Global lobbies for a global economy: The creation of the Spanish Institute of Family Firms in international perspective

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Globalisation has encouraged the creation of global lobbies which promote the interests of their associated members in international institutions. However, despite their increased importance in the global economy, scholarly literature has so far offered scarce data or analysis about these lobbies. This article examines the creation of global lobbies for large family firms over the last two decades, and the strong connection established in this period between collective action, education and internationalisation in the strategies of such firms. The establishment of the Spanish Institute of Family Firms is considered to be an early European adaptation of pioneering North American lobbies and a model for other European and Latin American associations of large family firms.

Keywords: family enterprise; lobby; Spanish Institute of Family Firms; globalisation

Introduction

Management literature on family capitalism tends to ignore the relevance of associations and collective action by powerful lobbies to the survival and growth strategies of family businesses. The first objective of this article is to help reduce this ignorance by shedding new light and providing empirical data about the creation of global lobbies of large family firms and the role they have played in fostering collective action and the globalisation of large family capitalism in the last two decades. Secondly, the article aims to demonstrate the institutional dynamism of family capitalism, and the close relationship that family lobbies have established between organised collective action and education.

The ‘information era’, the period that covers the last three decades of the spread of information technologies (IT), is characterised by the formation of global groups which arise in response to global needs (Castells, 1996, 2000) The internationalisation of knowledge and the increase in the exchange of goods and services develop while traditional institutions such as the state or central banks show rigidities and inadequacies in their historical function of establishing economic and legal rules of the game which affect business life. In addition, international institutions often seem unable to track, govern or tax the real flows of resources travelling across continents.
The consequences of these difficulties are clear in Europe, particularly for the sustainability of social welfare systems or for the survival of small and medium-sized firms without external support. Manuel Castells and Louis Galambos indicated some years ago that in the information age new groups appear either to survive in the new order, or to have a voice in the design of the new rules of the game (Castells, 2000; Galambos, 2005). New groups do not always mean new people, however. New business groups are often new combinations of pre-existing associations which share elements of cultural and economic affinity.

In the present era of globalisation there are no registries of global lobbies, despite recent attempts in 2008 of the European Commission to register on a voluntary basis the estimated more than 15,000 interest groups and 2500 organisations which seek to influence European policy-making in Brussels.1 There are, however, highly visible interest groups working actively to promote the interests of large family firms in America, Asia, Australia and Europe. These groups have their own associations, websites, publications, annual conferences and institutional chairs in private and public universities around the world. They are characterised by a few notable features: 1) convergence in terms of their general aims; 2) that these aims are to foster networking and knowledge exchange among members of distinctive medium-sized and large family firms; 3) the close links which they have among themselves and with political institutions at the national and international levels; 4) the fact that US interest groups in the study of family firms have been and still are the pioneers and leaders at the organisational and theoretical level, whereas such groups in Europe are much more concerned with creating a positive social image and political and legal acknowledgement for family firms. In Europe, it is precisely this willingness to influence social and political life which makes the study of the formation of family firm lobbies a particularly interesting topic for analysis.

This article is a modest first historical approach to a comparative understanding of what is still an on-going process. We address in this study some little known aspects of the historical formation of family firm lobbies in the world, with particular attention paid to the case of Spain. For good reason, the Spanish case is relevant because it has efficiently acted as a social and cultural bridge between the US model of the family firm study centre that appeared in the 1980s (dominated by consultants and educational purposes) and European models of family firm lobbying that appeared in the 1990s and the first decade of the twenty-first century (dominated by medium-sized and large family firms and socio-political goals).

In the following sections we first indicate the relevant theoretical background regarding the study of interest groups and lobbies. We then summarise our findings about the chronology and historical background behind the creation of national lobbies of family firms in the US and Europe, and the formation of a global network which is linking these lobbies to help them face international concerns. Finally, we focus on the formation of the Spanish lobby of family firms (the Instituto de la Empresa Familiar, or IEF), which has been for many recent European national family firm associations both a model to imitate and a focus of knowledge transfer which has successfully adapted US ideas to modern European concerns.

**Useful theories about interest groups and lobbies**

Early institutionalists (Commons, 1934) and new institutionalists (North, 1986, 1990) have convincingly emphasised that institutions define a framework of limited
possible alternatives of action comprising the norms on policy-making, property rights and behavioural rules at particular moments in the history of a given society. In this context, interest groups appear as a type of organisation that seeks influence in the formulation and execution of public politics affecting decision-making at the legislative, executive or judicial levels. Since the 1960s, a powerful theoretical literature has developed to study the logic behind collective action, and a dominant line of thought indicates the importance of the size of the group seeking influence on the one hand, and their incentives on the other, as two key factors for understanding the success and failure of organised groups which exert collective action (Olson, 1965, 1982). In political science and economics, the theory of collective action is concerned with the provision of public goods through the collaboration of two or more individuals, and with the impact of externalities on group behaviour. Mancur Olson’s studies on the logic of collective action and the theory of groups have provided a solid exploration of the relationship between market failures, consumer rationality and company profit-seeking strategies. Depending on the dynamism of the markets and the institutions that establish rules of the game for participating in such markets, firms may find it more useful to organise themselves in different types of associations. An association of firms that unify their needs and interests in terms of political power may provide higher profits to its members than individual firms might obtain in isolation. For Olson, there is often a symbiotic relationship between the political power of a pressure group and the entrepreneurial associations linked to that political power; this can generate tax advantages and provide positive selective incentives that attract more participants inside the group.

Olson was writing in the late 1950s and early 1960s, when powerful associations of big corporations appeared in the US after World War II to lobby for big slices of the cake of European and Asian post-war recovery. After the war, Europe and Japan needed reconstruction and the big US firms had the technology, the capital and the managerial skills to expand their FDI and the distribution of their services and products internationally, provided US political institutions protected US firms in foreign markets and with regard to the new rules of the game for world trade. Studies on the Americanisation of Europe and Japan have provided much data about the protection big US corporations enjoyed under the umbrella of their political representatives (Kudo, Kipping, & Schröter, 2004; Schröter, 2005; Zeitlin & Harrigel, 2000). Our hypothesis is that Europe reproduced in a particular way this process of global expansion of its businesses – with the support of its own lobbies of large firms, after the 1980s. Expanding their businesses into the Asian markets (India, China) and the emerging economies of Latin America was facilitated by large firms, powerful lobbies and excellent connections between these firms, their representative lobbies and the political institutions able to manipulate tax and commercial policies. Lobbies therefore facilitated the existence of large firms, and could only appear with greater market opportunities and the support of the foreign policy and tax policies of political institutions interested in the internationalisation of domestic firms. It is precisely this historical context which helps us to understand the creation and success of family firm lobbies first in the US and then in Europe.

At this early stage of our research, therefore, Americanisation, defined as the creative transfer of technology, organisational structures, institutions and last but not least values and codes of behaviour from the United States to other parts of the world, seems a more adequate framework to study the rise of European lobbies than
classical theories of collective action (Schröter, 2005, p. 3). We will state it in the following sections.

Family businesses are as old as humankind, and their relevance worldwide has been acknowledged and studied by a diverse group of social scientists, particularly historians and economists (Colli, 2003; Colli, Fernández Pérez, & Rose, 2003). ‘Family firms’ are, however, a relatively new type of business institution that has only appeared in the scholarly literature in the last three decades, in close coincidence with the creation of institutes, centres and networks whose focus of research and teaching is ‘the family firm’. Definitions have varied greatly in these years, as professional consultants, academic scholars and interested business groups have carried out their studies according to their own particular goals and clients and have not reached a clear theoretical consensus. However, it is certainly true that among the diverse definitions appearing since the late 1980s we can observe the development of two broad approaches towards a definition of what many call ‘the family firm’ (Fernández Pérez, 2008). On the one hand, definitions put forth in the 1980s and 1990s by US and European scholars and consultants, and which very much took into account family businesses embedded in culturally quite homogeneous territories, mentioned the importance of considering the strategic control on ownership and management, and the willingness to transfer such control to the next generation, as two basic elements for differentiating and defining family firms (Colli, 2003). On the other hand, new twenty-first-century definitions have been appearing which stress a ‘continuous’ and more dynamic concept of family firms considering various degrees of control by one or more family groups, with the consequence that at a given moment in time a firm could be ‘more family-controlled’ than at other periods (Casillas, Acedo, & Moreno, 2007, Tápies & Ward, 2008). This second type of dynamic definition indeed takes into account the recent dynamism of the business landscape itself, i.e. entrepreneurial families with strong investments in equity funds and diversified holdings operating worldwide beyond national or regional borders, with the traditional territorial embeddedness being much looser than what was included in the definitions of the 1980s and 1990s. It also takes into account, as the European lobby of family firms states in its 2007 Lisbon document to the European institutions (GEEF website, Documents), the fact that large continental European firms have a great number of family members with interests and participation in the other businesses of the group, something which is less common of other continents.

Economists and traditional business historians tend to be sceptical about including under one single term a spectrum of firms ranging from a small commercial house in a rural village to a highly diversified multinational company. However, there are so many groups, so well organised, with so many publications and websites, dealing with ‘the’ family firm that one wonders who is right. We dare not answer this question directly here. Rather, our paper aims more modestly to identify the members of a few powerful global interest groups who have designed a successful strategy for creating a ‘new’ type of firm, and to show how some of these have perfectly connected business interests with political interests on a regional, national and global scale. By ‘new’ we mean that no classical textbook of either Economics or Business Theory included in their business typologies the ‘family firm’ until after the 1970s crisis. Also, no official statistic, no commercial code, no tax legislation said that there was a type of firm called ‘family firm’ until the 1980s (Casillas et al., 2007; Tápies & Ward, 2008). Even today, it is very difficult to find statistics that register ‘family firms’, besides the ones facilitated by family business associations (Fernández
Pérez & Puig, 2007). This paper provides evidence to suggest that the networks and lobbies of large family businesses created since the late 1980s seem to be leading actors behind the creation of this new theoretical construction.

The formation of two international networks of family firm lobbies

The US Family Firm Institute (FFI), what we could label the first large-scale interest group associated with the study of the family firm, appeared in 1986, having among its founding members Ivan S. Lansberg, John Ward, and Ernesto J. Poza. These three internationally influential scholars did pioneering work in this field from an organisational and psychological perspective, and some members travelled to Lausanne, Switzerland, while still very young, to offer seminars on the organisation and problems of the family firm to European family firm owners. There were two independent business schools in Switzerland at the time: the IMI (International Management Institute), founded in Geneva in 1927 and sponsored since 1946 by Alcan Aluminium Ltd., and IMEDE (Institut pour l’Enseignement des Méthodes de Direction de l’Entreprise), founded in 1957 in Lausanne by Nestlé SA. They merged in 1990 to become IMD (International Institute for Management Development). It was in IMEDE where these North American professors taught their pioneering research about family firms from a managerial perspective.

The IMI was established in 1927 with joint funding from the League of Nations and two North American foundations (the Twentieth Century Fund, and the Rockefeller Foundation) to help disseminate the ideas of scientific management in Europe, though this was modified and adopted a more social concern due to the values and codes coming from IMI’s first European directors. We have no documents about the existence of family firm programmes of education in IMI before the 1970s, when John Ward, Ivan Lansberg and other North American professors specialising in psychological approaches to family firm problems started to offer classes on the subject. The success of the knowledge transfer was rapid, with seminars attended by members of family businesses from Belgium, the UK, France, Italy, and Spain. IMEDE in Lausanne only started offering a seminar on family firms in 1988, called ‘Leading the Family Business’, a programme that has been completed by managers from more than 700 family businesses throughout the world, and which has been from its beginning the flagship of the school in family business education. Press releases from IMD have revealed that a private family-owned bank, Lombard Odier Darier Hentsch & Cie, one of the largest firms of private bankers in Switzerland and Europe (21 offices in 16 countries and 1700 employees in 2006), has regularly contributed to the development and financing of the IMD-Lombard Odier Darier Hentsch & Cie Family Business Centre.

It is no coincidence, therefore, that it was in Switzerland in connection with the Geneva IMI and the Lausanne IMEDE Family Business Centre and family firm studies chair (established in the late 1980s at the IMEDE by an anonymous endowment of 3 million Swiss francs (IEF, 2004, p. 43)) that another big international interest group for medium-sized and large family firms appeared in 1990 (the year IMI and IMEDE merged as IMD): the Family Business Network (FBN).

In 2008 this FBN had 2500 member firms in 45 countries and 24 chapters worldwide, with a focus on networking and sharing of knowledge and best practice. The FBN in Lausanne received influence and advice from the above-mentioned
North American professors, notably John Ward, John Davies and Ivan Lansberg (Ward is still connected to the IMD Family Business Centre). Such influence is difficult to measure and define, though according to information on the IMD and FBN websites it has been significant in terms of theories and issues addressed by researchers, entrepreneurs and consultants. Studies published by European members of the network (like Miguel Angel Gallo, from the IESE (Instituto de Estudios Superiores de la Empresa), a private school founded in 1958 in Barcelona aimed at experienced business leaders) revealed a new awareness about the importance of analysing in a theoretical way issues like the ownership structure, succession design, and conflict management in family-owned businesses. More than Americanisation it seems that this was a process of eclectic adaptation of some rationalisation theories developed by specialists in family-owned businesses of the United States, to case studies on large and medium European firms written by consultants and family members who received training (and international contacts) in the Geneva and Lausanne schools.

It was in the late 1980s at Geneva’s IMI and Lausanne’s IMEDE (merged as IMD in 1990) that Spanish businessmen attended their first seminars on family firm theory and met the US pioneers. Some Spanish private business schools which were well-embedded in regions with a predominance of family firms, particularly the IESE, would be inspired by the activity of the family business centres of the US, Geneva and Lausanne to create a second chair in Europe on family firms, in Barcelona, in 1987, whose first holder would be Miguel Angel Gallo (Puig & Fernández Pérez, 2008). In the meantime, some Catalonian entrepreneurs, especially the perfumer Antoni Puig – who played an outstanding role in this process – realised that an adaptation of such theories and strategies for Spanish needs could be very useful for gaining the interest of other firms and getting them to join forces to deal with the Spanish government. The government, after centuries of lenient tax treatment for the wealthiest sectors of society, had been imposing since 1978 increasingly tough taxes on all types of firms and particularly on the wealthiest individuals. The tax reform of 1978 initiated the second strong historical push towards fiscal modernity in Spain; for the firms, however, it was a heavy load to bear as it took place during the 1970s crisis which also had a negative effect on prices and consumption. For family firms it was a double burden, as family businesses in Spain were firms in which personal and entrepreneurial wealth were closely intertwined, and therefore the increase in tax pressure (up to 40% of the value of the firm at the founder’s death to be paid by heirs) greatly increased the risks of personal bankruptcy and threatened family firm survival.

Since the late 1970s, Antoni Puig and other Catalonian entrepreneurs had been considering the painful consequences of these changes for family firms in Spain, and felt that their interests were not really understood by the big national entrepreneurial associations able to exercise continuous political pressure, such as the CEOE (Confederación Española de Organizaciones Empresariales), dominated as they were by large corporations where personal capital was clearly separated legally from entrepreneurial capital. Puig, a member of an internationalised family firm with contacts in the US and European markets, while attending a Lausanne seminar offered by US academics specialised in family firms, along with a few of his Catalan entrepreneur friends, saw that the US theories and concepts could be applied in Spain. They would have a specific purpose at that moment: to create social and political awareness about the existence of a distinctive type of firm dominant in
both wealth and employment, and which the government and the law had not really considered previously when designing the tax reforms of the 1970s and 1980s, i.e. the family firm (see unpublished sources in the reference list). These Catalonian entrepreneurs had excellent organisational skills, university training and good social and political contacts. In the early 1990s, the political situation was also more favourable to their initiative than during the political turmoil of the 1970s–1980s.

Spain had become a member of the European Community in 1986, and the decline of public industrial firms and the increased internationalisation of Spain’s institutions and economy (with the Barcelona Olympic Games and the International Exposition in Seville in 1992), made these ‘small’ private family firms more attractive than in the past, as they began to be seen as the seeds of future national Spanish business champions.

In 1992, the Spanish lobby of family firms created at the Instituto de la Empresa Familiar which has been characterised as having among its first goals to lobby to defend the interests of its members with diverse political institutions officially began operating (Tapies & Ward, 2008). We will examine its origins more closely in the following section, but it is interesting to note here that, in contrast with the more educational US experience, the Spanish institution was born first of all to force changes in a tax system that was negatively affecting the transmission of family wealth and the reinvestment of profits for productive activities. As we shall see, the members were highly successful in this, and gathered political support from governments of both left and right, as well as from regional governments, who helped them in their demands for substantial reductions in inheritance taxes and wealth taxes during the 1990s and the first decade of the twenty-first century. Both taxes are now kept to a minimum for family firms able to meet very simple conditions: the wealth tax created in the late 1970s has been abolished by the Spanish state, and the inheritance taxes (regionally managed) have been greatly reduced by many regional governments from levels affecting a maximum of 40% of inherited wealth to less than 10% depending on the region (curiously enough the Catalan government has maintained the tax at a high level in contrast with other Spanish regions due to budgetary deficits). With such tremendous political lobbying success, the Spanish Institute of Family Firms attracted more attention, and added to its future primary goals group educational objectives and the creation of a positive attitude regarding the social role of family firms.

Many Spanish entrepreneurs had business contacts with other European family firms, and word of the Spanish success spread through Europe. In the late 1990s, other European family business interest groups soon tried to imitate the strategies of the Spanish Institute to achieve social and political recognition, and centres and organisations fostering diverse interests connected with this kind of firm blossomed in each national legal context. Interestingly, each national association of family firms adopted similar external strategies, in imitation of the Spanish model: members had to be distinctive and important family firms; websites insisted on educational and social goals; workshops and conferences often dealt with the internal problems faced by large, traditional family firms and with the investments to be made in a globalised economy. It was in this context that the Groupement Européen des Enterprises Familiales (GEEF) appeared in 1997 with 10 national associations (Bulgaria, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden). Leading figures of the new institution were two Spaniards who were also leading figures within the IEF: Mariano Puig and
Fernando Casado. GEEF has close relationships with EU institutions and ‘has worked to ensure that the particular concerns of family firms are taken into account in European policy-making’.

That same year, the Associazione italiana delle Aziende Familiari was created in Italy (now with 26 soci promotori fondatori, and Alberto Falck as chairman di strategia delle aziende familiari since 2004).

Latin American and Asian entrepreneurs studying in US and European institutions soon learnt of this efficient method of international networking. Data from the Family Business Network, with which the European national associations have close contacts, shows that national centres and organisations for the promotion and networking of family firms appeared everywhere in the world except Africa. Between 1990 and 1998, eight national associations, called chapters, were created and linked to the FBN. Since 1998, national associations to promote the study of specialised aspects of family firms have also appeared: in the Netherlands (1999); Brazil and France (2000); Japan and the UK (2001); India, Ireland, Belgium (2005); Austria, Chile, Colombia (2006); Australia and Bulgaria (2007); Denmark and Switzerland/Geneva (2008).

Table 1 indicates the years of foundation of all 24 chapters of one of the most influential associations of family firms in the world, the FBN. The network has an on-line membership directory which includes over 2800 contacts of family-owned businesses established in more than 45 countries; these are then associated in 24 chapters. The table clearly reveals the intense foundation of centres linked to the Lausanne-based institution in Western Europe during the 1990s, and the spread to other European, American, and Pacific Asian countries during the first decade of the twenty-first century.

The predominance of Europe is clear in the FBN, created in 1990. The predominance of the US and territories under US influence is clearer in the other big interest group, the FFI, founded in 1986. Chapters are usually centres (business schools, departments or chairs specialised in family firm studies) which constitute key corresponding agents of the network with people and institutions interested in

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year Foundation</th>
<th>FBN chapter Country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Spain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Switzerland (FBN Deutsche-Schweiz, Zurich)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Italy, Finland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>The Netherlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>France, Brazil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>UK, Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Ireland, Belgium, India, World chapter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Austria, Chile, Colombia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Bulgaria, Australia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Denmark, Pacific Asia, Switzerland (FBN Suisse Romande, Geneva)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own elaboration from data of FBN website available in June 2008.
contacts in that country. The relationship of FBN and FFI is similar to that maintained by distant cousins. They are linked through education, members of each association often participate in meetings organised by the other association, but the visible heads behind the management and strategic design of activities are clearly European in the case of the FBN and North American in the case of the FFI. This has a clear impact on the places where the members meet, key issues addressed in their periodical meetings, and the focus of their research agendas. In both cases these include education and consultant needs related to the different markets they address (European firms the FBN, more global firms the FFI), and in a very explicit and public way political concerns related to tax legislation in the particular case of the FBN.

Tables 2 and 3 show that 60% of the 174 organisations linked to the US FFI are located in the US, with only 22% in Europe. From the chronology, one wonders whether it was not, perhaps, the strong predominance of US interests in the US network which prompted European entrepreneurs and groups – more concerned about taxes than the US groups – to create their own influence group four years later with a territorial base in a fiscally neutral country, Switzerland. Table 4 shows the dominance of family firms over total number of firms in Spain during the 1990s.

Table 2. Family Firm Institute: number of centres and related organisations, by country (2008).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Number of centres related to FFI</th>
<th>in %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>60.34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>England</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4.02%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2.87%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6.90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scotland</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong> 174</td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total:</strong> 100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own elaboration from Family Firm Institute website, June 2008.
The creation of a lobby of large family firms in Spain

Family firms during the critical years of the 1980s and 1990s

Higher taxes, higher prices, increased foreign competition and accumulated structural problems from long decades of isolation were the main factors behind the demise of thousands of family firms in Spain between the late 1970s and the 1990s. Did this mean the end of Spanish family capitalism or the beginning of serious dangers to the continuity of historical family firms, as seems to have been the case in Germany (Berghoff, 2006)? Not at all. Despite the problems, family firms in Spain still contribute to at least 80% of employment and 60% of GDP, according to data from the official website of the IEF. Large family firms constitute half of the dynamic Spanish multinationals, making them true stars of the Spanish economy’s recent process of rapid internationalisation.

Galve and Salas (2003) have provided general and solid data on the predominance of family capitalism in Spain, particularly in the manufacturing industries, with information that distinguishes family and non-family firms according to size, age, sector and specialisation, indebtedness, innovation and modernisation of their distribution systems. Their studies allow a comparison and tracing of the evolution of family firms in Spain from 1991 to 1998, thus indicating tendencies of change and transformation, as shown in Table 4.

Regarding size, during the 1990s all types of family-owned firms suffered severe declines in percentages and numbers, in contrast with non-family firms, for which
these same percentages and numbers have increased. In 1991, family firms comprised 40% of all firms in Spain, while in 1998 this figure was only 33%. SMEs dominated the family firm sector throughout the decade.

Spain has a strong presence of historical family firms, defined as those in which there is strategic control of ownership and management, and where there has been at least one successful succession (Fernández Pérez & Puig, 2004, 2007; Puig & Fernández Pérez, 2008, 2009). This definition is important because often family ownership does not mean willingness to transfer to next generation, which for scholars specialising in family firm studies is a key issue for this type of firms in contrast with non-family-owned firms, and an important issue when undertaking national and international comparisons (Tàpies & Ward, 2008). Most of these historical family firms are concentrated in Catalonia, possibly due to the historical economic diversification of the region in agricultural, industrial and service activities from early modern times until our own, but also thanks to the strong historical cooperation between public and private institutions there in comparison with other Spanish regions. Recent publications demonstrate the importance of Catalonia as a region where the pressure to protect historical family firms was greater than in other areas of Spain during the 1980s (Fernández Pérez & Puig, 2007). Particularly significant in Catalonia was the leading role played by the chemical, pharmaceutical and food and beverage sectors, where tax pressure was felt more heavily than in other sectors (Fernández Pérez & Puig, 2007). This is key to an understanding of why the entrepreneurs who founded the Spanish family firm lobby were members of four families closely linked to these sectors (Puig, Esteve, Carulla, and Ferrero), together with politicians with different regional and national interests, e.g. Catalonian policymakers interested in building a powerful economic base in a region which had become politically autonomous, though without economic resources, or Spanish politicians interested in building a powerful entrepreneurial platform to conquer European markets after Spain’s integration into those markets in 1986.

**The making of the IEF (Instituto de la Empresa Familiar)**

Collective action has had a long history in Spain, since at least the final decades of the nineteenth century, due to the historical existence of powerful but heterogeneous interest groups in the various regions, which controlled political institutions and for decades managed to achieve very soft tax legislation. Iron and steel producers in Biscay, Castilian and Andalusian landowners, and Catalonian textile and metal manufacturers learned to associate in an attempt to repeal what they considered unfair commercial legislations during the last third of the nineteenth century. The twentieth century would be a time of rapid technological transfer and it was during the inter-war period when the Catalonian financier and politician Francesc Cambó (in 1919 the Treasury Minister) encouraged Spanish industrialists to take a qualitative step forward and collectively defend their interests at the national as well as regional level. A few years later, under the rule of dictator Miguel Primo de Rivera, trade associations in general were favoured (for example, in the case of exporters). Finally, the Republican regime which held power between 1931 and 1936/1939 also created or tried to create a favourable environment for the organised defence of economic interests (Linz, 1981). These diverse governments, of different political persuasions, embraced economic protectionism during this period of transition from a backward country to an industrialised society, something which
had been practised before by more developed countries at earlier stages of industrialisation.

On the whole, Spanish businesspeople were receptive to political encouragement to associate to unify their voices and interests. Particularly in Catalonia, the cradle of the industrial revolution and at that time still the main locus of Spanish entrepreneurial activity. Many of the nationwide industrial associations that proliferated in the 1930s, for example, were born out of previously existing Catalanian associations. By forcing entrepreneurs (and workers) to join the so-called vertical trade unions (sindicatos verticales, a Spanish version of Mussolini’s economic corporations), the dictatorial regime that emerged from the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939) and was to last until Franco’s death in 1975 allowed many of the pre-war organisations to survive, adapting first to the widespread corruption of the self-sufficiency policy and then to the increasing liberalisation of the Spanish economy.

Despite the radically different institutional framework of post-war Spain, and the anti-capitalist rhetoric of Franco’s first governments, the 1940s and 1950s were a very good time for Spanish business, in particular for those willing to focus on the domestic market, deal with a strongly interventionist administration (and subsequent corruption), and find ways to maintain or establish links with the outside world. The price of survival was high, but there were advantages as well: a captive domestic market that was bound to grow, a cheap, docile workforce, and an extremely relaxed tax system (at both the corporate and personal income level). The ultimate proof that it was not such a negative business environment is that many of Spain’s multinational firms were born at this time.

The obvious failure of the self-sufficiency project, on the one hand, and international pressure on the other, would re-orient Spain’s economic policy beginning in the late 1950s. A new generation of ministers and top officers, many educated abroad, were now in charge. They would design Spain’s programme of economic liberalisation and introduce many reforms. Of particular interest here was a new corporate tax system that relied on the business community (which had to meet yearly within the aforementioned fascist corporations to agree with the tax authorities on the total sum to be paid, and then among themselves on the amount to be contributed by each firm). This peculiar evaluation procedure was not only a relatively cheap and effective way to collect taxes by a poorly staffed administration, but a means to strengthen collective action at the industrial level. The Spanish subsidiaries of foreign firms, whose number increased spectacularly in the 1960s, were also represented in those corporations, but they remained dominated by the largest domestic firms.

This situation could not last forever. Franco’s death and Spain’s successful transition to a democratic government challenged Spanish business in many ways. It was the worst possible scenario, with the oil and industrial crisis of the 1970s hitting Europe hard (in 1970, Spain had formally applied to join the European Common Market) and most of the Spanish industrial fabric falling prey to international competition. Among the most relevant institutional changes which occurred during this period we must mention the introduction of the first modern fiscal system in Spanish history and a new industrial relations model that meant the suppression of the old fascist corporations. Both were approved by consensus in 1978. The design of the new tax system is worthy of attention, as it brought together a growing number of influential family firms, under the lead of a few Catalanian companies to which we will refer later on. The new model of industrial relations is also relevant here, as it led the Spanish business community to create a new employer umbrella association
(the CEOE; many of the old associations would in fact change their names and join
this group) under the lead of Carles Ferrer Salat, the founder of Laboratorios Ferrer
(now Ferrer Internacional), a leading Catalan multinational family firm.

The launching of the 1978 fiscal reform was preceded by a large number of
formal and informal meetings between 1976 and 1978.12 The main players in this
included: the Tax Office Minister Fernández Ordoñez and several high-ranking
officials, such as Enrique Fuentes Quintana, linked to the University of Madrid; the
economist and University of Barcelona professor Ramon Trias Fargas; Ferrer Salat,
Antoni and Marian Puig, Josep Esteve, and Lluís Carulla, all of them owners of
Catalan family firms working in the pharma and food and beverage industries.
Puig, who had recently hired an ex-public official and top fiscal expert, Antonio
Barrera de Irimo, to help him find legal loopholes and influence the law-making
process, was the leading voice (see unpublished sources).

The family firm owners would soon grow suspicious of the social democratic
persuasion of the reform architects. What did they fear? At least three things: 1)
taxes on increased value; 2) inheritance tax; 3) personal wealth tax. According to
them, all three were Marxist concepts that unfairly multiplied tax pressure on
members of family firms whose personal wealth was mixed together with productive
entrepreneurial wealth. The final result of the commissioned reports did not satisfy
Trias Fargas, Ferrer Salat and Puig. The latter would subsequently gather
information on the situation in other countries through contacts his own firm had
at the time (since 1964–1965 Puig had had a joint venture in England: Gal of
London). The most striking thing he found was that in most countries the law
distinguished between short-term and long-term increased value. This was the key to
dealing with policy-makers obsessed with big corporations in which personal wealth
was radically absent from business activities. Industrial firms did not speculate; they
made long-term investments. This idea would please the new Catalan regional
government in the years to come (in its eyes Catalonia represented the productive
economy versus the speculative economy that existed elsewhere, Madrid in
particular). Puig produced his own comparative studies and estimates (see
unpublished sources) and met with other Catalan family firms
(Gallardo, Carulla, Ferrero and Esteve; the predominance of pharmaceutical, food
processing and perfume companies is again notable).

To suggest neutrality, expertise and independence, they asked the international
consulting firm Price Waterhouse to make a report on comparative tax systems
related to family firms (also in the list of unpublished sources). ‘The topic was very
European and the firm was too American’, in Puig’s words. The result was thus poor
and the Catalan entrepreneurs found it did not address their needs. They brought
the results to the Ministry, however, and succeeded in pushing forward Trias Fargas’
idea of lowered tax on increased value (to reduce tax pressure for value related to
reinvestment of profits, which would be clearly differentiated from tax pressure on
value related to personal increases of wealth).

The three-(tax-)front battle continued, with an addition: the fight against ‘fiscal
transparency’. Puig and others argued that this did not exist in the European Union,
and insisted that its main goal was ‘to accumulate capital from their profits no
matter how’ (‘remansar beneficios como sea’, interview with Antoni Puig, 5 June
2008, quoting former minister Barrera de Irimo) In the meantime, firm owners like
Puig scrutinised the law to find legal ways to avoid taxation. Advised by Barrera, for
instance, he discovered a hole in a pre-democratic law (the ley de promoción de
empresas) under which one could avoid paying the increased value tax if capital was over 500 million Spanish pesetas and shares were not sold within eight years. The result according to Puig (the first to use it) was the creation of a chain of small companies (family holdings). This was to be followed by an extensive use of tax havens, as there is a close relation, argues Puig, between tax havens and internationalisation. Later on, indeed, his own firm would be able to buy the French firm Nina Ricci thanks to a large amount of money kept in the Netherlands.

The party that dominated Catalonian politics in the 1980s and 1990s (the moderately nationalist Convergència i Unió, or CiU) fully supported the demands of this small group of family firms, which were very international by Spanish standards and perceived themselves as a sort of reliable, hard-working ‘Mittelstand’. Francesc Homs, a CiU congressman in Madrid, successfully defended the project – prepared by Antoni Puig and his Cuatrecases lawyer, Carles Puig – of ten years instead of three to accumulate profits (interview with Antoni Puig, 5 June 2008; IEF, 2004).

It was in this context that the Catalonian government’s Finance Minister, Macià Alavedra, encouraged Catalonian entrepreneurs with family-owned firms (as Cambó had done 70 years before) to defend their interests collectively. The catalyst was the Olympic Games held in Barcelona in 1992, an event that required the support of the Catalan business community. The Swiss essence manufacturer Firmenich, Puig’s friend and supplier, told him about a Chicago consultant who specialised in family firms. When Puig, an IESE alumnus, asked Miguel Angel Gallo, holder of the second European chair on family businesses, at the IESE, about the identity of this consultant, he was told that the three most relevant experts on the topic were giving a lecture at the IMI (later IMD) in Geneva. The experts happened to be three young consultants connected with the so-called Chicago school: John Ward, John Davies and Ivan Lansberg, two of them founding members of the US Family Firm Institute. They offered three conferences. Puig attended the first along with Professor Gallo of the IESE and Swiss entrepreneur Firmenich. Back in Barcelona, Puig began the knowledge transfer process, meeting with Carulla, Esteve and other family firm owners, many of them also IESE alumni. It was then that regional Finance Minister Alavedra called them to a meeting and encouraged them to create a lobby, at that time an odious word.

Alfredo Pastor, former IEF’s director and former Secretary of the Economy at the Spanish Government, has explained that in his first meetings with the members of the Institute (kept at a maximum of around 100 firms), some wanted the Institute to function as a traditional private labour market for its young members, or even as a discrete market for selling shares in associated firms wanting to avoid the public stock market (interview with Pastor, 17 January 2008). Pastor has said that despite the varied opinions, finally only one principal goal was admitted as the only important issue which the association had to represent at the public level. This was the battle to reform a tax system that negatively affected wealth accumulation and transmission in family firms, especially since the late 1970s. Pastor agrees that Antoni Puig was the fiscal brain of the group, and that all the firms agreed that the eldest owning generation was the one which would represent each firm at the Institute. Interestingly, the younger generations have had an internal network within the Institute to train them in open networking before they gain full management responsibilities.

In 2004, the Instituto de la Empresa Familiar published its own version on the process of its foundation in a commemorative internal publication (IEF, 2004).
According to this book, Leopoldo Rodés was a man of international experience in public relations. He had his own firm in the media business (Media Planning, now in the hands of the French group Havas, with Rodés’ son, Leopoldo Rodés Jr. as Spanish CEO) and was at the same time very close to the banking family March. The former president of the International Olympic Committee, Juan Antonio Samaranch, proposed that he try to influence international opinion on the suitability of Barcelona for the Olympic Games. Rodés, as the person responsible for the advertising campaign and public relations of the Olympic Games candidacy of Barcelona, had the opportunity to establish friendly networks with national and regional politicians and entrepreneurs, a key source of social capital he would later use to create the network of the family firm institute. Rodés was particularly well connected with the entrepreneurial landscape in Barcelona, with Catalanian personalities linked to Lausanne and Geneva, and with the political authorities in both the regional government and in the ministries in Madrid. According to the IEF, it was Spain’s Central Bank governor, Mariano Rubio, who asked Leopoldo Rodés coordinator of ‘Asociación Barcelona’ for the promotion of the 1992 Olympic Games in Barcelona, to organise a meeting in 1991 to gain first-hand knowledge of Catalanian entrepreneurial problems.

Rodés spoke with Alavedra, who backed the idea and helped prepare an initial list of 40 family firms. In the same year, 1992, some, among them Mariano Puig, met with the President of the Catalanian government, Jordi Pujol, who also liked the idea of supporting Catalanian family firms, which they considered to be more productive than other kinds of firms more linked to speculation or whose work was deemed inefficient. A preliminary meeting took place at Alavedra’s office. In November 1991, at Barcelona’s Hotel Princesa Sofia, and at the invitation of hotel entrepreneur Joan Gaspart, the first official meeting of the future institute took place, with 25 significant members of distinctive Catalanian family firms in attendance, among them Josep Ferrer of Freixenet, Jose María Serra of Catalana Occidente, José Antonio Rumeu of Corporación Uniland, Jaume Tomàs of Agrolimen, Joan Molins of Cementos Molins, José Manuel Lara Bosch of Planeta, Javier de Godó of Grupo Godó, Ignacio Ferrero of Nutrexpa, Joaquín Balet of Saica, Alfredo Bassal of Laboratorios Doctor Esteve, Joan Uriach of Laboratorios Uriach and Jose Felip Bertrán of Grupo Bertrán. There were few firms of medium size. They decided to be independent of any political parties, and to cross regional borders and become a national association. Subsequent meetings took place at the home of Leopoldo Rodés, who led the initiative.

After several months of contacts, 70 family firms from other regions of Spain decided to join the Catalanian group: in Madrid, Rafael del Pino of Ferrovial and José María Entrecanales of Entrecanales y Távora; in the Basque Country, Santiago Ybarra y Churrueca of Bilbao Editorial; in Aragon, Alfonso Soláns of Pikolin; in Galicia, Amando Ortega of Inditex; and in Andalusia, Osborne and González Byass, among others.

With 40 owners representing 40 of Spain’s leading family firms, the first constituent assembly took place at the Hotel Princesa Sofia in Barcelona on 15 January 1992. The first item to be debated was the name of the new entrepreneurial association. José María Figueras proposed using the word ‘institute’, and Joan Gaspart convinced the rest to add ‘family firms’ (IEF, 2004, p. 23). The first statutes limited the number of members to 100, so as to be more effective in the decision-making process, and established the requirements for becoming a member (family
ownership, turnover well above €60 million annually and €12,000 per year in fees – which 12 years later increased to €13,500). The aim was to form an opinion group with the influence to defend in a public, transparent way the interests of the largest family firms.

The media backed the creation of this institute (Rodés was well connected, and the Godó, owners of the leading Catalonian newspaper La Vanguardia were members of the Institute). In the following years, contacts at the highest political level with regional governments, and especially the national government, were established with extraordinary success, due to the country’s economic situation, marked by the 1993 crisis, the decline of the public sector, and its increasing internationalisation. On 11 November 1992, a first interview took place with the President of the Spanish government, Felipe González, and during 1993 the Institute held meetings with the President González (9 March and 15 September), with Vice-President Narcís Serra, Finance Minister Carlos Solchaga and later with Pedro Solbes, with Minister of Industry and Energy Claudio Aranzadi and his successor Juan Manuel Eguíaagaray, with Minister of Social Affairs Cristina Alberdi, with Secretary (in Spain a type of vice minister) of Economy Alfredo Pastor (who had previously been the Institute’s first director before being appointed to this office in 1993), with high-level officials in the public tax administration, and during 1993–1994 with leaders of the conservative opposition party. For two decades, contacts with the leading party in the Catalonian regional government, Convergència i Unió, were fluid and frequent (in meetings with economic advisors Macià Alavedra, Artur Mas and Francesc Homs). With Francesc Homs ‘the link was particularly close during his period as deputy in the Spanish Congress, as the Institute sent most of its tax reform proposals through this person’ (IEF, 2004, p. 32). Close contacts also were established between the Institute and CiU’s congressional representatives in Madrid, Joaquin Molins and Xavier Trias, as well as with Unió Democràtica’s congressional deputy, Josep Sánchez Llibre. With such contacts it could be no surprise that the Institute was finally received by His Majesty the King Juan Carlos I in royal audience at his Zarzuela palace on 28 February 1994, and again in 1999. To our regret, no information has been provided in publications of the institute about these conversations.

In the months following the creation of the Institute contacts increased not only with top political authorities but also with other top family firms in the country, and the Institute reached the number of 70 member firms (40 from Catalonia, 30 from the rest of Spain). With the influence of media coverage there was a great flow of firms seeking to enter the club. The Institute decided to maintain the pressure group’s effectiveness by keeping to a maximum of 100 members, a decision that recalls Olson’s idea of limiting size to maintain functional strength. In 1992 Catalonian firms made up 40% of the membership, with the remaining 60% being firms from other Spanish regions. Diplomatic strategies recommended at the time to add rather than subtract, and so the Institute created what are now called Regional Associations (Asociaciones Territoriales de Empresa Familiar) of the Institute of Family Firms, through which great numbers of firms can also have contacts with the Institute, but without complicating the strategy of the founding nucleus of 100 firms (whose sales, according to the Institute’s estimates, represent 8% of Spanish GDP), according to figures of the Institute website. FBN and FFI provided stimulus and ideas, and contacts that helped go beyond particular needs and establish an attractive programme of ideas and agendas.
The Institute’s first office opened in Barcelona’s Avenida Diagonal on 31 January, 1992, with a second in Madrid in August 1994. The first president was Leopoldo Rodés (Media Planning), the soul of the Institute, and the first director was Alfredo Pastor (PhD in Economics from MIT), soon followed by Fernando Casado (PhD in Economics from the University of Barcelona), who has held the office to the present. The first *junta* included Leopoldo Rodés (Media Planning) as President, Jaime Tomás (Agrolimen) and José María Entrecanales (Entrecanales y Távora) as Vice-Presidents, Alfredo Bassal (Laboratorios Dr Esteve) as Secretary, and *vocales* Mariano Puig Planas (Antonio Puig), José María Serra (Catalana Occidente), Juan Molins (Cementos Molins), José Manuel Lara Bosch (Editorial Planeta), Rafael del Pino (Ferrovial), José Felipe Bertrán (Grupo Bertrán), Javier de Godó (La Vanguardia) and Ignacio Ferrero (Nutrexpa).

The IEF acknowledged in its commemorative publication that its first task was to commission a comparative international report on tax systems and their relationship to wealth transmission in Europe, Canada and the US (Albi, 1993a). The second was to build a positive image about family businesses, as firms that risk their own personal wealth to create general wealth and employment, and which are deeply embedded in their respective territories, with the commitment to stay and continue there (IEF, 2004, pp. 30–31).

The main achievements of the IEF in these years, according to information provided on its own website, revolve around three pillars: a) fiscal measures, b) education, and c) positive public opinion in a country largely mistrustful of entrepreneurs.

With regard to fiscal measures, the lobby based around the IEF has been tremendously successful in its demands to reduce the taxation affecting family businesses in Spain: socialist governments first and later conservative governments in Madrid, as well as regional governments, have all reduced the tax on increased value, affecting productive wealth (the first reductions were obtained after representations to President González in 1994). Different governments since 1994 have promised and announced that the wealth tax will be removed and have provided substantial reductions on inheritance tax (the *Decreto Rato* of 7 May 1996 initiated a series of laws in this sense). Ironically, the inheritance tax still persists in the cradle of the Institute – Catalonia – due to the chronic budgetary deficits of the regional Catalan government.

On education, the Institute has developed three strategies: first, a series of publications (in 2009 around 150) and seminars with the participation of the world’s top specialists in the field of family businesses (basically from the US, but increasingly from European, Latin American, and Asian countries as well); second, to attend top-level international seminars through connections with the FFI, the FBN and the GEEF; and, third, to create a network of family firm chairs in Spain’s public and private universities, where specific problems related to the organisation and strategy of family firms are taught.

We know little about internal elections and votes of member firms, though the Institute is very open to provide copies of its internal reports and publications about issues that have a public interest to spread awareness about the existence and needs of large and medium family firms. Additionally, in its efforts to create a positive public image about entrepreneurial families and their firms, the Institute regularly publishes press notes about its National Congresses of Family Firms (the first was held in Alicante on 21–22 November 1997), and is willing to provide copies of their publications and reports for works of scholarly study and research.
Final remarks

Large family firms throughout the world, particularly those where there is at least a second generation in management, have undergone a very interesting transformation in many ways in recent decades. Neglected by orthodox neo-classical economists during capitalism’s golden age, they are now an object of desire for a vast network of scholars, consultants and business associations worldwide. Available studies provide some initial knowledge about their differences from other enterprises, regarding strategies, their longevity, their internal problems and their adaptation to technological and market changes. However, almost nothing has so far been published about their extraordinary ability for collective action, their adaptation to new global rules of the game, or about the construction at national and international levels of very well-connected associations that lobby to promote networking, knowledge exchange and legal reforms.

We suggest that this little known yet highly interesting chapter of the history of European capitalism can be examined in the light of recent theories on Americanisation. Indeed, the path initiated in the late 1980s by US consultants and academics has been enthusiastically followed by some European associations since the 1990s, who have added a political agenda to the US ideas. If at first the goal was tax reforms, it is now to achieve official status in European institutions that determine the conditions which large historical family firms need in order to continue creating employment and wealth in the coming years.

The Spanish family firm lobby has played a fundamental role in bridging and adapting US theories and strategies to European needs, and the increasing participation of Spain in international institutions and markets since the 1990s has provided a perfect opportunity for these firms to establish fruitful dialogue with regional and national political powers to support their efforts for tax reform in Spain. Contacts and training provided by centres of family business networks built a bridge through which US ideas originally created to solve problems of large family-owned corporations have been eclectically used to help solve the particular needs of European, Latin American, and Asian medium and large family-owned groups and firms. In many ways, rationalisation was probably for the first time consistently introduced by North Americans (and accepted by the rest of the world) as a key tool to handle the two basic concerns of family-owned businesses: on the one hand conflict-ridden processes of family business succession, and on the other hand the increasingly complex negotiations of family-owned firms with national and international institutions.

A research agenda for the near future will need to include a deeper study of this evolution, and of whether the claims made by European family firm lobbies have really meant greater investment in their home territories, and if the rights they are increasingly receiving are being used by family firms of all sizes and ages.

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association of family firms in Spain and Europe provided by conversations with: entrepreneur Antoni Puig; with the first director of the IEF, Alfredo Pastor, and the second and current director, Fernando Casado; and with the present holder of the family firm chair of the Barcelona business school IESE, Josep Tàpies. Also to Paola Bozzo Fernández for her assistance in the design of the database and tables of centres connected with the FFI. Preliminary versions of this study were presented at the European Business History Association conference held in Bergen in August 2008, and in the working papers series of the on-line edition of the Boletín de la Red de Estudios de Historias de Empresas of the Asociación Argentina de Historia Económica (Boletín 9, December 2008). We greatly appreciate comments received in the Bergen conference from attendants and Andrea Colli, and Maria Inés Barbero and Andrea Lluch’s interest in the original working paper.

Notes

1. The lobby Conseil de Cooperation Économique, created in 2003 under the leadership of Andrea Canino (close to former Italian Foreign Affairs Minister Massimo D’Alema), has associated the 53 largest firms of Spain, France, Portugal and Italy (plus 150 large firms which are not members but contribute with ideas to Canino’s reports). The Conseil organises interviews with the presidents and high-ranking bureaucrats of these four countries and others of the European Union, and creates reports on key strategic economic issues.

2. We greatly acknowledge the comments and suggestions about the discussion on definitions received by Carole Howarth, Mary B. Rose, Mike Parsons and Eleanor Hamilton.

3. A complete list of founding members and first founding board, with information on activities and goals, is available from the FFI website.

4. Family firms were not the first concern of IMI in its first years. On this, and on the second director of IMI, see http://www.unige.ch/ses/istec/EBHA2007/papers/Boyns.pdf

5. Interview with Antoni Puig, Barcelona, 5 June 2008.


8. Spaniards still have a more than significant presence in 2008 in the directorate of the GEEF: Mariano Puig as Honorary President, Jesús Casado of IEF Madrid as Secretary-General, and Alfonso Libano of Cobega representing the IEF as one of the GEEF’s three Vice-Presidents. See http://www.geef.org/structure.php. Particularly interesting in this action of lobbying is the note prepared for the 10th Anniversary of the European Group of Family Firms Meeting in Lisbon on 28–29 October, 2007, at the initiative of the President of the EU Commission, the ‘GEEF Lisbon Statement’, co-authored by Antonio Borges (Goldman Sachs) and Ludo Van der Heyden (INSEAD), available through the GEEF website mentioned above.


11. A few relevant studies are: Fraile, 1991; Sellés, 2000; and Sánchez Recio & Tascón, eds., 2003. A relatively recent overview of past literature on lobbies and pressure groups throughout the history of Spain (including works by Tedde de Lorca, Tortella, Fraile, Gómez Mendoza, Martín Rodríguez, García Delgado and Roldán, Aceña and Comín, Fanjul and Marvall) can be found in Simón Fernández, 1997, pp. 98–106. Cabrera and Rey have also published significant studies on the relationship between politics and business in Spanish history, though in general these two authors tend to argue that the links have not been as close as suggested by the scholars analyzed in Simón Fernández, 1997.

12. For the following we greatly rely on documents of the private archive of perfume manufacturer Antoni Puig, and on several interviews held by the authors with Antoni Puig from 2003 through 2008.
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