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**PRESIDENT, PRIME MINISTER, PEOPLE:
CHANGING POWERS IN THE ITALIAN MODEL OF GOVERNMENT**

by

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The Italian political system has experienced a major transformation following the electoral reform of 1993. Though incomplete from an institutional point of view, the transformation has involved all Italian political parties, the way the coalitions are formed, the governments, and, to a large extent, the role played by the President of the Republic. There are many studies in different languages of the many institutional problems created by the transition (Bufacchi and Burgess 2001; Pasquino 2002) that have so far remained more or less intentionally unsolved. There are also many studies of the three general elections that have been held under the new electoral system (Pasquino 1995b and 2002; Newell 2002; Bartolini and D'Alimonte 1995; D'Alimonte and Bartolini 1997; D'Alimonte and Bartolini 2002). What is sorely missing is an in-depth analysis of the processes of government formation and dissolution as a whole in the ten-year period 1993-2003. These processes are particularly important in themselves. They are also revealing of some significant developments that have taken place, to a large extent, unexpectedly, though not unpredictably, in the Italian political system. These developments are by no means over and may, indeed, lead to additional and incisive institutional reforms. In any case, they deserve special attention because much of the Italian political conflict has revolved around the interpretation of the new institutional situation and the respective powers of the major political actors. Overall, we feel that there is the need to provide a systemic interpretation of the problems and the changes. Such an interpretation is absolutely indispensable if one wants to understand what has changed, what has remained more or less the same, what may still have to change before the Italian political system achieves a new and sustainable equilibrium. In order to do that, it is important to offer a comprehensive view of the most important actors in the Italian political system, their strength, their strategies, their goals, and their accomplishments.

Our paper is organized as follows. In the first section, we will provide an essential description of the Italian constitutional design regarding the government formation and dissolution and the role played by major institutional players. Then, we will develop our analysis by carrying out two distinct comparisons, the one between different countries (Italy and France); the other within the same country (Italy) at different historical stages. In the second section, with the purpose of better illuminating the institutional problems and the resources available, firstly we will provide a brief comparison between Italy up to 1993 and the Fourth French Republic. Then, when analysing the second period of the Italian Republic (1993-2003), characterized by the reform of the electoral system and by the new role of the President of the Republic, we will also indicate the potentialities of a comparison with the Fifth French Republic. In the third and fourth sections, we will carry out a detailed inter-temporal comparison of the Italian political system and the most powerful actors in

two periods: from 1948 to 1993 and from 1993 to 2003. This way, we can make full use of the *coeteris paribus* clause. Finally, the last section contains some concluding remarks.

The major assumption of our paper is grounded in Tsebelis' theory of veto players (1995). More precisely, the reason why Italy has had very many unstable and not especially efficient governments has been the existence of quite a number of veto players. Has the reform of the electoral system created a brand-new political situation in which the number of veto players has been significantly reduced? Or, on the contrary, there has just been a shift of the arena in which the veto players conduct their political game? In order to answer these questions it is necessary to provide an overview of the past and an evaluation of the goals pursued by the 1993 electoral reform.

1. THE DESIGN OF THE ITALIAN CONSTITUTION

There is no doubt that the Italian Constitution was designed, exactly as John Rawls would have suggested and liked, under "a veil of ignorance". In 1946 no major party could be confident of its electoral strength. All parties feared to be left without any significant portion of political power. Moreover, the legacy of Fascism prevented any attempt to construct the institutional conditions for a strong executive. Neither a Presidential republic nor a Prime minister having considerable powers over his ministers, his political majority, his Parliament could be favourably entertained. Indeed, though the need for a stable and efficient executive was duly perceived, the solution was consciously rejected. In the end the Constitution provided for an overall institutional arrangement that must be defined weak. The President of the Republic was given some ill-defined prerogatives and powers concerning the appointment of the Prime minister (incidentally, in the Italian Constitution the Prime minister is defined as "President of the Council of Ministers") and the dissolution of Parliament as well as the authorization of government bills and the enactment of laws approved by Parliament. A symmetric, and overstaffed, bicameral Parliament (Tsebelis and Money 1997) was created with no differentiation of powers and functions. Probably, as yet another reaction to Fascism, Parliament was meant to occupy a "central" role in the institutional circuit: to be a check on the power of the government while each Chamber could counterbalance the power of the other. Finally, to prevent any possibility of a single-party majority government a proportional electoral law was approved fundamentally without any incisive exclusion clause from Parliament so that even small parties could obtain representation¹. It is not necessarily true that PR multiplies the number of political parties, though it does not prevent already existing parties from producing splits and, as a consequence, splinter parties are not discouraged at all (the Italian case does provide

¹ Wertman 1977 remains the best short description in English of the Italian electoral system. See also Pasquino 1995a.

several extremely important examples mostly having affected the left). What is certainly true is that PR photographs the political distribution of party preferences. Hence, if several parties already exist an “uncorrected” PR would allow quite a number of them to obtain parliamentary representation. Once having entered parliament, most parties enjoy political inertia plus several additional advantages (visibility, funds, ministerial offices). Therefore, they are better placed to reproduce their electoral support. All this said, looking at these institutional features one would have expected a rigorous comparison of the Italian political system with the Fourth French Republic. A most similar case design would have definitely enriched our knowledge. A rigorous comparison of this kind would still be a good idea even in terms of policy-making, that is, of what could still be done; in terms of institution-building/reforming, that is which institutions and mechanisms should be reformed, and how; with the aim of formulating a probabilistic theory, that is: “if the following reforms a, b, c are implemented, then it is likely that x, y, and z will make their appearance”.

2. ITALY AND FRANCE

We will not dwell here on the causes of the collapse of the Fourth Republic. No doubt the traumatic events of decolonization played a significant, though perhaps not decisive, role. We believe that the inability of the Fourth Republic to deal with the decolonization problems was also, perhaps largely, due to its institutional arrangement and party alignments. Nor will we overemphasize the extraordinary importance of De Gaulle’s charismatic leadership to “invent” the Fifth Republic, to smooth the transition toward that outcome, and to consolidate its institutions. Our main point is, first, that the Fourth French Republic and Italy until 1993 shared a very similar institutional arrangement and a very similar party configuration. Therefore, it is highly legitimate to look at these institutional and political factors both to explain their developments and to illuminate the processes of change. Our focus will be not on exogenous challenges, but on endogenous factors. To this purpose, two theories are very useful: the theory of polarized pluralism by Giovanni Sartori (1976) and the theory of veto players by George Tsebelis (1995).

Both the French and the Italian party systems were highly polarized, that is, first, the ideological and political distances separating the Communists and the extreme right in both countries from the other parties and from the average voter were, indeed, significant and not to be bridged easily. Second, both the extreme right and the Communists were ostensibly anti-system parties that were not only challenging successive governments in office and their policy-making, but that, if given the opportunity, would have changed the political system (or, at least, the socio-economic system and the international alliances). Moreover, the existence of two parties that in

each country could not be counted on for the formation of the various governmental coalitions meant that, first, no bipolar competition could be implemented and all governmental coalitions had to be constructed around the centre or converging towards the centre; second, that no alternation in the government was feasible. Hence, there was limited possibility of political renewal and of policy change. Table 2.1 summarizes the institutional and political features of the two regimes.

TAB 2.1 INSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL FEATURES OF THE ITALIAN REPUBLIC UP TO 1993 AND OF THE FOURTH FRENCH REPUBLIC

	<i>Italy</i>	<i>France</i>
<i>President of the Republic</i>		
elected by	Parliament	Parliament
powers	vague and limited	vague and limited
<i>Parliament</i>	bicameral symmetric	bicameral symmetric
<i>Government</i>		
composition	multiparty coalition	multiparty coalition
average tenure	eleven months	five months
<i>Electoral law</i>	proportional	proportional
<i>Party system</i>		
format	multiparty	multiparty
mechanics	polarized pluralism	polarized pluralism
major feature	no alternation	no alternation

A considerable body of research on democracies tells us that weak democracies, that is, democracies characterized by unstable, unproductive, and underperforming governments, are likely to collapse, that is, to implode. The theory of veto players by Tsebelis indicates that multiparty parliamentary regimes, such as Fourth Republic France and Italy are bound to have many political and institutional veto players. Therefore, it is very difficult for those regimes to change the status

quo. Once an equilibrium point is achieved too many veto players will join in opposing change. No coalition will be feasible to shift from one equilibrium point to another preferred by a majority. No reform will be made. These difficulties have certainly been neither left aside nor underestimated by Sartori's analysis of polarized pluralism. However, what must be explained is not the immobilism of the two regimes. Rather, it is the survival of the Italian republic long after the collapse of the Fourth French Republic that requires an explanation. We will not be satisfied with an ad hoc explanation, stressing, for instance, the impact of decolonization on the internal politics of France and the challenge launched by De Gaulle. It is our hypothesis that a better institutional arrangement and a more cohesive party system would have withstood both challenges. On the contrary, our explanation is based on some specific features of the party system. Because both party systems could function only by occupying the centre of the political continuum and by excluding the extreme left and the extreme right, it seems to us that the variable explaining the "longue durée" of the Italian Republic must be found in the nature and the strength of the party occupying the centre of the Italian political continuum: the Christian Democrats. Far more electorally powerful than the corresponding Mouvement Républicain Populaire (MRP), far better representative of a coalition of socio-economic interests, the Italian Christian Democrats were in control of all the processes and stages of government formation and dissolution in the Italian Republic until 1993. Though their control was somewhat reduced in the 1980s, when the Socialist leader Bettino Craxi tried to occupy the central role in the political alignment, the DC largely remained the governmental coalition-maker. Though internally factionalized, the Christian Democrats were capable of coalescing any time it was necessary to bargain with their potential allies. The MRP was a party among the others in the Fourth French Republic. The DC was the dominant party, the master of the coalitional game. Its representativeness was based on the ability of its many factions (at one point in time, in the early 1970s, there were nine of them) to reach out to many socio-economic sectors. Its political power derived from PR, that always allowed, and, indeed, encouraged and rewarded the parties that were running alone (therefore, preventing an alternative block to emerge), and always preserved the DC central role.

By 1958 the Fourth French Republic had in any case run its course (Williams 1958). The Algerian crisis only allowed the reappearance of De Gaulle and the quick implementation of the General's blueprint for the Fifth Republic. France experienced no "transition" as such. Like Minerva springing out of Jupiter's head full-blown, the Fifth French Republic was ready-made in De Gaulle's (and his collaborators') head. Some important clauses and mechanisms contained in its institutional arrangements, that is, the powers of the President of the Republic and, almost immediately after, the popular election of the President, and the run-off majority system,

significantly contributed to a major reshaping of the party systems: only “new” parties (the Gaullist, the Independent Republicans, and the Socialists) have so far won the highest political office. Generally speaking, after 1958 French governments have been highly stable enjoying an average tenure of about eighteen months. These figures and those referred to the governments of the Fourth Republic, plus generally all the figures referring to coalition governments are more or less misleading because new governments must be counted even when their party composition and their Prime minister have not changed). Most important, in the Fifth Republic the dynamics of the political competition has become bipolar and has offered the opportunity for alternation, already enjoyed several times. The *quadrille bipolaire* may have recently entered a period of difficulties, but its contribution to the functioning of the French political system have been really significant. Table 2.2 summarizes the changes that have taken place in the transition from the Fourth to the Fifth Republic.

TAB.2.2 A COMPARISON OF THE MAJOR INSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL FEATURES OF THE FOURTH AND FIFTH FRENCH REPUBLIC

	<i>Fourth Republic</i>	<i>Fifth Republic</i>
<i>President</i>		
elected by	Parliament	the voters
powers	vague and limited	precise and conspicuous
<i>Parliament</i>	bicameral symmetric	bicameral asymmetric
<i>Government</i>		
composition	multiparty	multiparty
average tenure	five months	eighteen months
powers	limited	shared with the President* independent, many#
<i>Electoral law</i>	proportional	run-off majority system
<i>Party system</i>		
format	multiparty	quadrille bipolaire
mechanics	polarized pluralism	bipolar competition
major feature	no alternation	alternation

Legenda: *the powers of the Prime minister are shared with the President when the Prime minister belongs to the same party, or coalition, of the President;

#in the case of cohabitation, though tensions and conflicts are bound to appear, the Prime minister relies on the support of a parliamentary majority. Therefore, the President is less inclined and less willing to interfere with the PM's exercise of powers.

Though too often either seriously underestimated or completely forgotten, the impulse for change in the Italian political system came from a happy encounter between the dissatisfaction of a number of parliamentarians and the discontent of many voters. Both were objecting to the way governmental coalitions were being formed and dissolved by few party leaders, at the national as well as at the local level, taking into little or no account the preferences of the voters. Thus, the reform of the electoral law was meant to “invest” the process of government formation as well. The only available instrument to impose a reform of the electoral law was the referendum. It was duly utilized and it produced the opportunity for a significant reform: away from PR, towards a plurality system. Again, this paper is not the appropriate locus/site to dwell either on the preferences of the parties or on the specific features of the new electoral law. Suffice it to say that 75 per cent of the Deputies and the Senators are elected in single-member constituencies through a plurality system. The remaining 25 per cent senatorial seats are given to the best losers in the larger regional colleges regrouping several constituencies. The remaining 25 per cent deputies are won by parties whose separate lists have received at least 4 per cent of the national vote. It may be interesting to remark that in the 2001 general elections only five parties have overcome the 4 per cent threshold; two of Berlusconi's coalition partners: the Northern League, 3.9 per cent, and the former DC, now UDC, 3.2 per cent, have seats in the House of Deputies only because they were blessed with, that is bargained hard for, safe constituencies.

The proportional electoral system was a major component of what in Italy is called the “material” Constitution, that is the Constitution as truly practically implemented. The entire dynamics of the party system and, above all, of the formation/dissolution of Italian governments, the attribution of ministerial portfolios and the distribution of patronage were profoundly affected by the percentage of the votes received by all parties, even by the two extreme parties. However, the reform of the proportional system, though having an impact, as it will be seen, on the process of government formation (less so on government dissolution), could not bring with itself the reform of the Italian institutional system. Indeed, if, following Easton, we define the institutional system, that is the rules, the procedures, the institutions, the regime, no “regime change” has yet taken place in the Italian Republic. Before we move to a close, empirical analysis of the distinctive processes of

formation/dissolution of the governments providing a neat comparison between the pre-1993 and the post-1993 features, it might be useful to indicate some tendencies at work (for a preliminary analysis Pasquino 2002b). These tendencies have not yet come to full fruition. Nonetheless, they suggest the Italian political system has been institutionally destabilized and is in search of a new equilibrium. Tab. 2.3 summarizes the changes we consider important.

TAB 2.3 THE ITALIAN INSTITUTIONAL AND PARTY SYSTEM IN TRANSITION

<i>President</i>	
election	proposals for direct popular election
powers	still vague, but exercised in a very incisive way
<i>Parliament</i>	
	symmetric bicameralism challenged
<i>Government</i>	
composition	multiparty pre-electoral coalition
average tenure	16-17 months*
powers	depending on the homogeneity of the coalition
<i>Party system</i>	
format	depolarized multiparty system
mechanics	bipolar competition
major feature	one successful alternation

Legenda: *the average months of duration is a misleading figure. In fact, Romano Prodi's government has lasted from May 1996 to October 1998, that is 28 months; Silvio Berlusconi's second government, inaugurated in June 2001, has already been in office, at the time of writing, 25 months. The longest government of the Italian Republic, led by Socialist Bettino Craxi, lasted 35 months from August 1983 to June 1986.

Now it is time we turn to an in-depth analysis, first, of the processes of government formation and dissolution; then, to an overall evaluation of the actual transformations and their consequences.

3 GOVERNMENT FORMATION IN ITALY- FIRST VS. SECOND REPUBLIC

Few comparisons can better highlight the changes occurred after the early '90s in Italy than the analysis of the government formation in the First and in the Second republic. In both cases, most governments have taken the form of coalition governments "in the sense that the parties that form the parliamentary majority also share control of the cabinet and the executive branch" (Müller e Strom 2000, p.2). As for most features of the government formation process, however, Table 3.1 shows many striking differences between the two historical phases.

TAB. 3.1 MAIN FEATURES OF GOVERNMENT FORMATION IN ITALY- FIRST VS. SECOND REPUBLIC

	<i>1st Republic</i>	<i>2nd Republic</i>
<i>Coalition formation time</i>	post-electoral	pre-electoral
<i>Government platform agreement</i>	post-electoral	pre-electoral
<i>Prime minister's designation</i>	post-electoral	pre-electoral
<i>Portfolios allocation</i>	post-electoral	mostly post-electoral
<i>Prime minister's role in portfolios allocation</i>	very limited	often decisive

The first factor accounting for the transformation of the Italian coalition politics can be identified in the appearance of pre-electoral coalitions. As a matter of fact, all First republic government coalitions were formed after the elections². Though certain parties, namely the Communist and the neo-Fascist parties were excluded *a priori* as anti-system parties, the participation of the other parties into the cabinet depended mainly on their electoral performance. As happens in proportional systems, then, each party competed in the election by standing on its own. Following the introduction of the new electoral law in 1993, which attributes 75% of the seats in single-member constituencies according to the plurality rule, it became immediately clear that no party was strong enough to conquer the majority of seats in Parliament. Therefore, all parties on the political stage were forced to coalesce in order to become competitive in the plurality constituencies. Because of the many differences among all parties as to their ideological background and their platforms, such a process of aggregation was understandably difficult. It took time and many adjustments to arrive at building two more or less cohesive and solid alliances, the

² An unfortunate attempt to create a pre-electoral coalition was made in 1953 as a condition established in the electoral law, defined "swindle law", to attribute a majority bonus in seats, but the voters defeated it.

one on the centre-left and the other on the centre-right. Even now, in 2003, it is not to be taken for granted that the composition of such two coalitions is stable and immutable; what can be easily predicted, however, is the survival and the centrality of pre-electoral coalitions unless another reform of the electoral system takes place.

In the Second republic, therefore, the coalition composition is decided upon several months before the election and the identity of the parties that will form the cabinet is well-known to all voters when they cast their votes. This means that several steps usually occurring after the election, that is to say the decision of which parties enter the coalition, the search for an agreement on a common programmatic platform, and the designation of the prime minister all take place with large advance. Although there is no constitutional prescription on such matters, in fact it is commonly accepted that the parties forming the electoral alliance will participate in the government, that the electoral platform will become the government programme, and that the leader of the electoral coalition is the prospective prime minister.

The fact that all those basic decisions are made in the pre-electoral period makes partially inadequate the theoretical framework employed by the standard research to understand coalition politics. In contrast to what occurred in the First republic, when all parties defined their strategies on the basis of the electoral results, in the Second republic the bargaining process among parties reflects the condition of uncertainty over the electoral results (Campus 2002b). In determining the size of the coalition and designing its leadership the first aim appears clearly to maximize the number of votes to be obtained. In principle, this should lead to include the larger number of parties as possible. However, the promotion of the image of a cohesive coalition with a consistent program appears to be no less important. In fact, voters may punish a coalition that is excessively heterogeneous; more precisely, moderate voters are supposed to dislike the inclusion of extreme parties. Such a belief has been preventing the centre-left coalition to include Rifondazione Comunista (RC), a party that originated from the split of the former Communist party and that still promotes the communist ideals. In 1996, the centre-left coalition, the Ulivo, reached at least a strategic stand down agreement with RC, according to which RC's candidates abstained from competing with the Ulivo's candidates in most constituencies. In exchange, the Ulivo's abstention made possible the election of a certain number of RC's candidates. Such an agreement proved to be effective at the electoral stage: the Ulivo prevailed over the centre-right and formed the government. However, since the Ulivo did not have the majority in Parliament, the external support of RC was essential to keep Prodi's minority government in office. When, in October 1998, deep divergences between the government budget policy and RC's demands for concessions emerged, in a dramatic vote of no-confidence, RC withdrew its support and brought down the Prodi cabinet. In

2001, having confronted directly the impossibility of governing together because of too different platforms, the Ulivo refused (after a lively internal discussion) any electoral pact with RC.

It should be clear that the agreement on a common policy platform among the members of the pre-electoral coalition is a basic requirement for a successful election and, even more, for a stable cabinet. From this point of view, the analysis of subsequent elections from 1994 to 2001 shows a clear improvement. In 1994, Berlusconi soon realized that because of the open divergences between the Lega Nord (LN) and Alleanza Nazionale (AN), the centre-right could not form a single electoral coalition. As a consequence, he decided skilfully to construct two alliances who competed separately in different geographical areas: Forza Italia & Lega Nord: Polo delle Libertà; and Forza Italia & Alleanza Nazionale: Polo del Buongoverno. Once a government was formed, it was rapidly brought down by the Lega Nord's defection after only seven months of life. In 1996, the two main coalitions, the Polo delle Libertà, on the centre-right, and the Ulivo, on the centre-left, appeared more homogeneous, but all coalitional parties did not abstain from presenting their individual party manifestos (Campus 2001), showing in such a way the clear intention of preserving their own distinct identities. The fact that, in 2001, parties belonging to both coalitions chose to present only a common manifesto can be regarded as an indicator of the achievement of a higher degree of cohesion among the different coalitional partners (Campus 2002c).

The designation of the prospective prime minister is even a more crucial matter. As observed above, the leader of the electoral coalition is supposed now to become prime minister in case of victory. What appears normal in most majoritarian democracies is in clear contrast with the First republic traditional practise of selecting prime ministers outside the party leaders -- the notable exception of the socialist Bettino Craxi, 1983-1987, aside. The identity of Italian prime ministers was usually unknown before the election and his designation often came out as the result of complex post-electoral bargaining among coalitional parties and among the several factions of the major party, the Christian Democratic Party (DC). On the contrary, in the Second republic, the coalition leader has acquired a much increased role as well as a greater responsibility. In a political context affected by a growing personalization and mediatization of politics³, and where the electoral outcome is more and more dependent on the decisions of volatile and uncertain voters, obviously the leadership factor may be critical. Above all, the role of the leaders as *promoters* of coalitions must be stressed. While in the past, the government coalition was often built prior to the selection of the premier, in the Second republic the two most successful leaders, Silvio Berlusconi and Romano Prodi gave birth respectively to the 'Polo delle Libertà' (then 'Casa delle Libertà' after joining of the Lega Nord in 2001) and to the 'Ulivo'. In both cases, showing great political insight, the two leaders

³ For a discussion of the 'mediatization' of politics, that is to say the impact of media development in politics, see Mazzoleni e Shutz (1999).

actually 'invented' their electoral coalition and, after the victory, were able to transform it into a government coalition whose identity became inextricably linked more to the leader himself than to the parties making up the coalition. In this regard, it is interesting to observe that when Prodi government fell and was replaced by a new cabinet with a slightly altered coalition of parties, but a different prime minister, most observers claimed that the Ulivo was dead. This highlights how the public opinion related the identity and the survival of the coalition to its leader. Few months later Prodi and his collaborators founded a new party, the "Democrats for Prodi", with the open claim to revive the Ulivo. The new party obtained a positive response by the electorate at the 1999 European election and, with few additions, has become in the space of few years the second largest party in the centre-left coalition, following closely the DS.

It is worth noting that the leaders most rewarded by the voters seem to be those which are able to play an active role in reframing the political context. As observed above, Berlusconi and Prodi invented their own coalitions and can be considered major actors in promoting the advent of a bipolar competition in Italy. By contrast, those leaders who are selected according more traditional rules, like Amato and, especially, Rutelli in 1996, who was chosen at the end of a difficult bargaining between the Ulivo coalition parties, are less successful. Should one think that voters tend to perceive them as rather weak and too subordinate to party pressures and to doubt their ability to lead the coalition and deliver their electoral promises?⁴ In a country where parties have been dominant for more than 50 years, and the so-called *partyocracy* produced one of the highest degree of instability experienced in a parliamentary democracy (47 cabinets from 1948 to 1992 –see Appendix 1a), it is not surprising that citizens look positively at the leader and his capability of launching a political programme as the most concrete opportunity for a change.

In the light of all this, it should be clear that the decisions made in the pre-electoral phase affect deeply the process of government formation and appears to be the most important difference between the First and the Second republic. By contrast, what is left to the post-electoral phase, namely the portfolio allocation and the spoils distribution, follows more traditional patterns. In principle, once formed the coalition, the list of ministers too could be decided in advance. In fact, this is highly unlikely and has never occurred. Rather, the process of bargaining over the portfolio allocation of the Second republic does not appear to have been remarkably easier than in the past. Indeed, even if sometimes pre-electoral anticipations had been partially fulfilled, like in the case of Prodi's cabinet formation, portfolio distributions have often shown unexpected outcomes. For instance, when, few days before the 2001 election, Berlusconi was asked about his prospective team, he mentioned people who later did not enter the government or obtained different portfolios

⁴ In 2001, for instance, comparing Berlusconi and Rutelli, voters believed the former was more competent and perceived him as more statesman (Itanes 2001, ch VIII) and a stronger leader (Barisione 2001, p.175).

(Campus 2002a). This inconsistency clearly indicates that the list of ministers that Berlusconi had in mind had to be vastly revised in order to form the government.

In a similar way as in the First republic, the portfolio allocation goes on reflecting the power relationships between the coalition parties as they emerge from the electoral results. Once elected, representatives give birth to separate parliamentary groups. The size of those groups not only depends on the votes gained by the coalition in the plurality vote, but also on the electoral result each party has obtained in the PR vote⁵. Through the PR vote, parties are able to weight their individual contribution to the electoral performance of the coalition, and therefore the most successful parties should reasonably be in the position to claim, or not, the lion's share. In general, the fact of being allied in the pre-electoral phase does not seem to prevent parties from pursuing their own interests and fighting each other in the process of the government formation. Indeed, it is likely that internal contrasts previously softened not to affect the image of harmony and cohesion of the electoral coalition start surfacing just at this stage.

Following what is known on coalition politics, it should be expected that those parties that have contributed more to the electoral victory will obtain larger payoffs. Sometimes, however, a party comes out as essential/indispensable to build an electoral and/or parliamentary majority and this of course will raise its demands over the portfolio allocation. Small parties, moreover, even if are not pivotal, seem to be advantaged in the spoils distribution. Comparative research has shown that larger parties often concede payoffs above the proportional share to smaller ones (Budge e Keman 1990, pp. 182 and ff.). This inclination appears clearly emphasized in the Italian Second republic. In a context with pre-existing electoral coalitions, the withdrawal of a party represents a damage to the image of the new cabinet and should be avoided. Therefore, also small parties are in a position of exerting a veto on a portfolio allocation they do not like. This may explain, for instance, why, in 2001, Berlusconi was willing to make several concessions to his minor allies, in particular to the Lega Nord (LN), in order to keep the electoral coalition together and give birth to an oversized government (Campus 2002a). Adjustments of the last minute to meet also smaller parties' requirements were also made possible by the major flexibility of the Second republic cabinets in assigning portfolios. In the First republic, one may identify some regularities according to which certain portfolios always went to certain parties (Verzichelli and Cotta 2000, pp.463-70): for instance, the DC had a strong hold on Internal Affairs, Agriculture, Education while the Socialist party had an interest in socio-economic and labor portfolios following a general

⁵ As for the technicalities of the electoral law, see Katz (1995).

European pattern (Laver and Schofield 1990). By contrast, in the Second republic, portfolios seem to be assigned without a fixed scheme⁶.

The most interesting feature of the process of government formation in the Second republic is the changing role of the Prime minister. In the First republic, the parties were the true players while the Prime minister was confined only to the role of mediator among partisan preferences and interests. The entire process of government formation was in fact controlled by the leaders of the coalition parties. In the case of the majority party, the DC, the bargaining process included also the leaders of the party factions, whose claims had to be satisfied in order to give the new cabinet a chance of surviving. By contrast, in the Second republic, the candidate for the office of the Prime minister has become a major player whose open ambition is that of leading the process of government formation. The struggle for independence from parties' pressures emerged clearly in the case of Prodi who played an active role in the cabinet formation. For instance, Prodi succeeded in including several of his non-partisan collaborators into the cabinet at the expenses of the spoils assigned to the coalition parties. Neither belonging nor representing any of the coalition party, Prodi could easily assume the character of the promoter/defender of the coalition against the threats posed by individual parties. This attitude created, however, a sort of competition between the Prime minister and the party leaders, in particular with the leader of the majority party, the DS, D'Alema and the leader of the Popular party, Marini (Pasquino, 2002b, pp. 161-167; Fabbrini 2000, p.129). This antagonism jeopardized Prodi's chances to cope with RC's attacks and finally contributed to the fall of his government. Also the formation of the second Berlusconi cabinet can be regarded as an indicator of the changing nature of the government leadership. As the leader of the majority party, Forza Italia, Berlusconi was reasonably a negotiator for his own party; however, he showed also to be able to place the government interests before Forza Italia's office-seeking expectations. In fact, he subtracted from his own party's proportional quota five portfolios, preferring to entrust the realization of important parts of his program to non-partisan experts whom he had, however, personally chosen. In general, the Second republic cabinets have a larger number of non-partisan ministers than the past governments (Verzichelli 2003, pp.68-9). In the first Republic, the prominence of the model of *party government*, which implies governments composed of party members who act to promote and implement policies decided by parties (Katz 1987), prevented parties from easily relinquishing cabinet positions to non-partisan experts. By contrast, now it seems commonly accepted that the Prime minister is entitled to have a 'quota' composed of trusted experts, another indicator of the larger discretionality now enjoyed by Prime ministers in the ministers' selection.

⁶ For a more detailed analysis of the bargaining process over the portfolio allocation in the Berlusconi II, see Campus (2002a).

TAB 3. 2 ROLE OF MAJOR ACTOR IN CHOOSING MINISTERS

	<i>1st Republic</i>	<i>2nd Republic</i>
<i>Prime minister's role in Ministers' selection</i>	limited role	some discretionality
<i>Presidents' role in ministers' selection</i>	no role	some influence
<i>Parties' role in Ministers' selection</i>	almost total control	great influence

To sum up, the advent of bipolar competition in the Second republic has encouraged the passage from a model of prime minister as the *mediator* among the coalition parties to a model of a leader as a *player* in the same position of coalition parties. The existence of pre-electoral coalitions and the early designation of their leader as the would-be prime minister have enhanced the leader's visibility and his/her commitment to the future of the coalition. Therefore, if electoral and governmental politics in Italy remain distinct, as it has been argued (Giannetti e Laver 2001, p. 532), inevitably the former has exerted a deep impact upon the latter by changing previous patterns of interaction among major actors. As a matter of fact, the role of all involved players has been altered. As above illustrated, Prime ministers have learned to antagonize parties' leaders to support common coalitional interests against particular party interests. Conversely, although remaining major actors in the bargaining process, parties have lost their total control on portfolio allocation and personnel selection.

The parties' power of determining the spoils distribution and the ministers' selection has been challenging also by another influential player. The role of the President of the Republic, once merely asked to give a formal approval to the ministers' list, has changed as well and become less ceremonial and more substantial. Starting with Oscar Luigi Scalfaro's vetoes on the ministers lists of the first Berlusconi cabinet until the softer, but influential suggestions of Carlo Azeglio Ciampi during the second Berlusconi cabinet formation, the President of the Republic has both acquired a greater role and been obliged to make use of it. While previously, in the processes of government formation, the President of the Republic was fundamentally a notary, countersigning, with few exceptions (one of them being Sandro Pertini, 1978-1985), the proposals made by the parties, now he is asked to become more than the custodian of the Constitution and the representative of

“national unity”. Accordingly, the President of the Republic seems to have played a crucial role also in the case of at least two cabinets' dissolution. Both in the case of Berlusconi I and Prodi, president Scalfaro's decision to interpret the constitution in the sense of not dissolving the parliament after the cabinet resignation, as long as parliament is capable of producing another governmental majority, had important consequences. In the first case, Scalfaro was criticized for not having opposed a *ribaltone* (a majority turn-over) by favouring the formation of Dini's cabinet, formally composed of non partisan-experts, but actually supported by the Lega Nord, which had left the centre-right coalition, and the centre-left parties who had lost the 1994 election. In the second case, having Scalfaro announced prior to the confidence vote in Parliament his intention of not dissolving parliament in any case, he was accused of having encouraged some members of the centre-left majority to defect from Prodi's government by giving them the assurance that a new centre-left cabinet could be formed (Pasquino 1999)⁷.

4. ITALIAN GOVERNMENT COALITIONS FIRST VS SECOND REPUBLIC

In her analysis of the Italian First Republic governments, Carol Mershon (2002) convincingly makes sense of the high instability of Italian cabinets by stressing the quite exceptional low costs of building and breaking coalitions. As a matter of fact, Italian governing parties, especially the largest and centrist party, the DC, were able to cut the costs of coalition by relying on their positions in the policy space and exploiting the opportunities offered by the institutional arrangement. First of all, they took advantage of the fact that their main opponents on both extremes of the left-right continuum (the Communist party and the neo-Fascist party) were perceived as anti-system parties and therefore excluded *a priori* from any government. Secondly, the DC promoted the expansion of ministerial offices and the formation of oversized coalitions in order to dilute the government responsibility before the electorate without losing its predominant position in the portfolio allocation. The reverse side of the coin, however, was that, being sure to enter the next cabinet, no matters if winners or losers at the elections⁸, all coalition members did not hesitate from bringing down governments as soon as divergences and tensions surfaced.

Table 4.1 shows the different phases of government coalition in the First republic. Each phase is characterized by a different party alliance. The first phase, the *centrism* (1947-63), consisted of the alliance between the DC and other three minor parties, the Republic party (PRI),

⁷ For some general references on the changing role of the President of the Republic, see Luciani and Volpi (1997) and Fusaro (2003).

⁸ The electoral results never altered in significant way the subsequent bargaining power of parties. According to Strom (1990, p.156), in Italy the responsiveness score, which weights the percentage of winners and losers participating into cabinets, was rather low. This means that electoral recent losers were overrepresented among governing parties.

the Liberal party (PLI), the Social Democratic party (PSDI). Such a phase saw a long sequence of oversized and minimum winning coalitions with a number of Christian democratic minority cabinets⁹. The second phase, the *centre-left* (1963-1976), was marked by the alliance between the DC and the Socialist party (PSI). Also the PRI and the PSDI participated in the coalition. Most cabinets were oversized coalition including all the four parties. The third phase, the *national solidarity* (1976-79), coincided with the most serious crisis of the First republic, threatened by terrorist attacks. To show that all the political parties stood united against the emergency, the DC formed two minority governments with the external support of all the other parties (the Communist included). The fourth phase, the *pentapartito five-party* (1979-92), was dominated by oversized coalitions including the DC, the PSI, the PSDI, the PRI, the PLI. The only exceptions were two minimum winning coalitions (without the PRI) in the early '90s when the political system had already entered the transition phase to the Second republic. The analysis of such subsequent phases shows clearly how the government parties, in particular the DC, managed to enlarge progressively the coalition, but at the same time had to increase the number of portfolios (see table 4.1). In such a way, the DC was able to compensate its electoral losses (from its highest level ever 48.5 in 1948 to 29.7% in 1992) by maintaining a predominant position (although the alternation of Christian democratic and Republic or Socialist prime ministers during the five-party phase may be taken as a signal of a partial renegotiation among coalition members).

TABLE 4.1 PHASES OF GOVERNMENT COMPOSITION-FIRST REPUBLIC

<i>Phases</i>	<i>Years</i>	<i>Parties allied*</i>	<i>Num. cabinets</i>	<i>Average num.ministers**</i>
<i>centrism</i>	1947-1963	DC+PSDI+PLI+PRI	14	18.8
<i>centre-left</i>	1963-1976	DC+PSDI+PRI+PSI	16	23
<i>national solidarity</i>	1976-1979	DC with external support of the other parties, but the neo-fascist	2	21
<i>five-party</i>	1979-1992	DC+PSI+PSDI+PRI+PLI	16	27.5

* Between a phase and the other there were some cabinets of preparation whose composition could be different from what indicated.

** Calandra (2000, pp.556-613).

⁹ For details of the classification of governments, see appendix 1a.

See the legenda in Appendix 1a.

As we have seen, remarkable and major changes have characterized the political scenario of the Second republic. The electoral reform and the collapse of the old party system gave way to a form of bipolar competition and made possible to experience the alternation in government for the first time in the history of the Italian republic. As a consequence, the conditioning factor that had much influenced the First republic governments' instability, that is, the government members' assurance of taking part into the next cabinet, has so vanished. Each party has become aware that elections may be an instrument used to punish or reward the governments for their performances. In particular, due to the growing personalization of politics, the prime ministers are the most exposed to such a retrospective judgement. Being crucial in attracting electoral consensus, leaders are also the most identified with the coalition platform and, therefore, held responsible for its realisation. In sum, in a country where the principle of accountability had been not familiar for a long time, it is now possible to argue that there is an ongoing revolution in public attitudes toward those who governed and their governments.

TAB 4.2 GOVERNMENT FEATURES- FIRST VS SECOND REPUBLIC

	1st Republic	2nd Republic
TYPE OF GOVERNMENT ^a		
Minority Coalitions	19	2
Minimum Winning	6	1
Oversized	22	3
NUMBER COALITION PARTIES ^b (on average)	2.8	5.5
DURATION IN DAYS (average) ^c	322	446*
NUMBER OF MINISTERS (average) ^d	24.2	24

*Included Berlusconi II at the August, 15 July

a, e As for the First republic, data from Mershon (2002, p. 212-3); as for the Second republic, authors' calculations and elaborations from information provided by Camera dei deputati and the Italian government website (www.camera.it; www.governo.it).

b, c Authors' calculation from information provided by the Italian government website www.governo.it and Calandra (2000).

See all the aggregate data and legenda in Appendix 1a e 1b.

Concerning other aspects, however, the state of things seems not to be so much altered.

Governments seem now to be more durable than in the past, but, on average, so far they have continued lasting less than a year and half (table 4.2)¹⁰. As a matter of fact, between 1994 and 2001, Italy had seven governments, six prime ministers and at least two alternations (see table 4.3).

Should one think that such an instability is the inescapable consequence of the transition from the First to the Second republic? Should one expect more government stability in the future? To answer this question, let us try to analyze in more details the governments of the Second republic and, in particular, the reasons for their dissolution.

4.3 SECOND REPUBLIC GOVERNMENTS

<i>Government</i>	<i>Life</i>	<i>Duration (in days)</i>	<i>Composition*</i>	<i>Type</i>	<i>Causes for Resignation</i>
Berlusconi I	10.5.94-22.12.94	226	FI-LN-AN-CCD	Over.	LN defection
Dini*	17.01.95-11.01.96	359	Non partisan	---	Election
Prodi	17.05.96-9.10.98	877	DS-PPI-RI-Greens	MIN	RC withdrawal
D'Alema I	21.10.98-18.12.99	423	DS-PPI-PdCI-RI-Greens- UDR	Over.	Democrats' for inclusion into the cabinet
D'Alema II	22.12.99- 19.04.00	119	DS-PPI-PdCI-RI-Greens- UDEUR-Democrats	MIN	Electoral defeat at the 2000 administrative election
Amato II	20.04.00- 9.03.01	325	DS-PPI-PdCI-RI-Greens- UDEUR-Democrats-SDI	MW	Election
Berlusconi II	11.06.01-	796 days at August, 15, 2003	FI-AN-LN-UDC	Over.	-----

* Dini's cabinet was formed as a transitional non-partisan cabinet between the fall of Berlusconi I and the 1996 election. For further details, see Pasquino (1996).

Source of data, legenda and further details in Appendix 1b

First of all, if the configuration of the parties in the Second republic political space has deeply changed, the number of parties has not been reduced at all. Indeed, the number of legislative

¹⁰ In principle, they should last a whole term, that is five years.

parties has increased (Giannetti e Laver, p.534). While the political system has become bipolar, the two main coalitions (especially the centre-left) are nonetheless composed by a large number of parties. As showed in table 4.2, the average number of coalition parties is almost doubled with respect to the First republic. The necessity of sharing the government spoils among so many partners has prevented a clear reduction in the number of ministers that has remained quite high¹¹.

Secondly, the electoral imperative to form coalitions does not necessarily imply a high degree of cohesion among coalitional partners. As already observed, coalitions are functional to winning elections; however, the achievement of a common platform takes time and several adjustments and compromises. Divergences among coalition members are more likely to come to the surface in the post-electoral time. Berlusconi first government was the casualty of LN defection. The end of Prodi's cabinet, which in any case was the third longest government in the history of the Italian republic, was easily predictable by comparing the electoral manifestos of the coalition parties and that of RC, expressing totally different visions of how Italy had to be governed (Campus 2001). Tensions and further defections of smaller coalition components were at the basis of the breaking of D'Alema I, as shows the passage from an oversized coalition to the D'Alema II minority government. Moreover, the formation of the parliamentary group of the "Democrats for Prodi" exerted a strong pressure to renew the governmental coalition in order to accommodate such a new party in the government as well. The electoral defeat at the 2000 administrative elections challenged D'Alema leadership and was the ultimate reason of his resignation. His successor, Giuliano Amato, formed an oversized cabinet by regaining and adding up to the same party coalition those small components that had previously left D'Alema's cabinet .

The making and breaking of the centre-left coalitions shows how, notwithstanding the transformations of the political system, the institutional setting, which has remained mostly unaltered, continues to incentivate governments' instability. No constitutional rule prevents individuals and groups from defecting between elections from the coalition under whose label they were elected. As Giannetti and Laver have observed (2001, p.552), "permissive rules on the formation of legislative groups ... make it possible for those groups to form and reform in response to the defection incentives that are always present in the system". Those changes in the composition of parliamentary groups not only may bring down governments by breaking their majorities, but also allow the formation of new governments by creating new alliances and new majorities in parliament, as occurred in the case of D'Alema I and II and Amato. In the short term, the cost of

¹¹ A reform has recently reorganized the Italian government by reducing the number of portfolios and introducing the vice-ministers, a sort of junior ministers that stand between ministers and undersecretaries (Pajno and Torchia 2000). This has sorted out a moderate cut of the number of ministers with respect to the last governments of the First republic. The number of portfolios, however, remains comparatively quite high.

breaking and re-building governments seems to be quite low. However, it is an open question if, in the long run, the centre-left has not paid a price. The obvious difficulty of making voters to identify the Ulivo coalition with a single cabinet, and in particular with a single prime minister, suggested the centre-left not to entrust the leadership of the electoral coalition to Giuliano Amato, who had more the characteristics of a *super partes* technocrat than those of a political leader. By selecting another leader, Francesco Rutelli, they also abstained from exploiting the incumbency advantage. Such a strategy has been identified as a possible explanatory cause for the Ulivo's defeat (Pasquino 2002c). Moreover, it is not to be excluded that voters were unfavourably impressed by the instability of the Ulivo governments, which resembled closely the succession of cabinets of the First republic.

Until now, the current government led by Berlusconi seems to be more stable than its predecessors. Its main advantage consists of a strong leadership, with a prime minister who not only attracts a large popular consensus among the centre-rightist voters, but is also the leader of the majority party. Such combination of factors reduces the possibility that Berlusconi's leadership be challenged by his party's allies as occurred to Prodi and D'Alema. Moreover, the government coalition is largely oversized and could overcome the defection of one of its components. For all these reasons, notwithstanding tensions and divergences among coalition members on several matters have repeatedly surfaced, the cabinet appears in the position of surviving. This experience indicates that the institutional incentives to instability can be counteracted by certain circumstances, like strong leadership and large majority. However, since those conditions could not be easily replicated at each election, it is an open question if Berlusconi cabinet has to be regarded optimistically as the first of a list of stable cabinets or rather as a fortunate exception.

5. CONCLUDING REMARKS

Two types of conclusions can be drawn from our analysis. The first one has to deal with the comparison between Italy and France (which, at this point of our research, we will not push too far). As shown in Table 5.1 the comparison between the Fourth and the Fifth Republic confronts us with some curious elements, some of them much similar to the Italian case of the Second Republic (see table 4.1), others rather peculiar.

TAB 5.1 MAIN FEATURES OF GOVERNMENT FORMATION IN FRANCE: IV VS V REPUBLIC

	<i>Fourth Republic</i>	<i>Fifth Republic</i>
--	------------------------	-----------------------

<i>Coalition formation time</i>	post-electoral	pre-electoral
<i>Government platform agreement</i>	post-electoral	pre-electoral
<i>Prime Minister designation</i>	post-electoral	post and pre-electoral*
<i>Portfolios allocation</i>	post-electoral	largely post-electoral
<i>Prime minister's role and powers</i>	limited	limited or significant#

Legenda: * the Prime minister is fundamentally pre-designated if the winning coalition does not correspond to the political coalition that has elected the President; if the President can rely on a parliamentary majority he appoints and dismisses his Prime minister(s).

the role and the powers of the Prime minister are important and significant in the case of cohabitation, that is when he enjoys the support of the parliamentary majority; they are limited when the President is, in fact, the leader of the parliamentary majority.

On the basis of these complex and not univocal transformations we would also expect a very clear-cut picture as to the main features of the governments, especially with reference to the Fifth Republic as shown in Table 5.2.

TAB 5.2 MAIN FEATURES OF THE FRENCH GOVERNMENTS- FOURTH VS FIFTH REPUBLIC

	<i>Fourth Republic</i>	<i>Fifth Republic</i>
TYPE OF GOVERNMENT		
Minority Coalitions	6	2
Minimum Winning	17	13
Oversized	3	-
NUMBER COALITION PARTIES (average)	4,5	4*
DURATION IN DAYS (average)	150	800#

Source: Data from Williams (1958, Appendix 2, pp.439-440) and elaboration from Pasquino (2003, p.96).

Legenda: * this figure is misleading. When the centre-right creates a government the number of coalition parties may be as small as two. In case the centre-left wins the government, there are four to five parties making up the parliamentary majority.

#again, this average does not convey the reality of very long lasting governments, such as the one led by Socialist Lionel Jospin (June 1997-April 2002), and shorter governments, such as the two Socialist governments from June 1991 to March 1993, led respectively by Edith Cresson and Pierre Bérégovoy, that lasted approximately one year. Once more, the existence of cohabitation is the powerful independent explanatory variable.

What has really changed in the Fifth Republic is due to the constraining role of the run off electoral system that makes the creation of pre-electoral coalitions all but imperative. The direct popular election of the President of the Republic with some governing powers adds to the possibility for creating and maintaining, if not the stability of individual governments, certainly the stability and efficacy of the governing coalitions. When there is cohabitation, obviously there are several veto players in France: the President, the Prime minister with his/her parliamentary majority, some parties, though those supporting the Prime minister will refrain from exercising their veto power. If the President has a parliamentary majority, only rare differences of opinions within his majority may act as veto players. However, the President may still get rid of them through an early dissolution of Parliament. All this said, there is no doubt that the French institutional transition from the Fourth to the Fifth Republic was immediately brought to an agreed-upon end by Gen. De Gaulle. One may want to say that the political transition was successfully completed when François Mitterrand won the presidential elections of 1981 and his Socialist-Communist coalition achieved a parliamentary majority one month after.

Our second conclusion deals more specifically with the Italian case. By all means, ten years after the beginning of its transition, Italy remains midstream, politically and institutionally. There is no other country in Europe, East and West, or South, where the regime has been continuously challenged for ten years, where the system of government appears so shaky and where none of the alternatives -- presidential Republic, semipresidentialism, government by the Prime minister-- enjoys enough support. When it comes to the processes of government formation, some positive changes have taken place and we have highlighted them. However, not even those changes can be considered firm and assured because several sectors of the political class would like to return to a proportional electoral system. In the light of the role played by the President of the Republic, others would like to introduce the direct popular election of the Italian President, either in a semipresidential or in a fully presidential pattern. As a consequence, the institutional challenge is not yet over. Consolidation does not seem in sight. The oft-quoted sentence attributed to the Gattopardo: “everything must change so that everything remains the same” must be reformulated: “not enough has changed” so that, especially when it comes to the behaviour of the political class, “too much has remained the same”, and nothing is really consolidated.

Appendix 1b FIRST REPUBLIC'S GOVERNMENTS (1948-1992)

<i>Government</i>	<i>Life^a</i>	<i>Duration^b</i> <i>(in days)</i>	<i>Composition^c</i>	<i>N.parties^d</i>	<i>Type^e</i>	<i>Ministers^f</i>
De Gasperi V	23.05.48- 12.01.50	599	DC-PLI- PSLI-PRI	4	OVER	21
De Gasperi VI	27.01.50- 16.07.51	535	DC-PSLI- PRI	3	OVER	20
De Gasperi VII	26.07.51- 29.06.53	704	DC-PRI	2	OVER	19
De Gasperi VIII	16.07.53- 28.07.53	12	DC	1	MIN	18
Pella	17.08.53- 5.01.54	141	DC	1	MIN	18
Fanfani I	18.01.54- 30.01.54	12	DC	1	MIN	18
Scelba	10.02.54- 22.06.55	497	DC-PSLI -PLI	3	MW	20
Segni I	6.07.55- 6.05.57	670	DC-PSLI-PLI	3	MW	21
Zoli	18.05.57- 19.06.58	396	DC	1	MIN	20
Fanfani II	1.07.58- 14.02.59	209	DC-PSDI	2	MIN	22
Segni II	15.02.59- 24.02.60	374	DC	1	MIN	22
Tambroni	25.03.60- 19.07.60	116	DC	1	MIN	22
Fanfani III	26.07.60- 2.02.62	556	DC	1	MIN	23
Fanfani IV	21.02.62- 16.05.63	449	DC-PSDI- PRI	3	MW	24
Leone I	21.06.63- 5.11.63	137	DC	1	MIN	22
Moro I	4.12.63- 26.06.64	205	DC-PSI- PSDI-PRI	4	OVER	25
Moro II	21.07.64- 21.01.66	548	DC-PSI- PSDI-PRI	4	OVER	25
Moro III	23.02.66- 5.06.68	833	DC-PSI-SDI	3	OVER	25
Leone II	24.06.68- 19.11.68	148	DC	1	MIN	22
Rumor I	12.12.68- 5.07.69	205	DC-PSU-PRI	3	OVER	25
Rumor II	5.08.69- 7.02.70	186	DC	1	MIN	25
Rumor III	27.03.70- 6.07.70	101	DC-PSI- PSDI-PRI	4	OVER	25

Colombo	6.08.70- 15.01.72	527	DC-PSI- PSDI-PRI	4	OVER	26
Andreotti I	17.02.72- 26.02.72	9	DC	1	MIN	24
Andreotti II	26.06.72- 12.06.73	351	DC-PSDI- PLI	3	MW	27
Rumor IV	7.07.73- 2.03.74	238	DC-PSI- PSDI-PRI	4	OVER	27
Rumor V	14.03.74- 3.10.74	203	DC-PSI- PSDI	3	OVER	25
Moro IV	23.11.74- 7.01.76	410	DC-PRI	2	MIN	25
Moro V	12.02.76- 30.04.76	77	DC	1	MIN	21
Andreotti III	29.07.76- 16.01.78	536	DC	1	MIN	21
Andreotti IV	11.03.78- 31.01.79	326	DC	1	MIN	21
Andreotti V	20.03.79- 31.03.79	11	DC-PRI- PSDI	3	MIN	22
Cossiga I	4.08.79- 19.03.80	228	DC-PSDI- PLI	3	MIN	24
Cossiga II	4.04.80- 28.09.80	177	DC-PSI-PRI	3	OVER	27
Forlani	18.10.80- 26.05.81	220	DC-PSI- PSDI-PRI	4	OVER	26
Spadolini I	28.06.81- 7.08.82	405	DC-PSI- PSDI-PRI- PLI	5	OVER	26
Spadolini II	23.08.82- 13.11.82	82	DC-PSI- PSDI-PRI- PLI	5	OVER	27
Fanfani V	1.12.82- 4.05.83	149	DC-PSI- PSDI-PLI	4	OVER	27
Craxi I	4.08.83- 27.06.86	1058	DC-PSI- PSDI-PRI- PLI	5	OVER	29
Craxi II	1.08.86- 3.03.87	215	DC-PSI- PSDI-PRI- PLI	5	OVER	29
Fanfani VI	17.04.87- 28.04.87	11	DC- Ind	1	MIN	25
Goria	28.07.87- 11.03.88	227	DC-PSI- PSDI-PRI- PLI	5	OVER	30
De Mita	13.04.88- 19.05.89	401	DC-PSI- PSDI-PRI- PLI	5	OVER	32
Andreotti VI	23.07.89- 29.03.91	614	DC-PSI- PSDI-PRI-	5	OVER	31

			PLI			
Andreotti VII	13.04.91-24.04.92	377	DC-PSI-PSDI-PLI	4	OVER	33
Amato I	28.06.92-22.04.93	299	DC-PSI-PSDI-PLI	4	MW	27
Ciampi	29.04.93-16.04.94	352	DC-PSI-PSDI-PLI	4	MW	26

a, b, c, d, e, f Information provided by the official website of the Italian government (www-governo.it) and by Calandra (2000, pp. 554-613).

Legenda: *Dc*: Democrazia Cristiana; *Msi*: Movimento Sociale Italiano; *Pci*: Partito Comunista Italiano; *Pli*: Partito Liberale Italiano; *Pri*: Partito Repubblicano Italiano; *Psi*: Partito Socialista Italiano; *Psli e Psdi*: Partito Socialdemocratico Italiano

Appendix 1b SECOND REPUBLIC'S GOVERNMENTS

<i>Government</i>	<i>Life</i>	<i>Duration (in days)</i>	<i>Composition*</i>	<i>N.parties</i>	<i>Type</i>	<i>Ministers[§]</i>	<i>UnderSec.</i>
Berlusconi I	10.5.94- 22.12.94	226	FI-LN-AN- CCD	4	Over.	27	38
Dini	17.01.95- 11.01.96	359	Non partisan	---	---	21	38
Prodi	17.05.96- 9.10.98	877	DS-PPI-RI- Greens	4	MIN	22	49
D'Alema I	21.10.98- 18.12.99	423	DS-PPI-PdCI- RI-Greens- UDR	6	Over.	26	56
D'Alema II	22.12.99- 19.04.00	119	DS-PPI-PdCI- RI-Greens- UDEUR- Democrats	7	MIN	25	66
Amato II	20.04.00 9.03.01	325	DS-PPI-PdCI- RI-Greens- UDEUR- Democrats-SdI	8	MW	23	55
Berlusconi II	11.06.01-	----	FI-AN-LN- UDC	4	Over.	24	59

Source: Author's calculations from information provided by the Italian government website, www.governo.it; For the classification of the types of government, we relied on information provided by the Italian Camera dei deputati website www.camera.it and by Giannetti e Laver (2001).

* As for the four centre-left government (Prodi, D'Alema I and II, and Amato), consider that the Ulivo included several small parties (for instance local parties etc.) whose representatives belonged to the mixed group in Parliament and supported the government. In 2001, also the Casa delle Libertà included two very small parties (PRI and New PSI) that obtained an undersecretary each. In order not to overemphasize the size of cabinet composition by including negligible components, we counted as coalitional partners only those parties who were represented in the cabinet at least by a minister.

§ Number of ministers + vice Prime Minister(s)

Legenda: *An*: Alleanza Nazionale; *Ccd*: Centro Cristiano Democratico; *Cdu*: Cristiano Democratici Uniti; *Ds*: Democratici di Sinistra; *Fi*: Forza Italia; *LN*: Lega Nord; *Pdci*: Partito dei Comunisti Italiani; *Ppi*: Partito Popolare Italiano; *Pds*: Partito Democratico di Sinistra; *Rc*: Rifondazione Comunista; *Ri*: Rinnovamento Italiano; *Sdi*: Socialisti Democratici Italiani; *Udeur*: Unione Democratici Europei; *Udc*: Unione democratici di centro (CCD+CDU); *Udr*: Unione democratica della Repubblica.

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