What makes the proposition that Caesar stabbed Brutus true? One answer is that it is made true by the fact that Caesar and Brutus (in that order) satisfy the stabs relation. This answer, however, presupposes that stabs has two argument positions, $\alpha$ and $\beta$, that are ordered sequentially. As Fine (2000) points out, the idea is problematic: It distinguishes between a relation and its converse, implying that (say) the cat is on the mat and the mat is under the cat correspond to distinct (albeit necessarily co-instantiated) states of affairs. Positionalism is able to avoid this implausible consequence of (what Fine calls) the standard view. On this approach, relations have argument positions, although these positions are not sequentially ordered. Anti-positionalism also avoids the unacceptable consequence. Here, the very idea of an argument position is an extrinsic feature of relations: Relations do not, strictly speaking, have argument positions. (Such positions are, however, derived through a process of triangulation.) Both theories of relations promise to resolve a problem facing the Russellian. The structured propositions Russelians espouse are not in fact structured enough to represent adequately the contents of our beliefs and assertions. I argue that Positionalism and anti-positionalism, although the best options for providing the missing structure, nonetheless fail to deliver the desired unity. In a final section I consider the act-theoretic approaches recently defended by Scott Soames and Peter Hanks and draw a similar conclusion.