Stable party systems are important for political stability and policy-making quality. A key element of party system stability is partisan attachment among the electorate. This article argues that the level of inequality during the critical juncture of party formation can have profound impact on partisan attachment. An unequal distribution of agricultural land under a limited franchise decreases the incentive of parties representing rural interests to build strong local party organizations and partisan loyalty. Consequently, areas with high land inequality should show less support for these parties after democratization. This theory is tested using data from early 20th century Denmark. In accordance with the theory, the Liberal Party, which represented rural interests, did poorer electorally in areas with historical high land inequality after democratization. The beneficiaries of the Liberal Party's weakness in these areas were both center and far-left parties as well as the extreme right, which suggest that a legacy of high land inequality might leave a polarizing mark on the national party system.