“Fiscal sustainability and fiscal shocks in a dollarized and oil-exporting country: Ecuador”

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**Abstract**

This paper investigates the fiscal sustainability of an emerging, dollarized, oil-exporting country: Ecuador. A cointegrated VAR approach is adopted in testing, first, if the intertemporal budget constraint is satisfied in Ecuador and, second, in identifying the permanent and transitory shocks that affect a fiscal policy characterized by inertia and a heavy dependence on oil revenues. Following confirmation that the debt-GDP ratio does not place the Ecuadorian budget under any pressure, we reformulate the model and identify two forces that push the fiscal system out of equilibrium, namely, economic activity and oil revenues implemented in the government budget. We argue that Ecuador needs to recover control of its monetary policy and to promote the diversification of its economy in order that non-oil tax revenues can replace oil revenues as a pushing force. Finally, we calculate quarterly elasticities of tax revenues with respect to Ecuador’s GDP and that of eight Eurozone countries. We illustrate graphically how the Eurozone countries with low positive or high negative elasticities’ levels suffer debt problems after the crisis. This finding emphasizes the pressing need for Ecuador to strengthen the connection between its tax revenues and output, and also suggests that the convergence of these elasticities in the Eurozone might contribute to the success of an eventually future fiscal union.

**JEL classification:** C32, E62, H60  
**Keywords:** Cointegrated VAR, fiscal sustainability, fiscal shocks, debt, Ecuador.

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1. Introduction

Compared to the large body of empirical literature analysing the effects of monetary policy, economic research examining the effects of fiscal policy has been much scarcer until recently. Nevertheless, the current sovereign debt crisis in the euro area has revived the academic and policy debate on the economic impact of expansive fiscal policies and high public debt levels. It is worth to note that market concerns with respect to fiscal sustainability in euro area countries have grown and spread to other countries, reinforcing the concern that high public debt levels harm economic growth.

In this context, Ecuador is a particularly interesting country to study. The fact that it relies on its fiscal policy to counteract both external and internal shocks should, it is assumed, result in the failure of current budget constraints. However, on the contrary, as Figure 1 in Annex II shows, Ecuador has not had to cut its expenditure and, moreover, reports a falling total debt-GDP ratio, two unlikely achievements for its European counterparts immersed in the current economic crisis.

Figure 1 describes the pronounced decline that Ecuadorian debt-GDP ratio experienced since 2000. This decline has to be understood in the specific context of this South-American country, notwithstanding. On the peak of a devastating economic crisis, Ecuador was forced to default on its Brady bonds ($6.604 million of the total debt) in the summer of 1999. The restructuring process, officially in August 2000, resulted in a reduction of close to 40 percent in the face value of the tendered bonds. After this event, Ecuador focused on its fiscal policy on debt reduction. Through the Organic Law on Fiscal Responsibility, Stabilization and Transparency\(^1\), in 2002, was created the Stabilization Fund for Social and Productive Investment and Debt Reduction (FEIREP) as a special trust fund, managed by the Central Bank. The FEIREP funds earmarked 70 percent for debt-buyback operations; 20 percent to stabilize oil revenues and for emergency spending, and 10 percent for education and health spending. The Fund was replaced in 2005 by the Special Account of the Productive and Social Reactivation, Development of Science and Technology and the Fiscal Stabilization (CEREPS). The 70 percent earmarking to debt reduction was reduced to 35 percent\(^2\). The debt-GDP ratio fell from 86 percent by end-2000 to about 34 percent by end-2006. However, this targeted debt reduction policy carried out by the government caused the revalorization of its international bonds, becoming the debt buyback even more

\(^1\) See the third title of the original version of the Organic Law on Fiscal Responsibility, Stabilization and Transparency published in the Ecuadorian Official Registry on June 4, 2002.

\(^2\) See Cueva (2008) for a more extensive description about the FEIREP and CEREPS funds.
onerous. This fact was the basis of the debt repudiation rhetoric of president Correa\(^3\). In December 2008 the debt-GDP ratio achieved a value around 23 percent. The public external debt was the least burdensome it had been in over three decades. Nevertheless, Ecuador decided to default again, making clear its “unwillingness to pay” rather than its “inability to pay”\(^4\).

Most studies in the literature have examined the effects of fiscal policy on macroeconomic variables in order to provide robust stylized facts regarding the effects of fiscal policy shocks. The discrepancies that exist, it is argued, result from the different methodologies adopted to analyse these shocks (see Caldara and Kamps, 2008). Irrespective however of the identification approach selected, all the studies concur that positive government spending shocks have persistent positive output, inflation and short term interest rate effects\(^5\).

The same holds for tax shocks. There is a degree of consensus in articles using the sign-restrictions approach (Mountford and Uhlig, 2009) or a narrative approach (Romer and Romer, 2010) that unanticipated tax increases have strongly negative output effects. However, conflicting results are obtained when using the structural VAR approach, so that while Blanchard and Perotti’s (2002) findings coincide with the aforementioned studies, Perotti (2002) suggests that output – as well as the inflation and short term interest rate – are unaffected\(^6\).

Recently, these models have been extended to satisfy the government budget constraint\(^7\). Since the fiscal variables of different countries react distinctly to macroeconomic variable shocks, such analyses should shed some light on how best to harmonize fiscal policies in monetary unions. Favero et al. (2011) identify the existence of heterogeneities between countries due to different

\(^3\) See Correa (2005).

\(^4\) The most controversial default was that made in 2008. President Rafael Correa justified the country’s moratorium on the basis that Ecuador’s foreign debt obligations were “immoral,” “illegal” and “illegitimate”. Ecuador stopped payments on 3.2 billion, confined to two of the country’s sovereign bonds: the one maturing in 2012 and another due in 2030, both born out of an earlier sovereign default that took place in August 1999 and accounting for nearly one-third of the external public debt in 2008. Between April and November 2009, the government repurchased the two bonds against cash at a steep discount of 65-70 percent on their face value. See Moodys (2009), Salmon (2009), Das, Papaioannou and Trebesch (2012), Feibelman (2010) and Díaz-Cassou et al. (2008) in order to go in depth on the Ecuadorian defaults over the last decade.

\(^5\) In the case of government spending, Perotti (2008) reports that both private consumption and real wages significantly and persistently increase in response to a positive spending shock, while employment does not react. Mountford and Uhlig (2009) find that the response of private consumption is close to zero and statistically insignificant, while Ramey (2011) reports a negative response to such a shock. Burnside et al. (2004) provide evidence that the real wage persistently and significantly falls while employment persistently and significantly increases.

\(^6\) It should be stressed that all these studies were undertaken using a very similar US sample period. Mountford and Uhlig (2009) and Romer and Romer (2010) simply extend the sample period first studied in Blanchard and Perotti (2002) which ran from 1947:1 to 1997:4.

\(^7\) For instance, Favero and Giavazzi (2007) estimate a fiscal VAR applying two approaches: structural VAR and a narrative approach. They include debt and the stock-flow identity linking debt and deficits, and report more sizeable effects of fiscal policy on output in the narrative approach than in the standard structural VARs.
fiscal reaction functions, different degrees of openness, and different debt dynamics. They also highlight the importance of including feedback between fiscal and macroeconomic variables in VAR models, since it conditions the reactions of both variable types to fiscal shocks.

Bohn (1998) adds to the debate about fiscal sustainability by demonstrating that rejections of low-order difference-stationarity and cointegration are consistent with the intertemporal budget constraint and he suggests that error-correction-type policy reactions are a promising alternative for understanding debt and deficit problems. He also estimates a positive response of primary surpluses to the debt-GDP ratio, suggesting the sustainability of US fiscal policy for the sample period 1916-1995. Other empirical studies adopting the same line include Bohn (2005, 2007) for the US; Collignon (2012) for Europe; Fincke and Greiner (2012) for selected countries in the euro area; and, Kia (2008) who undertakes the analysis for two emerging countries (Iran and Turkey).

Few studies to date have examined Ecuador’s fiscal policy. Cueva (2008) and Almeida et al. (2005) report that the legal framework is cumbersome regarding the distribution and earmarking of oil and tax revenues, creating large rigidities in fiscal management. They describe a “rigid budget characterised by inertia” that offers just eight percentage points to counteract unpredictable shocks. Other articles examining issues of debt sustainability include López-Calix (2003) and Tinsley (2003), who adopt standard approaches to sustainability; Barnhill and Kopits (2003) who, in developing a Value-at-Risk approach, find that the volatility of sovereign spreads and of oil prices constitute major sources of risk for Ecuador’s public sector; and Alvarado et al. (2004), who calculate debt threshold sensitivities for different assumptions regarding revenue volatility and expenditure adjustments. They emphasize that uncertainty in government tax revenues and the inflexibility in its non-interest expenditure leave Ecuador vulnerable to fiscal crises in the future.

Mejía et al. (2006) claim that dollarization reforms have limited the diapason of fiscal instruments available to governments. They warn of the dangers of dependency on oil revenues as a source of instability in a balanced budget. Mari Del Cristo and Gómez-Puig (2013) also remark the imminent inflation pressures in Ecuador due to the rise of pass-through and an inexistent monetary policy to deal with. These findings might question the theory that low-inflation policies increase the confidence of bond market investors, and governments may, therefore, have even greater access to borrowing. Actually, fixed exchange rates and dollarization restrain monetary policy but leave open debt-financed fiscal policy, at least until debt burdens become unsustainable (Palley, 2004).

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8 The composition of public expenditure is as follows: 26 per cent for wages, 10 per cent for current transfers, 8 per cent for transfers to regional governments (gobiernos seccionales), 3 per cent for investment projects, 10 per cent for interest payments and 32 per cent for amortizations, among other expenditures.
This article has two aims: first, to determine if Ecuadorian fiscal policy satisfies the intertemporal budget constraint and, second, to determine the main push factors and forces of adjustment (permanent and transitory shocks) interacting in the long run equilibrium. The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Section II briefly describes the theoretical approach of the intertemporal budget constraint extended to oil-exporting countries. Section III presents the econometric methodology. Section IV explains the empirical results. Section V examines the policy implications based on an examination of elasticities of tax revenues with respect to Ecuador’s GDP and that of eight Eurozone countries. Finally, section VI summarizes the conclusions that can be drawn from the article.

2. The Theoretical Model

An increasing debt-GDP ratio depends on the economic environment \((r_t - g_t)d_{t-1}\) and on the primary surplus. If the interest rate \(r_t\) exceeds the growth rate \(g_t\), then the debt-GDP ratio \(d_t\) will increase indefinitely unless there is a primary surplus which can offset the rising debt service.

The paths of public debt implied by the sequences of primary surplus \(s_t\) and economic environment \((r_t - g_t)\) are:

\[
d_{tn} = \left( \prod_{k=0}^{n} \left( 1 + (r - g) \right) \right) d_{t-1} - \sum_{j=1}^{n} \left( \prod_{k=j+1}^{n} \left[ 1 + (r - g) \right] \right) s_{t+j} \tag{1}\]

Assuming the economic environment as given and constant, the accumulation of debt over several periods \(t=1\ldots n\):

\[
d_{tn} = \left( 1 + r - g \right)^n d_{t-1} - \sum_{j=0}^{n} \left( 1 + r - g \right)^{n-j} s_{t+j} \tag{2}\]

If we divide by \(\left( 1 + r - g \right)^n\) and arrange terms:

\[
\frac{1}{\left( 1 + r - g \right)^n} d_{tn} = d_{t-1} \sum_{j=0}^{n} \frac{s_{t+j}}{\left( 1 + r - g \right)^j} \tag{3}\]
Assuming that the transversality condition holds\(^9\), fiscal policy will satisfy the intertemporal budget constraint (IBC) because it is on a path whereby the present value of expected future primary surpluses equals the initial debt:

\[
d_t = E \left( \sum_{s=t}^{\infty} \frac{S_{t+s}}{(1+r-g)^s} \right)
\]  \hspace{1cm} (4)

Equation (4) states that debt sustainability requires a variation in the primary budget surplus. A surplus is needed when the growth rate falls below the rate of return on government bonds. Thus, whether fiscal policy is sustainable or not depends on the sign of the fiscal policy reaction with respect to the target: if an increase in debt is followed by an increase in primary surpluses, debt is sustainable. In the long run, the debt-GDP ratio is required to converge on an equilibrium position that is determined by the nominal growth rate, target reference values and adjustment coefficients\(^{10}\).

In order to explain the sustainability of oil-producing countries, Kia (2008) extends Barro’s (1979, 1986) tax smoothing model by introducing energy revenues. In Barro’s approach, the base of real taxable income is a deterministic variable \(y_t\), a fixed fraction of real GDP that generally depends on the path of tax rates. Kia (2008) assumes GDP to be a function of the country’s energy income.

Let \(\tau_t\) be the average tax rate and \(\tau_t y_t\), the real tax revenues. The total government revenues of an oil-producing country are, therefore, the sum of \(\tau_t y_t\), and \(E N_t\), the oil revenues derived from the exports of the natural resource. The government budget constraint, Equation (4), with constant real interest rate, \(r\), and in a situation in which the country has energy income is:

\[
d_t = E \left( \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \frac{(\tau y_{t+j} + EN_{t+j}) - (Gov_{t+j} + rd_{t+j})}{(1+r-g)^j} \right)
\]  \hspace{1cm} (5)

\(^9\) The initial debt equals the expected present value of future primary surpluses if and only if discounted future debt converges to zero (Bohn, 2005).

\(^{10}\) Collignon (2012) adopting the fiscal reaction function \(\Delta t_t = \alpha(def_t - z_1) + \beta(debt_t - z_2)\) relates the deficit and debt ratios with the primary surplus, \(z_1\), and \(z_2\), are the target reference values for the deficit and debt ratios respectively under the Stability and Growth Pact; \(\alpha\) and \(\beta\) are the adjustment speed coefficients by which governments respond to the deviation from the deficit and debt ratio reference values, respectively.
where the primary surplus $S_{t+j}$ is now different from that in Equation (4) given the inclusion of $EN_{t+j}$.

In line with Kia (2008), we have to make several assumptions for empirical purposes. First, we assume that real government expenditure, $Gov$, and the real tax base $yt$ can be expected to fluctuate around the common rate of the growth of the economy $g$. Second, the expected present value of energy income is also its current value. This means that all economic agents expect energy revenues not to change over the remaining life of the oil reserves. Third, the oil reserves are expected to last forever. This assumption, however, is unsustainable based on OPEP’s Annual Statistical Bulletin which states that Ecuador has about 8,235 million barrels of proven reserves and an exportable trend of 334 thousand barrels per day in 2011, that is, seventy percent of its production. We thus simplify the model, including the fact that interest rates and price levels are kept constant, as we are analyzing a dollarized country.

If we resolve empirically that in the long run oil revenues, as opposed to non-oil tax revenues, are pushing away from the steady state, we can assume that this intertemporal budget constraint is not sustainable, given that oil revenues will dry up, unless the country diversifies its economy and substitutes the volatile oil sector with others that are more sustainable over time.

11 Alvarado (2004) points out the main problem of this given that it assumes that increasing resource exploitation to pay the debt does not affect sustainability. It is assumed that oil reserves have the same return as the government’s other financial assets and liabilities.

12 Where $t = m$ when the country’s energy resources are exhausted, and $I_t$ the information available at time $t$, including the state of the economy:

$$ EN_t = E \left[ \int_0^\infty EN_t e^{-r_t} dt \mid I_t \right] $$

13 We reject the null hypothesis of non-stationarity for Ecuadorian inflation.
3. Data and Econometric Methodology

The study of the dynamic response of macroeconomic variables to shifts in fiscal policy is usually carried out by estimating a vector autoregressive (VAR) model of the form:

\[ X_t = \sum_{i=1}^{k} \prod_{j=1}^{i} X_{t-i} + e_t \]

Where \( X_t \) includes the minimum set of variables required for the VAR analysis, i.e., government spending net of interest, net tax revenues, output, inflation and interest rate (Perotti, 2002). Here, we extend this set to include the debt level, as Bohn (1998) has shown that the feedback obtained from the debt to tax and government spending ratios is statistically significant and economically relevant. The importance of monitoring debt dynamics when analysing fiscal policy has also been stressed by Romer and Romer (2010), Favero and Giavazzi (2007) and Favero et al. (2011). This result has clear implications for countries with fixed exchange rate regimes, including pegged or monetary union regimes.

We use monthly data from the Central Bank of Ecuador covering the period 2000:1 to 2012:7. The fiscal variables are the log of government expenditure net of interest \( l_{gov} \), the log of non-oil tax revenues \( l_{rev} \), and the log of oil revenues \( l_{orev} \). For the first model we use the sum of these last two figures to obtain the log of total fiscal revenues: \( l_{trev} \). The remaining variables are the log of the Economic Activity Index (EAI) represented by \( l_{eai} \), and the log of the external and internal debt-GDP ratio \( l_{debt \_gdp} \). The EAI variable was chosen instead of GDP because Ecuador was dollarized in 2000:1 and GDP is only reported annually or quarterly; thus, in order to be able to use the highest number possible of observations from the dollarized period we include the EAI which is reported monthly. Hence, the first model we estimate comprises the following

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14 Romer and Romer (2010) claim that the effect of a US tax shock on output depends on whether the change in taxes is motivated by the government’s desire to stabilize the debt or not. Favero and Gavazzi (2007) also find that interest rates depend on future monetary policy and the risk premium, both variables being affected by the debt dynamics. Hence, the absence of an effect of fiscal shocks on the long-term interest rates, a frequent outcome in VAR-based research that omits debt level, is due to a misspecification.
vector of endogenous variables: $X_t = [lrev_lgov_leai_ldept_gdp]^{15}$. We include neither the interest rate nor inflation, since both are constant throughout the sample period$^{16}$.

### 4. Empirical Results

We start with the CVAR specification. We first estimate the unrestricted VAR(k) model with different lag lengths $k$ using general-to-specific testing and information criteria to determine a lag length with no autocorrelated error terms. With $k=4$, the model presents neither autocorrelation nor Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (ARCH) effects. However, normality is strongly rejected. The univariate tests show that normality is rejected due to the non-normality in the debt-GDP ratio variable: two outliers produce skewed residuals and generate excess kurtosis. The outliers are associated with two key moments in Ecuador’s history when, as mentioned, its external debt was restructured: August 2000 and June 2009$^{17}$. However, even when the first restructuring took place in August 2000, it was not until January 2001 that the total debt-GDP ratio illustrated the break level. We, therefore, introduce two unrestricted shift dummies: 2001:01 and 2009:06, that have the value 1 if $t$ refers to any of those dates but is zero otherwise.

All our statistical tests are now acceptable. The univariate tests of normality only reveal some kurtosis in the residues of the debt-GDP variable but no skewness (which can be considered more serious than kurtosis)$^{18}$. Thus, our model is well-specified and the empirical results are reliable.

Given that we have four trending variables, we allow for trends in the levels and a non-zero mean of the cointegration relations. Likewise, we allow for a trend in the cointegration relations, since

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$^{15}$ Unlike Favero and Giavazzi (2007), we include the debt-GDP ratio among the endogenous variables, in order to capture the rich dynamics of fiscal aggregates in the cointegrated VAR. As the government debt is an accumulation of budget deficits, if we include the debt-GDP ratio we do not include the interest payments.

$^{16}$ The empirical application is carried out using CATS software, in line with Juselius (2006), who argues the advantages of employing the cointegrated VAR approach over others (cf. Hoover et. al (2007); Juselius, 2009). See Annex I to a brief explanation.

$^{17}$ The total external debt ratio was reduced from 106 per cent GDP at the end of 1999 to around 98 per cent in 2000 (Quispe-Agnoli, 2006). In June 2009 the Correa government defaulted on $3.2 billion of foreign public debt, and then completed a buyback of 91 percent of the defaulted bonds (Sandoval, 2009).

$^{18}$ Simulation studies have shown that valid statistical inference is sensitive to the violation of some of the assumptions, including parameter non-constancy, autocorrelated residuals (the higher, the worse) and skewed residuals, while quite robust to others, such as excess kurtosis and residual heteroscedasticity.
the trends in the levels do not cancel out in the cointegration relations. After testing the non-
stationarity of the variables, we calculate the trace test statistics (Johansen, 1996), one including
both seasonal and permanent dummies, and a second without dummies as a sensitivity analysis.
Both tests determine the existence of one cointegration relation; thus, three common stochastic
trends are pushing the system out of equilibrium.

Once the CVAR model is restricted to r=1 and has passed a number of diagnostic tests for
parameter constancy, including the log-likelihood test or recursively calculated trace test
statistics19, we test the long-run exclusion and weak exogeneity hypotheses. These have been
tested with a likelihood ratio test procedure described in Johansen (1996), Johansen and Juselius
(1990) and Juselius (2006). If we accept the null hypothesis of the test of long run exclusion, i.e. a
zero row restriction on β, the variable is not needed in the cointegration relations. Testing whether
a variable is weakly exogenous is equivalent to test a zero row in α. When accepted it defines a
common driving trend in the system since this variable does not adjust to the long run relations.

We check that the debt level variable can be excluded from the cointegration relation and the
weak exogeneity test points to the variables that are pushing the system out of equilibrium,
namely, the EAI and the government expenditure. Annex III presents the main tables (Table 1 and
Table 2) related to these results.

These results can be read in more than one way; thus, it might be that Ecuador’s debt-GDP ratio
does not place the government under any pressure, or it might be that its intertemporal budget
constraint cannot be described by cointegration relations if the debt is decreasing during most of
the sample period while government expenditure rises20, unless government revenues offset the
difference. However, the revenue variable adjusts to the cointegration relation; it is not a variable
pushing the system out of equilibrium. The variable which does present this condition is
government expenditure, and this might confirm its inertial nature as described elsewhere or it
might correspond to other forces not included in the model.

In order to determine the actual exogenous forces that make government expenditure a weak
exogenous variable we estimate the following CVAR: $X_t = [trev, lgov, leai, lorev]$. We divide
total revenue between its oil and non-oil sources and exclude the debt-GDP ratio, since here
again this variable can be excluded from the new model.

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19 Interestingly the test of constancy is rejected if the oil revenues variable is included in the model,
confirming the volatility of revenues of this type. All tests are available upon request.
20 Ray and Kozameh (2012) and the World Bank (2005) provide further details about the expansive
programs addressed at reducing poverty levels and raising education levels.
From the previous model we retain the lag number and the deterministic terms, but we change the permanent dummy variables to 2005:4 and 2006:10 in order to avoid problems of skewness in the EAI and the oil revenue variable, respectively. We determine the rank with and without dummies and decide for r=2 without dummies (See Table 3). The exogeneity tests show the two possible common stochastic trends: economic activity and oil revenues (See Table 4).

Table 5 shows the residual correlations. The government expenses variable is related to both oil and non-oil tax revenues; and non-oil tax revenues are related to economic activity, oil revenues and government spending. Therefore, we need the structural MA representation, which requires structural and uncorrelated residues in order to interpret the empirical shocks adequately.

It can be derived from Annex I that if multiplying by a B matrix, then we add $p^2$ additional parameters to the cointegrated VAR. This being the case, we need to impose exactly the same number of restrictions on the model's parameters to achieve a just-identification scheme. Since we have four variables, the B matrix adds 16 new coefficients. The assumption that $\mathbf{u} \sim \mathbf{N}(0, I)$ implies $((p^2(p+1)/2) = 10)$ ten restrictions on $B$ (four unit coefficients on the diagonal elements and six zero restrictions on the off-diagonal elements).

Four additional restrictions $((p-r)^r = 4)$ are necessary to separate transitory from permanent shocks, and two more restrictions are required to achieve a just-identified structural MA model. The latter are essential because there are two possible sequences of the transitory shocks and two possible sequences of the permanent shocks. A single specification can be obtained by imposing one exclusion restriction on the common trend and one exclusion restriction on the transitory impulse response.

The impulse response functions are calculated with the following structurally identified MA model:

$$\begin{bmatrix} lrev_t \\ lgov_t \\ leai_t \\ lorev_t \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} 0 & 0 & * & * \\ 0 & 0 & * & * \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & * & * \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} \sum_{i=1}^t u_{s1,i} \\ \sum_{i=1}^t u_{s2,i} \\ \sum_{i=1}^t u_{i1,i} \\ \sum_{i=1}^t u_{i2,i} \end{bmatrix} + \begin{bmatrix} 0 & * & * & * \\ * & * & * & * \\ * & * & * & * \\ * & * & * & * \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} u_{s1,t} \\ u_{s2,t} \\ u_{i1,t} \\ u_{i2,t} \end{bmatrix} + \begin{bmatrix} u_{s1,t-1} \\ u_{s2,t-1} \\ u_{i1,t-1} \\ u_{i2,t-1} \end{bmatrix} + C_t B^{-1}_t$$

The one exclusion restriction on the permanent shocks is defined by assuming that only supply shocks can affect economic activity in the long run; thus, oil revenues do not impact on production, as proxied by the $leai_t$ variable. The one exclusion restriction on the transitory shocks
is defined by assuming "sticky" taxes, so tax revenues do not react immediately to a government expenditure shock.

The estimated matrix B normalized at the largest coefficient in each row in Table 7, defines how the orthogonalized permanent and transitory shocks are associated with the estimated CVAR residuals. Recovering the last two rows and substituting in the equation: \( u_t = Be_t \), we obtain the combinations which make up the permanent shocks:

\[
\begin{align*}
    u_{t,3} &= B'_{13}e_t = 0.103e_{\eta_{rev,t}} - 0.11e_{\eta_{gov,t}} + e_{\eta_{lsl,t}} + 0.135e_{\eta_{rev,t}} \\
    u_{t,2} &= B'_{12}e_t = 0.233e_{\eta_{rev,t}} - 0.961e_{\eta_{gov,t}} + e_{\eta_{lsl,t}} - 0.381e_{\eta_{rev,t}}
\end{align*}
\]

It appears that both the first and the second permanent shocks are given primarily by shocks to the economic activity. The results suggest that oil revenue shocks have less influence, which can be considered a favourable outcome given the finite nature of oil reserves. The importance of the government spending shock is worth noting in the second permanent shock. This is in line with reports elsewhere that are critical of the rigid nature of Ecuador’s public budget. Table 6 and Figure 7 in Annex III describe the dynamic impulse response functions after 23 periods for each of the system’s variables resulting from a one standard deviation shock. We are able to verify that all the transitory shocks have a zero long-run impact on the four variables, whereas all permanent shocks have a non-zero impact, except for the identifying zero impact of economy activity. From this we can infer that oil revenues depend on both government demand and economic activity shocks, and that Ecuador needs to develop its fiscal system so as to ensure that tax revenues constitute not only the most important shock but also the most highly affected variable.

5. Policy implications based on budget revenues elasticity

Having completed the fiscal sustainability exercise based on a CVAR, we chose to conduct a further experiment based on fiscal revenues elasticities. Given that the debt-GDP ratio had not put the Ecuadorian government under pressure over the last decade, we sought to show, by drawing comparisons with the situation in Europe, the consequences of a fiscal policy that fails to stabilize and increase tax revenues.

Elasticities of different tax revenues (personal income taxes, corporate income taxes, indirect taxes, social security contributions and other receipts) and expenditure (unemployment benefits)
with respect to output have been traditionally calculated by the OECD to estimate the sensitivity of these variables to the cycle. The method is described in Van den Noord, P. (2000) and updated in Girouard and André (2005). Through a regression analysis the output gap and the elasticities are used to derive the effect on taxes and expenditure arising from the economy’s cycles. Combining these estimates one can construct the cyclically adjusted budget balance (CAB) indicator, extensively used by the European Commission in order to measure the sustainability of fiscal policy of its member states, i.e. a fall in the primary CAB is interpreted as a sign of expansionary policy, a rise as an indication of a contractionary fiscal policy (European Commission, 2004).

Empirical articles can either estimate elasticities through econometric methods or use these elasticities calculated by OECD in order to measure the sensitivity of expenditure and revenues separately\textsuperscript{21}.

Our experiment constitutes a mere graphical analysis instead. First, we calculate a simple elasticity of government revenues with respect to GDP at current prices (erevgdp), which measures the contribution of a change of one percentage of output to budget revenues, i.e., the degree of connection between economic growth and government revenues. Subsequently, we graphic them with respect the budget revenues growth (growth_rev).

In order to calculate the elasticities for the Eurozone countries we use quarterly data based on government statistics that have been drawn from Eurostat. The period covers 2001Q1-2007Q4, a boom period just before the crisis and when all the eight countries we study (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain) already belonged to the Eurozone\textsuperscript{22}.

We have also calculated the elasticities of current government expenditures, but the graphics are not presented for space reasons. We find that according to their elasticities, Eurozone countries can be split into two groups (A and B). Countries in Group B (Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain) present the higher positive government expenditures elasticities, but as we are not interested in achieving balance budget through reducing government spending which would mean cutting welfare measures, this variable is not a subject of analysis.

\textsuperscript{21} Bayoumi (1995) estimates the sensitivity of expenditure and revenues separately by ordinary least squares. She shows how in the U.S. the cyclical responsiveness of state budget is significantly affected by fiscal restraints. She also extents the analysis to some European industrial countries such as Germany, France or Netherlands, considering the Maastricht Treaty on Economic and Monetary Union as restraints which significantly diminish the stabilization afforded by national budgets. Eichengreen and Wyplosz (1999) use both OECD and Bayoumi (1995)’s elasticities to review the reasons that have been encouraged the Stability and Growth Pact. One of these was the systemic risk of bank crisis owing to government’s failure to service its debt. More recently, Eller (2009) uses the European Commission’s elasticities to show that in the EU member states in Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe, budgetary positions react less strongly to GDP changes than in the euro area.

\textsuperscript{22} Greece became the twelfth EU Member State to adopt the single currency 1\textsuperscript{st} January of 2001.
Instead, we focus our analysis on revenues budget. The analysis has been completed for all the Eurozone countries with the same results and is available upon request. We will observe that, not only the magnitude of the elasticity matters, but also the position that each observation takes into the quadrants in Figure 2 (it displays the relationship between the elasticity of revenues with respect to GDP and revenues growth) is important. Figure 2 in Annex II shows the graphics of two groups of countries: group A comprises three countries (Austria, France and Germany) with debt-GDP ratios under 100 percentage points in 2011Q4 together with Belgium, which exceeded this limit in 2012; while group B comprises three countries (Greece, Ireland and Portugal) with debt-GDP ratios over 100 percentage points together with Spain which, even though its debt-GDP ratio is similar to those in group A, suffers major credit problems as a result of the collapse of its banking sector and high levels of unemployment. The “x” axis corresponds to the revenues elasticity and the “y” axis to tax revenues growth. We interpret the graphics in function of their quadrants, the four sections into which the x-y plane is divided by the “x” and “y” axes. Observations in quadrant I with a positive elasticity and positive growth of revenues mean a positive growth of GDP. Conversely, observations in quadrant II with a negative elasticity and positive growth of revenues imply a decreasing GDP (so, it is expected that few observations yield into this quadrant). Likewise, we expect few observations in quadrant III, because revenues are descending when GDP is increasing as revenues elasticity is negative. Finally, quadrant IV show a positive connection between product and revenues, both are into downwards trends because elasticity is positive and revenues growth is negative. It is expected that countries with a negative or low positive degree of connection would present the worst debt problems.

Greece for instance, shows low positive elasticities coinciding with rising revenues (the highest value does not reach 2.5) during all the period with only one exception: 2001Q4 (38.08). The same pattern is repeated in Portugal where the highest positive value of the elasticity is 13.88. Portugal is also the country with the highest negative elasticity located in quadrant III (\(-434.46\) in 2002Q3), but this observation was eliminated to facilitate the understanding of the Figures. Ireland would be the exception since the highest positive value of its revenue elasticity is 25.58, however its notable presence in both quadrant III and IV has undermined its fiscal revenues. Spain is in a delicate situation, even though its size is higher than that of the other countries in group B and according to the “too big to fail” theory this fact might preserve this country from excessive turbulent speculative attacks, it should increase its positive revenue’s elasticity to levels close to those registered by countries which conform Group A. Observations that correspond to Austria, Germany and France are predominantly situated into quadrant I, and the highest values of their

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revenues elasticity are of 37.18, 54.26 and 18.55, respectively. Even Austria is able to increase revenues while GDP is decreasing. The exception is Belgium with a revenue elasticity which does not reach the value of 8, which might explain why this country registers the biggest debt-GDP ratio in Group A. It is worthy to remark that this is the main difference between France and Belgium taken into account that revenue elasticity does not register negative values in both countries.

In order to calculate the elasticities in Ecuador, we employ the same monthly data (converted to quarterly revenues) used in the CVAR models described above. We employ an initial elasticity for total revenue including oil revenue (etotalrevgdp) and a second for tax revenue (erevgdp) only. In the case of Ecuador, Figure 3 illustrates that the relationship between revenues and output is poor (the majority of the observations are below the value of 5). Besides, it is worrisome those observations into quadrant III which represent negative revenue elasticity: revenues are decreasing while GDP is increasing.

Finally, Figure 4 and Figure 5 present the relationship between tax revenues growth and expenditure growth in the eight European countries we have studied and Ecuador, respectively, whilst Figures 6 and 7 display the relationships between debt-GDP ratios with deficit-GDP ratios in the above-mentioned Eurozone countries.

Regarding countries of group B, Greece records the highest debt-GDP ratio before and after 2007. Ireland has the second highest debt-GDP ratio reaching 100 percentage points. It is worth noting that Ireland has greater deficits but lower debt than Greece. It is comprehensive since, unlike Greece, it presents large periods with positive elasticity of revenues with respect to GDP, which allowed several surplus episodes before the crisis. Spain also accumulated surplus but recall that it presents a persistent low positive elasticity of revenues with respect to GDP.

The above analysis can also be applied to the Ecuadorian economy. First, Ecuador does not present high positive elasticity of tax revenues with respect to GDP and second, its positive relationship between tax revenues and expenditures (see Figure 5) implies that Ecuador does not have enough sources of revenues to cover overall government spending. Unfortunately, Ecuador is following the same path as those countries in Group B above. Ecuador needs to diversify both its economy and tax system in order to strength the connection between the two and so as to face any future fiscal crises.
6. Conclusions

This article seeks to clarify whether fiscal sustainability is possible in Ecuador taking into account that it is a dollarized country and one that is strongly dependent on oil revenues, which are particularly volatile because of price fluctuations. We estimate a cointegrated VAR using the variables that fulfil the intertemporal budget constraint and confirm previous findings that characterize Ecuadorian government expenditure in terms of its inertia and heavy dependence on oil revenues. We verify that Ecuador does not have a debt problem as the debt-GDP ratio can be excluded from the cointegration relation. We show that the debt-GDP ratio falls as long as government spending rises; therefore, we conclude that government expenditure is not tied to debt. In addition, this allows the Ecuadorian government to keep expenditure high as it does not increase the debt-GDP ratio.

However, it would seem that given its non-diversified economy, Ecuador is vulnerable to future debt problems. If we analyse the evolution of total government expenditure of the Eurozone countries and their revenue behaviour since they became part of the EMU, it seems that Ecuador might be likely to suffer similar debt problems in the future. From calculations of the quarterly elasticity of tax revenues with respect to GDP, it can be seen that countries with high elasticities are the ones with the smallest debt problems today. However, Ecuador presents patterns of behaviour that are very similar to those presented by Eurozone economies with low tax revenues elasticities. But by diversifying its economy, and by basing it on a lasting, renewable sector, this elasticity should be raised, and eventually fiscal sustainability will depend on these stable, more profitable sectors.

The fact that Ecuador is a dollarized country means that it has relinquished control over both its interest rates and exchange rates, the latter being fundamental in failing sectors other than the oil sector. As such, Ecuador needs to rethink its exchange rate regime, before dollarization becomes counter-productive to budgetary positions. Whether a monetary union is among the alternatives open to Ecuador, it is our belief that within the framework of such a union the convergence of tax revenues elasticities might be a key factor in achieving successfully this exchange rate regime, so as to avoid any “non-odious and legitimate” debt crises that might end up being restructured.
References


Annex I. Econometric Model: Cointegrated VAR

Following Engle and Granger (1987), Johansen and Juselius (1990; 1992) extend the VAR model by applying the concepts of cointegration and error correction to analyse long run relations among non-stationary variables. This extension is referred to as cointegrated VAR.

Consider the $p$- dimensional VAR ($k$):

$$X_t = \sum_{i=1}^{k} \prod_{i} X_{t-i} + \phi D_t + e_t$$  \hspace{1cm} (1)

Where $X_t$ is a $p*1$ vector of endogenous variables with $t=1,2..T$; $\prod_{i}$ is $p*p$ matrices of parameters to be estimated with $i=1,2…k$; $D_t$ is a vector of deterministic terms as a constant, trend or dummy variables. Finally, $e_t$ is a $p*1$ vector of error terms which follow a Gaussian distribution: $e_t \sim \text{iid} \text{ N}(0,\Sigma)$. The residual covariance matrix ($\Sigma$) is a $p*p$ matrix containing the information about contemporaneous effects. And $k$ is the number of lags necessary to have an appropriate model (no autocorrelation, no ARCH effects and normalized errors).

This $p$- dimensional VAR ($k$) can be re-written in the Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) form:

$$\Delta X_t = \prod_{i} X_{t-i} + \sum_{j=1}^{k} \gamma_j \Delta X_{t-j} + \phi D_t + e_t$$  \hspace{1cm} (2)

Where,

$$\prod = \sum_{j=1}^{k} \prod_{j} - I_p$$ represents the long run effects and

$$\gamma_j = -\sum_{j=1}^{k} \prod_{j}$$ the short run effects, with $i= 1, \ldots,k-1$ and $e_t \sim \text{iid} \text{ N}(0,\Sigma)$.

We have that $\Delta X_{t}$ and $\Delta X_{t-i}$ are stationary because they perform first difference processes to get rid of the just one unit root that the level variables contain. Since a stationary process cannot be equal to a non-stationary process, the estimation results can only make sense if $\prod_{i}$ defines stationary linear combinations of the variables (Juselius, 2006). $\prod_{i}$ can be written $\prod_{i} = \alpha\beta'$, where $\alpha$ and $\beta'$ are $p*r$ matrices, $r \leq p$. Thus, under the I(1) hypothesis, the cointegrated VAR model is given by:
\[ \Delta X_t = \Gamma_1 \Delta X_{t-1} + \ldots + \Gamma_{k-1} \Delta X_{t-k+1} + \alpha \beta' X_{t-1} + \Phi D_t + e_t \]  

where \( \beta' X_{t-1} \) is an \( r \times 1 \) vector of stationary cointegration relations. Under the hypothesis that \( X_t \sim I(1) \) all stochastic components are stationary in model (3) and the system is now logically consistent.

Cointegration exists when two or more variables share common stochastic and deterministic trends, they move together in the long run, and therefore they can be interpreted as long-run economic steady-state relations.

\( \beta' X_{t-1} = \beta_0 \) describes a system in equilibrium where there is no economic adjustment force to change the system to a new position. When exogenous shocks affect the system, and \( \beta' X_{t-1} - \beta_0 \neq 0 \), the adjustment term \( \alpha \), pull the process back towards the long run equilibrium. If \( r=1 \) there is a unique stationary relation. If \( r>1 \) only the cointegration space \( \prod_i = \alpha \beta' \), and not the cointegration parameters (\( \alpha \) and \( \beta \)), is estimated consistently. We have to resolve an identification problem.

The VECM expressed as a function of the innovations of the system shows which common stochastic trends are responsible for the non-stationarity of the process.

\[ X_t = C \sum_{i=1}^{r} (e_t + \Phi D_t) + C'(L)(e_t + \Phi D_t) + X_0 \]  

\( t=1,2,\ldots,T \)

Where:
\[ C = \beta_\perp (\alpha_\perp' \Gamma \beta_\perp)\alpha_\perp' \]  
or  
\[ C = \beta_\perp' \alpha_\perp' \]

Where:
\[ \beta_\perp' = \beta_\perp (\alpha_\perp' \Gamma \beta_\perp)^{-1} \]

The idea is to determine which variables are simply adjusting to a long run equilibrium equation i.e. significant alphas (\( \alpha \)) in order to identify which ones are simply pushing the system (insignificant alphas, therefore can be zero in the VECM).

Knowing that \( \alpha_\perp' \alpha_\perp = 0 \), a zero row in alpha corresponds to a unit vector in \( \alpha_\perp \), we say that this variable is long-run weakly exogenous implying that its cumulated residuals can be considered a
common stochastic trend, then \( \alpha \sum_{i=1}^{r} e_{i} \) is understood as an estimation of the \( p - r \) common stochastic trends.

This does not imply that the variable itself is a common trend. For this we need the rows of the \( \Gamma_{i} \) matrices associated with the weakly exogenous variable to be zero. Given \( X_{i} \sim I(1) \) this is essentially the condition of strong exogeneity, under which the equation for a strongly exogenous variable \( X_{j,t} \) becomes \( \square x_{j,t} = e_{j,t} \), in this case \( x_{j,t} = \sum_{i=1}^{r} e_{j,i} \): the common stochastic trend coincides with the variable itself, and then, \( x_{j,t} \) will have a unit row vector in the \( C \) matrix.

Similar to \( \alpha \) and \( \beta \), we can transform \( \beta^{*} \) and \( \alpha^{*} \) by a non-singular \( (p-r)(p-r) \) matrix \( Q \) without changing the value of the likelihood function:

\[
C^{c} = \beta^{*} QQ' \alpha^{*} = \beta^{*} (\alpha^{c})'
\]

Additional restrictions on \( \beta^{*} \) and \( \alpha^{*} \) do constrain the likelihood function making possible the over identifying restrictions on \( \alpha_{\perp} \) and \( \beta_{\perp} \) which can be expressed as testable restrictions on \( \alpha \) and \( \beta \). In our case, with \( r=2 \) and \( X_{i}' = [g_{i,t}, t_{i}, y_{i}, d_{i-1}] \) we test the weak exogeneity of debt level and economic activity in the following manner:

\[
\alpha = \begin{bmatrix}
* & * \\
* & * \\
0 & 0 \\
0 & 0
\end{bmatrix}
\quad \alpha_{1} = \begin{bmatrix}
0 & 0 \\
0 & 0 \\
1 & 0 \\
0 & 1
\end{bmatrix}
\]

With a C matrix:

\[
C^{c} = \begin{bmatrix}
0 & 0 & * & * \\
0 & 0 & * & * \\
0 & 0 & * & * \\
0 & 0 & * & *
\end{bmatrix}
\]
Even when the unrestricted $C$ matrix gives very useful information about the effects of the stochastic driving forces in the VECM, and the restricted $C^r$ can be used to check the robustness of the analysis, the challenge is to recover the structural shocks in order to interpret the results empirically\textsuperscript{24}. This means that we have to obtain the empirical shocks from a structural MA model, i.e. the structural $C^r$ matrix\textsuperscript{25}.

By premultiplying (2) with a non-singular $p*p$ matrix $B$ we obtain the VECM with simultaneous effect:

$$B \Delta X_t = B_i \Delta X_{t-1} + b \beta' X_{t-1} + B \Phi D_t + u_t,$$

Where $B_i = B \Gamma$, $b = B \alpha$ and $u_t = B \epsilon_t$.

The $B$ matrix defines how the structural shocks $u_t$ are associated with the VECM residuals\textsuperscript{27}.

The structural MA representation of the CVAR:

$$X_t = C \sum_{i=1}^{\infty} u_{t-i} + C^* u_t + X_0$$

Where $C^* = C B^{-1}$ and $C^{*-1} = C^* (L) B^{-1}$

\textsuperscript{24} A column of insignificant coefficients means that the empirical shocks of the corresponding variable have only temporary effects on the variables of the system, while a column of significant coefficients means permanent effects. The rows in C matrix inform us about the weights with which each variable is influenced by any of the cumulated empirical shocks.

\textsuperscript{25} Juselius (2006) points out that omitted relevant variables generate correlated $p$ residuals in VAR, a feature that is not assumed to be present in the structural VAR model, where the orthogonality of structural VAR errors is based on an assumption that the model contains all the relevant variables. This is the main reason why the labelling of empirical residuals as structural shocks is often misleading.

\textsuperscript{27} We can find a $B$ matrix to fulfil the following assumptions: (i) A distinction between $r$ transitory and $p-r$ permanent shocks is made, i.e. $u_t = (u_t, u_{t-1})$; (ii) The transitory shocks have no long-run impact on the variables of the system whereas the permanent shocks have such effects on at least one variable in the system and (iii) $E(u_t u_t') = I$, i.e. all `structural’ shocks are linearly independent.
Annex II. Figures

Fig. 1. Total government expenditures and Debt/GDP ratio in Ecuador.

Source: Central Bank of Ecuador and own estimates. The government expenditures include interest payments.

Fig. 2. Relationship between the elasticity of revenues respect GDP and revenues growth of Eurozone countries.

Source: Eurostat
Fig. 3 Relationship between revenue's elasticities respect GDP and revenues growth of Ecuador

Source: Central Bank of Ecuador

Fig. 4. Relationship between revenues growth expenditure growth in Eurozone countries.

Source: Eurostat

Fig. 5. Relationship between tax revenues growth and expenditure growth in Ecuador.

Sources: Central Bank of Ecuador
Fig. 6 Relationship between Debt/GDP and Deficit/GDP in Eurozone countries during the period 2001-2006.

Group A

![Graph A](image1)

Group B

![Graph B](image2)

Source: Eurostat

Fig. 7. Relationship between Debt/GDP and Deficit/GDP in Eurozone countries during the period 2007-2011.

Group A

![Graph A](image3)

Group B

![Graph B](image4)

Source: Eurostat
Annex III. Empirical Results

Table. 1 Results of the I (1) analysis for the first model.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>With permanent and seasonal dummies</th>
<th>Excluding all sort of dummies</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>p-r</td>
<td>R</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
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</table>

(*) Corresponds to the Bartlett corrected trace test.

Table. 2 Results of testing restrictions on beta and alpha for the first model.

<table>
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<th>Test of exclusion (restrictions on beta)</th>
<th>Test of weak exogeneity (restrictions on alpha)</th>
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<tr>
<td>r</td>
<td>DGF</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
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</table>

LR test, Chi-square(r), p-values in brackets.
Table. 3 Results of the I (1) analysis for the second model.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>With permanent and seasonal dummies</th>
<th>Excluding all sort of dummies</th>
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<tr>
<td>p-r</td>
<td>r</td>
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(*) Corresponds to the Bartlett corrected trace test.

Table. 4 Results of testing restrictions on beta and alpha for the second model.

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<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>3</td>
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Table 5. Residual S.E. and Cross- Correlations for the second model

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>lgov</th>
<th>leai</th>
<th>lorev</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Residual S.E.</td>
<td>0.02922825</td>
<td>0.05619247</td>
<td>0.02272652</td>
<td>0.12829084</td>
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<td>lrev</td>
<td>1.000</td>
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<td>0.883</td>
<td>1.000</td>
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<tr>
<td>leai</td>
<td>0.708</td>
<td>0.294</td>
<td>1.000</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>lorev</td>
<td>0.959</td>
<td>0.980</td>
<td>0.478</td>
<td>1.000</td>
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</table>
Fig. 7 The impulse response functions for the two permanent shocks and transitory shocks.

Table 6 Impact after 23 periods

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Trans(2)</th>
<th>Perm(1)</th>
<th>Perm(2)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LREV</td>
<td>0.034</td>
<td>0.023</td>
<td>2.054</td>
<td>2.037</td>
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<tr>
<td>LGOV</td>
<td>0.034</td>
<td>0.021</td>
<td>1.637</td>
<td>5.348</td>
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<tr>
<td>LEAI</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>2.270</td>
<td>-0.007</td>
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<tr>
<td>LOREV</td>
<td>-0.040</td>
<td>-0.028</td>
<td>6.156</td>
<td>11.295</td>
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</table>

Table 7 B normalized matrix \([U(t) = B*EPS(t)]\)

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
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<th>EPS(2)</th>
<th>EPS(3)</th>
<th>EPS(4)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trans(1)</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>0.069</td>
<td>-0.437</td>
<td>-0.046</td>
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<td>Trans(2)</td>
<td>-0.388</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>0.707</td>
<td>-0.232</td>
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<tr>
<td>Perm(1)</td>
<td>0.103</td>
<td>-0.110</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>0.135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perm(2)</td>
<td>0.233</td>
<td>-0.961</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>-0.381</td>
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<td>WP 2013/06</td>
<td>“Fiscal sustainability and fiscal shocks in a dollarized and oil-exporting country: Ecuador” Mari Del Cristo, L.M. and Gómez-Puig, M.</td>
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<td>WP 2012/15</td>
<td>“A Note on the Relationship Between the Cyclicality of Markups and Fiscal Policy” Claeys, P. and Costa, L.F.</td>
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<td>“Do intra- and inter-industry spillovers matter? CDM model estimates for Spain” Goya, E.; Vayá, E and Suriñach, J.</td>
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<td>WP 2012/13</td>
<td>“What Drives the Choice of Partners in R&amp;D Cooperation? Heterogeneity across Sectors” Badillo, E. and Moreno, R.</td>
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<td>WP 2012/12</td>
<td>“Corruption and local politics: does it pay to be a crook?” Jiménez, J.L. and García, C.</td>
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<td>WP 2012/11</td>
<td>“Not always sunny in paradise: prices and brand diversity in touristic areas supermarkets” Campos, J.; Jiménez, J.L. and Suárez-Alemán, A.</td>
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