Research Group
in Analytic Philosophy

Abstract

In this talk, I defend the thesis that the content of know-how states is different in kind to the content of know-that states: it is nonconceptual content. My argument proceeds in two stages. First, I examine the intellectualist central claim that the distinction between know-how and know-that states is just a distinction between types of ways of grasping the same kind of content. Contra the intellectualist, I argue that such a distinction between types of ways of thinking is unintelligible unless it is tied in with a distinction between types of contents. Second, I consider and reject an objection that has been brought against the view that the content of know-how states is nonconceptual. The objection is that if the content of know-how states were nonconceptual, it would be mysterious why attributions of know-how create opaque contexts. I show that the objection conflates two orthogonal issues: the nature of the content of a state and the theoretical—hence propositional— characterization of its correctness conditions. Once the conflation is debunked, the opacity of attributions of know-how states with nonconceptual content presents no mystery.