Research Group
in Analytic Philosophy

The Myth of Mitys and the Nature of Narratives

Date: 06 March 2019

Time: 15:00

Place: Seminari de Filosofia UB


arroll (2001, 2007) conceives of narratives as representations of events that involve causal connections. Yet, as pointed out by Velleman (2003) and Currie (2006) this view is challenged by a case proposed by Aristotle: Mitys was murdered and then one day his statue accidentally felt down killing his murderer. Although there is no relevant causal connection between the murder of Myth and the death of his murderer, the "myth of Mitys" looks like a sort of narrative. I shall argue that this depends on another key feature of narratives, namely, teleology: the statue felt down not *because of* the assassination of Mitys but rather *with the alleged aim of* avenging it. I shall show that paradigmatic narratives are governed by a teleological closure that affects causal connections. However, I shall contend, there can be non-paradigmatic narratives exhibiting either causation without teleology or teleology without causation. I shall conclude that the "myth of Mitys" is of the latter kind.