Research Group
in Analytic Philosophy

Philosophy of Science (PoS)

This academic year, the philosophy of science reading group focus on scientific objectivity. In the first term, we have discussed several papers on feminist epistemology/philosophy of science, particularly concerning the very idea of objectivity and the role of values in science, as envisaged from a feminist standpoint. In the second term, we are discussing papers related with climate and COVID-19 models, forecasting and objectivity.

We meet in person every other week, Thursdays from 12 to 14 h., starting October 28th. Our usual room is the Seminari Maria Zambrano (Faculty of Philosophy, UB, 4th floor).

Reading list (updated April 2022)

First term 

1.)           Haraway, Donna. 1988. “Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective,” Feminist Studies, Vol. 14, No. 3, pp. 575-599.

2.)           Harding, S, 1992, “Rethinking standpoint epistemology: what is strong objectivity?”. The centennial review, Vol. 36, No. 3, pp. 437-470.

3.)          Longino, H., 1994, “In Search of Feminist Epistemology,” Monist, 77, pp. 472–485.

4.)          Anderson, Elizabeth, 1995b, “Knowledge, Human Interests, and Objectivity in Feminist Epistemology,” Philosophical Topics, 23, pp. 27–58.

5.)          Haack, Susan, 1996, “Science as social: yes and no”. In L. H. Nelson and J. Nelson (eds), Feminism, Science, and the Philosophy of Science, Kluwer Academic Publishers, pp. 79-93.

6.)          Intemann, Kristen, 2005, “Feminism, Underdetermination, and Values in Science,” Philosophy of Science, 72, pp. 1001–12.

7)           Wylie, Alison, and Lynn Hankinson Nelson, 2007, “Coming to Terms with the Values of Science: Insights from Feminist Science Studies Scholarship,” in Value-Free Science? Ideals and Illusion, Harold Kincaid, John Dupré, and Alison Wylie (eds.), New York: Oxford University Press

8)           Intemann, K. (2021). Feminist Perspectives on Values in Science. En S. Crasnow y K. Intemann (Eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Feminist Philosophy of Science (pp. 201-215).

Second term (provisional list)

9) Intemann, K. (2015). “Distinguishing Between Legitimate and Illegitimate Values in Climate Modeling,” European Journal of Philosophy of Science 5(2), pp. 217–232.

10a) Harvard, S., Winsberg, E., Symons, J., & Adibi, A. (2021). Value judgments in a COVID-19 vaccination model: A case study in the need for public involvement in health-oriented modelling. Social Science & Medicine, 286, 114323 .

10b) Eric Winsberg, Stephanie Harvard. Purposes and duties in scientific modelling. Journal of Epidemiology & Community Health  (IF3.872),  Pub Date : 2022-01-13, DOI: 10.1136/jech-2021-217666

11) Ioannidis, J. P. A. et al. (2022) Forecasting for COVID-19 has failed. International Journal of Forecasting 38 (2), pp. 423-438