Research Group
in Analytic Philosophy

Abstract

Very roughly, ontological minimalism with respect to Fs is the view that the existence of Fs is analytically / conceptually entailed by truths that neither quantify over nor refer to Fs. Ontological minimalism (in some version or other) has been defended for a wide variety of Fs -- e.g. numbers, propositions, events, fictional characters, mereological sums, possible worlds, 'ordinary' objects such as chairs and tables, etc.

In my talk, I will be concerned with a few (rather modest) observations about the interplay between ontological minimalism and the notion of conceptual truth / analyticity. Let a wide conceptual truth be a proposition that is true in virtue of some concepts. Let an internal conceptual truth be a proposition that is true in virtue of the concepts it contains. Let an external conceptual truth be a wide conceptual truth that is not an internal conceptual truth. Ontological minimalist claims entail the existence of external conceptual truths. This in turn entails that internal conceptual truth is not closed under logical consequence. These observations provide the material to resist an argument that has recently been put forward by Josh Parsons for what he calls "conceptual conservatism".