Research Group
in Analytic Philosophy

Abstract

Representationalism is the thesis that phenomenal properties are equivalent to representational properties. The transparency of experience makes it very plausible that representationalism is true.

The purpose of this paper is twofold:

In the first part I will explore different proposals that have been made to make it compatible representationalism with internalism about phenomenal properties. In particular, I will focus on dispositional representationalism and fregean representationalism. Dispositional representationalism is the view that holds that phenomenal properties are the properties of representing a certain disposition (a satisfactory characterization of this disposition would be part of the talk) to cause the experience. Fregean representationalism, on the other hand, appeals to modes of presentation to characterize the content of the experience.

Both, dispositionalism and fregeanism, have to appeal to 'normal conditions' in order to account for the possibility of misrepresentation.The characterization of what are 'normal conditions' is the central issue of the second part of the talk.

Teleological theories of mental content appeal to etiological notion of function in order to explain such intrinsic norms. I suggest some alternatives to etiological theories of functions and conclude with a dilemma. Either some alternative notion of function can account for the normativity required for representation or phenomenal properties are not representational properties after all