Research Group
in Analytic Philosophy

Pretend Co-Reference and Pretend Reference

22 January 2014  |  15:00  |  Seminari de Filosofia UB

Abstract

In recent work, Stacie Friend  points out that we have intuitions of “co-identification” about dialogues like this:

 

Smith:  When he wakes up, Gregor Samsa has been changed into a cockroach.

 

Nabokov:  No, when he wakes up, Gregor Samsa has been changed into a beetle.

 

Here, Nabokov naturally “takes himself to identify the same character that Kafka invented and that his opponents misconstrue”. After pointing out the connection between Friend’s problem of co-identification and Geach’s notorious issue of intentional identity, I will critically discuss Friend’s and Everett’s take on the issue, and offer an account inspired by contemporary discussions of intentional identity.