Research Group
in Analytic Philosophy

Abstract

Ontic Structural Realists claim that, in some sense, all there is is structure. One of the main motivations for this idea has been the argument from metaphysical underdetermination. My aim here is to offer a new and I think better way to understand the argument. First, I rehearse how the argument from metaphysical underdetermination appears to have been interpreted by its advocates, Steven French and James Ladyman. I highlight some obvious problems. Then I offer a reformulation which draws on Stephen Yablo’s work in metaontology. Yablo argues that sentences like “numbers exist” lack determinate truth value. I argue that advocates of OSR can (and maybe ought to)  say the same thing about claims concerning the existence of particles or space-time points. The OSR position I articulate, call it quizzicalist ontic structural realism (QOSR), depends on a particular way of understanding the No Miracles Argument. I end by considering how plausible this understanding is, and what other options there are. I recommend a QOSR interpretation in some settings but not others.