
  • Alfonso García Lapeña. 2021

    Truthlikeness for quantitative deterministic laws

    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. 74. First online May 2021, doi: 10.1086/714984.
  • Alfonso García Lapeña. 2021

    Truthlikeness for probabilistic laws

    Synthese 199, 9359–9389, doi: 10.1007/s11229-021-03206-4.
  • Alfonso García Lapeña, David Ferragut. 2020

    Un museo para los videojuegos

  • Alfonso García Lapeña, David Ferragut. 2019

    Ensayos y errores: Arte, ciencia y filosofía en los videojuegos

    (Trials and Errors. Art, science and philosophy in video games). Co-edited by David Ferragut and Alfonso García. Anaitgames.
  • Alfonso García Lapeña. 2019

    ¿Qué es un videojuego?

    (What is a video game?). In Ensayos y Errores. Arte, ciencia y filosofía en los videojuegos. Co-edited by David Ferragut and Alfonso García. Anaitgames.
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2023

    Semantics of Fiction

    Mind and Language, 38 (2), 604-618,
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2023

    Lying vs. Misleading, with Language and Pictures: The Adverbial Account

    ‘Lying vs. Misleading, with Language and Pictures: The Adverbial Account’, Linguistics & Philosophy 46, 509–532
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2023

    Fictional Narrators and Normative Fiction-Making

    Patrik Engisch & Julia Langkau (eds.), The Philosophy of Fiction: Imagination and Cognition, Routledge, London 2023, 99-119
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2023

    Kripke's Groundbreaking Philosophy

    Teorema 42 (1), 171-181
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2022

    How to Understand Rule-Constituted Kinds

    Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 13, 7-27
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2022

    Predelli on Fictional Discourse

    Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 80 (1), 83-94
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2022

    Games, Artworks, and Hybrids

    E. Terrone & V. Tripodi (eds.), Being and Value in Technology, Palgrave Macmillan, 187-217
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2022

    Truth in Fiction Reprised

    British Journal of Aesthetics, 62 (2), 307-324
  • Manuel García-Carpintero, Michele Palmira. 2022

    What Do Propositions Explain? Inflationary vs. Deflationary Perspectives and The Case of Singular Propositions

    Synthese, DOI: 10.1007/s11229-022-03467-7
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2021

    Models as Hypostatizations: The Case of Supervaluationism in Semantics

    Alejandro Cassini & Juan Redmond (eds.): Models and Idealizations in Science: Fictional and Artifactual Approaches, Cham: Springer, 179-197

  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2021

    Reference-fixing and Presuppositions

    S. Biggs & H. Geirsson (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Linguistic Reference, London: Routledge, 179-197.

  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2021

    Metasemantics: A Normative Perspective (and the Case of Mood)

    P. Stalmaszczyk (ed.), The Cambridge Handbook of the Philosophy of Language, Cambridge: CUP, Cambridge: CUP, 2021, 401-418.

  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2021

    Documentaries and the Fiction/Nonfiction Divide

    Studies in Documentary Film 15 (2), 163-74

  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2021

    Do the Imaginings that Fictions Invite Have a Direction of Fit?

    Emar Maier and Andreas Stokke (eds.): The Language of Fiction, Oxford: OUP, 2021, 131-152
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2021

    Pretense, Cancellation, and the Act Theory of Propositions

    Inquiry  DOI: 10.1080/0020174X.2021.1990795
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2020

    On the Nature of Presupposition: A Normative Speech Act Account

    Erkenntnis 85(2), 269-293, 2020
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2020

    Co-Identification and fictional names

    Philosophy and phenomenological research, 101 (1), 3-34, DOI: 10.1111/phpr.12552

  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2020

    Referential Indeterminacy in Fiction

    Journal of Applied Logic, 7(2), 177-190

  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2020

    Semantics and Metaphysics of Truth

    M. Kusch (ed.), Routledge Handbook to the Philosophy of Relativism, London: Routledge, 468-76

  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2020

    Mario Gómez-Torrente’ Roads to Reference: An Essay on Reference Fixing in Natural Language

    Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews

  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2020

    Commentary on Greg Currie’s Imagining and Knowing

    The Junkyard

  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2019

    On the Nature of Fiction-Making: Grice or Austin?

    British Journal of Aesthetics 59 (2), 2019, 203-210, DOI: 10.1093/aesthj/ayy054


  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2019

    Assertions in Fictions: An Indirect Speech Act Account

    Grazer Philosophische Studien  96(3), 445-462, DOI: 10.1163/18756735-09603013



  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2019

    Normative Fiction-Making and the World of the Fiction

    Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 77 (3), 2019, 267-279, DOI: 10.1111/jaac.12660


  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2019

    Conventions and Constitutive Norms

    Journal of Social Ontology, 5 (1), 2019, 35-52, DOI: 10.1515/jso-2019-0013

  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2019

    Semantics of Fictional Terms 

    Teorema 38(2), 2019, 73-100.

  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2019

    Singular Reference in  Fictional Discourse?

    Disputatio 54 (2019), 143-177, DOI: 10.2478/disp-2019-0015
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2018

    De Se Thoughts and Immunity to Error through Misidentification

    Synthese 195, 3311-3333, DOI: 10.1007/s11229-015-0817-y.

  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2018

    Pure Quotation Is Demonstrative Reference

    Journal of Philosophy 115 (7): 361-381
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2018

    Sneaky Assertions

    Philosophical Perspectives 32, 188-218
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2018

    John Woods' Truth in Fiction

    Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2018

    The Mill-Frege Theory of Proper Names

    Mind 127 (508), 1107-1168, doi:10.1093/mind/fzx010
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2017

    The Philosophical Significance of the De Se

    Inquiry, vol. 60(3), 253-276, doi: 10.1080/0020174X.2017.1262003
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2016

    Relatar lo ocurrido como invención: una introducción a la filosofía de la ficción contemporánea

    Editorial Cátedra, Madrid
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2016

    Mark Richard’s Truth and Truth-Bearers

    Notre Dame Philosophical Review 
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2016

    Recent Debates on Learning from Fiction

    Teorema 35(3), 5-20
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2016

    Token-reflexive Presuppositions and the De Se

    García-Carpintero, M. & Torre, S. (eds.), About Oneself, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016, 179-199.
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2015

    Accommodating Presuppositions

    Topoi, DOI: 10.1007/s11245-014-9264-5
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2015

    Is Fictional Reference Rigid?

    Organon F 22, suppl. 1, 145-168.
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2015

    Contexts as Shared Commitments

    Frontiers in Psychology, 6:1932, 2015, DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.01932.
  • Manuel García-Carpintero, Teresa Marques. 2014

    Disagreement about taste: commonality presuppositions and coordination

    Australasian Journal of Philosophy, DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2014.922592
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2014

    Introduction: The Problem of Empty Representations

    García-Carpintero, M. & Martí, G. (eds.), Empty Representations: Reference and Non-Existence, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014, 1-22.
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2014

    Understanding Anaphoric Dependence: A Reply to Glezakos

    Revista de Filosofía de la Universidad de Costa Rica 53, 136, suppl. vol. (2014), 119-124.
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2013

    Critical Study: Relativism and Monadic Truth

    Philosophical Quarterly, 2013, DOI: 10.1111/1467-9213.12011 .
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2013

    Relativism, the Open Future, and Propositional Truth

    F. Correia & A. Iacona (eds.), Around the Tree, Synthese Library, Springer, 2013, 1-27.
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2013

    Explicit Performatives Revisited

    Journal of Pragmatics, DOI: 10.1016/j.pragma.2013.01.005
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2013

    Self-Conception: Sosa on De Se Thought

    J. Turri (ed.), Virtuous Thoughts: The Philosophy of Ernest Sosa, Philosophical Studies Series, Springer, Dordrecht 2013, 73-99.
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2013

    Referencia y Ficción

    Perspectivas en Filosofía del Lenguaje, David Pérez-Chico (coord.), Prensas de la Universidad de Zaragoza, Zaragoza.
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2013

    Insinuating Information and Accommodating Presuppositions

    Brevity, Laurence Goldstein (ed.), OUP: Oxford, 214-229.
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2013

    Norms of Fiction -Making

    British Journal for Aesthetics, DOI: 10.1093/aesthj/ayt021
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2013

    The Self File and Immunity to Error Through Misidentification

    Disputatio 36, (2013), 191-206
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2012

    Minimalism on Quotation?

    Philosophical Studies, 161 (2012) , 207-225. DOI: 10.1007/s11098-011-9730-5 .
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2012

    Foundational Semantics I: Descriptive Accounts

    Philosophy Compass 7(6), 2012, 397-409 DOI: 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2012.00484.x.
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2012

    Foundational Semantics II: Normative Accounts

    Philosophy Compass 7(6), 2012, 410-421 DOI: 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2012.00485.x
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2012

    Vindicating Analyticity

    Disputatio 33, 4 (2012), 495-513.
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2012

    Editorial Introduction: the History of the Philosophy of Language

    García-Carpintero, M. & Kölbel, M. (eds.), The Continuum Companion to the Philosophy of Language, Continuum, London, London, 2012, 1-1.
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2011

    Double-duty Quotation, Conventional Implicatures and What Is Said

    E. Brendel, J. Meibauer & M. Steinbach (eds.): Understanding Quotation, Mouton Series in Pragmatics 7, 107-138.
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2011

    A Genealogical Notion

    Teorema 30, 43-52.
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2011

    Truth-Bearers and Modesty

    Grazer Philosophische Studien, 82, 49-75.
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2011

    Review of Assertion, Brown & Cappelen (eds.), OUP 2011

    Teorema 30 (2011), 167-17.
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2010

    Supervaluationism and the Report of Vague Contents

    S. Moruzzi & R. Dietz. (eds.), Cuts and Clouds: Essays in the Nature and Logic of Vagueness, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 345-359.
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2010

    Fictional Entities, Theoretical Models and Figurative Truth

    Frigg, R, and Hunter, M. (eds.), Beyond Mimesis and Convention – Representation in Art and Science, Springer, 139-68.
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2010

    Fictional Singular Imaginings

    Jeshion, R. (ed.), New Essays on Singular Thought, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 273-299.
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2010

    Gaskin's Ideal Unity

     Dialectica 64, 2, 279-288.
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2009

    Voltolini’s Ficta

    Dialectica 63, 57-66.
  • Manuel García-Carpintero, Manuel Pérez-Otero. 2009

    The Conventional and the Analytic

    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 78, 2, 239-274.
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2008

    Homophonic Prejudices

    Crítica 40, 67-84.
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2008

    Singular Thought and the Contingent A Priori

    Revue Internationale de Philosophie, special issue “Contemporary Analytic Philosophy of Mind” edited by Joëlle Proust, 62, 79-98.
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2008

    Relativism, Vagueness and What Is Said

    In García-Carpintero, M. & Kölbel, M. (eds.), Relative Truth, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2007

    Recanati on the Semantics-Pragmatics Distinction

    Crítica 38, 35-68.
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2007

    Fiction-Making as an Illocutionary Act

    The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 65, 203-216.
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2007

    A Non-Modal Conception of Secondary Properties

    Philosophical Papers 36, 1-36.
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2007

    Bivalence and What Is Said

    Dialectica 61, 167-190.
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2006

    Frascolla on Tractarian Logical Pictures of Facts

    Dialectica 59, 87-97.
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2006

    Nonconceptual Modes of Presentation

    European Review of Philosophy 6, 65-81.
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2006

    Two-Dimensional Semantics: A Neo-Fregean Interpretation

    In Two-Dimensional Semantics, M. García-Carpintero & J. Macià (eds.), Oxford University Press, Oxford, 181-204.
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2006

    Logical Form: Syntax and Semantics

    Wittgenstein Today, A. Coliva & E. Picardi (eds.) Il Poligrafo, Padova, 2004, 63-87.
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2005

    Double-Duty Quotation: The Deferred Ostension Account

    Belgian Journal of Linguistics 17, 89-106.
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2005

    The Real Distinction between Descriptions and Indexicals

    Teorema 24, 49-74.
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2004

    The Deferred Ostension Theory of Quotation

    Noûs 38, 674-692.
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2004

    Assertion and the Semantics of Force Markers

    The Semantics/Pragmatics Distinction, C. Bianchi (ed.) CSLI Lecture Notes, The University of Chicago Press Stanford, 2004,133-166.
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2003

    Qualia that It Is Right to Quine

    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 63, 357-377.
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2002

    Sense-Data: the Sensible Approach

    Grazer Philosophische Studien, 62, 17-63.
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2001

    Gricean Rational Reconstructions and the Semantics/Pragmatics Distinction

    Synthese, 97, 93-131.
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 2000

    A Presuppositional Account of Reference-Fixing

    Journal of Philosophy, 97 (3),109-147.
  • Manuel García-Carpintero, Manuel Pérez Otero. 1999

    The Ontological Commitments of Logical Theories

    European Review of Philosophy 4, 157-182.
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 1999

    Searle on Perception

    Teorema 18/1, 19-41
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 1998

    Indexicals as Token-Reflexives

    Mind 107, pp. 529-563
  • Manuel García-Carpintero, Manuel Pérez Otero. 1998

    Davidson, Correspondence Truth, and the Frege-Gödel-Church Argument

    History and Philosophy of Logic, pp. 63-81.
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 1998

    A Paradox of Truth-Minimalism

    C. Martínez, U. Rivas & L. Villegas-Forero (eds.), Truth in Perspective, Ashgate, Aldershott (UK), pp. 37-63.
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 1998

    Fregean versus Kripkean Reference

    Teorema 17/1, 21-44
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 1996

    What Is a Tarskian Theory of Truth?

    Philosophical Studies 82, pp. 113-144
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 1996

    The Model-Theoretic Argument: Another Turn of the Screw

     Erkenntnis 44, pp. 305-316
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 1995

    The Philosophical Import of Connectionism : A Critical Notice of Andy Clark’s Associative Engines

    Mind and Language 10, pp. 370-401


  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 1994

    Ostensive Signs: Against the Identity Theory of Quotation

    Journal of Philosophy, 91, 253-264.
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 1994

    Dretske on the Causal Efficacy of Meaning

    Mind and Language 9 (2), 181-202
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 1993

    The Grounds for the Model-Theoretic Account of the Logical Properties

    Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, vol. 34, núm. 1, 107-131
  • Manuel García-Carpintero. 0

    The Supervenience of Mental Content

    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,  Vol. 94 (1994), pp. 117-135
  • Daniel Gregory. 2023

    Imagining a way out of dream skepticism

    Erkenntnis, forthcoming
  • Daniel Gregory. 2022

    How not to decide whether inner speech is speech: Two common mistakes

    Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, forthcoming
  • Daniel Gregory, Malte Hendrickx, Cameron Turner. 2022

    Who knows what Mary knew? An experimental study

    Philosophical Psychology, 35: 522-545.
  • Daniel Gregory. 2020

    Are inner speech utterances actions?

    Teorema, 39(3): 55-78
  • Daniel Gregory. 2020

    Judging the mental states of others: “Mindreading” in legal decision-making

    Jurisprudence, 11: 48-62
  • Daniel Gregory. 2018

    The feeling of sincerity: Inner speech and the phenomenology of assertion

    Thought, 7: 225-236
  • Daniel Gregory. 2017

    Is inner speech dialogic?

    Journal of Consciousness Studies, 24(1-2): 111-137
  • Daniel Gregory. 2016

    Inner speech, imagined speech, and auditory verbal hallucinations

    Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 7: 653-673.
  • J.P.  Grodniewicz. 2021

    The justification of comprehension-based beliefs

    Review of Philosophy and Psychology,
  • J.P.  Grodniewicz. 2020

    The process of linguistic understanding

  • J.P.  Grodniewicz, (with J. Adam Carter and Emma C. Gordon). 2020

    Understanding a communicated thought

  • J.P.  Grodniewicz, (with Bartłomiej Czajka). 2017

    On the cognitive role of singular thoughts

    Review of Philosophy and Psychology,


  • Marie Guillot. 2016

    I Me Mine: on a Confusion Concerning Subjective Character

    Review of Philosophy and Psychology. [Download PDF ]
  • Marie Guillot. 2016

    Thinking of Oneself as the Thinker: the Concept of Self and the Phenomenology of Intellection

    Philosophical Explorations. Forthcoming.
  • Marie Guillot, joint work with Alexandre Billon. 2014

    Can Fregeans Have I-Thoughts?

    In Juan Diego Moya Bedoya and David Suárez-Rivero (eds), Gottlob Frege’s Puzzle. A Reexamination of the Cognitive Significance Phenomenon. Rev. Filosofía Univ. Costa Rica. 53 (136 Extraordinary), 9-15, May-August 2014, p. 97-105. [Download PDF ]
  • Marie Guillot. 2014

    Connaissance de soi et connaissance du mien

    In Jean-Marie Chevalier & Benoit Gautier (eds), Connaître. Questions d'épistémologie contemporaine . Editions d'Ithaque.   

  • Marie Guillot. 2014

    Identification-Free at Last. Semantic Relativism, Evans's Legacy and a Unified Approach to Immunity to Error through Misidentification

    Teorema, Vol XXXIII/3 (autumn 2014). Winner of the 2013 Teorema Essay Prize. [Advanced draft ]

  • Marie Guillot. 2013

    The Limits of Selflessness. Semantic Relativism and the Epistemology of De Se Thoughts

    Synthese Vol. 190, Issue 10 (2013), p. 1793–1816. [Download PDF ]
  • Marie Guillot. 2012

    Anscombe aurait-elle été relativiste?

    Repha (6). 55-72. [PDF ]
  • Carl Hoefer, Genoveva Martí. 2020

    Realism, Reference & Perspective

    European Journal for Philosophy of Science 10:3, 2020

  • Carl Hoefer, Antonio Vassallo. 2020

    The Metaphysics of Machian Frame-Dragging

    Einstein Studies v. 15Thinking About Space and Time (edited by Claus Beisbart, Tilman Sauer & Chris Wüthrich), Springer, 2020.  

  • Carl Hoefer. 2020

    Scientific Realism Without the Quantum

    Scientific Realism and the Quantum, ed. Steven French & Juha Saatsi, Oxford University Press 2020

  • Carl Hoefer, Christopher Viger, Daniel Viger. 2019

    The Philosopher’s Paradox: How to Make a Coherent Decision in the Newcomb Problem

    THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of ScienceVolume 34/3, September 2019, pp. 313-471.  

  • Carl Hoefer, Genoveva Martí. 2019

    Water Has a Microstructural Essence After All

     European Journal for Philosophy of Science, 9:12 (2019).

  • Carl Hoefer. 2019

    Chance In the World: A Humean Guide to Objective Chance

    Oxford University Press, 2019.
  • Carl Hoefer, Albert Solé. 2019

    The Nomological Interpretation of the Wave Function

    Philosophers Look at Quantum Mechanics, ed. Alberto Cordero, Synthese Library #409, Springer 2019.

  • Carl Hoefer, Chris Smeenk. 2016

    Philosophy of Physical Sciences

    Paul Humphreys (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Science.  Forthcoming, Oxford University Press, 2016

  • Carl Hoefer. 2016

    Objective Chance:  Not Propensity, Maybe Determinism

    Lato Sensu: Revue de la Société de Philosophie des Ciencies, U. Catholique Louvain, 2016.

  • Carl Hoefer, Albert Solé. 2015

    Introduction: Space–time and the wave function

    Intro to special issue of Synthese (eds. A. Solé & C. Hoefer), Synthese 192:10 (2015), pp. 3055-3070.  DOI: 10.1007/s11229-015-0826-x.
  • Carl Hoefer, Roman Frigg. 2015

    The Best Humean System for Statistical Mechanics

    Erkenntnis. Special issue edited by J. Berkovitz & P. Huneman. December 2015, Volume 80, Supplement 3, pp 551-574
  • Carl Hoefer. 2014

    Consistency and Admissibility: Reply to Meacham

    Chance and Temporal Asymmetry (ed. Alastair Wilson), Oxford University Press, 2014.
  • Carl Hoefer. 2014

    Mach's Principle as action-at-a-distance in GR: the causality question 

    Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics.  Online First Oct. 2014
  • John Horden. 2016

    Devious Stipulations

    Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, forthcoming
  • John Horden. 2014

    Ontology in Plain English

    Philosophical Quarterly, 64: 225-42
  •  . 2016

    Is predication an act or an operation?, in: Topics in Predication Theory, P. Stalmaszczyk (ed.), Studies in Philosophy of Language and Linguistics, Peter Lang GmbH, forthcoming. 

    Should propositions proliferate?, Thoughtvol. 4 (2015), 243-51.

    Introduction (with M. Duží), Synthese, vol. 192 (2015), 525-34.

    Transparent quantification into hyperintensional objectual attitudes (with M. Duží), Synthese, vol. 192 (2015), 635-77.

    Qualifying quantifying-in, in: Quantifiers, Quantifiers, and QuantifiersA. Torza (ed.), Synthese Library, vol. 373 (2015), 241-69.

    Structured lexical concepts, property modifiers, and Transparent Intensional Logic, Philosophical Studies, vol. 172 (2015), 321-45.

  • Matt Jope. 2021

    The Symmetry Problem for Testimonial Conservatism.

  • Matt Jope. 2021

    On the Alleged Instability of Externalist Anti-Skepticism. 

    The Journal of Philosophy. 
  • Matt Jope. 2019

    Closure, Credence and Rationality: A Problem for Non-Belief Hinge Epistemology. 

  • Marta Jorba, Valentina Petrolini, Agustín Vicente. 2023

    What does it take to be rigid? Reflections on the notion of rigidity in autism

    Frontiers in Psychiatry 14: 1072362 doi: 10.3389/fpsyt.2023.1072362
  • Marta Jorba, Tom McClelland. 2022

    Perceptual Motivation for Action

    Review of Philosophy and Psychology
  • Marta Jorba. 2022

    Metaphors of intersectionality: reframing the debate with a new proposal

    European Journal of Women’s Studies 29(1): 23–38.
  • Marta Jorba. 2020

    Husserlian Horizons, Cognitive Affordances and Motivating Reasons for Action

    Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 19, 847–868
  • Marta Jorba, Agustín Vicente. 2020

    Phenomenal Contrast Arguments: What They Achieve

    Mind and Language 35 (3):350-36
  • Marta Jorba, Valentina Petrolini, Agustín Vicente. 2020

    The Role of Inner Speech in Executive Functioning Tasks: Schizophrenia with Auditory Verbal Hallucinations and Autistic Spectrum Conditions as Case Studies

    Frontiers in Psychology
  • Marta Jorba. 2020

    Apunts per a una fenomenologia de la interseccionalitat

    Convivium 33: 47-64
  • Marta Jorba, Maria Rodó-Zárate. 2019

    Beyond Mutual Constitution: the Property Framework for Intersectionality Studies

    Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 45(1): 175-200
  • Marta Jorba, Agustín Vicente. 2019

    The Linguistic Determination of Conscious Thought Content

    Noûs 53:3, 737–759
  • Marta Jorba, Agustín Vicente. 2018

    How Far Does the User-illusion Go? Dennett on Knowing What We Think

    Teorema. Revista Internacional de Filosofía 37 (3): 205-221
  • Marta Jorba, Agustín Vicente. 2017

    The Linguistic Determination of Conscious Thought Content

    Noûs DOI: 10.1111/nous.12239
  • Marta Jorba. 2017

    La fenomenologia cognitiva

    Quaderns de Filosofia 4 (2): 61-89. 
  • Marta Jorba. 2016

    Attitudinal Cognitive Phenomenology and the Horizon of Possibilities.

    Breyer, T. and Gutland, Ch. (eds.). The Phenomenology of Thinking. Philosophical Investigations into the Character of Cognitive Experiences. London: Routlegde: 77-96.

  • Marta Jorba. 2016

    Review of Semantic Perception, by Jody Azzouni

    Mind 125 (497): 290-297.
  • Marta Jorba, Dermot Moran. 2016

    Conscious Thinking and Cognitive Phenomenology: Topics, Views and Future Developments

    Philosophical Explorations 19(2): 95-113.
  • Marta Jorba. 2016

    The Conscious and Phenomenal Character of Thought: Reflections on Their Possible Dissociation

    Phenomenology and Mind 10: 44-56.
  • Marta Jorba. 2015

    Thoughts, Processive Character and the Stream of Consciousness

    International Journal of Philosophical Studies 23 (5): 730-753.
  • Marta Jorba. 2015

    Conscious Thought and the Limits of Restrictivism

    Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía 47 (141): 3-32.
  • Marta Jorba, Agustín Vicente. 2014

    Cognitive Phenomenology, Access to Contents and Inner Speech

    Journal of Consciousness Studies, Vol 21, Issue 9-10, pp. 74-99. 
  • Marta Jorba. 2014

    Perspectives sobre el contracte sexual-social: John Locke i Carole Pateman.

    Anuari de la Societat Catalana de Filosofia XXV, pp. 117-133. 
  • Marta Jorba. 2013

    Book review of Cognitive Phenomenology 

    Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, Vol 2, Issue 4, pp. 883-890. 
  • Marta Jorba. 2013

    Translation: Gallagher, S. y Zahavi, D. (2013). La mente fenomenológica. (The Phenomenological Mind, 2012. 2nd edition. London: Routledge).

    Madrid: Alianza Editorial.
  • Marta Jorba. 2013

    Intencionalitat (Intentionalität).

    Anuari de la Societat Catalana de Filosofia XXIV, 115-13.
  • Marta Jorba, Rodó-de-Zárate, Maria. 2012

    Commentary of The Complexity of Intersectionality

    Humana.mente. Journal of Philosophical Studies. Vol 22, pp. 189-197. 
  • Marta Jorba. 2012

    Book review of Heidegger and the Watches. Genetic Phenomenology of time measurement

    Continental Philosophy Review. Vol 45, Issue 4, pp. 597-602. 
  • Marta Jorba. 2011

    Thinking and Phenomenal Consciousness

    Balkan Journal of Philosophy, Vol 3, Issue 1, pp. 101-110.
  • Marta Jorba. 2011

    La Intencionalidad: entre Husserl y la Filosofía de la mente contemporánea

    Investigaciones Fenomenológicas: anuario de la Sociedad Espeñola de Fenomenología, Vol 8, pp. 79-91. 
  • Marta Jorba. 2011

    Book review of Cuerpo Vivido

    Investigaciones Fenomenológicas: anuario de la Sociedad Española de Fenomenología, Vol 8, pp. 217-224.
  • Marta Jorba. 2010

    Is There a Specific Experience of Thinking?

    Theoria. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science. Vol 25, No 2, pp. 187-196.
  • Sophie Keeling. 2022

    Believing for a Reason is (at least) Nearly Self-Intimating, Erkenntnis (online advance:

  • Sophie Keeling. 2022

    Controlling our Reasons, Nous
  • Sophie Keeling. 2021

    Knowing our Reasons: Distinctive Self-Knowledge of Why We Hold Our Attitudes and Perform Actions, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 102(2), 318-341

  • Sophie Keeling. 2019

    The Transparency Method and Knowing our Reasons, Analysis, 79(4), 613-21

  • Sophie Keeling. 2019

    Review of Alex Byrne's Transparency and Self-KnowledgeThe Philosophical Quaterly, 70(280), 639-42

  • Sophie Keeling. 2018

    Confabulation and Rational Requirements for Self-Knowledge, Philoosphical Psychology, 31(8), 1215-1238

  • Max Kölbel. 2017

    "About Concerns "

    In Ilse Depraetere and Raphael Salkie (eds.), Semantics and Pragmatics: Drawing a Line, Amsterdam: Springer, 197–214.

  • Max Kölbel. 2016

    "Aesthetic Judge-Dependence and Expertise "

    Inquiry 59, 589–617.
  • Max Kölbel. 2016

    "Moralischer Relativismus " (German translation of "Moral Relativism" (2015).

    In Markus Rüther (ed.), Grundkurs Metaethik. Münster: Mentis Verlag.
  • Max Kölbel. 2015

    "Relativism 1: Representational Content"

    Philosophy Compass 10/1, pp. 38–51.
  • Max Kölbel. 2015

    "Relativism 2: Semantic Content"

    Philosophy Compass 10/1, pp. 52–67.
  • Max Kölbel. 2015

    "Moral Relativism "

    In Tim Crane (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2015, London: Routledge.
  • Max Kölbel. 2015

    "Propositionen "

    In Nikola Kompa (ed), Handbuch Sprachphilosophie, Stuttgart/Weimar: Verlag J.B. Metzler.

  • Max Kölbel. 2015

    Review of John MacFarlane, Assessment Sensitivity [CORRECTED VERSION]

    Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews
  • Max Kölbel. 2014

    "Agreement and Communication"

    Erkenntnis 79, pp. 101–120.

  • Max Kölbel. 2013

    "Should we be Pluralists about Truth?"

    in Nicolaj Jang Pedersen and Cory Wright (eds), Truth Pluralism: Current Debates, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2013.
  • Max Kölbel. 2013

    "The Conversational Role of Centered Contents "

    Inquiry 56, pp. 97–121.

  • Max Kölbel. 2013

    Wörtliche illokutionäre Kraft. Eine Verteidigung der konventionalen Behauptung

    in Eva-Maria Konrad et al. (eds), Fiktion, Wahrheit, Interpretation, Münster: Mentis Verlag.
  • Max Kölbel. 2011

    "Global Relativism and Self-Refutation "

    Steven D. Hales (ed.), The Blackwell Companion to Relativism, Oxford: Blackwell.
  • Max Kölbel. 2011

    "Conversational Score, Assertion and Testimony "

    in Jessica Brown and Herman Cappelen (eds), New Essays on Assertion, Oxford Oxford University Press.
  • Max Kölbel. 2011

    Objectivity, Relativism and Context Dependence (text book for master-level course)

    Fernuniversität Hagen.
  • Max Kölbel. 2010

    "Vagueness as Semantic "

    Dietz and Moruzzi (eds.): Cuts and Clouds: Vagueness, its Nature and its Logic, Oxford: Oxford University Press
  • Max Kölbel. 2009

    "The Evidence for Relativism"

    Synthese 166 (January 2009), pp. 375–95.
  • Max Kölbel. 2009

    "Literal Force: A Defence of Conventional Assertion "

    in Sarah Sawyer (ed.), New Waves in Philosophy of Language, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 2010.
  • Max Kölbel, Darragh Byrne. 2009

    Arguing about Language (edited by Darragh Byrne and Max Kölbel)

    London: Routledge.
  • Max Kölbel. 2009

    Sittenvielfalt und Moralischer Relativismus

    in Gerhard Ernst (ed.): Moralischer Relativismus, Paderborn: Mentis.
  • Max Kölbel. 2009

     English translation of pp. 25-36 as well as the last paragraph of Gottlob Frege: “Über Sinn und Bedeutung”. The translation is by Max Kölbel and may be used unchanged for non-commercial purposes, as long as the source is properly acknowledged. 

    This translation has appeared also in Darragh Byrne and Max Kölbel (eds), Arguing about Language, London: Routledge 2010, pp. 49–55.
  • Max Kölbel. 2008

    "Truth in Semantics "

    Midwest Studies in Philosophy 32 (2008), pp. 242–57.
  • Max Kölbel. 2008

    "' True' as Ambiguous "

    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (September 2008), pp.359–84.
  • Max Kölbel. 2008

    "Motivations for Relativism "

    in Garcia-Carpintero and Kölbel (eds.), Relative Truth, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2008, pp. 1–38.
  • Max Kölbel, Manuel García-Carpintero. 2008

    Relative Truth (edited by Manuel García-Carpintero and Max Kölbel)

    Oxford: Oxford University Press
  • Max Kölbel. 2007

    How to Spell Out Genuine Relativism and How to Defend Indexical Relativism

    International Journal of Philosophical Studies 15 (July 2007), p. 281–288.
  • Max Kölbel. 2006

    "Conventions in Language "

    Keith Brown (ed.), Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics, Oxford: Elsevier Publishers 2006. Reprinted in Alex Barber and Robert Stainton (eds),Concise Encyclopedia of Philosophy of Language and Linguistics, Oxford: Elsevier Publishers 2010.

  • Max Kölbel. 2005

    "Moral Relativism "

    in Dag Westerstahl and Torbjörn Tännsjö (eds), Lectures on Relativism, Göteborg University 2005.
  • Max Kölbel. 2004

    "Indexical Relativism vs Genuine Relativism "

    International Journal of Philosophical Studies 12 (Oct. 2004), pp. 297–313.
  • Max Kölbel. 2004

    Sainsbury’s Programme ”. Article for a Book Symposium on Departing from Frege by Mark Sainsbury

    Philosophical Books 45, (July 2004), pp. 187–96.
  • Max Kölbel. 2004

    Zwei Arten von Relativismus

    in R. Bluhm and C. Nimtz (eds.), Selected Papers Contributed to GAP.5, 5th International Congress of the Society for Analytical Philosophy, Bielefeld, 22-26 September 2003, Paderborn: Mentis 2004. (Shortened German version of "Indexical Relativism vs Genuine Relativism").
  • Max Kölbel. 2003

    "Faultless Disagreement "

    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104 (October 2003), pp. 53–73.
  • Max Kölbel. 2002

    "Wright on Disputes of Inclination "

    Unpublished paper, deposited here in order to continue to provide access.
  • Max Kölbel. 2002

    Truth without Objectivity (table of contents , introduction )

    London: Routledge
  • Max Kölbel. 2001

    "Two Dogmas of Davidsonian Semantics "

    Journal of Philosophy 98 (December 2001), pp. 613–35.
  • Max Kölbel. 2000

    "Edgington on Compounds of Conditionals "

    Mind 109 (Jan 2000), pp. 97–108.
  • Max Kölbel. 1999

    Saving Relativism from its Saviour

    Crítica 31 (April 1999), pp. 91–103.
  • Max Kölbel. 1998

    Lewis, Language, Lust and Lies

    Inquiry 41 (Sept 1998), pp. 301–15.
  • Max Kölbel. 1997

    Wright’s Argument from Neutrality

    Ratio 10, (April 1997), pp. 35–47.
  • Max Kölbel. 1997

    Expressivism and the Syntactic Uniformity of Declarative Sentences

    Crítica 29 (December 1997), pp. 3–51.
  • Markel Kortabarria. 2023

    Kortabarria, M. (2023). A Defense on the Usefulness of ‘Big-G’ Grounding”, 
    Metaphysica, 24, 147-174.
  • Dan López de Sa. 2017

    'Making Beautiful Truths'

    In JO Young (ed.), Semantics of Aesthetic Judgements, Oxford Univeristy Press, pp. 38-60
  • Dan López de Sa. 2015

    'Expressing Disagreement'

    Erkenntnis 80, 153–165
  • Dan López de Sa. 2014

    'Audience in Context'

    Erkenntnis 79, 241-253
  • Dan López de Sa. 2014

    'Lewis vs Lewis on the Problem of the Many'

    Synthèse 191, 1105-1117
  • Dan López de Sa. 2014

    ‘What Could Vague Objects Possibly Be?’

    in Akiba & Abasnezhad (eds.), Vague Objects and Vague Identity, Springer, 257-71
  • Dan López de Sa. 2013

    'Vagueness as Semantic Indecision: Metaphysical Vagueness vs Indeterminate Reference'

    Metaphysica 14, 197-209 (special volume: Vagueness and Ontology)
  • Dan López de Sa. 2013

    Rigid vs Flexible Response-Dependent Properties

    Hoeltje, Schnieder & Steinberg (eds.), Dependence, Philosophia Verlag
  • Dan López de Sa. 2013

    The Aposteriori Response-Dependence of the Colors'

    Croatian Journal of Philosophy 13, 65-79
  • Dan López de Sa. 2012

    'What does it Take to Enter into the Circumstance?'

    Philosophical Studies (2012) 159:147–153, DOI 10.1007/s11098-011-9695-4
  • Dan López de Sa. 2011

    'The Many Relativisms: Index, Context, and Beyond'

    S. Hales (ed.), A Companion to Relativism, Blackwell, 102-17
  • Dan López de Sa, Elia Zardini. 2011

    'No-No. Paradox and Consistency'

    Analysis 71, 472-8
  • Dan López de Sa. 2010

    'How to Respond to Borderline Cases'

    R. Dietz & S. Moruzzi (eds.), Cuts and Clouds, OUP, 327-39
  • Dan López de Sa. 2010

    'The Makings of Truth: Realism , Response-Dependence, and Relativism '

     C. Wright & N. Pedersen (eds.), New Waves in Truth, Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 191-204
  • Dan López de Sa. 2010

    'Relativismo y operadores'

    Teorema 29, 1, 81-93
  • Dan López de Sa. 2009

    'Disjunctions, Conjunctions, and their Truthmakers'

    Mind 118, 417–25
  • Dan López de Sa. 2009

    'Can One Get Bivalence from (Tarskian) Truth and Falsity?'

    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39, 273-282
  • Dan López de Sa. 2009

    'Relativizing Utterance-Truth?'

    Synthese 170, 1-5
  • Dan López de Sa. 2008

    Is the Problem of the Many a Problem in Metaphysics?

    Noûs 42, 746-752
  • Dan López de Sa. 2008

    Rigidity for Predicates and the Trivialization Problem

    Philosophers’ Imprint 8/1, 1-13
  • Dan López de Sa. 2008

    'Presuppositions of Commonality'

    M. García-Carpintero & M. Kölbel (eds.), Relative Truth, OUP, 297–310
  • Dan López de Sa. 2008

    'The Over-Generalization Problem: Predicates Rigidly Signifying the "Unnatural"'

    Synthese 163, 263–72
  • Dan López de Sa. 2008

    'Defending "Restricted Particularism" from Jackson, Pettit & Smith'

    Theoria 62, 133–143
  • Dan López de Sa, Elia Zardini. 2007

    Truthmakers, Knowledge, and Paradox

    Analysis 67, 242–50
  • Dan López de Sa. 2007

    Rigidity, General Terms, and Trivialization

    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107, 117–23      
  • Dan López de Sa. 2007

    The Chief Supreme Court Justice: A Metaphysical Puzzle?

    Critica 39, 61–68
  • Dan López de Sa. 2007

    On the Semantic Indecision of Vague Singular Terms

    Sorites 19, 88–91
  • Dan López de Sa. 2007

    'The Many Relativisms and the Question of Disagreement '

    International Journal of Philosophical Studies 15, 269–279

  • Dan López de Sa. 2006

    Is ‘Everything’ Precise?

    Dialectica 60, 397–409
  • Dan López de Sa. 2006

    Flexible Property Designators

    Grazer Philosophische Studien 73, 221–230
  • Dan López de Sa, Elia Zardini. 2006

    'Does This Sentence Have No Truthmaker? '

    Analysis 66, 154–57
  • Dan López de Sa. 2006

    'The Case against Evaluative Realism'

    Theoria 21, 277–294
  • Dan López de Sa. 2006

    'Por qué la aposterioridad no (basta, según Kripke, ni) basta'

    Theoria 21, 245–55
  • Dan López de Sa. 2006

    'Values vs Secondary Qualities'

    Teorema 25, 197–210

  • Dan López de Sa. 2003

    'The Non-Circularity Constraint: Peacocke vs Peacocke'

    Teorema 22, 85–93
  • Abel M. Suñé, Manolo Martínez. 0

    Suñé, A., Martínez, M. "Real patterns and indispensability." Synthese (forthcoming).

  • Josep Macià. 0

    Proper Names: Ideas and Chains

    Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 34:sup1, 129-155, DOI: 10.1080/00455091.2004.10717603

  • Alisa Mandrigin. 2013

    Ambrosini, E., Blomberg, O., Mandrigin, A., Costantini, M.

    Social exclusion modulates pre-reflective interpersonal body representation. Psychological Research.

  • Alisa Mandrigin. 2013

    Serino, A., Alsmith, A., Costantini, M., Mandrigin, A., Tajadura-Jiménez, A., Lopez, C.

    Bodily ownership and self-location: components of bodily self-consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition, 22: 1239-1252.

  • Alisa Mandrigin. 2010

    Review of Todd E. Feinberg, From Axons to Identity

    Journal of Consciousness Studies, 17: 9-10: 248-254. 

  • Cristian Mariani, Vincent Lam, Laurie Letertre. 2022

    Quantum Metaphysics and the Foundations of Spacetime

    In Vassallo, A. (Ed.), The Foundations of Spacetime Physics: Philosophical Perspectives, Routledge.
  • Cristian Mariani. 2022

    Non-Accessible Mass and the Ontology of GRW

    Studies in History and Philosophy of Science
  • Cristian Mariani, Giuliano Torrengo. 2022

    The Metaphysics of Passage in Dynamical Reduction Models of Quantum Mechanics

    In Santelli, A. & Donati, D. (eds.), Ockhamism and Philosophy of Time, Synthese Library, Springer.
  • Cristian Mariani. 2022

    Does the Primitive Ontology of GRW rest on Shaky Ground?

    In Allori, V. (Ed.), Quantum Mechanics and Fundamentality. Synthese Library.
  • Cristian Mariani, Robert Michels, Giuliano Torrengo. 2021

    Plural Metaphysical Supervaluationism

  • Cristian Mariani, Claudio Calosi. 2021

    Quantum Indeterminacy

    Philosophy Compass
  • Cristian Mariani. 2021

    Emergent Quantum Indeterminacy

  • Cristian Mariani, Giuliano Torrengo. 2021

    The Indeterminate Present and the Open Future

  • Cristian Mariani. 2020

    Indeterminacy: Deep but not Rock Bottom

    Analytic Philosophy
  • Cristian Mariani, Claudio Calosi. 2020

    Quantum Relational Indeterminacy

    Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics
  • Teresa Marques, Manuel García-Carpintero. 2023

    Language, Words, and Linguistic Objects

    forthcoming in Oxford Handbook of Social Ontology, edited by Stephanie Collins, Brian Epstein, Sally Haslanger, and Hans Bernhard Schmidt for Oxford University Press.
  • Teresa Marques. 2023

    El lenguaje dañino, y su dimension social y política

    forthcoming in Filosofia del Lenguaje, edited by Ignacio Vicario for SEFA collection. Madrid: Tecnos.
  • Teresa Marques. 2022

    The expression of hate in hate speech

    Journal of Applied Philosophy,
  • Teresa Marques, Chiara Valentini. 2021

    Collective Action, Philosophy and Law


  • Teresa Marques. 2021

    Relativismo y retractaciones

    David Pérez Chico (ed.), Cuestiones de Filosofía del Lenguaje: Pragmática, Prensas Universitarias de Zaragoza.

  • Teresa Marques. 2021

    Pejoratives & Oughts

    Philosophia: Philosophical Quarterly of Israel,
  • Teresa Marques. 2021

    Illocutionary force and attitude mode in normative disputes

    Metaphilosophy, 52: 449– 465.

  • Teresa Marques, Åsa Wikforss. 2020

    Shifting Concepts: The Philosophy and Psychology of Conceptual Variability

    Oxford University Press. ISBN: 9780198803331
  • Teresa Marques, Manuel García-Carpintero. 2020

    Really expressive presuppositions and how to block them

    Grazer Philosophische Studien 97(1): 138–158. DOI:

  • Teresa Marques. 2020

    Disagreement with a bald-faced liar

    Ratio, 33 (4), 255-268. DOI: 10.1111/rati.12268
  • Teresa Marques. 2020

    How can philosophy of language help us navigate the political news cycle?

    in Elly Vintiadis (ed.) Philosophy by Women: 22 Philosophers Reflect on Philosophy and its Value. Routledge.
  • Teresa Marques. 2020

    Amelioration vs. Perversion

    In Teresa Marques & Åsa Maria Wikforss (eds.), Shifting Concepts: The Philosophy and Psychology of Conceptual Variability. Oxford: Oxford University Press (2020)
  • Teresa Marques. 2019

    Hybrid Dispositionalism and the Law

     in D. Plunkett, S. Shapiro, and K. Toh (eds.), Dimensions of Normativity: New Essays on Metaethics and Jurisprudence. Oxford University Press.
  • Teresa Marques. 2019

    The case against semantic relativism

    in M. Kusch (ed.) The Routledge Handbook to Relativism, Routledge.
  • Teresa Marques. 2019

    "Beasts in human form": How dangerous speech harms

     Araucaria: Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofía, Política, Humanidades, y Relaciones Internacionales, 21 (42)

  • Teresa Marques. 2018


    Synthese. 2018, 195 (8), pp 3335–3359 DOI:10.1007/s11229-015-0852-8
  • Teresa Marques. 2018

    This is not an instance of (E)

    Synthese, 195(3):1035–1063. DOI:  10.1007/s11229-016-1293-8
  • Teresa Marques. 2017

    Can metalinguistic negotiations and "conceptual ethics" rescue legal positivism?

    In A. Capone & F.Poggi (eds.), Pragmatics and Law: Practical and Theoretical Perspectives. Springer. pp. 223-241
  • Teresa Marques. 2017

    The Relevance of Causal Social Construction

    Journal of Social Ontology. 3 (1) DOI: 10.1515/jso-2016-0018.
  • Teresa Marques. 2017

    What metalinguistic negotiations can't do

    Phenomenology and Mind, 12: 40-48. DOI:
  • Teresa Marques. 2017

    Pejorative Discourse is not Fictional

    Thought: A Journal of Philosophy. DOI: 10.1002/tht3.258
  • Teresa Marques. 2016

    Aesthetic Predicates: A Hybrid Dispositional Account

    Inquiry 59 (6): 723-751. DOI: 10.1080/0020174X.2016.1192484
  • Teresa Marques. 2016

    We can't have no satisfaction

    Philosophy South - Unisinos Philosophy Journal 17(3): 308-314
  • Teresa Marques. 2015

    Disagreeing in Context

    Frontiers in Psychology 6 (257):1-12.
  • Teresa Marques. 2015

    Construção Social

    in J. Branquinho and R. Santos (eds.) Compêndio em Linha de Problemas de Filosofia Analítica. Lisbon: CFUL.
  • Teresa Marques. 2014

    Doxastic Disagreement

    Erkenntnis. 79 (1): 121 - 142. doi: 10.1007/s10670-013-9448-1.
  • Teresa Marques. 2014

    Relative Correctness

    Philosophical Studies. 167 (2): 361 - 373. doi: 10.1007/s11098-013-0100-3
  • Teresa Marques, Daniel Cohnitz. 2014

    Disagreements, introduction

    Erkenntnis, 79 (1): 1-10. DOI 10.1007/s10670-013-9442-7
  • Teresa Marques, Daniel Cohnitz. 2014


    Erkenntnis 79 (1) Supplement.
  • Teresa Marques, Manuel García-Carpintero. 2014

    Disagreement about taste: Commonality Presuppositions and Coordination

    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92(4): 701-723
  • Teresa Marques. 2014

    É o Género uma Construção Social?

    n A. P. Mesquita, C. Beckert, J. L. Pérez & Xavier M. L. L. O. (eds.), A Paixão da Razão. Homenagem a Maria Luísa Ribeiro Ferreira. Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa. 561-578.
  • Teresa Marques. 2014


     in J. Branquinho and R. Santos (eds.) Compêndio Em Linha de Problemas de Filosofia Analítica.
  • Teresa Marques, Manuel García-Carpintero. 2012

    Filosofia da Linguagem

    in P. Galvão (ed.), Filosofia - Uma Introdução por Disciplinas, Lisboa, Edições 70.
  • Teresa Marques. 2010

    What Can Modes Do for (Moderate) Relativism?

    Crítica - Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía, vol 42, no. 124, pp. 77 -- 100. 
  • Teresa Marques. 2010

    Truth and the Ambiguity of Negation

    in Rast, E & Baptista, L (eds.) Meaning and Context, Peter Lang.
  • Teresa Marques. 2008

    The Square of Opposition and the Paradoxes

    Logica Universalis, vol II, no. 1, pp. 87-105.
  • Teresa Marques. 2007

    Normativity and Rationality

    (editor) Special issue of Disputatio, Vol. II, no. 23


  • Teresa Marques. 2006

    On an argument of Segal's against singular object-dependent thoughts

    Disputatio, volume II, no. 21, pp. 19-37.

  • Teresa Marques. 2006

    Pode o Deflacionismo Negar a Bivalência?

    Philosophica, 28, pp. 227-244

  • Teresa Marques. 2006

    Referência, Teorias da.

    in  Enciclopédia de Termos Lógico-FIlosóficos -- Nova Edição, J. Branquinho, N. Gomes and D. Murcho (eds.),São Paulo, Martins Fontes. 
  • Teresa Marques. 2006

    Tipo Natural

    in Enciclopédia de Termos Lógico-Filosóficos -- Nova Edição, J. Branquinho, N. Gomes and D. Murcho (eds.) São Paulo, Martins Fontes. 
  • Neri Marsili. 2022

    Fictions that purport to tell the truth

    Philosophical Quarterly (forthcoming)
  • Neri Marsili, Guido Lohr. 2022

    Saying, commitment, and the lying - misleading distinction

    The Journal of Philosophy (forthcoming)
  • Neri Marsili. 2021

    Lies, Common Ground, and Performative Utterances

  • Neri Marsili, Alex Wiegmann. 2021

    Should I say that? An experimental investigation of the norm of assertion

    Cognition, 212, 104657
  • Neri Marsili, Mitchell Green. 2021

    Assertion: a (partly) social speech act

    Journal of Pragmatics, 181, 17-28
  • Neri Marsili, Peter Pagin. 2021


    Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
  • Neri Marsili. 2021

    Truth: the rule or the aim of assertion?

  • Neri Marsili. 2021

    Lying: Knowledge or Belief?

    Philosophical Studies
  • Neri Marsili. 2020

    Retweeting: its Linguistic and Epistemic Value 

  • Neri Marsili. 2020

    Lying, speech acts, and commitment

  • Neri Marsili. 2019

    The norm of assertion: a ‘constitutive’ rule?

    Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy. 
  • Neri Marsili. 2019

    Immoral lies and partial beliefs

    Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
  • Neri Marsili. 2018

    Truth and Assertion: rules vs aims 

    Analysis, 78 (4), 638–648, doi:10.1093/analys/any008

  • Neri Marsili. 2018

    Lying and Certainty

    J. Meibauer (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Lying. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • Neri Marsili. 2016

    Lying by Promising: a study on insincere illocutionary acts

    The International Review of Pragmatics, 8 (2): 271-313. [DOI:10.1163/18773109-00802005]
  • Neri Marsili. 2015

    Normative Accounts of Assertion: from Peirce to Williamson, and back again

    Rivista Italiana di Filosofia del Linguaggio
  • Neri Marsili. 2014

    Lying as a scalar phenomenon: insincerity along the certainty-uncertainty continuum

    Cantarini, Abraham & Leiss (ed.) Certainty-uncertainty – and the attitudinal space in between.  (John Benjamins Publishing).  [DOI:10.1075/slcs.165.09mar]

  • Genoveva Martí. 2022

    Reference and theories of reference

    Piotr Stalmaszczyk (ed.): The Cambridge Handbook of the Philosophy of Language. Cambridge University Press, pp. 233-265.
  • Genoveva Martí, Lorena Ramírez-Ludeña. 2021

    Tolerance, Flexibility and the application of kind terms.

    Synthese,198: 2973-2986
  • Genoveva Martí, José Martínez-Fernández. 2021

    The representation of gappy sentences in four-valued semantics

    Semiotica 2021(240): 145-163
  • Genoveva Martí. 2021

    Gödel and Schmidt

    Helen de Cruz (ed.): Philosophy Illustrated. 42 thought experiments to broaden your mind. Oxford University Press
  • Genoveva Martí. 2020

    Names, Descriptions and Causal Descriptions. Is the Magic Gone?

    Topoi 39: 357-365

    DOI. 10.1007/s11245-017-9525-1

  • Genoveva Martí, Lorena Ramírez-Ludeña. 2020

    On whales and fish. Two models of interpretation.

    Jurisprudence, 11 (1): 63-75.

  • Genoveva Martí, Carl Hoefer. 2020

    Realism, reference and perspective

    European Journal for Philosophy of Science 10(3) 38

  • Genoveva Martí, José Martínez-Fernández. 2020

    Natural kind terms and rigidity

    S. Biggs & H. Giersson (eds.): The Routledge Handbook on Linguistic Reference. Routledge: 283-294.
  • Genoveva Martí. 2020

    Experimental semantics, descriptivism and anti-descriptivism. Should we endorse referential pluralism?

    A. Bianchi (ed.): Language and Reality from a Naturalistic Perspective. Springer Verlag, pp. 329-341.

  • Genoveva Martí, Carl Hoefer. 2019

    Water has a microstructural essence after all

    European Journal for Philosophy of Science, 9, 1 UNSP 12



  • Genoveva Martí. 2017

    Names, predicates and the object-property distinction.

    M. de Ponte and K. Korta (eds.): Reference and Representation in Thought and Language. Oxford University Press, pp. 14-19.

  • Genoveva Martí, José Martínez-Fernández. 2017

    Editors' introduction. Special issue of Teorema on Experimental Philosophy

  • Genoveva Martí, Lorena Ramírez-Ludeña. 2016

    Legal Disagreements and Theories of Reference

    Francesca Poggi (ed.): Pragmatics and Law. Philosophical Perspectives. Springer: 121-139.
  • Genoveva Martí. 2015

    Reference without cognition

    A. Bianchi (ed.) On Reference. Oxford University Press
  • Genoveva Martí. 2015

    General terms, hybrid theories and ambiguitiy. A discussion of some experimental results

    Jussi Haukioja (ed.). Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Language. London. Bloomsbury, pp. 157-172
  • Genoveva Martí. 2014

    For the Disunity of Semantics

    Mind & Language, 29/4: 485-489
  • Genoveva Martí. 2014

    Reference and Experimental Semantics

    Edouard Machery and Elizabeth O’Neill (eds.): Current Controversies in Experimental Philosophy. New York. Routledge, pp. 17-26
  • Genoveva Martí. 2012


    García-Carpintero, M. and Kölbel, M.: Continuum Companion to the Philosophy of Language. London. The Continuum International Publishing Group (2012), pp. 106-124.
  • Genoveva Martí. 2012

    On Modality and Reference. Ruth Barcan Marcus (1921-2012). Obituary

    Teorema, 31 (2102), pp.  203-212
  • Genoveva Martí. 2012

    Empirical Data and the Theory of Reference

    Kabasenche,  W.; O'Rourke, M.; Slater, M. (eds.): Topics in Contemporary Philosophy: Reference and Referring. MIT Press: 63-82
  • Genoveva Martí, José Martínez-Fernández. 2011

    General Terms, Rigidity and the Trivialization Problem

    Synthese 181, 2 (2011), pp. 277-293; doi:10.1007/s11229-010-9802-7
  • Genoveva Martí. 2011

    Review of Lecturas Filosóficas de Ciencia Cognitiva (edited by Luis A. Pérez Miranda)

    Investigación y Ciencia, Febrero 2011: 93
  • Genoveva Martí, José Martínez-Fernández. 2010

    General Terms as Designators: A Defence of the View

    H. Beebee & N. Sabbarton-Leary: The Semantics and Metaphysics of Kinds. Routledge, pp. 46-63
  • Genoveva Martí. 2009

    Against Semantic Multiculturalism

    Analysis, 69:42-49
  • Genoveva Martí. 2008

    Direct Reference and Definite Descriptions

    Dialectica, 62: 43-57
  • Genoveva Martí, José Martínez. 2007

    General Terms and Non-Trivial Rigid Designation

    C. Martínez, J.L. Falguera & J.M. Sagüillo: Current Topics in Logic and Analytic Philosophy. Universidad de Santiago de Compostela: 103-116
  • Genoveva Martí. 2007

    Weak and Strong Directness: Reference and Thought

    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LXXIV: 730-737
  • Genoveva Martí, José Martínez-Fernández. 2007

    General Terms and Non-Trivial Rigid Designation

    C. Martínez (ed.): Current Topics in Logic and Analytic Philosophy. Universidad de Santiago de Compostela, pp.103-116.
  • Genoveva Martí. 2004

    Rigidity and General Terms

    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 104: 129-146
  • Genoveva Martí. 2003

    The Question of Rigidity in New Theories of Reference

    Nous, 37: 161-179
  • Genoveva Martí. 1998

    The Significance of the Distinction between Concept Mastery and Concept Possession. Response to James Higginbotham

    Philosophical Issues, vol 9, pp. 163-167
  • Genoveva Martí. 1998

    Rigidity and the Description of Counterfactual Situations

    Theoria, vol 13: 3, pp.477-490
  • Genoveva Martí. 1997

    Rethinking Quine’s Argument on the Collapse of Modal Distinctions

    Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, vol 38:2, pp. 276-294
  • Genoveva Martí. 1995

    The Essence of Genuine Reference

    Journal of Philosophical Logic, 24, pp. 275-289
  • Genoveva Martí. 1994

    Do Modal Distinctions Collapse in Carnap's System?

    Journal of Philosophical Logic, vol. 23, pp. 575-593
  • Genoveva Martí. 1993

    The Source of Intensionality

    Philosophical Perspectives, vol 7 (1993). pp. 197-206
  • Genoveva Martí. 1989

    Aboutness and Substitutivity

    Midwest Studies in Philosophy. Vol. XIV (1989). pp. 127-139
  • Manolo Martínez, Miguel Ángel Sebastián. 2023

    Gradualism, Bifurcation, and Fading Qualia

    Miguel Ángel Sebastián, Manolo Martínez (2023). Gradualism, Bifurcation, and Fading Qualia. Forthcoming in Analysis.
  • Manolo Martínez, Luca Barlassina. 2023

    The informational profile of valence: The metasemantic argument for imperativism

    Manolo Martínez, Luca Barlassina  (2023). The informational profile of valence: The metasemantic argument for imperativism. Forthcoming in British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
  • Manolo Martínez, Bence Nanay. 2023

    Many-to-One Intentionalism

    Manolo Martínez, Bence Nanay (2023). Many-to-One Intentionalism. forthcoming in Journal of Philosophy
  • Manolo Martínez, Carlota Serrahima. 2023

    The Experience of Dysmenorrhea

    Carlota Serrahima, Manolo Martínez  (2023). The Experience of Dysmenorrhea. Synthese, 201(173):1-22. 
  • Manolo Martínez. 2022

    Imperative Transparency

    Manolo Martínez  (2022). Imperative Transparency. Mind, 131(522):585-601
  • Manolo Martínez, Marc Artiga. 2021

    Neural Oscillations as Representations

    Manolo Martínez, Marc Artiga (2021). Neural Oscillations as Representations. forthcoming in British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
  • Manolo Martínez, Marc Artiga, Jonathan Birch. 2020

    The Meaning of Biological Signals

    Marc Artiga, Jonathan Birch, Manolo Martínez (2020). The Meaning of Biological Signals. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, 84:101348.
  • Manolo Martínez. 2020

    Synergic Kinds

    Manolo Martínez (2020). Synergic Kinds. Synthese, 197(5):1931-1946
  • Manolo Martínez. 2019

    Representations are Rate-Distortion Sweet Spots

    Manolo Martínez (2019). Representations are Rate-Distortion Sweet Spots. Philosophy of Science, 86(12):1214-1226
  • Manolo Martínez, Abel Suñé. 2019

    Real Patterns and Indispensability

    Abel Suñé, Manolo Martínez (2019). Real Patterns and Indispensability. Synthese, 198(5):4315–4330
  • Manolo Martínez. 2019

    Usefulness Drives Representations to Truth

    Manolo Martínez (2019). Usefulness Drives Representations to Truth. Grazer Philosophische Studien, 96(3):319-341
  • Manolo Martínez. 2019

    Deception as Cooperation

    Manolo Martínez (2019). Deception as Cooperation. Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, 77: 101184
  • Manolo Martínez. 2019

    Karen Neander's 'A Mark of the Mental: In Defense of Informational Teleosemantics'

    Manolo Martínez  (2019). A Mark of the Mental: In Defense of Informational Teleosemantics. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews
  • Manolo Martínez, Colin Klein. 2018

    Imperativism and Pain Intensity

    Colin Klein,  Manolo Martínez (2018). Imperativism and Pain Intensity. Philosophy of Pain – Unpleasantness, Emotion, and Deviance (eds. D. Bain, M. Brady and J. Corns), Routledge.
  • Manolo Martínez, Peter Godfrey-Smith . 2016

    Common Interest and Signaling Games: A Dynamic Perspective

    Manolo Martínez, Peter Godfrey-Smith (2016). Common Interest and Signaling Games: A Dynamic Perspective. Philosophy of Science, 83(3):371-392
  • Manolo Martínez, Marc Artiga. 2016

    The Organizational Account of Function is an Etiological Account of Function

    Marc Artiga, Manolo Martínez  (2016). The Organizational Account of Function is an Etiological Account of Function. Acta Biotheoretica, 64 (2):105-117
  • Manolo Martínez, Colin Klein. 2016

    Pain Signals are Predominantly Imperative

    Manolo Martínez, Colin Klein  (2016). Pain Signals are Predominantly Imperative. Biology & Philosophy, 31 (2):283-298
  • Manolo Martínez. 2015

    Modalizing Mechanisms

     Manolo Martínez  (2015). Modalizing Mechanisms. Journal of Philosophy, 112 (12):658-670
  • Manolo Martínez. 2015

    Pains as Reasons

    Manolo Martínez (2015). Pains As Reasons. Philosophical Studies, 172 (9):2261-2274
  • Manolo Martínez. 2015

    Disgusting Smells and Imperativism

    Manolo Martínez (2015). Disgusting Smells and Imperativism. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 22 (5-6):191-200
  • Manolo Martínez. 2015

    Deception in Sender-Receiver Games

    Manolo Martínez (2015). Deception in Sender-Receiver Games. Erkenntnis, 80:215-227
  • Manolo Martínez. 2015

    Informationally-Connected Property Clusters, and Polymorphism

    Manolo Martínez (2015). Informationally-Connected Property Clusters, and Polymorphism. Biology & Philosophy, 30 (1):99-117
  • Manolo Martínez. 2013

    Teleosemantics and Indeterminacy

    Manolo Martínez (2013). Teleosemantics and Indeterminacy. Dialectica, 67 (4):427-453
  • Manolo Martínez, Peter Godfrey-Smith. 2013

    Communication and Common Interest

    Peter Godfrey-Smith, Manolo Martínez (2013). Communication and Common Interest. PLOS Computational Biology, 9 (11):e1003282
  • Manolo Martínez. 2013

    Ideal Negative Conceivability and the Halting Problem

    Manolo Martínez (2013). Ideal Negative Conceivability and the Halting Problem. Erkenntnis, 78 (5):979-990
  • Manolo Martínez. 2013

    Teleosemantics and Productivity

    Manolo Martínez (2013). Teleosemantics and Productivity. Philosophical Psychology, 26 (1):47-68
  • Manolo Martínez. 2011

    Imperative Content and the Painfulness of Pain

    Manolo Martínez  (2011). Imperative Content and the Painfulness of Pain. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 10 (1):67-90
  • Manolo Martínez. 2011

    Traveling in Branching Time

    Manolo Martínez (2011). Traveling in Branching Time. Disputatio, 4 (31):271-287
  • José Martínez. 2007

    Maximal Three-Valued Clones with the Gupta-Belnap Fixed-Point Property

    Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 48, 4, pp. 449-472.
  • José Martínez. 2005

    El concepto de lenguaje universal

    Quaderns de Filosofia i Ciència, 35, pp. 13-18.
  • José Martínez, Anil Gupta. 2005

    Field on the Concept of Truth - Comment

    Philosophical Studies, 124, pp. 45-58
  • José Martínez. 2003

    The Gupta-Belnap Fixed-Point Problem and the Theory of Clones of Functions

    in Foundations of the Formal Sciences II: Applications of Mathematical Logic in Philosophy and Linguistics, edited by B. Löwe, W. Malzkom and T. Räsch, Kluwer, pp. 175-184.
  • Ivan Milić. 2020

    Hypocritical Blame: A Question for the Normative Accounts of Assertion 

    Philosophia 48 (4): 1543-1549 
  • Ivan Milić. 2018

    What Counts As an Insult? 

    Acta Analytica 33 (4): 539-552


  • Ivan Milić, Javier González de Prado Salas. 2018

    Recommending beauty: semantics and pragmatics of aesthetic predicates 

    Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 61 (2): 1-27


  • Ivan Milić, Stefan Reining . 2017

    A Wittgensteinian Role-Based Account of Assertion  

    Philosophical Investigations 40 (2): 139-153 


  • Ivan Milić. 2017

    Against Selfless Assertions 

    Philosophical Studies 174 (9): 2277-2295


  • Ivan Milić. 2015

    A Note on Existentially Known Assertions  


    The Philosophical Quarterly 65 (261): 813-821  



  • Ivan Milić. 2013