Research Group
in Analytic Philosophy

De Jure Coreference: A Presuppositional Account.

Date: 12 November 2014

Time: 15:00

Place: Seminari de Filosofia UB


Several philosophers (Perry 1988, Fine 2007, Heck 2012) have pointed out that the difference between statements formalized as a = a and those formalized as a = b lies in that the latter state the obtaining of a relation of de facto or external coreference, while the former presuppose one of de jure or internal coreference, expressed in natural languages by relations of anaphoric dependence; the same can be said about other cases used to pose Frege's puzzles, such as the validity of 'Hesperus is a planet, therefore Hesperus is a planet or a star' vs. the non-validity of 'Hesperus is a planet, vs. Phosphorus is a planet or a star'. Relations of de jure coreference are usually picked out by appeals to understanding (Schroeter 2007, Fine 2007, Pinillos 2011), and they are to be counted as analytic under a natural characterization of that notion. In the presentation, I will engage arguments by Fine (2007), Sainsbury & Tye (2012) and Heck (2012) that Fregean senses are not needed to account for de iure coreference, and by Pinillos (2011) that they are unable to explain them.