1. Introduction

The 20th Century has witnessed the transformation of the European territory. The first half of the century saw the consolidation of the urbanization process, leading, after the 1950s, to a progressive phenomenon of suburbanization which culminated in territorial metropolitanization. In other words, the limits of what we understand to be “urban” have widened and nearly three-quarters of the European population (Eurostat, 2014) currently live in metropolitan and urban areas. But these limits are extended and in constant evolution, resulting in multiple statistical definitions of “urban” (metropolitan areas, metropolitan regions, urban areas, city-regions, etc.). Without entering into a strict statistical definition, we understand metropolitan areas and urban agglomerations (treated here as synonyms) as a territory with a minimum population (according to Eurostat, 250,000 inhabitants) with one or more main centers, where there are labour market integration and activities (economical, cultural, leisure) provided by the mobility of its inhabitants.

The challenges posed by the metropolitan phenomena are diverse: social (combating inequalities, ensuring access to public services), economical and financial (guaranteeing competitiveness and efficiency); territorial and environmental (the management of urban explosion, mobility and waste); political and institutional (the co-ordination of policies and services, democratic representation). The constant shift between traditional administrative boundaries and the metropolitan territory has led to several theoretical approaches and proposals about the ideal formula for the government of urban agglomerations (for a summary see Heinelt and Küber 2005; Tomás, 2009). At one extreme the merge of all municipalities in the agglomeration to overcome institutional fragmentation is proposed. This option, which extended between the years 1950-70 in northern and central Europe, is still proposed and applied (but not without controversy). This is shown in recent examples from Denmark (2007 reform) and from Canada (the creation of the new cities of Toronto, Montreal and Ottawa between 1990 and 2000 as a result of mergers). In the other extreme, there would be the proposal of non-interference and let municipalities to freely decide whether they want to share services or cooperate in some metropolitan agency. This has been the United States specific approach, where there are scarce institutionalized models.

In Europe, as we will see later, an intermediate option - via the creation of a metropolitan structure of two tiers (metropolitan and municipal) - has been generally adopted, by taking into account the political balances and how to fit the urban agglomeration in the whole territory. But we cannot talk of a European metropolitan policy or a European model, as there is a great diversity, as a result of traditions and historical richness of the different countries.
2. Metropolitan governance models in Europe

Metropolitan governance refers to the capacity to face the challenges of urban agglomerations. This concept, widespread since the 1990s, wanted to distinguish between the classical notion of “government”, and a wider vision which includes the role in metropolitan governance of the public sector but also of the private one (Jouve et Lefèvre, 1999). Metropolitan governance adopts various forms, especially in Europe. This diversity lies in the interrelation of various elements: territorial fragmentation, the competencies in metropolitan issues, and the type of financing and representation.

Firstly, there are differences depending on the number of existing administrations and institutions in the metropolitan area. Indeed, there are agglomerations characterized by a high level of fragmentation and others in which there is more institutional simplicity. For example, in countries in which municipal reforms have taken place (like Nordic countries) there are fewer municipalities whilst countries in the south of Europe are characterized by a high number of municipalities. Apart from the number of municipalities with a monocentric character (Rome, Paris) or with a polycentric one (Randstad in The Netherlands), there are other administrations which carry out metropolitan tasks (autonomous community, province, region, county, etc.) and other public or private institutions, which have also functions at metropolitan level. In fact, there are often public or private institutions which promote strategies to strengthen economic and social development (like platforms to promote international competitiveness). There are also institutions of municipal assistance which give technical and legal support to municipalities (for example, to apply for grants from the European Union). In addition in the majority of metropolises, services at metropolitan level are managed by public, private or mixed capital institutions.

Concerning competencies, these can be framed both in the area of hard policies - that is, related to physical environment (territorial planning, urbanism, transport, environment etc) - and in the area of soft policies (education, health, social services etc.). However, various studies show that competencies almost exclusively focus on the field of hard policies and especially on those related to territorial planning, transport and environment (Tomàs, 2009; VVAA, 2009). The other area in which metropolitan institutions often intervene is economic development, basically in employment promotion strategies and wealth generation. Nevertheless, it is important to differentiate between exclusive competencies and shared competencies with other administrations in the same area. One way to identify the policy capacity at metropolitan level is by analysing the binding or non-binding character of the decisions to be taken. For example, determining if the set up actions of a metropolitan plan are obligatory or not for the municipalities.

Without doubt, financing determines to a large extent the level of autonomy. Not only with regard to material resources (the quantity) but also to the source of this financing (own financing or via other means). With regard to metropolitan structures, financing comes basically from two sources, usually combined. Firstly, municipal transfers (from the bottom to the top) and from a higher level of government -States or sub-states institutions - in accordance with the political structure of the country (from the top to the bottom). Secondly, levies and own taxes (the sale of services such as water, collection of taxes related to waste treatment, etc.). As we can see from concrete cases, one of the problems of the existing metropolitans institutions is the lack of financial autonomy, as their resources are very much conditioned by the transfers coming from other levels of government.

Metropolitan governance models are also differentiated by the citizens’ capacity to elect directly their political representatives and by the type of representation. In the various models we can find both direct election of the mayor/president and councillors, and indirect election (those forming part of the metropolitan structure as representatives of their municipalities). In addition, understanding that governance is a concept wider than government, we can find cases in which governance models include representation of members from civil society (association representatives, chambers of commerce, universities etc).
Bearing in mind these different elements, four big metropolitan governance models can be drawn according to its level of institutionalization. This is, depending on the type of institutional arrangements that have been made. In one extreme, the metropolitan governments or structures created expressly to face metropolitan challenges. These structures rely on a metropolitan council (elected directly or indirectly depending on the case) and with competencies and financing established by law. At metropolitan level, metropolitan agencies can also be found which, in contrast to metropolitan governments, have the competence for managing or planning one sole service (public transport, environment, police etc.). The third model is the one of vertical co-ordination, in which metropolitan policies are not made by a specific metropolitan institution but de facto by other already existing levels of government (autonomous community, a province, a county, etc.). Finally, the least institutional model is that of voluntary co-operation between municipalities, in which various local representatives organize themselves. This model can be represented by the most traditional form (Union or Association of municipalities) or by a more flexible formula in line with governance postulates (strategic planning).

It must be said that these models are idealistic types and set great tends. In practice, some of them are mixed and models which in theory are the same, in practice are different. Elements which are more intangible, related to political culture as well as attitudes and values of local representatives towards metropolitan governance influence the final model. For example in some countries there is more tradition to institutionalize metropolitan co-operation via the creation of new structures (such as in France), whilst in others reforms move towards the reduction of its number (such as in Denmark). In certain countries reforms are made at national level and homogeneous models are sought (such as currently in Italy) whilst in other countries there is a large variety of governance models (such as in Germany and Spain). The political and legal consideration of the municipality has also an effect: whether it is an important government area (with competences and financing), whether it has a main role in the country’s politics (high participation in municipal elections), etc. Also, the failures and successes of various governance formulas are understood by the attitudes of metropolitan representatives: the willingness to co-operate and find a common denominator in favour of the general interest. A formal metropolitan institution can exist but so that it works successfully there must be political willingness. In some cases the “ideal” model has
not been adopted due to the local or national representatives’ resistances. Later on, each one of the models will be analyzed and presented with illustrative examples.

2.1 Metropolitan governments

By metropolitan governments we refer to the maximum institutionalization level of metropolitan areas; that is, the creation of metropolitan institutions with strong competences (legal and tax autonomy) and democratic legitimacy (direct election of their representatives). This model implies the passing of laws and the recognition of the metropolitan fact. However, in practice, current structures in Europe do not meet these criteria and we have to consider them like a light version of metropolitan governments. In fact, their autonomy has been limited by sharing competences with other levels of government, by the lack of own financing or by the legitimate democracy weakness. But still, they are co-ordination bodies of metropolitan policies that usually have an integral vision of the agglomeration, as they do not have only one competence such as the sectorial metropolitan authorities. Some examples of current metropolitan structures are Stuttgart, (1994), London (created by law in 1999, in effect since 2000), Lisbon (various legislations, the latest in 2013), Lyon (1999), or Barcelona (2010 Law, in effect since 2011).

Table 1: Examples of metropolitan governments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name &amp; date of creation by law</th>
<th>Number of municipalities</th>
<th>Type of election</th>
<th>Principal type of financing</th>
<th>Main competencies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Verband Region Stuttgart, 1994</strong></td>
<td>179</td>
<td>Direct: assembly, between 80 &amp; 96 members (now 87) elected every 5 years</td>
<td>Transfers (municipal, county, länder and federal government) and transport taxes</td>
<td>Transport, territorial planning, economic development, waste treatment, tourism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Greater London Authority, 1999</strong></td>
<td>City + 32 districts (boroughs)</td>
<td>Direct: mayor &amp; assembly (25 councillors elected every 4 years)</td>
<td>Transfers (above all central government)</td>
<td>Transport; Economic development, international promotion; prevention and fire control, emergencies, police and security.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Communauté urbaine de Lyon, 1999</strong></td>
<td>57 municipalities</td>
<td>Indirect: council of 153 members (delegates from municipalities)</td>
<td>Fees and own Taxes (TPIU) and central government transfers</td>
<td>Economic, social and cultural; development, territorial planning; promotion of public housing urban dinamation and revitalization; management of shared services; environment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Metropolitan Area of Lisbon, (2003, 2008 and 2013)</strong></td>
<td>18 municipalities, 36 parishes (freguesias)</td>
<td>Indirect: council of 55 members (delegates from municipalities)</td>
<td>Transfers from municipalities and the State.</td>
<td>Elaboration of plans and investment programs; economic, social and environmental development; Management of regional development programs; Defining service networks and metropolitan facilities; participation in metropolitan institutions on transport and environment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Metropolitan Area of Barcelona, 2010</strong></td>
<td>36</td>
<td>Indirect: council of 89 members (delegates from municipalities)</td>
<td>Transfers (above all from municipalities and consortia), taxes</td>
<td>Territory and urbanism; transport and mobility; housing; environment; economic development; social cohesion.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The most part of structures are of indirect election and exclusive for local elected officials, with a mixed financing and above all dependents on the transfers. Their competencies are related to territorial planning, environment, transport, and economical development. Only London and Stuttgart are of direct election. In fact, one the recurring debates in metropolitan governance continues to be the need or not to elect mayors and councillors at metropolitan level. Direct election is due to the willingness to give visibility and legitimacy to metropolitan institutions, specially in newly created ones. In fact, having direct representation at metropolitan level implies having a campaign and an electoral metropolitan program on which to discuss and adopt compromises. In indirect elections, there would not be pressure from citizens towards the administration of metropolitan institutions. The mayors and councillors are the ones who, having been elected on the basis of their municipality, have to defend a shared metropolitan interest; this task would be difficult to carry out when one is responsible to municipal voters rather to the whole metropolitan area ones. In general, this would imply dedicating little time to metropolitan authorities and would difficult the emergence of a metropolitan leadership. Moreover, the mandate within the metropolitan government is tied to the municipal electoral calendar: in the case of changes in local political majorities, there will also be changes in the composition of the metropolitan government. Therefore, the continuity of metropolitan councillors do not depend on their performance at metropolitan level but at municipal one.

The direct election of metropolitan representatives is a costly economic option which may generate political resistance because of the magnitude of the election (in many cases a considerable number of the population). Resistance is especially strong in the case of capitals. In this case, the possibility of creating political rivalry depends largely on the power of metropolitan governments. If these have strategic and management competencies such as in the case of London, the possibility to emerge as a counterpower is minimal. An indicator of democratic legitimacy of metropolitan governments with direct election is the turnout in metropolitan elections (see Graphs 1 & 2).

In Stuttgart, after a first voting in 1994 close to 70%, turnout has been stabilizing above 50%. In London, there is a less than 40% stability, except for the 2008 elections (45%), in which the historic mayor, Ken Livingstone was defeated by the conservative candidate, Boris Johnson. In fact the Blair government held a referendum before the creation of the Greater London Authority: 72% of citizens voted in favour, but only 35% of citizens with the right to vote, voted. If we compare this with the electoral turnout for the municipal elections, we see that in both cases the percentages are similar. In other words, the direct election of the metropolitan council in these two agglomerations would not have achieved a greater turnout or have differentiated themselves from the municipal elections.
2.2 Metropolitan Agencies

In this case, there is a medium-level of institutionalization with a sectorial agency with a main function rather than a metropolitan authority with various competencies. For example, in Frankfurt it is the regional planning. In the case of Birmingham, there are several sectorial agencies with functions such as transport, police, fires and emergencies. In fact, transport planning is often carried out by a metropolitan agency, such as it is in the case of Barcelona metropolitan region - which covers a territory much larger than the metropolitan area -, in which there is the Metropolitan Transport Authority (ATM).

Birmingham

**History:**
Between 1974 and 1986, the metropolitan area of Birmingham had a metropolitan government (*West Midlands Metropolitan County*) similar to other English cities. After its abolition, its core municipalities continue to have some shared services, provided by metropolitan authorities with a sole function.

**Competencies:**
- *West Midlands Passenger Transport Executive*: known as Centro, is the public body responsible for promoting and co-ordinating public transport services (buses, train & metro), and it is run by public and private companies.
- *West Midlands Police*: the public body responsible for ensuring the safety of citizens. It also performs preventative and educational tasks in relation to crime and violence.
- *West Midlands Fire Service*: the public body responsible for the protection, prevention and intervention in fires and emergencies.

**Financing:**
These metropolitan agencies are financed mainly by transfers from municipality members (50%) and State subsidies (30%). The remainder (20%) comes from the payment of fees for the offered services.

**Representation:**
The type of representation in the three authorities is indirect.
The West Midlands Passenger Transport Executive and the West Midlands Fire Service have a council composed of municipality members delegates, according to their population (27 members in both cases) and lead by an executive committee. In contrast, the West Midlands Police is organized in 10 operating units lead by a Chief of Police (chief superintendent). The group of units is co-ordinated by a team of police officers and technical staff.

Frankfurt

**History:**
Greater Frankfurt extends to three länders and has several institutions responsible for a single function (regional planning, transport, waste, culture, parks) which act in different geographical areas. The Parliament of Hesse, where most of the municipalities are based, passed the Law on Frankfurt/Rhein-Main, which entered into force on the 1st April 2011. This law involved the creation of *Regionalverband FrankfurtRheinMain*, a regional planning agency comprising 75 municipalities in the metropolitan area. It is not the first structure created for this purpose, as there have already been several regional planning agencies with different names (the last one, *Planungsverband Ballungsräume Frankfurt/RheinMain* and just before, the *Umlandverband*, of direct election).

**Competencies:**
The main function of the agency is regional planning, which is carried out by elaborating the Regional Land Use Plan and Landscape Plan. The aim of those plans is to harmonize the various municipal plans (previously there were other planning agencies with less municipality members). The *Regionalverband FrankfurtRheinMain* also develops tasks related to technical assessment to municipalities about European funds, analysis of regional data and the management of projects financed by the European Union.

**Financing:**
The municipalities finance the agency. Municipal contributions (*umlage*) are calculated based on two criteria: population and wealth (income per capita). Therefore the large and rich municipalities are those that contribute more money to the association.

**Representation:**
Decisions are taken by the Regional Council, composed of municipal representatives (indirect election).
These two examples are illustrative of how this model of governance works. Firstly, the creation of a sectorial agency involves less institutional changes than metropolitan governments (especially in the case of direct election). Therefore, it is politically easier to perform and cause less political resistance. This does not imply that there will not be any type of conflict. For example, in Frankfurt some municipalities have opposed to the creation of the new planning agency and have tried to halt the process. Secondly, these type of agencies have indirect representation, and are presented rather as a technical than a political body. Unlike metropolitan governments, however, the metropolitan perspective is fragmented, since they only deal with one area (waste, transport, housing), and lack of a global vision.

Agglomerations with various sectorial agencies, each one covering a different territory, are also often found. Today in Helsinki, there is a transport agency for 7 municipalities (Helsinki Region Transport, HSL) and an environment one for 4 municipalities (Helsinki Region Environmental Services Authority, HSY). This was also the case of Barcelona before the coming into force of the Law of 2010, in which a transport entity, an environmental entity and a association of municipalities coexisted and comprised each one a different number of municipalities. This fragmentation was eliminated with the creation the new Barcelona Metropolitan Area. In contrast, the case of Birmingham is the opposite: there was a metropolitan structure with various functions and this structure was removed and to three sectorial metropolitan agencies were born. Co-ordination between them is one of the agglomeration outstanding challenges.

2.3 Vertical Co-ordination

This governance model includes those cases where an administration not specifically metropolitan develops de facto a role of metropolitan co-ordination. In other words, it has not been created for this function but in practice exercises this function - in the absence of a specifically created metropolitan government. There are numerous examples in Europe: the city-state of Vienna, the Region of Brussels-Capital, Stockholm County, the Regional Authority of Dublin, the Hovedstaden region in Copenhagen and the Autonomous Community of Madrid (Comunidad de Madrid).

### Autonomous Community of Madrid

**History:**
The Autonomous Community of Madrid was founded by a statute passed in 1983. Madrid represents the exception to the tendency of southern European cities because of its low institutional density. There are only two governments: the local and the regional one. It contains 179 municipalities: the reduced size of the municipalities of the second metropolitan belt contrasts with the large extension of the central city and Spanish capital, as a result of the joining of 13 municipalities between 1948 and 1954. The rapid urban development around the capital occupies nearly all the territory of the Autonomous Community of Madrid.

**Competencies:**
As an Autonomous Community, Madrid has a wide range of competencies set out in its Statue of Autonomy. Amongst them the following can be highlighted: territorial planning, urbanism, housing, public works, roads, railways, transport, ports and water resources. It also has responsibilities of the former provincial council, such as the co-ordination of municipal entities in order to guarantee the provision of municipal competencies throughout the territory. The Autonomous Community of Madrid has other competencies which shares with the State such as: economic planning, industry, security, education and health.

**Financing:**
The revenues of the Autonomous Community of Madrid come 80% from direct and indirect taxes (on goods and services, property and income). 70% of these revenues are collected by the State and transferred to the Community of Madrid, such as the IRPF and VAT. The rest of the regional financing comes from transfers from the State.

**Representation:**
The Madrid Assembly is the legislative and political representation body of the citizens of the Autonomous Community of Madrid. It consists of 111 deputies directly elected every 4 years. The Assembly elects the President of the Autonomous Community and leader of the Executive power, who sets his own Governing Council and is responsible before the Assembly.
### Region Hovedstaden in Copenhagen

**History:**
In Denmark in 2007, a municipal reform took place: 14 counties (second level of local government) were substituted for 5 regions and the number of municipalities went from 271 to 98. In Copenhagen, the creation of the Regional Capital (Region Hovedstaden) meant the disappearance of the existing metropolitan authority. The agglomeration of the Danish capital is characterized by the low degree of institutional fragmentation: few and large municipalities and the region of Hovedstaden. Before the 2007 reform there were also various transport authorities, which also merged into a sole one (Movia).

**Competencies:**
The new regions are decentralization institutions of the State; and their decisions are binding. The competencies of the regions are related to the management of hospitals and its personnel, the management of health coverage (health insurance), regional development (economic development, tourism, culture, education); the environment (regional plans, pollution measures); public transport (co-ordination of transport agencies, planning, fare integration); the co-ordination of institutes working for the population with special needs (social services, education).

**Financing:**
Regions unlike municipalities cannot raise taxes. Their financing comes essentially from transfers from the State (80%) and municipalities (20%).

**Representation:**
Each region is represented by a Council of 41 members, elected directly every 4 years.

These two cases show how, in a State decentralization process, metropolitan governments are not created but that sub-states institutions (Autonomous Communities, regions) are the ones to assume in practice metropolitan functions. Both in the case of Madrid and Danish, the territory activity is larger than the metropolitan area, and therefore the policies are not specifically metropolitan but are diluted into all policies. In return, those are cases of institutions with outstanding competencies and direct election, which gives them legitimacy. Furthermore these government areas would be difficult to eliminate by change of government, in contrast to metropolitan governments, which have been subject of political fights (cases of Barcelona & English metropolitan authorities in the 1980s).

In conclusion, the models of vertical co-ordination are characterized by the following elements: Firstly, the government areas assuming metropolitan tasks have more or less powers, type of financing and direct or indirect representation depending on the cases (especially depending on the degree of decentralization of the State). Secondly, the territorial area of work of the institution (regional, city-State, county, autonomous region) is larger (cases of Madrid, Copenhagen, Stockholm, Dublin) or smaller (Vienna, Brussels) than the metropolitan area. Consequently, the problem with the vertical co-ordination model is the difficulty of building a metropolitan vision as is no explicit recognition of the metropolitan fact; this depends on the capacity to create metropolitan projects and policies for each of the institutions.
2.4 Voluntary Co-operation between Municipalities

Less institutionalized models are characterized by the lack of reforms in existing political structures as they are based on local initiative and willingness on the part of the municipalities, by using flexible formulas of co-operation. The traditional model is that of voluntary co-operation between municipalities of the same metropolitan area. In the majority of countries there are associations of municipalities to provide some service. For example, in Spain there are more than 1,000 associations of municipalities, including rural zones. In the case of urban agglomerations, the co-operation can take place on a more political basis, becoming an element of transition towards more institutionalized metropolitan governance. This was the case in the Mancomunitat de Municipis of the Barcelona Metropolitan Area and later on the Metropolitan Consortium, which served as a transition to the new AMB. This is currently the case of Paris (see 2.5). In other cases, voluntary co-operation is carried out in order to build a common space for metropolitan dialogue and to reach agreements between members, as in the case of the Polish agglomeration of Poznan.

The effectiveness of voluntary co-operation structures depends to a large extent on the legal framework under which the municipals act (competencies, funding etc.) and the political willingness of municipal representatives. Without a clear leadership and willingness to co-operate, these models of governance are ephemeral. For example, in Warsaw an association was created in the year 2000, (Warsaw Metropolis Association), which was only comprised of municipalities surrounding the Polish capital. Although Warsaw joined the association in 2006, mistrust between the suburban representatives and those of the capital have prevented any real co-operation between them.

During the decades of 1990 and 2000, strategic planning has emerged as a governance tool. In this case, municipal representatives share a space for discussion and debate with other stakeholders such as other administrations, employers’ organisations, chambers of commerce, universities, non-profit organizations, etc. Well-known cases of strategic planning are Barcelona and Turin. As in the previous case, they can also be transitional or complementary elements of a more institutionalized metropolitan co-operation. For example, in the Polish city of Wroclaw, the planning strategy has been a stage before the constitution of a metropolitan agency. Indeed, the exercise of intense strategic planning started in 1999 lasted six years, and ended due to lack of results. However, this experience led in 2007 to the creation of a sectorial agency (ARAW-Wroclaw Agglomeration Development Agency).

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Poznan Metropolis Association

**History:**
This metropolitan area with more than one million inhabitants is mono-centric and is characterized by the long tradition of co-operation between municipalities. After various inter-municipal structures in the year 2007, Poznan, the surrounding county and 17 municipalities, created the Poznan Metropolitan Council. Its aim was to develop a strategic plan that would lead to the creation of the Poznan Metropolis Association in 2012.

**Competencies:**
To be a forum for discussion between members and co-ordinate the co-operation among them as well as managing the territorial financing from the European Union (Integrated Territorial Investment- ITI).

**Financing:**
The association is financed by contributions from members. It also applies for subsidies from the European Union.

**Representation:**
Currently the association includes the city of Poznan, the county of Poznan & 21 municipalities, which are organized into an assembly with representation of the members.
Torino Internazionale

**History:**
Turin is a fragmented agglomeration, in which the Piedmont region and the Province of Turin have competencies. It has several public and private companies that manage the services and a metropolitan structure without coordination. Torino Internazionale is the association created in 2000 to promote strategic planning and reach an agreement on the future of the agglomeration. The first strategic plan, pioneer in Italy, came up at a time of a crisis in the industrial sector (especially automotive) and with the Winter Olympic Games at the horizon in 2006. The goal was to renew the international image of the city. The second strategic plan focused on the knowledge society and on how to develop new economic development niches. Currently, its work focuses on the development of a third strategic plan focused on strategies to cope with the economic crisis while promoting sustainable development of the city, including both social and environmental aspects.

**Competencies:**
To guide the development of the agglomeration through agreements between the various members, setting goals and specific projects to achieve them.

**Financing:**
The association has three main financing sources: membership fees; contributions and donations from other public and private entities; the benefits of the initiatives of the Association.

**Representation:**
The association is composed of an assembly that has currently 89 members and is chaired by the Mayor of Turin. Members are of various types, including representatives from public institutions, organisations, universities, cultural centres, businesses, unions and chambers of commerce.

The objective of the strategic plans is to create a **vision of metropolitan consensus** tracing the main elements which should guide the future of the metropolis. It is therefore a reference tool without binding capacity. This character helps agreements to be reached and to include other representatives who have no voice in formal institutions but have a prominent role in the metropolitan area. In contrast, the strategic objectives can be easily abandoned, either because of lack of leadership, political changes or lack of co-operation with other government areas.

2.5 Ongoing reforms
There are currently several metropolitan reform processes, such as in France and Italy. What do they propose? Are these innovative? How are they framed within the metropolitan governance models?

In the French case, for the last 8 years there has been a debate on the reform of the various territorial entities that affect large cities, especially Paris. The capital was excluded from the national reform of 1990 (*Loi Chevènement 1999*) due to its complexity. At the same time the various law and urban development projects (such as Grand Paris), have been consolidating new models of metropolitan voluntary cooperation with a broad strong territorial base. The adoption of the Law of 27 January 2014 of modernization of public territorial action and affirmation of metropolises (*Loi de modernisation de l’action publique territoriale et d’affirmation des métropoles*) represents the institutionalization of this co-operation, as it provides for the creation of a new body of intermunicipal cooperation, the *Métropole du Grand Paris*, on the 1st January 2016.
Recent Chronology of metropolitan co-operation structures in Paris

**Metropolitan conference (2006-2009):**
Following the initiative of the mayor of Paris, a space is created for dialogue to reflect and discuss the most important challenges of the agglomeration of the capital. More than 100 entities (municipalities, intermunicipal structures, départements and the region Île-de-France) participate.

**Paris Métropole (2009-2015):**
To study in detail a diagnosis of the metropolitan challenges, a mix study group was created (syndicat mixte d'études), which brings together more than 200 regional bodies (municipalities, intermunicipal structures, departments and region) of both the first and the second belt of the agglomeration. These 211 bodies (in February 2015) represent 9.3 million inhabitants. Financed by its members, it is organised in an Assembly in which each member has the same importance, and a smaller steering committee. It also has a Comité de partenaires to represent civil society. One of the lines of work is the Projet métropolitain which works for the transition towards the new body Métropole du Grand Paris, together with the Mission de Préfiguration.

**Mission de Préfiguration de la future Métropole du Grand Paris (2014-2016):**
It is the structure responsible for preparing the way towards the new Métropole du Grand Paris, through diagnosis and evaluation reports (legal conditions, financial, etc.). Mayors and other stakeholders are represented in order to contribute to the project. Its task will end six months after the creation of the Métropole du Grand Paris.

**Métropole du Grand Paris (2016-...):**
It will be the new intermunicipal institution (établissement public de coopération intercommunale - EPCI) that will bring together Paris and the municipalities of the first belt (about 7 million inhabitants) from the 1st of January 2016. Competencies are related to territorial planning, social and economic development, housing and environmental protection. It will be governed by a metropolitan council (of more than 300 councilors) which will elect - with the absolute majority - the presidency.

In Italy, the process of creating “metropolitan cities” begun in 1990 and never concluded has been recently reopened. According to the law 56/2014, the provinces are to be eliminated and replaced by metropolitan governments in several agglomerations, among which there are Milan, Turin, Rome, Bologna, Florence, Naples, Bari, Venice, Genoa and Reggio Calabria. These new institutions will absorb provincial competencies and will take on new competencies being responsible for territorial planning and environment, strategic planning, transport and mobility, social and economic development. Currently the cities are involved in the process of the new bodies approval; one of the most advanced cities is Milan, which since the 1st of January 2015 is metropolitan Città.

Recent chronology of the construction of the Metropolitan Città in Milan

**Strategic project Città di città (2005-2009):**
A space for reflection on metropolitan challenges initiated by the Province of Milan and Milan Metropolis Development Agency, with the support of the Polytechnic University of Milan and the participation of public and private institutions has been created.

**Towards the new metropolitan Città (2011-2014):**
2011: appointment of a minister for the creation of the Metropolitan Città
2012-14: Elaboration of the project “Milano Città Metropolitana”, with municipalities and socio-economic stakeholders
22nd of December 2014: approval of the statutes of Metropolitan Città.

**Città metropolitana (1st of January 2015-...):**
Chaired by the Mayor of Milan (Sindaco Metropolitano) and governed by a Metropolitan Council (Consiglio Metropolitano) of 24 members. It also counts with an assembly (Conferenza Metropolitana) representing the municipality members. If they meet certain conditions stated in the law (decentralization of the city, definition of homogeneous areas within the agglomeration), the mayor and metropolitan council can be directly elected.
With regard to the metropolitan governance models we have previously seen, those two examples are in line with metropolitan governments, as they imply a legislative and institutional recognition of the metropolitan fact, with some nuances. In the case of Paris, it is difficult to make a diagnosis because the body is still in a preparatory phase, but the project is framed within the French tradition of intercommunalité and brings few new elements. In the case of Milan, the province has been replaced by the metropolitan città, and now, as in Paris, the Metropolitan Council and the metropolitan Mayor are elected indirectly. In both cases they also share the fact that the areas of the new bodies are smaller than the limits of the real agglomeration, reflecting the complex political balance of metropolitan reforms. Moreover, in both examples the creation of a consultative body brings together the socioeconomic stakeholders of the territory (Metropolitan Forum of Civil Society in Milan and the Council of development in Paris).

The case of Milan provides an innovative element: citizen participation at a metropolitan level. According to the statutes of the metropolitan città, popular legislative initiatives and referendums may be carried out. This could represent a strengthening of the democratic legitimacy of the metropolitan città. Nonetheless, the fact that currently the metropolitan mayor is also the mayor of the city of Milan seems contradictory, since the latter is directly elected by the people of Milan and not by the whole metropolitan population of the città metropolitana. Finally, it must be seen how the different metropolitan città in Italy will evolve and if a diversity or homogeneity in their statutes will be found. In the case of Rome, it must be seen how the state capital combines with the metropolitan città.

3. Conclusions

In conclusion, we summarize the advantages and disadvantages of the different models of metropolitan governance that we have seen. In addition, we take note of two of the metropolitan governance challenges for upcoming years. On one hand, territorial and metropolitan services management; and on the other hand, the metropolitan fitting within Europe.

3.1 Pros and cons of metropolitan governance models

Metropolitan governance in Europe has adopted a plurality of forms, which we have classified into four types, from more to less institutionalized ones: metropolitan governments (direct or indirect election), metropolitan agencies (sectorial), vertical co-ordination (from an existing administration: a region, province, etc.) and voluntary co-operation between municipalities (association of municipalities, strategic plans). There is not an ideal model, since they all have their advantages and disadvantages.

At one extreme, the way of dealing with metropolitan problems involves institutional changes and the recognition by law of the metropolitan fact. This leads to a number of pros and cons. Firstly, if the new structure has real competencies and adequate financing, this is the option that will allow to tackle metropolitan challenges in a global way and deal with social and fiscal inequality - issues whose responsibility is usually of a higher level of government (regional and / or state). However, the autonomy of metropolitan governments is limited by the distribution of competencies with other areas, the lack of self-financing or weakness of democratic legitimacy. Secondly, the creation of metropolitan governments help to reduce institutional fragmentation but there are still several institutions and companies (planning, management, economic development) operating at metropolitan level. Another obstacle of creating a new level of government is its cost (especially if other existing structures are not eliminated).

Fourthly, the creation of metropolitan governments is less flexible to the inherent changes in the metropolitan dynamics. Once an institution with competencies is created, financing and political representation are very difficult to change. In contrast, the metropolitan area is not fixed: the area on which the new structure acts overcomes in a short time. Finally, the main reason why powerful metropolitan governments are not created is political resistance generated by this type of intervention, both by municipalities and by other existing govern-
ment areas such as provinces, regions or even the central government. Indeed, few governments dare to create metropolitan governments that group the majority of the country population and / or are its capital. In cases that this option has been implemented, metropolitan governments have been given limited competencies (management, planning and execution) in very specific areas (above all transport and environment, and to a lesser extent territorial planning and economic development).

In contrast, the less institutionalized metropolitan governments are more flexible and adapt better to a changing environment. In effect, the adherence of new municipalities to the association is easier since it depends on the willingness of municipality members. Similarly, depending on the type of local government it is possible to extend or reduce the competencies of the association by changing its statutes. The second advantage is that the less institutionalized mechanisms arise from a local initiative. In fact, the municipalities are the ones who decide to associate and therefore the process is controlled by local actors. Taking decisions during and after the process is kept at local level and without interference from another level of government. The decentralization of the decisions allows working in a more flexible way and a better appropriation of goals.

Voluntary cooperation models have three major disadvantages. First, such mechanisms may have more difficulty to last because they depend on internal dynamics (political alliances) and the association's leadership. In practice, the type of actions is arisen in a short term, as the agreement remains voluntary. Another negative aspect of the voluntary cooperation is possibility to work with the status quo. In other words, the fact that decisions are taken in a consensual way may lead to the failure to reach agreements and lack of action. It also depends on the distribution of power within the association (number of representatives per each municipality). Depending on the balance of power at the time of voting, it is possible to block decisions and not stepping forward. The risk of paralysis may also occur if members fail to fund the association as a large part of funding comes from municipal transfers. In fact, one of the elements that affect the function of voluntary co-operation between municipalities is the distribution of the financial burden among the municipality member as they have very different resources and socio-economic profiles.

Finally associations of cooperation between municipalities use to have limited competencies (service management, assistance to municipal members) and therefore their impact on large political metropolitans is less than in the case of metropolitan governments. In the case of strategic planning, its consultative nature should also be added to its cons, although as we have seen this can be a useful tool for overcoming institutional conflicts and create a consensual metropolitan vision.

In practice, each metropolitan area has a governance model according to the tradition of cooperation, political alliances, relationships between governmental areas and the local configuration of the various stakeholders (public and private). These balances modulate the type of governance that evolve over time. There are many examples of cities that have a model of metropolitan governance more or less institutionalized according to the stages: from metropolitan government to sectorial agencies, from a strategic plan to cooperation between municipalities, etc. Currently, the reforming processes in France and Italy show a tendency to recognize the metropolitan fact, but with limited competencies and a reduced territory of application.

In the new metropolitan Città in Milan, there is the possibility of directly elect the representative bodies (mayor and council). However, the cases of London and Stuttgart show a turnout rate in the metropolitan area similar to the municipal level (around 40 and 50% respectively). In fact, when thinking about the models of metropolitan governance one must consider whether the metropolitan area is for citizens a significant and identification space such as the municipality. Perhaps we should wonder whether the fact of electing political leaders makes oneself feel a part of the metropolitan area or the sense of belonging is linked to other variables, such as a similar lifestyle or shared reference spaces. The study made in Barcelona indicates this is so (Tomàs and Vallbé, 2014). In this sense, the most innovative feature of Metropolitan Città in Milan is the fact that its statutes include citizen participation tools at metropolitan level which run beyond elections.

3.2 The challenges in territory management and in metropolitan services

One of the challenges is metropolitan governance is territorial management and the services they provide. In this regard, there are several aspects to bear in mind.

Firstly, we have seen that one of the obstacles to metropolitan coordination is the gap between institutions and territory. Indeed, as we have seen in several cases, metropolitan governments usually do not cover the whole agglomeration. Moreover, with the increasing metropolitanization of the territory, any structure created is shortly
obsolete, unless it incorporates an agil mechanism to expand the perimeter of action.

Secondly, there is a great fragmentation in territorial management. Apart from governments and territorial administrations (municipalities, metropolitan authorities, provinces, regions), in all metropolitan areas there are other organizations with different functions. We are talking about agencies, consortia and associations which perform mainly management, planning and external projection. The creation of metropolitan governments helps reduce institutional fragmentation but even so the plurality of entities operating at metropolitan level is common in all cases.

**Management** companies are the more abundant, especially those related to public transport service, and to a lesser extent, waste treatment. In all agglomerations there is a company responsible for the transport in the central city and surrounding towns. For example, Metro Madrid, Barcelona Metropolitan Transport or WienerLinien (Vienna). In many cases, these companies are integrated within other public institutions engaged in planning the transport network, fare integration, etc. In the case of Madrid, it is the Regional Transport Consortium of Madrid, which depends on the Comunidad de Madrid; in the Catalan case, the Metropolitan Transportation Authority, dependent on the Generalitat of Catalonia; in the case of the Austrian Association of transport of the eastern region, under supervision of the Länder. Regarding the environment, there are usually management companies of water-related services (water supply, sanitation and sewage disposal) and waste (collection, treatment, recycling), which are also coordinated by metropolitan agencies and metropolitan governments. As we have seen, there are cases in which there are various sectorial agencies (transport, environment) with different territorial area; in this case, ensuring coordination is the major challenge.

Apart from the planning and management bodies, we found a large number of non-profit associations and public, private or mixed companies with the main objective of international economic promotion of the metropolitan agglomerations at international level, in order to attract investors and tourists. Some organizations are engaged in institutional marketing and improvement of the competitiveness of the metropolitan area (for example, Frankfurt, Stuttgart, Copenhagen), while others are presented as a platform for debate and reflection on metropolitan issues (Dublin City Development Board, the Association of the Barcelona metropolitan Strategic Plan, Torino Internazionale, London First). They are consultative bodies with mixed representation, as apart from mayors and councilors there are also members from the business sector, chambers of commerce, universities, etc.

In short, in urban agglomerations act various public, private or mixed capital entities from different territories, with varied and diverse functions. Apart from the coordination of all of them, one of the biggest challenges is to ensure efficiency and economic viability of services management in areas that generate great benefits such as water and territorial sustainability. In this regard, the growing interest of multinationals to develop Smart Cities tests the governance capacity, as in this field, the public-private cooperation is essential. Indeed, neither the municipal government nor the metropolitan governments have the technology or knowledge to deploy the model of Smart Cities, so the articulation between the public and private interests lies at the heart of metropolitan governance.

### 3.3 Metropolitan fitting within Europe

Given the fact that almost 75% of the European population lives in urban areas, which is expected towards 2050 to be 80%, the European Commission is giving increasing importance to the urban phenomenon. There is growing concern about the territorial sustainability, understood in its environmental aspect (pollution, resource depletion), but also social (inequality, social exclusion). Several reports, letters and statements have been taking place to set up a European urban agenda. Thus, in 2012, the General Directorate of the Commission’s regional policies became to be called Urban and Regional policy, with the intention of investing half of the regional development funds in urban areas. In addition, a growing number of sectorial policies are aimed at urban areas: energy, information society, environment, education and culture, etc. The Europe 2020 Strategy also highlights the need for an integrated planning at metropolitan level.

An outstanding element at the European institutions is that the metropolitan fact contrasts with the territorial allocation of decision-making bodies. In the process of European integration, the role went to the Member States. All major organs of representation have been conceived on a national basis, while the regions and municipalities have a very secondary role, through the Committee of the Regions. In the case of metropolitan areas, this role is even minor. In spite of existing network of cities such as Eurocities, there is not an own representative body. This is ironic when considering that 67% of European GDP is generated in urban areas, while its population represents 59% of the total (Eurostat, 2014). So, one of the European governance challenges is to give voice to the Metropolitan representatives, both in policy making
and priority goals in programs. However, the European urban agenda cannot be developed independently from the Member States, which must also recognize the role of urban agglomerations. As we have seen, this is still, in most cases, a pending subject.

References:

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