

**Table 1 Types of deals in policy fields (absolute figures)**

Policy Field	Type of arrangement				where?
	explicit	procedural	implicit	all	
language	2	-	-	2	Leburton
regionalization	18	3	1	22	Tindemans, Leburton
morality	1	-	3	4	Leburton, Lubbers
socio-economic	15	-	14	29	all
education	4	2	5	11	Leburton, Lubbers, Van Agt, Kok
budget	10	-	7	17	Lubbers, Van Agt, Kok, Tindemans
nuclear power	-	4	1	5	Van Agt, Lubbers
media	1	-	2	3	Lubbers
infrastructure	-	1	1	2	Kok
institutional reform	-	-	2	2	Kok
environment	-	1	-	1	Kok
	51	11	36	98	

**Table 2** Types of deals in coalition agreements (percentages)

<b>Coalition</b>	<b>Type of arrangement</b>			
	explicit	procedural	implicit	
Leburton	58	17	25	(n=24)
Tindemans V	80	0	20	(n=15)
Van Agt II	33	20	47	(n=15)
Lubbers I	36	9	55	(n=22)
Kok I	55	9	36	(n=22)
average	52	11	37	(n=98)

**Table 3 Effects of explicit compromises (percentages)**

	<b>Effect</b>			
	conflict prevented	implemented	implemented without conflict	
<b>Coalition</b>				
Leburton	43	50	29	(n=14)
Tindemans V	50	8	8	(n=12)
Van Agt II	60	20	20	(n=5)
Lubbers I	38	63	25	(n=8)
Kok I	67	83	58	(n=12)
average	51	47	29	(n=51)

**Table 4 Effects of procedural deals (percentages)**

	<b>Effect</b>			
	conflict prevented	implemented	implemented without conflict	
<b>Coalition</b>				
Leburton	50	75	50	(n=4)
Tindemans V	-	-	-	(n=0)
Van Agt II	100	67	67	(n=3)
Lubbers I	50	100	50	(n=2)
Kok I	0	100	0	(n=2)
average	55	82	45	(n=11)

**Table 5 Effects of implicit compromises (percentages)**

	<b>Effect</b>			
	conflict prevented	implemented	implemented without conflict	
<b>Coalition</b>				
Leburton	0	33	0	(n=6)
Tindemans V	0	100	0	(n=3)
Van Agt II	29	0	0	(n=7)
Lubbers I	8	58	8	(n=12)
Kok I	38	88	38	(n=8)
average	17	53	11	(n=36)